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According to Plato, we live in a substitute world. The things we see around us are shadows of 
reality, imperfect imitations of perfect originals. Beyond the world of the senses, there is 
another, changeless world, more real and more beautiful than our own. But how can we get at 
this world, or attain knowledge of it, when our senses are unreliable and the perfect 
philosophical method remains out of reach? In the Divided Line passage of the Republic, 
Plato is clear that mathematics has a role to play, but the debate about the exact nature of that 
role remains unresolved.  
 
My reading of the Divided Line might provide the answer. I propose that the ‘mathematical’ 
passages of the Meno and Phaedo contain evidence that we can use to construct the method 
by which Plato means us to ascend to knowledge of the Forms. In this dissertation, I shall set 
out my reading of Plato’s Divided Line, and show how Plato’s use of mathematics in the 
Meno and Phaedo supports this view. The mathematical method, adapted to philosophy, is a 
central part of the Line’s ‘way up’ to the definitions of Forms that pure philosophy requires. I 
shall argue that this method is not, as some scholars think, the geometric method of analysis 
and synthesis, but apagōgē, or reduction. On this reading, mathematics is pivotal on our 









Throughout history, mathematics has influenced those at the forefront of other fields, 
and philosophy is no exception. Writing about the great philosopher Thomas Hobbes, Aubrey 
captures the massive impact that the achievements of mathematics can have on a thinker: 
 
He was 40 years old before he looked on Geometry; which happened accidentally. Being in a 
Gentleman’s Library, Euclid’s Elements lay open, and twas the 47 EL. Libri I. He read the 
Proposition. By G- sayd he (he would now and then swear an emphaticall Oath by way of 
emphasis) this is impossible! So he reads the Demonstration of it, which referred him back to 
such a proposition; which Proposition he read. That referred him back to another, which he 
also read…that at last he was demonstrably convinced of that trueth. This made him in love 
with Geometry (Cited in Stillwell [1989] p 13). 
 
Consider also the words of Bertrand Russell: 
 
At the age of eleven I began Euclid…This was one of the great events of my life, as dazzling 
as first love. I had not imagined there was anything so delicious in the world (Cited in 
Stillwell [1989] p 26). 
 
This sentiment is not limited to philosophers: writing of himself, here is what 
Abraham Lincoln has to say about the same subject: 
 
He studied and nearly mastered the six books of Euclid since he was a member of Congress. 
He began a course of rigid mental discipline with the intent to improve his faculties, 
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especially his powers of logic and language. Hence his fondness for Euclid, which he carried 
with him on the circuit till he could demonstrate with ease all the six books (Cited in 
Stillwell [1989] p 26). 
 
No doubt Plato would have approved of the study of geometry by a statesman; much 
of his Republic is taken up with a plea for the rulers of his ideal state to undergo rigorous 
mathematical training. Plato has his own love affair with mathematics, and, as I shall try to 
argue, his dialogues can tell us about the effect it had on his philosophy. 
Plato’s relationship with mathematics, it has already been argued,1 changed his entire 
philosophical approach. This dissertation explores one aspect of this change: the hypothetical 
method in the so-called ‘middle dialogues,’ with particular reference to the use of imagery. 
Plato is famously critical of images2 and although much work has been done to rehabilitate 
the status of the image in Plato’s political thought (Nehamas [1999] Ch. 12-13), it remains 
the black sheep of Platonic epistemology. Yet the dialogues are full of images, as Plato 
himself is not unaware.3 Indeed, the use of images, along with the use of hypothesis, is a 
distinguishing mark in the science that Plato so much admires: the mathematics of his time. 
In the divided line passage of the Republic, Plato notes that the use of hypotheses and the use 
of diagrams are both characteristics of dianoia, or mathematical reasoning. This project will 






                                                
1 See especially Vlastos (1991), pp. 107-131 for a discussion of the influence of mathematics on Plato. 
2 See books IX and X of Republic for Plato’s criticism of images. 
3 Socrates refers to such issues at Phaedo 100a. 
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Aims of the Thesis 
 
Plato’s theory of Forms is one of the most distinctive aspects of his philosophy. 
Forms are central to his metaphysics, epistemology and moral and political theory. The 
Philosopher Kings of the Republic are to spend years in training to attain knowledge of the 
Forms before they are to rule. In the divided line passage of the Republic (509d-511e), Plato 
speaks of there being two realms: the intelligible (containing the Forms) and the visible, and 
each realm has two states of mind associated with it. Dianoia is the state of mind that Plato 
links to mathematics: I shall argue that it is a kind of reasoning that Plato himself uses in the 
middle dialogues, and it is the second highest kind of reasoning in Plato’s scheme. The 
ultimate aim for the philosopher is to attain the highest state of mind, noēsis, but the problem 
for Plato is how to do that when most of us spend our lives contemplating the visible world. 
In fact, as Plato notes in the Phaedo (66cd) we are tied to the physical world, so how can we 
release ourselves from these tethers to contemplate the intelligible?  
The primary aim of the thesis is to show how Plato can use the mathematical method 
to provide a solution. I shall suggest that Plato’s divided line can be seen as an 
epistemological scale to be ascended by the philosopher, and that the mathematical method 
provides a pivotal role in ascending this scale. In fact, it is by using this method that we may 
escape the prison of the senses, and begin to contemplate the intelligible. By examining 
Plato’s remarks about mathematics, and the structure of some of the important arguments in 
the middle dialogues, we shall see that Plato himself uses the mathematical method to do 
exactly this: when Socrates’ friends are stuck in pistis, the state of mind that uses physical 
objects as tools of inquiry, Socrates sometimes uses dianoia to ascend the epistemological 
scale and reach for knowledge of the Forms. I shall argue that he does this in the Meno and 
Theaetetus, and that his friends initiate this in the Phaedo. 
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I also aim to explain in detail how the history of mathematics influences Plato’s 
thought, by arguing that, in addition to the important role that mathematics plays in Plato’s 
epistemology as a whole, there is a specific mathematical method that Plato uses as a way of 
ascending the epistemological scale. I shall build on the work of Karasmanis ([1987] see 
especially pp. 44-52 and 303-307), who points out that, whereas Plato is often supposed to be 
using the method of analysis and synthesis in the mathematical passages (often called the 
hypothetical method), it is probable that he is using the method of apagōgē, or reduction. I 
aim to support this claim, and also to build upon it: I will suggest that apagōgē is also the 
method used in ascending part of the epistemological scale as described in the Republic: I 
shall argue that it is used in both dianoia and the initial stages of noēsis. In addition, I shall 
argue that a closer examination of the text reveals a more exact match to this mathematical 
method than has been suggested before, particularly in the Meno, as well as suggesting that 
the structure of Plato’s arguments often reflects his epistemological scheme. 
A further aim will be to examine the characteristics of dianoia as described in the 
Republic, with particular reference to the role of images in Plato’s epistemology. This study 
will suggest that to Plato the image is not an ideal epistemological tool, but it is useful in the 
initial stages of the philosopher’s quest. In the famous ‘Divided Line’ passage (510cd), the 
Republic tells us that dianoetic reasoning has two distinctive qualities: the use of hypotheses 
and the reliance on imagery. Plato is not specific about how the relationship between the use 
of diagrams and the use of hypotheses came to be, yet he seems to want to say that the 
connection is philosophical, rather than historical– that is, it is the nature of mathematical 
thought itself that causes hypotheses and images to be used in this connection.4 
Although dianoetic reasoning and the hypothetical method are not the same, we shall 
see that dianoia comprises the preliminary stages of this method. I shall argue that the 
                                                
4 See Burnyeat’s discussion ([2000] pp. 37-38) for the view that hypotheses are ‘intrinsic to the nature of 
mathematical thought’ (p. 37). 
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hypothetical method spans both the dianoia and noēsis segments of the line, so an 
investigation into the properties of dianoetic reasoning can tell us a great deal about the 
hypothetical method as a whole. We shall use Plato’s own dialogues to examine the role that 
imagery plays as the hypothetical method is deployed. 
Finally, my proposed solution to Plato’s problem uses Plato’s conception of 
definitions and their role in epistemology. I aim to show that Platonic definitions, which I 
shall be calling ti estis, are needed to attain knowledge of the Forms, and needed for noēsis: 
Plato’s conception of these and the role they play will be discussed in the sections on the 
Republic and Meno. From the early dialogues, Socrates insists on finding the ti esti of a thing 
before we can inquire into its properties. However, without a ti esti, it can be very difficult to 
get the discussion started. As Meno remarks to Socrates, “How on earth are you going to set 
up something you don’t know as the object of your search?” (Meno 80d). The problem is 
that, without the ti estis we need for noēsis, it is difficult to know how to escape pistis, a state 
of mind connected with contemplation of the sensible world. I propose that the characteristics 
of dianoia can provide the means for the mind to ascend the epistemological scale. 
Hypotheses and images, I will suggest, can be used as proxies for ti estis, so that the inquiry 
can continue until a Platonic definition is attained. 
 
Statement of Terminology 
 
I have spoken about Plato’s use of mathematical reasoning in his dialogues, as well as his use 
of images in connection with mathematical thought. I now want to summarise my use of the 
relevant terminology, and how I will use these terms throughout the thesis. Firstly, when I 
say ‘mathematical reasoning’ I mean reasoning modelled on mathematical practice, ie, 
dianoia or the hypothetical method. As I have noted, dianoia is not the same thing as the 
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hypothetical method, although there is an overlap: I shall suggest that dianoia makes up the 
initial stages of the hypothetical method, and this process is Plato’s way of ascending the 
epistemological scale. I shall argue that Plato has modelled this process on the mathematical 
method of apagōgē, as opposed to analysis and synthesis, so when I speak about the 
mathematical method, this is the method I mean.  
Throughout the thesis ‘hypothesis’ and ‘assumption’ are translations of the same 
Greek word; I shall prefer to use ‘hypothesis,’ except when citing a translation that uses the 
word ‘assumption.’ In addition, when discussing scholarship that uses both ‘hypothesis’ and 
‘assumption,’ I shall need to use that terminology also. For example, when I discuss 
Robinson’s scholarship on this issue in the section on Imagery and Hypothesis, below, I shall 
use statements like ‘the hypothesis is treated as an assumption.’ By this, I mean to stress that 
the hypotheses are treated as strictly hypothetical, and that the user of the hypothetical 
method acknowledges that the hypotheses still need confirmation.  
I shall also want to bring the reader’s attention to the influence mathematics in 
general has on Plato’s work, for example his many references to mathematics in the Phaedo 
outside of the hypothetical passage. Mathematics for Plato is arithmetic (things “to do with 
number”, as he says in Republic 525a), plane geometry, the study of plane surfaces (Republic 
528ab), and solid geometry, “the treatment of dimension and depth” (Republic 528d). Plato 
also mentions astronomy and harmonics as mathematical sciences (Republic 528e-531d). 
Therefore, when I talk about mathematics in general and its influence on Plato, I mean these 
features of the discipline.  
 Plato himself is not consistent in his use of terminology regarding the divided line; 
see for example, his different uses of terms at Republic 511de and 534a. Plato himself says 
that he is not keen to fix on rigid technical terms (Republic 533e). However, we should be 
clear about our use of the term ‘image’, as I want to use it in quite a broad sense. Plato seems 
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to want to use the term for both visible diagrams or pictures and analogies in discourse 
(which I shall also call ‘verbal images’). When I am speaking of dianoia, ‘image’ will mean 
visible diagrams in those cases when the philosopher or mathematician actually uses a visible 
figure (for example, when Socrates draws the squares on the sand in the Meno’s slave boy 
passage). The term will refer to analogies in discussion when Socrates and his interlocutors 
are using analogies as verbal instantiations of a Form to inquire about its properties (for 
example, Simmias and Cebes’ harmony and tailor images in the Phaedo). Of course, Plato 
says that images are also used in eikasia, the state of mind that is the lowest on his divided 
line. Once again, I shall argue that eikasiastic images can be either verbal or visible: in the 
Republic section, I shall suggest that Plato means the term image to refer to both poetry and 
painting. For example, in book X of the Republic, Plato links the two: he says that a painting 
is only a representation of a physical object (596de), and this is compared to the poet creating 
a likeness of physical things (598e-599a).  
In the case of dianoia, the use of the term ‘image’ to refer to both verbal and visible 
images is supported by the fact that Plato uses the same term for both, as well as by the fact 
that they perform the same role in dianoetic discussion. In the Phaedo, Plato makes Simmias 
and Cebes use physical things as images in the discussion; these are specifically called 
images, eikones (87b), just as the figures of the mathematician are described as images at 
Republic 510b. I shall argue that the images used by Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo are 
part of the process of dianoia described by Socrates in the Republic. This, I shall argue, 
justifies the use of the term ‘image’ for both visible diagrams and analogies in discussion.  
 In addition, my broader understanding of the term ‘image’ is supported by the way in 
which the image works in the discussion. I shall argue that verbal images allow Socrates and 
his friends to make philosophical progress in the same way that the visible diagram often 
does. For example, it allows the group to inquire into something for which they have no 
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definition, in this case, the soul. In the same way, in the Meno, Socrates and the slave use the 
visible diagram of a square to inquire into its properties without first defining what it is. I 
shall argue that Simmias’ and Cebes’ use of their images allows them to break Socrates’ ‘say 
only what you believe’ rule without resorting to sophistry. This, I shall argue in the Meno 
section, is also an important feature of dianoia, and, as such, warrants the inclusion of 
analogies in discussion under the term ‘images.’ Finally, these verbal images allow us to 
perform operations on a proxy of a Form; as I shall explain in the Republic section, Plato is 
concerned about mathematicians performing operations on things that are eternal and 
unchangeable (Republic 527ab). I shall suggest that Plato’s dianoetic images allow the 
philosopher to get around this problem: this is true for both visible and verbal images, and is 
a further reason for including both visible figures and analogies under the term ‘image.’ 
 
Development of Plato’s Methodology5 
 
Traditionally, Plato’s dialogues have been split into the following categories: early, 
(transitional), middle and late. These divisions have been made according to stylistic and 
philosophical groupings that occur in the corpus. The argument is that we can reconstruct a 
development in philosophical method. In the early dialogues, we see the deployment of the 
Socratic elenchus, which the historical Socrates is believed to have used. Vlastos has 
convincingly argued that, after Plato’s return from Sicily, where he learned new techniques 
from the Pythagoreans, Plato abandons the method of his old teacher and brings in the 
hypothetical method. We see this in the Meno, Phaedo and Republic (Vlastos [1991] Ch. 4, 
pp 107-131; cf. Karasmanis [1987] especially pp. 303-307, who makes a similar point). 
Later, in dialogues like the Phaedrus, this method is eclipsed by the method of collection and 
                                                
5 The dialogues are not treatises; when we say that Plato has a ‘method,’ we mean simply the structure of the 
argument. 
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division (White [1987] Ch. 5, pp 117-125 and Kahn [1998] Ch. 10, pp 292-328). Note that 
these changes in methodology do not exactly correspond to the division between early, 
middle and late – Phaedrus, for example, is usually classed as a middle dialogue - but this 
point of view does imply the development of ideas in Plato associated with the traditional 
distinctions. The purpose of this section will be to examine this development and briefly state 
our position. 
 In terms of doctrine, the conventional standpoint is that the early dialogues are 
characterised by Socratic eudaimonism (the idea that virtue is sufficient for happiness) 
(Apology 28bd; 38a) and the Socratic paradox that no-one errs voluntarily (Protagoras 329c-
333b). Crafts and skills are characterised as branches of knowledge (Charmides 165e; 
Euthydemus 281a; Ion 532c; Protagoras 356de; Republic I), innate knowledge is implied by 
the elenchus and its ‘say only what you believe’ requirement (Phaedrus 275b; Meno 71d; 
Theaetetus 171d) and akrasia, or weakness of will is impossible. 
 In the middle period, when Plato abandons the Socratic elenchus in favour of the 
hypothetical method, the idea of innate knowledge is made explicit in the theory of 
recollection (Meno 81-86c; Phaedo 73c-75c). Forms are introduced, and the introduction of 
the tripartite soul in Republic IV (also Phaedrus 246) allows for the possibility of akrasia. In 
later dialogues, it is argued by some that Plato abandons his theory of Forms, having 
identified several problems with it in the Parmenides.6 There is also a significant shift in style 
in later works, with Socrates taking less of a prominent role, which has led some scholars to 
suggest that Plato became disillusioned with the dialogue form.7 
 More recent scholarship has questioned the traditional reading. Kahn (1998, 
especially pp. 38-48) has argued that, although stylistic analysis can give us some clue as to 
                                                
6 Notably, although not restricted to, the problem of participation (especially Parmenides 131a-133a).The 
question is not immediately relevant to this paper, but it should be noted that this author does not support this 
reading of Parmenides. Rather, the theory of forms is not abandoned here, but subjected to a high level of 
scrutiny that requires immense intellectual honesty on Plato’s part. 
7 This view is not universally accepted. See Rowe (2007), especially pp 266-276. 
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the chronology of the dialogues, we cannot find a sharp break between the early dialogues 
and the metaphysical doctrine of Phaedo and Republic. Kahn thinks that Socrates was an 
influence on Plato’s moral theory, but this is not localised in the early dialogues. He sees a 
continuity in Plato’s thought throughout the corpus and reminds us that Plato’s works are 
literary as well as philosophical; Plato deliberately ‘holds back,’  maintaining a psychological 
distance between himself and his audience. 
 In a similar vein, Rowe (2007) points out that Plato is aware of how strange his ideas 
are, and that he is reluctant to reveal the most radical points of his philosophy at first. 
Agreeing with the threefold stylistic division of Plato, Rowe tries to reconcile the themes 
from all three parts – so Socrates’ agnosticism in Apology is not at odds with his dogmatism 
in Phaedo, for example (ibid, Ch. 3, pp.122-142). 
 The so-called ‘developmentalist’ debate lies outside the scope of the present study, 
but any reading of the individual dialogues is unavoidably affected by one’s conception of its 
place in the development of Plato’s thought. Therefore, we should at least be clear about our 
own assumptions regarding the relevant points of chronology to our task. For this reason, I 
shall now briefly state the position assumed by the current project.  
There is an argument that Plato’s style can be used to order the dialogues, however 
much disagreement exists over their exact order or the development of doctrine. This study 
will loosely follow Vlastos’ (1991, pp. 46-47) ordering of the dialogues, with the notable 
exception that Republic I is not taken to be a separate work from the rest of the dialogue.8 We 
shall retain the idea of a ‘transitional’ period, also following Vlastos.  
 The study therefore follows the following chronological scheme: 
 
                                                
8 See Kahn (1993) pp. 131-142 for an excellent discussion on this. 
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Early dialogues (not in chronological order): Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, 
Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras 
Transitional dialogues (not in chronological order): Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, 
Menexenus, Meno 
Middle dialogues: Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, 
Theaetetus 
Late dialogues: Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Laws 
 
The dialogues are literary works, not treatises, so the extraction of doctrine from the 
text must be undertaken with caution. The dialogue form allows Plato to present views for 
scrutiny without necessarily having to endorse them, and allows the reader to examine his 
own beliefs (Frede [1998], pp. 253-269) - both important for Plato’s dynamic conception of 
philosophy.9 In addition, Plato is aware of how strange his ideas are, and it is understandable 
that he would want to introduce his reader to them gradually, rather than being explicit from 
the beginning. We cannot even rule out the idea that Plato went back to rewrite some of his 
early work. In this way, the developmentalist position is difficult to prove, given that Plato 
never makes his own position explicit through dramatisation, and may often be holding 
back.10 
However, there is considerable evidence that events in Plato’s life did influence his 
philosophy, and caused a radical departure from the thought of his teacher Socrates. We can 
also see that new techniques are introduced at different stages in the corpus, and it has been 
convincingly argued that at least some of these find parallels in the intellectual climate to 
                                                
9 At Phaedrus 274-276 and Seventh Letter 344 (if it is genuine) Plato is cautious about the written form, noting 
that it lacks the ability of speech to respond to ideas as they are proposed. 
10 For example, can we see a suggestion of the tripartite soul in Phaedo 81d-84a, or Symposium 207-209? These 
dialogues seem to concentrate on the division between body and soul. Certainly there is a division of the 
appetitive, the timocratic and the philosophic, but until the explicit exposition in Phaedrus and Republic, it is 
difficult to say exactly when the idea of the divided soul was formulated. 
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which Plato was exposed.11 This is especially evident in Plato’s first visit to Sicily. Cicero 
tells us that, here, Plato became intimate with Archytas the mathematician-statesman, and 
learned about mathematics and the transmigration of the soul from the Pythagoreans. Because 
he loved Socrates, he interwove Socratic and Pythagorean ideals in the dialogues (Cicero, De 
Republica I.X.16). We are told that the historical Socrates discouraged the study of 
mathematics that has no practical application (Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.7, 6-10), whereas 
Plato sees it as essential part of the training for his philosopher-rulers (Republic VII). 
Bluck argues that Meno was written soon after Plato’s return from Sicily, on the 
grounds that it uses Pythagorean beliefs and adapts these ideas (Bluck [1961] pp.111-116; cf. 
Vlastos [1991] pp. 107-131, who makes a similar point). With that in mind, we can see 
evidence of Plato trying to import the methods of his exciting new studies into his dialogues. 
Vlastos argues convincingly for the importance of Plato’s mathematical studies in his 
departure from Socratic thought. He notes that, in Gorgias, Plato makes Socrates confident 
that the elenctic method is the final arbiter of truth, whereas after this, he seems to lose faith 
in it. Vlastos argues that Plato’s studies of mathematics caused the change: 
 
That Plato’s encounter with geometry was to prove no passing infatuation, but a love-
match, a life-long attachment as deep as it was intense, is not hard to understand. We 
know how susceptible he was to beauty. Is any product of the human imagination 
more beautiful than are some of the proofs in Euclid? The elenchus is a messy 
business by comparison (Vlastos [1991] p.130). 
 
                                                
11 For example, by Karasmanis (1987): see especially pp. 286-308. 
 17 
This is a highly credible account of the development in Plato’s thought.12 Therefore, 
while remaining cautious about the development of doctrine in Plato, this study accepts the 
traditional account of development in method, as outlined below. 
The Socratic elenchus is introduced in the early dialogues as a method of testing for 
falsehood by refutation. Usually, a question is put forward about the definition of an ethical 
term – in Euthyphro, for example, the question is, what is holiness? (5d). The interlocutor is 
instructed to say only what he believes. He gives his primary answer (‘what is agreeable to 
the gods is holy, and what is not agreeable is unholy’ - 7a) and Socrates, feigning ignorance, 
asks a series of questions, to which the natural answer is ‘yes’ (for example, in Euthyphro, 
Socrates asks whether, if the gods dispute with one another, these disputes are over what is 
just and unjust, fine and despicable or good and bad - 7be). This leads to the identification of 
a flaw in the initial definition (‘Then the same things would be both holy and unholy 
according to this account’ - 8a). The elenchus can be seen as a form of moral education13 - 
once the false opinion is removed, the interlocutor is in a better position than when he started, 
now that he knows that he does not know (cf. Meno 84ab, which makes a similar point). The 
early ‘Socratic’ dialogues tend to end in aporia – a state of puzzlement where the initial 
problem remains unsolved. 
 Although recent scholarship has done much to overturn the traditional view that the 
historical Socrates did not hold any positive views (Vlastos [1991] pp107-131; Frede [1998] 
pp 254-269), elenchus works primarily by eliminating falsehoods, rather than generating 
truths.  
In the middle dialogues, we see the introduction of the hypothetical method, which 
aims to prove, rather than disprove. The method involves the setting down of a hypothesis 
                                                
12 Note that even writers like Kahn accept that there is such a development in methodology. On this point, see 
Kahn (1998) Ch. 10 pp 292-328. 
13 Robinson (1953) pp 7-19. For a discussion of presocratic use of elenchus as a method of establishing truth by 
eliminating falsehood, and its early links with morality, see Furley (1989) pp. 1-12. 
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and using it in two ways. Firstly, there is the ‘downwards’ path, from the premiss to the 
conclusion and secondly, there is an ‘upwards’ path towards the premiss or prior questions. 
The method is substantially different from the elenchus in that it requires debating an 
unasserted premiss, whereas the elenchus requires that the interlocutor says only what he 
believes (Vlastos [1991] Ch. 4 pp. 107-131). It is discussed in Meno, Phaedo and Republic, 
and although there are considerable differences between these passages, it has been 
convincingly argued that we can speak of these as different aspects of the same method 
(Karasmanis [1987] pp. 303-307; Kahn [1998] Ch. 10 pp. 292-328). We shall outline these 
passages in the following section. 
Later, the hypothetical method is replaced by the method of ‘collection and division’, 
or ‘synthesis and analysis,’14 a method that involves the ‘collection’ of things that share some 
particular similarity and then division of these things in their subcategories according to their 
differences. For example, at Phaedrus 265-270, Socrates ‘collects’ a range of behaviours 
characterised as ‘madness’ then distinguishes between the different kinds of madness, 
according to their variations. We also see applications of this method in Sophist, Statesman, 
and Philebus.15 It has been argued that this method is closer to the hypothetical method than 
has previously been supposed, which is worth noting, although such a question lies outside 
the scope of the current study.16 
 
The Hypothetical Method and its Application in Plato 
 
We shall now outline the passages that speak about the hypothetical method in Meno, Phaedo 
and Republic, before going on to discuss possible applications of the method in the dialogues. 
                                                
14 At least, the hypothetical method is not mentioned again after Parmenides; for this point, see Kahn (1998) Ch 
10 pp. 292-328. 
15 See especially, Sophist 232b-264b and Philebus 16-17; on the same point, see Matthews (1972) pp. 39-40.  
16 Sayre ([1969] Ch. 4, pp. 216-238): Sayre argues that these methods are close in the goal of achieving 
knowledge in the form of definitions. 
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The hypothetical method is introduced in Meno 86dff. In order to answer a question 
about virtue, Socrates insists that we must first be clear about what virtue is and decides to 
investigate by the method of hypothesis. The question is whether or not virtue can be taught, 
so the hypothesis is put forward that virtue is a kind of knowledge. Socrates considers 
arguments both for and against this position. This form has been compared with the 
hypothetical syllogism,17 with the hypothesis being put forward, and arguments being found 
both for and against it. In the Meno section, I shall be arguing that the argument against the 
hypothesis is not a part of the hypothetical method, but that it is a separate, empirical 
argument. 
 The next explicit statement of the hypothetical method we see is in Phaedo 99bff. 
Socrates is about to reply to Cebes’ objection to the immortality of the soul by presenting his 
theory of causation, but first explains his frustration with pre-Socratic explanations. He has 
previously described his disappointment with the failure of Anaxagoras to keep his promise 
to explain causation in terms of intelligent design. He does not feel able to produce the best 
kind of explanation himself, so he goes on to give an account of a deuteros plous, a second 
voyage or a second-best method, like taking up the oars in a boat once the wind has failed 
(according to Bostock [1986] p.157; originally from the poet Menander Fr 241). The 
metaphor here does not imply that the philosopher will not eventually arrive at the 
destination, but Socrates does feel that he has had to resort to a more laborious method in the 
absence of the account he had hoped for. 
 Socrates says that he first lays down18 the theory that seems to be the least vulnerable, 
and assumes to be true whatever agrees with it, assuming anything else to be untrue. In this 
passage, he uses the hypothetical method to formulate his theory of causation. He assumes 
the existence of ‘Beauty in itself and Goodness and Largeness and all the rest of them’ 
                                                
17 Robinson (1953) p. 119; on this point, see also Aristotle, Prior Analytics 50a. 
18 ὑποθέµενος, the verb related to the noun hypothesis. 
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(101b). So if someone asked Socrates why something is beautiful, he would disregard 
explanations that refer to its colour or shape or other attributes, and clings simply to the 
explanation that it is by Beauty that beautiful things are beautiful.  
 If anyone should question the hypothesis itself, Socrates would not answer until he 
had considered whether the consequences were mutually consistent or not. Then he would 
substantiate the hypothesis by assuming a ‘higher’ hypothesis until he reached a satisfactory 
one – he would not ‘mix the two things together by discussing both the starting point and its 
consequences, like one of these masters of contradictions – that is, if you wanted to discover 
any part of the truth’ (101e). 
The next appearance of the hypothetical method is in Republic VI. Socrates has been 
explaining his ‘divided line’ allegory, which is introduced after the allegory of the sun. The 
latter has given the interlocutors a concept of two things: those that can be seen and those that 
can be understood (509d). We are told to imagine a line divided into two unequal parts, with 
one section representing the class of visible things, and the other one representing the 
intelligible. Each section is divided again into two subsections in the same proportion: the 
first subsection is a state of mind that uses images, the second is a state of mind that uses 
sensible things, the third is a state of mind that uses mathematical thought, and the final 
subsection is a state of mind that uses the forms. These states of mind are respectively: 
eikasia, or conjecture, pistis, or belief, dianoia, or mathematical reasoning and noēsis.19 
In the description of dianoetic, or mathematical reasoning, we are told that the 
mathematicians use hypotheses, but are unable to go further than these. This kind of inquiry 
                                                
19 The exact translation of these terms is highly controversial, and will be discussed in a later chapter. For now, 
we leave noēsis untranslated and the translations of the other terms remain highly provisional. Some translators 
translate dianoia as ‘understanding’ and noēsis as ‘intelligence.’ Noēsis itself is often translated as 
‘understanding,’ but due to recent academic discussions over this word, we should prefer to avoid it. The 
divisions between contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science over whether there exists such a 
thing called ‘understanding’ distinct from knowledge has been echoed in Plato scholarship and lies beyond the 
scope of the current project. For an example of the view in philosophy of science that the two are not distinct, 
see Lipton  (2004) p. 30; for the view in epistemology that the two are distinct, see Kvanvig (2003) Ch. 8 pp. 
185-204 and  Pritchard (2007, SEP). For the corresponding debate in ancient philosophy, see Fine (1990) pp.85-
115 and Burnyeat (1981) 97-139.  
 21 
uses as images those things which are themselves the originals of the images in the lowest 
subsection (511a). In the highest subsection, these hypotheses are treated not as first 
principles but literally as hypotheses ‘like stepping stones and jumping-off places’ (501b). In 
this way, the dialectician proceeds to an unhypothesised first principle. Then he may 
investigate what follows from it to arrive at a conclusion ‘not using anything perceptible at all 
but proceeding by means of forms themselves, through forms. And it ends with forms’ 
(501c).20 
I shall argue that, although the dialectician improves upon the mathematician, 
dianoetic reasoning is not a completely separate endeavour.  In fact, dianoia actually forms 
the initial stage of the hypothetical method, and is part of Plato's use of the mathematics of 
his day in philosophy. 
What is being taken over from mathematics, I shall suggest, falls into two categories: 
tools and methodology. Dianoia, as Plato explicitly states at Republic 511, uses hypothesis 
and imagery, which are the tools of the mathematician. The 'higher hypothesis' is Plato's own 
invention, and it would be difficult to find an equivalent in geometry. We shall explore this 
concept in the Phaedo section: I shall describe it as Plato's way of ascending the 
epistemological scale, but it is not something that Plato has taken from the mathematicians of 
his day. I shall also argue that Plato adopts part of the mathematical method itself. As I shall 
argue in the Meno section, Plato adopts a method of apagōgē (as opposed to analysis and 
synthesis) as his model of mathematical reasoning. 
The implications of the 'hypothetical' passages are very much disputed, but they are 
commonly cited as the most explicit expositions of the hypothetical method we find in Plato 
                                                
20 In this way, the dialectician improves upon the use of hypotheses of the mathematician. However, we should 
not take this to be a criticism of the discipline: mathematics plays a vital role in Platonic epistemology, and 
forms a major part of the education of the philosopher-rulers. As Burnyeat notes, ‘mathematics is not criticised 
but placed.’ (2000) p. 42. The virtue of mathematics according to Burnyeat’s view is not, in fact, its rigorous 
procedures, but its ability to tell us how the world is, objectively speaking. 
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(however infuriatingly little this tells us). There is another small passage in Cratylus which is 
thought to hint at the method. We shall return to this passage throughout the project: 
 
It is just so sometimes in geometrical diagrams; the initial error is small and 
unnoticed, but all the numerous deductions are wrong, though consistent. Everyone 
must therefore give great care and great attention to the beginning of any undertaking, 
to see whether his foundation is right or not. If that has been considered with proper 
care, everything else will follow (Cratylus, 436cd). 
 
Various arguments have been put forward about when and how Plato applied the 
method. Robinson thinks that ‘the hypothetical method is less used in the dialogues than it is 
abstractly discussed’ (Robinson [1953] p. 209). He does acknowledge that it is immediately 
practised after its introduction in Meno, and says that it is put to use more thoroughly in 
Phaedo than in any other dialogue – although he thinks that this dialogue does not illustrate 
all of the extensions of the method.21 He thinks that much of Republic is in fact alien to the 
hypothetical method. Finally, he concedes that we may interpret chains of elenchus in 
Cratylus, Parmenides and Theaetetus as leading to the intuition of a beginning, which 
Robinson identifies as the procedure of the ‘upward path’ (we shall dispute this 
interpretation). However, he concludes that there is little exemplification of the method on 
the whole in the middle dialogues or elsewhere in Plato. 
Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 119-183) disagrees with the traditional interpretation that the 
hypothetical method is limited in its application in the Phaedo: indeed, he thinks that if we 
take the dialogue as a whole, we can see all extensions of the method exhibited. He agrees 
with other scholars that the first part of the method, hypothesizing a proposition and positing 
                                                
21 In particular, Robinson argues that we do not see an example of the appeal to a second, or if needs be a third 
higher hypothesis, until an adequate hypothesis is reached in Phaedo (1953) p 203. 
 23 
as true whatever agrees with it, and false whatever disagrees with it, can be found in 100b-
107a, as well as other parts of the dialogue. As Bailey ([2005] pp. 95-115) shows, there is a 
difficulty here in understanding what Socrates means by this. What Socrates says seems to 
require something more than consistency but less than entailment.22 Karasmanis says that the 
second part of the method, examining whether any contradiction arises out of the hypothesis, 
is seen in the refutation of Simmias’ ‘attunement’ theory.  
Karasmanis challenges the view that the third part of the method, hypothesising a 
‘higher’ hypothesis in order to give an account of a lower one, is not exhibited in Phaedo. 
Instead, he argues that all three parts of the method applied throughout the whole dialogue, 
especially the first and third parts. He does this by tracing the application of the method 
throughout the development of the dialogue, and consideration of linguistic analysis of the 
relevant passages. 
Matthews ([1972] pp. 38-39) thinks that some of the clearest examples of the use of 
the method can be seen in Theaetetus, although this dialogue gives us little in terms of actual 
discussion of the method. She also thinks that Parmenides, in addition to giving us a 
demonstration of the use of hypotheses, makes further points concerning the method, notably 
the necessity of considering the contradictory of the hypothesis and its consequences. It also 
explores the possibility that absurd consequences can result from acceptance of both the 
hypothesis and its contradictory. This observation has led some23 to suggest that this 
observation makes Plato abandon the hypothetical method altogether after Parmenides. 
 
                                                
22 Bailey ([2005] pp. 95-115, especially pp. 95-98) shows that, if we understand Socrates’ remarks about 
agreement and disagreement to mean ‘be consistent with,’ we run into problems. He says, “but for any 
hypothesis, there will be an infinite number of propositions which are consistent with it, but which we have no 
independent reason to assert. Surely we are not to set these down as true simply because they bear a relation as 
weak as consistency to the hypothesis. It sounds ludicrous – and of course it results in disaster. For among this 
infinite number of propositions there will be pairs of propositions inconsistent with one another” (p.97).  
However, if we take Socrates to mean entailment, this also has problematic results, Bailey says, as ‘it is also 
ludicrous to put down as false all the propositions which are not entailed by the hypothesis’ (p.98). I examine 
Bailey’s solution to the problem in Section Three, Chapter One iv d. 
23 Notably Robinson (1953) Ch. 13 pp. 223-280. 
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Imagery and Hypotheses 
 
We should note that the hypothetical method is not identical to dianoetic reasoning, as the 
former extends into dialectic. In the divided line passage, Plato is explicit about the fact that 
the dialectician should go beyond the mathematician in two ways. Firstly, he should treat the 
hypotheses as statements still needing confirmation, not absolute beginnings, and secondly, 
he should not rely on the evidence of the senses, in the reference to images.  
This study will argue that the dialectician’s improvement on dianoia does not exclude 
dianoetic processes from the initial stages of the hypothetical method. That is, although he is 
expected to question the initial hypothesis and abandon the use of imagery in the final stages, 
the initial stage does not require such a step. This will involve close inspection of Republic 
511, and a difficult passage in Phaedo, 99e-100a, which speaks ambiguously about the use of 
images in theory. 
In the divided line passage, we see that dianoetic reasoning has two distinctive 
qualities: the use of hypotheses and the reliance on imagery. In the debate about the 
significance of each level of the Line for Plato’s epistemology as a whole, various 
suggestions have been made about the connection between the two features. Plato is not 
specific about how the relationship between the use of diagrams and the use of hypotheses is 
any more than a historical fact, yet he seems to want to say that the connection is a 
philosophical necessity, and comes from the nature of dianoia itself.24 This project aims to 
explain the connection as philosophically important. 
The most prominent suggestion as to the philosophical weight of the connection 
between hypotheses and imagery in dianoetic reasoning comes from Robinson (1953 pp. 152-
156), who acknowledges that Plato is not explicit about the existence of a philosophical 
                                                
24 See also (Burnyeat [2000] pp. 1-81) for this view. 
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connection between the two marks. He points out that Plato does wish to present thought [sc. 
dianoia] as a distinct type of reasoning: “If these two marks were connected only historically, 
‘thought’ would not be a real species of mental activity, but a conjunction of two real 
species” (ibid p. 155). 
Robinson suggests that the connection lies in the need for mathematicians to appeal to 
spatial intuition to support their postulates. Due to the fact that the mathematician’s 
hypotheses are assumptions, not certainties, they use diagrams which appear to support them. 
In this way, they fail to recognise that their hypotheses are assumptions, and do not question 
them, or see the need to give an account of them. Robinson’s suggestion is grounded in his 
wider conception of the importance of intuition in Plato’s philosophy: for example, he prefers 
the ‘intuition theory’ of the upward path and makes use of the ‘divine spark’ passage of the 
Seventh Letter. 
This explanation is supported by Cross and Woozley ([1986] pp. 244-246) who add 
that Greek mathematics of Plato’s time aspired to be an idealised description of the spatial 
world, and say that Euclid, writing later, upheld postulates that had their roots in common 
experience.25 Cross and Woozley try to support this by giving an account of dianoia as a 
parallel mental state to eikasia, the lowest level of the divided line. They think that people in 
the state of eikasia take the image for an original, not realising that it is a copy. 
Mathematicians, however, in the state of dianoia, take hypotheses as truths, without 
recognising them as assumptions. In this way, for Cross and Woozley, both eikasia and 
dianoia are dogmatic, given to taking sense experience as truth.  
The weakness of the Robinson/Cross/Woozley view is that it does not take into 
account the way in which Plato employs hypotheses and images in the dialogues. Robinson 
has a whole chapter devoted to explaining away the use of analogy and imagery, and has to 
                                                
25 Here, Cross Woozley cite Blumenthal (1961) p. 16. 
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say that the dialogues are teaching devices, not models for how philosophy is to be done. 
Imagery is not good as a means of discovery, but good as a means of teaching. He uses 
evidence from Phaedrus and the Seventh Letter to support this view. However, Plato’s 
methodology could be much more efficiently and informatively explained if the descriptions 
of the conversations in the dialogues were taken as illustrations of Platonic method.26 There 
are several passages in the middle period where hypotheses and imagery interact, and these 
could be instrumental in shedding light on the description of dianoetic reasoning in the 
divided line passage. 
This project will criticise the explanation mentioned above of the link between 
hypotheses and imagery, while retaining the idea that the relationship is philosophically 
useful (rather than historically factual). Using the critical passages from Phaedo and the 
Meno where the images are used along with hypotheses, this study will explain the link by 
showing that it is, like the hypothesis, a proxy for the ti esti - which I shall describe as a 
Platonic definition - that we do not have at this stage in the inquiry. 
A ti esti is a Platonic definition: that is, a definition that has the attributes that Plato 
thinks are needed for high-level philosophy. Particularly in the early dialogues, Plato makes 
Socrates ask for the ti esti, or definition, of the thing to be investigated as a priority. As we 
shall see in the Meno section, a ti esti must both identify the thing to be investigated, and also 
be a heuristic tool. In the absence of it, a hypothesis or image can be used as proxy.  
In this way, I shall argue, dianoia is a pivotal part of the philosopher's ascent to 
knowledge.27 As we shall see, the idea of an epistemological ascent is found at Republic 511 
and 517b, and also in the Symposium 201a-212c. In the latter, it is the perception of sensibles that 
                                                
26 Of course Plato could have chosen to write treatises; see my comments above. My point is not that Plato used 
the dialogue form because it was the best way to illustrate the Platonic method; rather, I mean that the images 
Plato uses can help us to understand how his arguments work.  
27 As opposed to Scott ([1995] pp. 15-52)a, who does not see the path to philosophy as an ascent from ordinary 




leads us to the Forms: through the love of beautiful bodies, one can come to contemplate beauty itself, 
and become a lover of knowledge. What I suggest in this study is that the mathematical stage of the 
divided line acts as a way of getting from the perception of sensibles to the contemplation of Forms. 
We need a ti esti to reason about the Forms, but, when only perceiving sensibles, we do not have one 
of these. The tools of dianoia provide a proxy until a ti esti can be attained. 
We shall explore the conception of imagery as a part of a thought experiment, using 
the aporetic passages from the Meno to explain the psychological basis for Plato’s theory. 
We shall see that the hypothetical method has a distinct psychological element; indeed, it 
needs this to prevent it from slipping into eristic and to go beyond the elenchus. In this way, 
traditional Socratic concepts like aporia are an important part of the method; it is a necessary 
condition for any research, and we shall see it manifest in different ways according to the 
nature of the project in hand.  
 This explanation has the advantage of explaining Platonic texts in terms of Plato’s 
own theory. It also allows a theory-building role to the hypothetical method, and supports 
Plato’s criticism of the reliance on reductio ad absurdum arguments of the sophists. Although 
‘proof by contradiction’ has arguably been used successfully in mathematics by Plato’s time, 
Plato takes the point that the opposition of contradicting concepts as an epistemological 
method can lead to fallacy: in Euthydemus, he makes Socrates point out that truth can lie 
outside of the opposites that frame the question. In giving cognitive weight to the image in 
dianoetic reasoning, Plato allows for the development of argument in a way that could not 
result from the argument from opposites. Although he certainly does not abandon the latter as 
a method, it is clear that he sees the need for an epistemological device that plays a more 
positive role in philosophical debate.  
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 We shall see that Robinson is right to stress the role of intuition in the upward path,28 
but he ignores the role of the interlocutor in the dialogues. As recent scholarship suggests,29 
the interlocutor does not always contradict Socrates with a direct opposite, but sometimes 
indicates the weakness in his theory in other ways. This study will argue that the image plays 
an important part in theory-building in the early stages, and aims to illustrate this using the 
‘harmony’ passage in Phaedo.  
This conception will allow us to build upon scholarship that identifies the application 
of the hypothetical method in Phaedo as a unified whole, outlined above. We shall see the 
vital role played by imagery especially in the passage where the initial stage of the 
hypothetical method is displayed. We shall see that, at this stage, the image plays a theory-
building role in dianoia that enables the transition to the later stages. In this way, we can 
explain the link between hypotheses and images implied by Republic VI in a way that is 
consistent with his use of them in Phaedo.  
The image and the hypothesis are philosophically connected by their shared 
provisional nature, and the sense in which they are both ‘copies’ in some way. However, far 
from being negative, as some scholarship suggests, this provisional nature is necessary, and, 
when it follows the psychological state of aporia, allows the argument to advance rather than 
jeopardising its integrity. They are provisional, because they are to be replaced by ti estis as 
the thinker acquires them. For this reason, the two actually complement each other, with the 
image often prompting new avenues of enquiry that the hypothesis in itself cannot. 
In the first section of this study, we shall examine the allegories of the sun, divided 
line and cave of the Republic, focusing particularly on the dianoia passage of the divided 
line. After introducing the allegories, I shall discuss them in the context of the wider 
                                                
28 See the ‘divine spark’ passage of the Seventh Letter 340: “If the hearer has the divine spark which makes 
philosophy congenial to him and fits him for its pursuit, the way described to him appears so wonderful that he 
must follow it with all his might if life is to be worth living.” 
29 Alex Long (2013) especially pp. 67-74; also Beversluis (2000) pp. 18-57.  
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epistemology of the Republic as a whole, with a particular focus on Gail Fine’s controversial 
interpretation, and the response of her critics. I shall then go on to give my own reading of 
the allegories, arguing that we can see the divided line as an epistemological scale, to be 
ascended by the philosopher, with noēsis being the ultimate goal, but dianoia a necessary 
step towards that goal. Not only is it a scale, I shall say, but it is a continuum, with the later 
stages of dianoia being progressively closer to noēsis. The tools of noēsis, I shall say, are ti 
estis, or Platonic definitions, which, I shall argue, have a particular set of requirements that 
Plato indicates in the Meno and other dialogues. In the absence of these, dianoia uses 
hypothesis and imagery to make progress. 
I shall then go on to take a closer look at dianoia, arguing that the dianoetic image is 
different from the eikasiastic image, which is how we normally think about images. The 
dianoetic image, I shall argue, is an intelligible instantiation of a Form: it may have a visible 
part, perhaps in the diagram that is drawn, but its properties are most fully contained in the 
mind of the thinker. This means that Robinson’s solution, that the image provides the 
mathematician with the visual appeal to his intuition that he needs, is redundant. Of course, 
there is an element of ‘seeing’ that something is the case if we can see it represented visually, 
but this does not do anything like the work that Plato’s dianoetic image needs to do. I shall 
argue for this point throughout my readings of the Meno, Phaedo and Republic.  
After examining the dianoetic image, I shall then go on to examine the hypothesis, 
which of course extends from dianoia into noēsis. I shall argue that there is a role for 
intuition in the ‘upward path’ as Robinson calls it, but that this is far more limited than 
Robinson would have it. Finally in the Republic section, I shall briefly discuss how 
hypothesis and imagery might work together in dianoia, by looking at the Theaetetus as a 
case study.   
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My next section will be on the Meno. I shall begin by looking at what the dialogue 
can tell us about Platonic definitions, or ti estis, because it is these that I am saying the 
hypotheses and images substitute in dianoia. I shall consider the idea that Plato is looking for 
a series of closer approximations to the right answer, and that the ti esti is not necessarily 
going to be a concise answer; but nor does it have to be an exhaustive description of a Form.  
I shall go on to examine the aporia of the middle part of the Meno as preparation for a new 
method, before examining the hypothetical passage as Plato’s modelling philosophy on 
mathematical method. I shall recognise that there are problems with many attempts to do this, 
because usually, it is assumed that the method Plato has in mind is analysis and synthesis, 
which does not fit with the text. By looking to a different method, and seeing the end of the 
passage as being a little earlier than is usually supposed, we can see a much closer fit 
between mathematics and philosophy. 
The hypothetical passage and the slave-boy experiment in the Meno, I shall argue, are 
examples of the exercise of dianoia. In my Phaedo section, I shall argue that the objections 
of Simmias and Cebes, which also use hypothesis and imagery, are also examples of the 
exercise of dianoia. I shall then go on to say that Socrates’ ‘intellectual autobiography,’ 
which follows the objections, takes us through an ascent of part of the epistemological scale 
described in the divided line passage of the Republic. The hypothetical passage, which comes 
straight after this, occupies the section on the scale which takes us from dianoia to noēsis. In 
my discussion of this passage, I shall consolidate what I said in the Republic section about the 
‘upwards’ path, arguing that the hypotheses can be any part of the eventual ti esti; there are 
no particular requirements for what kind of statement a hypothesis has to be. This, I shall say, 
is because of the nature of the epistemological ascent. Because a ti esti will include the 
‘account’ generated by the hypothetical process, there is no one kind of statement we need 
for our hypothesis.  
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The main body of my study will focus on the texts of the relevant passages from the 
Meno, Phaedo and Republic. My reading will be based on what Plato explicitly says about 
importing the mathematical method into philosophy, as well as what he actually does when 
Socrates and his friends try to apply it. However, a study like this needs to appeal to the 
history of mathematics to support the claims being made, so I shall do this at various points. 
For example, when following Karasmanis in arguing that the method of apagōgē is used in 
the Meno and Phaedo, rather than that of analysis and synthesis, I shall appeal to the history 
of geometric methods. Finally, in the appendix, I suggest some possible avenues of future 
research: for example, an alternative reading to the view that the role of the diagram in 
geometry was to appeal to spatial intuition, by looking at the avoidance of completed 
infinities in Greek mathematics. On this reading, there is no need to split off so much of what 
Plato says from what he does.  
 
Section One: The Republic 
 
According to Plato, we live our day-to-day lives in a substitute world. The things we see 
around us are shadows of reality, imperfect imitations of perfect originals. Beyond the world 
of the senses, there is another, changeless world, more real and more beautiful than our own. 
But how can we get at this world, or even attain knowledge of it, when our senses are useless 
and the perfect philosophical method remains out of reach? In the divided line passage of the 
Republic, Plato is clear that mathematics has a role to play. In passages in the Meno and 
Phaedo, Socrates is forced to adopt a ‘second-best’ mathematical alternative to pure 
philosophy. The role of mathematics, according to Plato, is pivotal in the philosopher’s initial 
journey into the world of Forms, but the debate about exactly what that role is remains 
unresolved.  
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In this section, I suggest that my reading of the divided line might provide the answer, 
in addition to solving the problem of the roles of hypothesis and imagery in dianoia. This is 
the central problem that this project aims to solve, set out in the divided line passage of the 
Republic. The line is one of three allegories that Plato makes Socrates give to explain his 
theory of Forms. It is also, along with the allegories of the cave and the sun, one of the most 
beautiful and radical innovations in the history of philosophy. Notoriously ambiguous, the 
allegories lend themselves to a vast range of often contradictory interpretations, so a 
consensus upon Plato’s exact meaning remains elusive.30  
Essentially, this study asks an epistemological question: what is the connection 
between hypothesis and imagery in mathematical reasoning as conceived by Plato, and what 
are their respective roles? However, the solution to this problem needs to connect this kind of 
reasoning to truth, as this is the aim of knowledge, so we need to take account of Plato’s 
metaphysical system. The connection between Plato’s metaphysics and his epistemology is 
so intimate that some have claimed that there is no divide between the two.31 Plato’s 
metaphysical and epistemological claims are mutually reinforcing, and mutually dependent. 
The highest kind of knowledge must be knowledge of Forms. In order to know about Justice, 
we must not confine ourselves to the examination of just acts, but we must study the Form of 
Justice itself.  
However, in dianoetic reasoning, the Forms are not directly examined, but dianoia is 
still conceived by Plato as a kind of knowledge, or at least the foundations of knowledge. For 
our solution to work, the image and hypothesis must be in some sense veridical. What makes 
them veridical? The answer, I shall argue, is to be found in the metaphysics of the divided 
line, and supported by a connected reading of certain passages of the Phaedo. I am not 
                                                
30 See Annas (1981) pp. 245- 246 for allegations of Plato’s mysticism. Annas, claiming that Plato does not make 
clear how the Good makes things known in the way that the sun makes things known to the eye, writes: ‘Plato’s 
Good, which he refuses to clarify here, becomes a byword for obscurity’ p 246. 
31 For example, see White (1992) pp.277-310. 
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claiming that any image or hypothesis is veridical, only those that are successfully chosen. As 
we shall see in the discussion of Simmias’ objection, some images are not veridical: as an 
objection to Socrates’ theory (Phaedo 86ad; 87a-88b), Simmias proposes that the soul could 
be like an attunement of a musical instrument, which is also invisible, but which ceases to 
exist once the instrument is broken (Phaedo 73d8-9). Socrates is able to evaluate the fit of the 
attunement hypothesis as a model for the soul, concluding that ‘there is no justification for 
our saying that the soul is a kind of attunement’ (94e-95a). Although some images are not 
veridical, I argue those that are veridical are connected to the Forms. 
One of the things I want to say about the metaphysics of the line is that the objects 
associated with dianoia are not just mathematical objects. I cover this in Chapter Three ii c of 
this section, in which I argue that dianoia can be used to reason about moral truths as much 
as mathematical ones. That is what Plato is doing in the passages of the Meno and Phaedo 
that we shall cover in the following sections. 
 
Chapter One: Introducing the Sun, Line and Cave  
 
Grounded in the preceding discussion about knowledge and belief in book V of the Republic, 
the allegories of the sun, line and cave provide the context for the main question of this study. 
In this chapter, I shall introduce the allegories, picking out the relevant points for discussion 
in later chapters. The traditional reading of the allegories takes them to be an illustration of 
Plato’s Two Worlds theory, both metaphysically and epistemologically. By this, I mean that 
the traditional reading takes Forms to exist in an intelligible realm separate from our own (ie, 
as universalia ante rem, universals independent of things, as opposed to universalia in rebus, 
universals in things).32 In addition, this reading seems to suggest that rejection of true belief 
                                                
32 See Price ([2001] pp. 20-41) for a good discussion of the distinction. 
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as a basis for knowledge, and the two worlds theory, are mutually reinforcing. The traditional 
‘objects analysis’ sees the objects of knowledge and belief as distinct. Knowledge is 
knowledge of Forms; belief is belief about sensibles. 
 In addition to outlining this reading and pointing out the extent to which I think Plato 
is committing to it, I shall also pick out some other issues to which I shall return in later 
chapters. Namely, I wish to highlight the fact that Socrates feels that his own account is 
inadequate, and that there is a better way of giving an account that lies beyond his current 
resources; I shall return to this in the Phaedo section. In addition, I want to introduce the idea 
of the divided line as an epistemological scale, to which I shall return in the chapter 
explaining my own reading of the allegories. I also want to point out the shift I see in the way 
that Plato explains the four states of mind of the divided line when he comes to dianoia, 
which needs to be taken into account when assessing the traditional ‘objects’ reading of the 
allegories. 
When Plato introduces the allegories of the sun, divided line and cave, Socrates is 
describing the qualities that a good philosopher must have, and the education that will 
produce philosophers with these qualities. The philosopher ‘must work as hard at his 
intellectual training as his physical’ (504cd), in order to reach the highest form of knowledge. 
At this point, Adeimantus is surprised that Socrates should think that there is anything higher 
than justice and the other qualities they discussed, and says that Socrates cannot ‘escape 
cross-questioning about what you call the highest form of knowledge and its object’ (504e). 
 Socrates says, ‘the highest form of knowledge is knowledge of the form of the good, 
from which things that are just and so on derive their usefulness and value…the good is the 
end of all endeavour’ (505ad). However, Socrates thinks that a satisfactory explanation of the 
 35 
good is beyond the reach of their present inquiry: instead, he tells the group about something 
that he calls ‘a child of the good’ (506e).33 
 First, Socrates reminds the group that they have agreed that there are particular things, 
as well as ‘things-in-themselves’ (Forms). The particulars are objects of sight but not of 
intelligence; the Forms are objects of intelligence but not of sight (Republic 507ac). 
However, sight and the visible need a third element to enable us to see: light, from the sun. 
The sun is neither identical with sight, nor with the eye, but it is the cause of sight, and is 
seen by the sight it causes. This is what Socrates calls the child of the good:  
 
…the good has begotten it in its own likeness, and it bears the same relation to sight and 
visible objects in the visible realm that the good bears to intelligence and intelligible objects 
in the intelligible realm (508bc). 
 
Now, Socrates says, apply the analogy to the mind:  
 
When the mind’s eye is fixed on objects illuminated by truth and reality, it understands and 
knows them, and its possession of intelligence is evident; but when it is fixed on the twilight 
world of change and decay, it can only form opinions, its vision is confused and opinions 
shifting, and it seems to lack intelligence…then what gives the objects of knowledge their 
truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing is the form of the good (508de). 
 
 The form of the good enables knowledge and truth to be, but is not identical with 
them, in fact it is more splendid than them (Republic 508e-509a). Pursuing the analogy 
further, Socrates points out that the sun not only makes the objects of sight visible, but 
                                                
33 See also 507a, where Plato also uses this phrase. 
 36 
‘causes the process of generation, growth and nourishment, without itself being such a 
process’ (509b). So: 
 
The good therefore must be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects 
of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond 
it, and superior to it in dignity and power (509b). 
 
 Socrates says that he has not nearly finished his account, and will have to leave a lot 
out. We shall go on to discuss the implications of Socrates’ analogy in the following section, 
but for now we should note that Socrates has hinted at an account of the process of generation 
that has as its root the form of the good: this is not the ‘secondary account’ that results from 
the ‘second best method’ of the Phaedo (see the following chapters), but nor is it one that 
Socrates feels able to give at this point. He does seem to want to say here that the form of the 
good is the source of knowledge and reality; the highest kind of knowledge must be in some 
sense connected to it, even though he does not feel able to do this himself at this point. 
 For now, Socrates decides to do his best to fill in everything he can about his account 
under the present circumstances. This is where he introduces his divided line analogy 
(Republic 509d-511e), which is what I want to argue is Plato’s epistemological scale. It is 
also Plato’s connection of the levels of his metaphysics to the stages of his epistemology. He 
begins from the point of the ‘two powers’ - that is, the form of the good and the sun - of 
which they have spoken (Republic 509d). The form of the good is supreme over the 
intelligible realm; the sun over the visible.  
 Then Socrates asks the group to suppose that there is a line divided into two unequal 
parts, which are divided again into two unequal parts in the same ratio. The upper two parts 
represent the intelligible realm and the lower two parts represent the visible realm. The 
lowest subsection of the line stands for ‘images,’ by which Socrates means ‘shadows then 
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reflections in the water and other close-grained, polished surfaces, and all that sort of thing’ 
(510a). The next subsection of the line, the upper of the two ‘visible’ sections, stands for the 
objects that are the originals of the images: ‘the animals around us, and every kind of plant 
and manufactured object’ (510a). Socrates says that these subsections differ in that one is 
genuine and one is not, and the relation of the image to the original is the same as that of the 
realm of opinion to that of knowledge (Republic 510a).  
 As for the intelligible part of the line: 
 
…in one subsection the mind uses the originals of the visible order in their turn as images, 
and has to base its inquiries on assumptions and proceed from them not to a first principle but 
to a conclusion: in the other, it moves from assumption to a first principle which involves no 
assumption, without the images used in the other subsection, but pursuing its inquiry solely 
by and through forms themselves (510b). 
 
 This is by far the most important passage for the present study, and it is one that we 
shall return to both in this and the following sections. For now I want to note a shift in the 
way that Plato is describing the parts of the line (at least if we take the traditional ‘objects’ 
reading of the line that I am going to describe below). For the first two subsections of the 
line, Plato, according to the traditional reading, has been listing the objects of inquiry: images 
and physical things. For the next two sections, he seems to be speaking about the process by 
which the mind inquires, that is, what the soul does, and the objects that the mind uses to 
inquire, not the objects of inquiry themselves.34 For now, all I want to note is that, although 
the ‘objects’ reading of the line is not incompatible with what Plato says here, it is certainly 
not something he is committing to at this point.  
                                                
34 By comparing the upper and lower divisions of the line, we should be able to get a better idea of what goes on 
in the upper division, as this is the part that is most difficult to describe. 
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What Socrates says next serves to highlight the fact that he is talking about the tools 
of inquiry, rather than the objects of it. To clarify his theory, Socrates gives the following 
example: 
 
I think you know the students of geometry and calculation and the like begin by assuming 
there are odd and even numbers, geometrical figures and the three forms of angle, and other 
kindred items in their respective subjects; these they regard as known, having put them 
forward as basic assumptions35 which it is quite unnecessary to explain to themselves or 
anyone else on the grounds that they are obvious to everyone. Starting from them, they 
proceed through a series of consistent steps to the conclusion which they set out to find 
(510cd). 
 
He goes on: 
 
You know too that they make use of and argue about visible figures (eidos) though they are 
not really thinking about them, but about the originals which they resemble; it is not about the 
square or diagonal which they have drawn that they are arguing, but about the square itself or 
diagonal itself, or whatever the figure may be. The actual figures they draw or model, which 
themselves cast their shadows and reflections in water – these they treat as images only, the 
real objects of their investigation being invisible except to the eye of reason (510d-511a).36 
  
 In this passage, Plato distinguishes between the objects of investigation and the tools 
that the mind uses in this kind of inquiry: images and hypotheses. He says, ‘this type of thing 
                                                
35 ὑποθέµενοι, or hypothesizing. 
36 This is Lee’s translation, where ‘eye of reason’ translates τῆι διανοίαι. Grube (1974) translates this passage: 
“You also know that they use visible figures and talk about them, but they are not thinking about them but about 
the models of which these are likenesses; they are making their points about the square itself, the diameter itself, 
not about the diameter which they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures which they fashion and 
draw, of which shadows and reflections in the water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to 
understand those others in themselves, which one cannot see except in thought.” 
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I called intelligible,’ which by no means limits this kind of inquiry to geometry; it also 
happens in ‘kindred sciences’ (‘technai,’ or brother arts, in this case other branches of 
mathematics). As for the images it uses, these are ‘the very things which in turn have their 
images and shadows on the lower level’ (511a) – ie, the physical objects are in turn used as 
images in the lowest intelligible subsection of the divided line. 
 When Socrates goes on to elaborate on the other intelligible subsection, he focuses on 
the process of argument, not the objects of inquiry:  
 
…it treats assumptions not as principles in the true sense, that is, as starting points and steps 
in the ascent to something which involves no assumption and is the first principle of 
everything; when it has grasped that principle it can again descend, by keeping to the 
consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion. The whole procedure involves nothing in 
the sensible world, but moves solely through forms to forms, and finishes with forms (511bc). 
 
Again, this vital passage will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters 
and sections, but the thing I want to note is that Plato has not said that Forms are the objects 
of the procedure, but that the procedure moves through Forms. I am not arguing that Forms 
are not the objects of this procedure – indeed, only Forms are mentioned, and this passage is 
compatible with the traditional reading. What I do want to stress is that Plato wishes us to 
consider here the tools used by the mind at least as much as, if not more than, the objects of 
inquiry. 
The divided line passage finishes with a summary of Socrates’ remarks, which also 
gives us some additional information about the states of the mind in each section. The upper 
part of the intelligible section of the line (he says) has more clarity than the lower. Although 
the latter uses reason rather than sense-perception, its use of assumption places it between 
opinion and intelligence.  Socrates concludes that there are four states of mind, pathēmata en 
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tēi psuchēi, corresponding to each of the four sections of the line. The episteme part of the 
line is divided into noesis and dianoia, of which noesis is the bigger part. The doxa part of 
the line is divided into pistis and eikasia. The ratio pistis:eikasia is equal to that of 
noesis:doxa. This representation is based on Plato’s statement of the division at 511de.37 In 
fact, Plato’s statement at 534a is slightly different. At this point: 
 
noēsis covers the top two sections of the line, and includes:  epistēmē 
  dianoia 
doxa covers the bottom two sections of the line, and includes:  pistis 
         eikasia 
 In this scheme, epistēmē is restricted to the top subdivision, and noēsis covers the top 
two sections of the line. Dianoia is, in both cases used for the mathematical subdivision. 
Plato is not consistent in his terminology, and in fact suggests that he is not keen to fix on 
rigid technical terms.38   Foley ([2008] pp.1-24), who examines another controversy in 
Plato’s two statements of the divided line,39 has a reflection that may also apply to this case. 
He says, “By knowingly giving a contradictory analogy for his epistemology, and perhaps his 
ontology as well, Plato reveals that the reader must ultimately be willing to devote herself to 
philosophical enterprise…Socrates’ demurral at 534a – precisely the point that he should be 
wrapping up his comments about the line – takes on added meaning. The passage shows that 
                                                
37 For the point that 511d2 is an interpolation, see Slings (2005) pp.113-119. Slings thinks that καίτοι νοήτῶν 
ὂντων µετά ἀρχῆς is an interpolation, because καίτοι as a modifying participle is hardly ever used by classical 
authors; to a lesser extent, he thinks that the use of the genitive is suspect. Slings also feels that the clause is too 
compact, and even that it is harsh Greek for such an important point. The significance is that it makes 
mathematical objects intelligibles in the wider sense of the term, making Plato seem more positive about 
mathematics than he would be without this clause. However, as Slings points out, the basic concepts of 
mathematics are νοητά anyway, and what the mathematicians have could ultimately be converted into 
knowledge. 
38  ‘…I don’t think we should quarrel about a word – the subject of our inquiry is too important for that…we 
shall be content to use any term provided it conveys the degree of clarity of a particular state of mind’ (Republic 
533e). See Lee’s notes to his (1987) translation of the Republic, pp 249-251 and 283-284. 
39 The question on which Foley writes is whether the middle two subsections of the line are equal in length. The 
question of epistemological terminology is different, but Foley’s point about the possibility of Plato leaving 
their resolution to his readers can apply to both. 
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Plato is not willing to set forth his views on the further complexities that have emerged. It is a 
task that he intentionally leaves for his readers” (p. 23).  
Throughout this thesis, I have chosen to use the terminology of the earlier version, for 
several reasons. Firstly, the earlier version is the one in which Plato’s focus is on the 
pathēmata en tēi psuchēi, which relates to the central question of my thesis: how does one 
ascend the mental states in Plato’s epistemology? The second reason I have chosen to use this 
terminology is due to the debate about knowledge in contemporary scholarship. For example, 
although Gail Fine ([1999] pp. 215-246) uses the word ‘understanding’ as a translation for 
noēsis,40 she disagrees with Burnyeat’s ([1981] pp. 97-139) distinction between knowledge 
and understanding, which links explanation and understanding, but not explanation and 
knowledge. Instead, Fine prefers to think of ‘richer and deeper kinds of knowledge.’41  This 
debate is reflected in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science over whether 
there exists such a thing called ‘understanding’ distinct from knowledge.42  However, this is a 
modern problem, and we should be wary of letting it affect our reading of Plato. I chose to 
use the terminology of the earlier version partly to avoid the problem of letting modern 
debates about epistemology create artificial distinctions in Plato’s thought. 
Others may wish to adopt the terminology of the later version. If one were to argue 
that dianoia has the same scope as the sphere of knowledge and at the same time argue that 
dianoia falls short of epistēmē, the terminology of the statement at 534a is a good fit. This 
confines epistēmē to the top subdivision, with the result that noēsis covers the whole of the 
top section, although it continues to use dianoia for the mathematical subdivision. This 
version allows dianoia to be a form of noēsis while achieving something less than 
knowledge. However, my reading presents dianoia as the foundations of knowledge, but still 
                                                
40 Others translate dianoia as ‘understanding’ and noēsis as ‘intelligence.’ 
41 Gonzalez ([1996] p 258) has yet another perspective on this distinction, saying that ‘knowledge here is 
understanding and acquaintance, understanding achievable only in direct acquaintance with certain objects.’ 
42 As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Lipton (2004) p. 30 thinks that knowledge and understanding 
are not distinct, Kvanvig (2003) Ch. 8 pp. 185-204 and Pritchard (2007, SEP) believe that they are. 
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inferior to noēsis. We shall see that noēsis is less removed from truth (because of its tools, 
which I shall argue are the ti estis that the mind uses in this particular mental state) and more 
certain (because of the testing of hypotheses). As I shall argue in Section One, Chapter Three 
ii, Plato says that the mind uses different kinds of things to reason with (tools) in each section 
of the divided line: the tools of noēsis are ti estis, those of dianoia are hypotheses and 
dianoetic images. Pistis uses perception of physical objects and the tools of eikasia are 
images of physical things.  
The earlier version of the line is the one in which Plato tells us about the tools the 
mind uses in each mental state and I argue that there is much value in looking at the question 
from this aspect. In particular, it will allow me to suggest a solution to the problem of how 
we can progresses through the mental states (which, at Republic 532ab, Plato explicitly 
mentions). I propose this solution in Section One, Chapter Three ii and Four of this thesis. It 
also allows for the division between dianoia and noēsis that Plato specifies, because although 
hypotheses are used at both levels, the dianoetic image is restricted to dianoia and the ti esti 
is restricted to noēsis. 
The reference to the allegories in the later statement at 534c and connection of the 
education of the philosophers to the line at 533e-534a show the correspondence between the 
two statements.  With this in mind, I shall continue to refer to noēsis as the top subsection of 
the line, and epistēmē as the upper two subsections, on the understanding that Plato is 
inconsistent in his use of terminology elsewhere. 
 Finally, Socrates goes on to describe the allegory of the cave, which he says will 
illustrate the enlightenment or ignorance of the human condition. We are asked to imagine a 
cave, in which men have been imprisoned since they were children, with their heads fixed so 
they can only see the wall. Behind them is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners runs 
a road, in front of which is a curtain wall. Men carry things beyond the curtain wall, 
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projecting figures of men and animals onto the wall that the prisoners can see. The prisoners 
believe that the shadows on the wall are the real things, until one is released from his bonds 
and able to look around the cave. At first, he is dazzled by the fire, and finds it difficult to see 
or regard as real the originals of the shadows he used to see. If he were dragged up the ascent 
to the world outside, he would be so dazzled by the sunlight that he would not be able to see 
any one of the things he was now told were real. He would have to become accustomed to the 
light, then begin by looking at shadows and reflections, then objects and the heavenly bodies 
at night. Finally, ‘he would be able to look at the sun itself, and gaze at it without using 
reflections in water or any other medium, but as it is in itself’ (516b). 
 The allegory has much to say about the psychology of learning and the pragmatics of 
politics that we do not have time to consider here. For now, I just want to mention Socrates’ 
remarks on how the allegory of the cave is connected with the line and the sun: 
 
The realm revealed by sight corresponds to the prison, and the light of the fire in the prison to 
the power of the sun. And you won’t go wrong if you connect the ascent into the upper world 
and the sight of the objects there with the upward progress of the mind into the intelligible 
region (517b). 
 
Mapping the stages of the prisoner’s journey onto the divided line is not such an easy 
task as Socrates’ remarks might suggest. Do the mathematical objects of the traditional 
reading of the divided line correspond to the reflections of the physical objects in the outside 
world of the cave analogy? This is one problem that we need to discuss, along with the 
question of how far the metaphor goes: can we take seriously the mathematical consequences 
of the ratios in the divided line? We shall also need to look more closely at what Plato has to 
say about dianoia, as he makes some remarks in Book Seven which can tell us more about 
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the mathematical sciences. First, though, we should examine the debate about how Plato’s 
epistemology works, as it is described here. 
 
Chapter Two: Readings of the Allegories in Context 
 
The three allegories are neither complete nor freestanding expositions of Plato’s 
epistemology, but grounded in the wider discussion of books V to VII of the Republic and 
further informed by Plato’s remarks on education in book VII. Academic readings of the 
allegories tend to be built on a wider theory that tries to incorporate Plato’s discussion of 
knowledge and belief in Republic V, and is supported by epistemological passages of other 
middle dialogues, such as the Meno and Phaedo. Notably, interpretations of the allegories 
need to be consistent with a convincing reading of what knowledge and belief are ‘set over,’ 
according to Plato’s remarks in books V-VII. In this chapter, we shall discuss Gail Fine’s 
challenge to the traditional reading, and the response of her critics, all of which attempt to 
produce such an interpretation. I want to make clear what I endorse about Fine’s reading (her 
concerns about the impossibility of knowledge of sensibles), what I reject (her propositional 
reading and rejection of the Two Worlds metaphysics), what I would amend (her 
coherentism), and what problems my account shares with hers (my tendency to rationalize 
Plato).  
 
i. Knowledge, Belief and Gail Fine 
 
By far the most controversial article to have been published on this topic is Gail Fine’s 
‘Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII.’43 In it, she challenges the traditional ‘Two 
                                                
43 (1999) pp. 215-246. 
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Worlds’ reading of Plato ‘according to which there is no knowledge of sensibles, but only of 
Forms, and no belief about Forms, but only about sensibles’ (Fine [1999] p215). Fine means 
that she thinks the traditional interpretation of the divided line holds the objects of inquiry to 
be what we have labelled as the ‘metaphysics’ side of the line in the diagram of the previous 
chapter. 
 Fine’s problems with the traditional reading of Plato’s epistemology in his middle 
work are connected with her careful reading of the middle dialogues and a reinterpretation of 
what Aristotle can tell us about Plato.44 She thinks that, if we say that for Plato the objects of 
knowledge and belief are disjoint, we also need to say that Plato radically rejects the Meno’s 
account of knowledge, in which true beliefs become knowledge when they are adequately 
bound to an explanatory account. She says, ‘for the Meno, knowledge implies true belief; on 
TW (Two Worlds), knowledge excludes true belief’ (Fine [1999] p 216). 
 Fine also thinks that the implications of this cause a big problem for Plato. On a 
practical level, one cannot first believe that the sun is shining, then come to know it is. The 
consequences for the political theory of the Republic, then are remarkable: the philosopher-
ruler, can know the Form of Justice, but he cannot know what actions are just (because he has 
no knowledge of actions in the sensible world). She says that, in this case, it is strange that 
the Republic should be an attempt to convince us that the philosophers should rule, since their 
knowledge is inapplicable in the sensible world. 
 Fine ([1999] pp. 218-219) calls the traditional reading the ‘objects’ reading of the 
line, because she says that this reading takes Republic V to mean that Plato specifies the 
objects of knowledge and belief. As a consequence of this reading, we can only know what 
exists (so there can be no knowledge of things such as Father Christmas) and we can only 
have beliefs about what does not exist. Fine thinks that, on the contrary, Plato is referring to 
                                                
44 For the latter, see Fine (1995), especially pp. 23-29 and pp. 36-65.  
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the contents of knowledge and belief, so one can only know true propositions, and one can 
believe both true and false propositions. She calls her reading the ‘contents’ analysis. 
 To summarize, Fine wants to avoid the traditional ‘Two Worlds’ reading because it 
leads to the absurdity that we cannot know facts about the physical world, it contradicts 
Socrates’ claim to have only belief about the Form of the Good, and it contradicts the claim 
that the philosopher who returns to the cave can have knowledge of the sensibles. 
 Fine’s solution to the problem is to argue that Republic 5-7 is not committed to the 
Two Worlds reading of Plato’s metaphysical epistemology (TW). In fact, she thinks that 
Plato is never committed to TW. She thinks TW contradicts the text of the Republic, because 
at 506c, Plato says that he has no knowledge of, but beliefs about the Form of the Good, and 
at 520c, he says that the philosopher who returns to the cave will know the things there.45 She 
agrees with the aspect of the traditional reading that correlates knowledge with Forms and 
beliefs with sensibles, but she says that this need not imply TW. According to Fine, Plato 
argues only that knowledge requires (but is not restricted to) Forms, and that one can at most 
achieve belief if restricted to sensibles. 
 Fine strengthens the claim she is making by saying that Plato is a coherentist, rather 
than a foundationalist, about justification. She suggests that, for Plato, no beliefs are self-
evident or self-justified; to be known, they must be justified in terms of other beliefs. Her 
reading of Plato’s epistemology relies on the claim that Plato is talking about propositional 
knowledge. She rejects the ‘objects analysis’ that reads Plato as holding knowledge to be 
restricted to certain kinds of objects in favour of a ‘contents analysis’ that correlates 
knowledge to certain sorts of propositions. This is the most vulnerable part of Fine’s theory: 
Plato never explicitly frames knowledge in this way, and it is on this point that Fine receives 
the most criticism. 
                                                
45 Fine also thinks she has found other instances of Plato allowing for knowledge of the sensibles, at Meno 71b, 
97a9 and Theaetetus 201ac. 
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 We shall examine Fine’s argument and the criticisms against her in detail before I go 
on to explain my own interpretation of Plato’s epistemology in the Republic. I am not going 
to endorse her reading, but I do sympathise with some of the points she raises about the 
traditional reading of the line and Plato’s epistemology as a whole. The biggest problem I see 
with Fine’s work is that she needs to restrict Plato to talking about ‘propositional’ knowledge, 
when it is not clear from the text that Plato had any such distinction in mind. This is a 
common criticism of Fine, as we shall see, so finally I want to see if we can salvage anything 
from what Fine is trying to do by explaining my own reading, which allows us to have 
knowledge of the sensibles without some of the problems that Fine has to deal with. 
 Fine examines46  Plato’s remarks in Republic 5, in which he offers an account of how 
knowledge differs from belief. Fine makes a lot of the fact that the argument is intended to 
persuade the ‘sight-lovers’, so should not begin from any premiss that the sight-lovers should 
dispute. She says that, when Plato speaks of knowledge and belief as being ‘set over’ certain 
things, we can interpret him as meaning (in the case of knowledge, for example) any of the 
following: 
 
a. Knowledge is set over what exists. 
b. Knowledge is set over what is F (for some predicate F to be determined by the 
context). 
c. Knowledge is set over what is true. 
 
Fine explains that, on the (a) and (b) readings, the objects of knowledge and belief 
are specified. On the (c) reading, it is the propositions that are the contents of knowledge and 
belief that are specified. Because Fine sets so much store by the fact that the sight-lovers are 
                                                
46 1990 pp.85-115 or 1999 pp. 215-246; 1995 pp. 23-29, 36-65; 2004 pp. 48-81; 2005 pp. 200-226; 2007 pp. 
331-367 and 2010 pp. 125-152. 
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the supposed audience for this passage, she thinks she can argue that readings (a) and (b) 
violate the dialectical requirement, according to which Plato cannot begin from a premiss that 
the audience would readily accept. These two premisses separate the objects of knowledge 
and belief, which the sight-lovers cannot be expected to agree to from the outset. Fine also 
thinks that the sight-lovers would have a problem with the idea of knowledge as involving 
some kind of acquaintance, as (a) implies, or that it is impossible to know something that is 
equal and unequal, as (b) implies.  
 She thinks that premiss (c) satisfies the dialectical requirement, as it says only that 
knowledge entails truth. She also wants to qualify this interpretation to talk about sets of 
propositions, so that Plato’s conception of belief entails that the set of propositions that can 
be believed includes some truths and some falsehoods. She thinks that this means that all we 
have been told so far is that knowledge, but not belief, is truth-entailing, which is quite 
compatible with the claim that there can be knowledge and belief about the same objects.  
 Plato is clear that knowledge and belief are different capacities, but, as Fine says, this 
does not mean that they must be set over different objects. She says, ‘Husbandry and 
butchery, for instance, do different work; but they are both set over the same objects – 
domestic animals’ (Fine [1999] p 220).  
 Fine has good reason to draw our attention to this apparent problem in Plato: in spite 
of the fact that the analogy of the state is introduced as a way of examining on a larger scale 
the properties of justice in the soul (Republic 368d-369a), the Republic does seem to want to 
argue for a specific political theory that has philosophers as rulers. As such, it would be very 
strange if they could not apply their knowledge to the physical world. Moreover, Socrates 
says he has beliefs about, but no knowledge of, the Form of the Good (Republic 506c) and 
the philosopher who returns to the cave will know things about sensibles (Republic 520c). As 
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Fine says, at this point the only thing that Plato has committed himself to so far is that 
knowledge and belief are different capacities, and that knowledge must be truth-entailing. 
 In her reading of Republic 6-7, Fine builds on her theory with an extensive reference 
to the sun, cave and divided line allegories. For Plato, she says, there are two sorts of 
knowledge and two sorts of belief. The best sort of knowledge requires knowledge of the 
Form of the Good. Moreover, she points to Plato’s remark that the Form of the Good is not 
an ousia at all, but, says Fine, it is the formal and final cause of all Forms. The Form of the 
Good is ‘the teleological structure of things; individual Forms are its parts, and particular 
sensible objects instantiate it' (Fine [1999] p 228).  
This, says Fine, embodies her point that Plato is a holist about knowledge: ‘Full 
knowledge of anything requires knowing its place in a system of which it is a part, or which it 
instantiates; we do not know things in the best way if we know them only in isolation from 
one another’ (Fine [1999] p 229).47 
 All this has implications for Fine’s interpretation of the divided line, which she 
correlates to the allegory of the cave and which we shall examine now before I explain my 
own interpretation in the following section. At level one, eikasia, which Fine translates as 
‘imagination’, the prisoner is unable to distinguish between images and their objects. It is not 
that he only sees images, because ‘even if they were confronted with a physical object, they 
would remain at level one, so long as they could not systematically discriminate between 
images and their objects, and could not tell that the objects are more real than the images, in 
that they cause images’ (Fine [1999] p 232). Fine explains Plato’s remark that most of us are 
at level one by saying that it is not because we only see images, but because we have level 
one moral beliefs. 
                                                
47 Fine thinks this makes middle Plato more coherent with the holist conception we find in later dialogues; She 
also argues this in Fine (1979) pp.70-80. She also thinks it is more coherent with Plato’s creation myth in the 
Timaeus; see also Fine (1999) p 229 for this view. 
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 At level two, pistis, which Fine translates as ‘confidence,’ the prisoner learns to 
distinguish between images and their objects. This represents the first application of elenchus 
or dialectic, in which the prisoner can discriminate between physical objects and images, but 
not explain their differences. Again, Fine rejects the ‘objects analysis’ by saying that one 
does not need to be confronted with a physical object to be at level two: if one is lacking an 
aitias logismos, a satisfactory account, of the sort necessary for knowledge, ‘he remains at a 
belief state, though at a better one than he was before’ (Fine [1999] p 234). 
At level three, dianoia, which Fine translates as ‘thought,’ the prisoner’s attention is 
turned to Forms. The two key differences between levels three and four are that, at level 
three, one uses sensibles as images of Forms, and proceeds from a hypothesis to various 
conclusions. Fine argues (and this is one of the points upon which I shall agree with her) that 
level three reasoning is not restricted to mathematics. She writes: 
 
…any reasoning that satisfies the more general features [ie, the use of hypothesis and 
imagery] belongs at L3. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that that although Socrates (in 
the Socratic dialogues and Meno) places himself at L2 in his moral reasoning, Plato in the 
Republic places himself at L3 (Fine [1999] p 236). 
 
 This means that it is possible to reason dianoetically and noetically about 
mathematical objects, which is a problem for the ‘objects’ analysis of the divided line, but 
important for the solution to the main problem of this dissertation. Fine backs up this point by 
pointing out that, in the Republic, Plato uses images all the time. For example, he explains 
justice in the soul through the analogies of health and justice in the city; the analogy of the 
ship is used to illustrate the nature of democracy. So the moral reasoning in the Republic 
satisfies the dianoetic feature of using imagery, says Fine.  
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Fine’s argument that 'L3 is not restricted to mathematics' also includes a reference to 
Phaedo 100ff, which, she points out, ‘is plainly not restricted to mathematical reasoning’ 
([1990] p. 106). I will also argue that this passage uses the same method as Fine’s L3 and part 
of L4 of the divided line in Section Three, Chapter One and Chapter Two ii. The link 
between the two passages is one argument in favour of extending L3 reasoning beyond 
mathematics. I also make a similar link (although Fine may not necessarily agree with this) 
between this kind of reasoning and the hypothetical passage of the Meno in Section Two, 
Chapters Three and Four. In both the Meno and the Phaedo, I will argue, Plato hints that 
mathematics can be used as a model for other kinds of philosophy both in the hypothetical 
passages and in other places in the texts. 
Moreover, Fine says that the partial account of virtue in book four of the Republic is a 
‘mere outline that requires a longer way’ (Fine [1999] p 236).48 The longer way would 
involve relating those virtues to the Form of the Good, which is what makes the account in 
book four dianoia rather than noesis. Fine thinks this satisfies the feature of dianoia that it 
‘proceeds from a hypothesis to various conclusions’ (Fine [1999] p 235-6).49 
Fine makes clear that she thinks dianoia is not always deductive. According to her, 
the moral reasoning of the Republic is also an example of level three/dianoetic reasoning. 
This is not a claim that I am making in this study; as I made clear in the introductory section, 
I am looking only at the images that are clearly part of the argument, that the interlocutor is 
given a chance to amend, not those that are used as illustrations. Fine’s definition of dianoia 
                                                
48 Cf Republic 435d and 504c9-e2. 
49 On the point that the analogical reasoning in Book IV is to be identified as equivalent to the mathematical 
reasoning of the divided line, Fine refers us to Irwin ([1977] pp. 222-223). Here, Irwin’s point is that ‘the 
definitions of the virtues in Republic IV are hypotheses, not resting on a full account of the good, but assuming 
some beliefs about it and drawing conclusions about the virtues – that is why they are only sketches, not 
completed definitions (504d6-8)’ (Irwin [1977] p.222). In Chapter Three ii.c and d of this section, I shall give 
my reading of how hypotheses might stand in for definitions as sketches, which does allow for the identification 
of the analogical reasoning in Book IV to be identified with the mathematical reasoning of the divided line. 
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is a lot wider than (but not incompatible with) mine, although I share her view that it is not 
restricted to mathematics. 50 
Fine’s account is a coherentist one. Rather than the foundationalist claim that  
the regress of knowledge stops owing to self-justified or self-evident beliefs, Fine’s 
coherentist reading of Plato holds that the regress is finite but has no end: ‘I explain p in 
terms of q, and q in terms of r, and so on until, eventually, I appeal again to p; but if the circle 
is sufficiently large and explanatory, then it is virtuous, not vicious’ (Fine [1999] p 240-
241).51  
 This is quite a controversial claim for Fine to make, but I am sympathetic. It is 
controversial because, as Fine admits, Plato is typically counted as a foundationalist. Plato 
seems to reject coherentism at Republic 533c, where he says, ‘For if one’s starting point is 
something unknown, and one’s conclusion and intermediate steps are made up of unknowns 
also, how can the resulting consistency ever by any manner of means become knowledge?’52 
There is also a passage in Cratylus, in which Plato seems to endorse foundationalism: 
 
                                                
50 As a result of her reading of Plato’s conception of knowledge, Fine realises that at this point, she must provide 
an account of the famous justification regress. She thinks that knowledge requires at least two things. One, she 
calls KL, meaning that knowledge requires an account, or logos, in addition to true belief. So it is not enough to 
believe, truly, that Edinburgh is north of London; we must also be able to provide an account of why this is true. 
She also thinks that, for Plato, KBK, ie, knowledge must be based on knowledge (so ‘I know a thing or 
proposition only if I can provide an account of it which I also know’ Fine [1999] p 238). The regress occurs 
because, to know something, one must provide an account. Given KBK, one must also know this account. 
Given KL, I must also provide an account of it, which, given KBK, I must also know, and so on ad infinitum. In 
addition, Fine needs to account for the implication in Plato that, to know anything, one must know Forms. 
 Fine’s solution to this problem is to suggest that the hypotheses and conclusions used by the 
mathematician might be mutually reinforcing: 'For the hypotheses and proofs used to derive the conclusions 
might reasonably `be though to constitute an account of – an explanation of, and so an adequate justification for 
believing – them' (Fine [1999] p 239). This does not escape the regress, because if the hypotheses are not 
known, it violates KL and KBK. However, Fine thinks, this does not preclude justifying the hypothesis in the 
course of the inquiry (Fine [1999] p 240). As Fine goes on to say, there does seem to be a circle here: for KBK 
to be satisfied, the conclusions must also be known; but they may not be known, because, although KL is 
satisfied in this case, KBK is not, because the hypothesis is not also known. However, Fine writes, 'although 
there is a circle here, it is not a vicious one. The hypotheses are justified in terms of the conclusions, and the 
conclusions in terms of the hypotheses' (Fine [1999] p 240). 
51 Cf Kvanvig 2007 pp185-204 for a modern perspective. 
52 Cf White (1976) p 113 n 50, in which White comments that the method of hypothesis is a way of gaining 
consistency, but that this consistency is not turned into knowledge. 
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The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names 
to be consistent with it. There would be nothing strange in that. It is just that way sometimes 
in geometrical constructions: given the initial error, small and unnoticed, all the rest that then 
follow are perfectly consistent with one another. That’s why every man must think a lot about 
the first principles of anything and investigate them thoroughly to see whether or not it’s 
correct to assume them. For if they have been adequately examined, the subsequent steps will 
plainly follow from them (Cratylus 436cd).53 
 
At level four, noēsis, which Fine translates as ‘understanding,’54 the prisoner reaches 
an unhypothetical first principle, which Fine conceives of as ‘a definition of, and perhaps 
further propositions about, the Form of the Good’ (Fine [1999] p 242). She thinks that when 
                                                
53 Cf Republic 377a: ‘…the first step, as you know, is always what matters most.’ Lee in his (1987) translation 
of the Republic (p 69) points out that this refers to the Greek proverb, ‘The beginning is everything.’ A more 
literal translation would be, ‘the beginning is half of the whole,’ although ‘well begun is half done’ also conveys 
the sense of the Greek phrase. None of this troubles Fine. She says that the passages do seem to commit Plato to 
KBK, but that her coherentist account means that one may come to know the starting-point through deriving 
conclusions from it. She says that the passage might suggest that consistency is insufficient for knowledge ‘but 
any self-respecting coherentist would agree’ (Fine [1999] p 241). The consistent beliefs must be mutually 
supporting or explanatory, and form a sufficiently large group; moreover, such coherence is only sufficient for 
justification; knowledge requires truth. At this point, we are talking about coherentist justifications in 
mathematics and dianoia as a whole, so on the face of it, Fine’s interpretation may seem strange.  It is common 
to associate the mathematics, with its extensive use of axioms, with foundationalist accounts. Euclid’s Elements 
of Geometry has been described as exemplary of a foundationalist system (Newman [2010]), as it begins with a 
foundation of first principles (definitions, postulates and axioms) to construct further propositions. Euclid’s 
system even inspired Descartes’ approach of building knowledge from first principles. 
So why should we seriously consider Fine’s claim that Plato’s dianoia is coherentist? Certainly, it is a 
very elegant solution to the problem, but it is difficult to reconcile it with the common reading of the passages 
from Republic and Cratylus cited above. I admire the elegance of Fine’s position, but I think it would take more 
work to provide a convincing case for coherentism at the level of dianoia. In fact, it is not something I am going 
to attempt to resolve here; it is beyond the scope of the current project, given that the solution I propose does not 
require a coherentist account.  
I would suggest that Fine would need to give an account of Plato’s reading of mathematics in order to 
support her claim. In the Meno section, I consider the possible mathematical methods that Plato might be using, 
and there is a case to be made for suggesting that apagōgē does satisfy the conditions that Fine wants for her 
argument to work. This is a method that reduces the problem to a series of lemmas, or premises, until we arrive 
at a conclusion that is independently known of the thing sought. In this case, it does look like Greek 
mathematics (and Plato’s reading of it) would support a foundationalist, rather than a coherentist, theory of 
knowledge, but Fine could try to argue that one could know the hypothesis and conclusion simultaneously; the 
conclusion would satisfy KL and KBK for the hypothesis, and the hypothesis would satisfy KL for the 
independently known conclusion. Of course, Fine’s claim is actually stronger than this: she wants to say that 
there is no need to have an independently known conclusion, but the evidence for this claim is not immediately 
apparent.  
54 At least, that is her translation here (1999) pp. 215-246. However, she does not agree with Burnyeat’s ([1981] 
pp. 97-139) distinction between knowledge and understanding, which links explanation and understanding, but 
not explanation and knowledge. Instead, Fine prefers to think of ‘richer and deeper kinds of knowledge.’ 
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one can relate the hypotheses to the Form of the good, then the hypotheses cease to be mere 
hypotheses and are known in a noetic sense, rather than a dianoetic sense. Moreover, in 
noēsis, one thinks of Forms directly, not through images of them, and uses only Forms. 
Crucially, Fine thinks that one can apply this knowledge to the sensibles. She compares this 
capacity with Aristotle’s assertion that one can define various species and genera without 
reference to particular instances of them, but once one has done this, one can apply the 
definitions to particulars in such a way that gives knowledge of them.  
The problem that Fine faces in her account of level four reasoning is that the 
hypotheses are explained by relating them to the Form of the Good. But how is the Form of 
the Good known?55 Fine goes further: ‘Indeed, Plato’s coherentism may require L4 type 
knowledge of sensibles to be possible’ (Fine [1999] p 245). This is one of her strongest and 
most controversial claims: usually Plato is seen as very strongly rejecting the sensibles as a 
means to knowledge. Some people criticise this aspect of Fine’s work, saying that she is 
imposing a sort of implicit empiricist approach onto Plato. They say that Plato follows 
Parmenides in being committed to the nonreality of the phenomenal world, so for Plato, 
being is prior to becoming.56  
Although I am not endorsing Fine’s coherentism here, the use of sensibles as a means 
to knowledge is something that I am going to have to deal with, because I want to say that 
dianoia is connected to the sensibles as it uses them as images through which to reason about 
                                                
55 There is nothing more fundamental than the Form of the Good that can be used to explain it, so how can we 
avoid violating KL or KBK? Fine rejects the kind of solution that involves connecting noēsis with vision or 
acquaintance, because she thinks it does not satisfy KL: ‘it claims that knowledge does not require an account 
after all, but only a vision’ (Fine [1999] p 243). 
Fine’s solution is again to appeal to coherence. She stresses that dialectic, not acquaintance, must be 
the route to noēsis. One’s claims about the Form of the Good are justified not in terms of anything more 
fundamental, but in terms of its explanatory power.  Fine sees the Form of the Good as the teleological structure 
of things. Claims about it can be justified ‘by showing how well it allows us to explain the natures of, and 
interconnections between, other Forms and sensibles’ (Fine [1999] p 244). 
This kind of coherence, Fine claims, is superior to the level three kind, because it integrates reality into 
a ‘synoptic whole,’ rather than being restricted to individual branches of knowledge like dianoia. The 
coherentist explanations are fuller and richer in noēsis than in dianoia, which is what makes it a better sort of 
knowledge. 
56 I am grateful to Simon Trépanier for his remarks on this subject; cf Kahn (1998) pp. 345-346, who covers the 
same ground. 
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intelligibles. This means that I do not have the work of supporting Fine’s coherentist reading, 
or arguing that Plato means particularly knowledge of propositions, but I do need to argue 
that Plato’s epistemology is a scale and involves an ascent that is not purely intuitive. 
Accounts that use intuition as a mechanism for ascending the Platonic epistemological scale, 
like Robinson’s, portray Plato as less rational than my account. To be clear, my account does 
leave room for intuition in some sense, but it is not at all the most important factor in my 
reading of Plato’s middle epistemology. 
This means that I need to argue for an ascent in Platonic epistemology that is not 
largely accidental.57 The ascent passage in the Symposium provides a picture of an ascent to 
higher principles, but it lies outside the scope of the current study to provide a full exposition 
of this (although I would point to it as part of an appeal to wider evidence in Plato). This is a 
problem I shall tackle in two ways: first, in this section, I shall produce my own reading of 
the divided line that explains the path to knowledge as an upward ascent from sensibles-
based reasoning, although I am not suggesting that it is the sense faculties that are involved in 
dianoia. Secondly, in the following chapters, my reading of the passages from Meno and 
Phaedo will highlight text-based evidence of this kind of ascent in Plato.  
All in all, Fine’s account of Plato’s epistemology makes him extremely modern, in 
that she thinks he conceives knowledge in terms of explanation and interconnectedness, not 
in terms of certainty or vision. According to Fine, Plato thinks that one knows more to the 
extent that one can explain more; but she thinks ‘this is only to say that, for him justification 




                                                
57 Again, I am grateful to Simon Trépanier for his constructive criticism on this subject. 
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ii. Propositions or Objects: Gonzalez on Fine 
 
Fine’s work has been much debated and criticised. The most controversial issues that have 
been identified with Fine’s reading are her reliance on propositions to explain Plato’s theory 
of knowledge and her rejection of the division of the objects of knowledge and belief. One of 
the most definitive criticisms of Fine is that of Gonzalez (1996) pp. 245-275, who attacks 
Fine’s rejection of the ‘objects analysis’ of the divided line and argues that her 
‘propositional’ reading is untenable. Gonzalez does this mainly through his reading of 
Republic V, which takes an ‘existential-predicative’ reading, which seems to demand 
knowledge by acquaintance, rather than propositional knowledge. He also accuses Fine of not 
abiding by her own dialectical requirement. A third controversial aspect of Fine’s reading is 
her ‘coherentist account’ of Platonic knowledge, especially dianoia. Gonzalez does not tackle 
this aspect, but, as we have discussed it above, we shall now turn to Gonzalez’ account. 
 As we saw, Fine’s use of the dialectical requirement to argue against the existential or 
predicative readings relies on their alleged contentiousness as opening premiss. Gonzalez 
argues that, if the text is read correctly, there is actually nothing controversial in the 
existential or predicative readings. These two readings, he says, are mutually supportive and 
consistent with the text; they also fulfil Fine’s dialectical requirement. Why should it be 
controversial to equate knowledge with perception? If, Gonzalez says, we are trying to 
persuade the sight-lovers, surely the opposite is true, and there is no good reason to prefer 
propositional knowledge. In this case, we should be thinking about Platonic knowledge as 
knowledge by acquaintance. 
In Gonzalez’ favour, we can find passages in middle Plato that do seem to give 
examples of knowledge by acquaintance. For example, in Meno, Socrates speaks of knowing 
Meno and being able to recognise him, and his thought experiment about the way to Larissa 
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has also been interpreted as supporting a theory of knowledge by acquaintance (or at least 
holding this as an unarticulated assumption).  
 In addition, later works such as the Timaeus sometimes seem to support the objects of 
belief and knowledge as being diverse:  
 
If intelligence and opinion are different in kind, then these ‘things-in-themselves’ certainly exist, 
forms imperceptible to our senses… now there is no doubt that the two are different, because they 
differ in origin and nature (Timaeus 51dff). 
 
 This in itself is not conclusive; other passages in middle Plato conversely seem to 
support the idea of knowledge and belief sharing objects, in that knowledge is true belief plus 
something. There is the lengthy discussion in the Theaetetus of the hypothesis that 
knowledge is ‘correct judgement and an account’ (202d). This question is not resolved, but it 
is an argument that Plato seems to take seriously. Moreover, Fine herself uses the Larissa 
example of the Meno to support her case.58 As we shall discuss in the Meno section, she sees 
the passage as further proof that Plato is not committed to the Two Worlds theory in the 
middle period. She thinks that the Meno contains Plato’s first suggestion that knowledge is 
true belief plus something.59 
 In this case, we need something more than an initial intuitive preference for 
knowledge by acquaintance in Plato in order to defeat Fine on this point, and we need to at 
least make sure that this reading is consistent with the text. Gonzalez thinks that he can also 
show that both his existential-predicative reading and knowledge by acquaintance are 
philosophically coherent with each other, and that they are consistent with the text. 
                                                
58 Fine (2004) pp. 48-81 thinks that the passage contains Plato’s suggestion that there are similarities between 
knowledge and true belief. They are both are equally good guides (to Larissa and in action) and can have as 
their objects at least some of the same things (Larissa and how to double the area of a square).  
59 See section two of this thesis for more discussion of this topic. 
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He points out that we need not interpret the predicative reading as absurdly meaning 
that one cannot know that something is both F and not-F. We can see it as claiming that 
knowledge of what F is cannot be ‘set over’ what is both F and not-F. He refers to Charles 
Kahn’s (1996) observation that ‘to speak of what F is or what is (truly) F for Plato, is to 
speak of the same thing.’60 Predication, for Plato, is not predication in the modern sense: ‘In 
the predication ‘x is F,’ what is primarily referred to is not the x, but the F’ (Gonzalez [1996] 
p 254). Gonzalez thinks that he has found support for this view at Republic 524a, which he 
reads as setting perception over ‘not the sensible object per se as a substance distinct from its 
properties, but the properties themselves’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 255).61 This, thinks Gonzalez, 
puts the predicative reading on at least an even footing with Fine’s predicative reading as a 
noncontroversial opening premiss, especially as he thinks that the parallel to knowing and 
perceiving is natural to the sight-lovers. 
  Gonzalez points to the debate about the meaning of doxa. Doxa has been connected 
to judgement by some scholars, whereas others maintain that it is ‘more analogous to 
perception, being essentially intuitive and even nonpropositional’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 256).62 
Gonzalez’ position is to remark that perception can be the basis for statements of what F is, 
and if that perception is confused, those statements can be true or false: 
 
It is undeniable that Plato sees the person whose cognitive state is doxa as believing that 
certain things are the case and thus as affirming numerous true propositions…However, it is 
nevertheless possible that when Socrates speaks of doxa he is referring primarily not to the 
                                                
60 Cited in Gonzales (1996) p 254. 
61 To Gonzalez, this is the most important point of response to Fine’s theory. His argument relies on the 
complementary natures of the existential and predicative readings, so he needs to prove that Socrates does not 
mean that we cannot believe something to be both equal and unequal. This is one of Fine’s points against the 
objects analysis, but I do not think it is as important as her main argument about the possibility of having beliefs 
about Forms and knowledge about sensibles.  
62 Cf Bluck (1963) pp 30-43, who cites the example of finding the way to Larissa as relating to the role of 
intuition in doxa. 
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assertion that something is F, but rather to the confused intuition of F itself that underlies and 
guides this assertion (Gonzalez [1996] p 256). 
 
 He argues that perception of beauty, for example, is for sight-lovers confined to 
sensible objects that are as ugly as they are beautiful, is equally ‘set over’ ugliness and 
therefore cannot clearly separate the two. Gonzalez believes that this suggests doxa is 
perceptual rather than propositional. This depends very much on his interpretation of the 
predicative reading, in which knowledge and belief are assigned to objects. On his view, the 
predicative reading complements the existential reading. He weighs in on the debate about 
understanding by saying, ‘knowledge here is understanding and acquaintance, understanding 
achievable only in direct acquaintance with certain objects; doxa is the failure to achieve such 
understanding on account of the character of the objects with which it is acquainted’ 
(Gonzalez [1996] p 258). 
 Gonzalez then turns to Fine’s rejection of what she thinks is a nonsensical notion of 
degrees of existence, a debate which itself has attracted a lot of interest. Fine thinks it is 
nonsensical to say that a thing has degrees of existence: something has to either exist or not 
exist; it cannot half-exist, or vary in degrees, the way that its properties can.  
Fine’s view is supported by Annas ([1981] pp. 195-199) and Vlastos ([1973] pp. 58-
75), both of whom agree that the notion makes no sense. Gonzalez remarks that the Greeks 
did not possess our concept of existence, and claims that Vlastos’ fixation on contemporary 
usage in beside the point. According to him, Plato does not distinguish a thing’s ‘substance’ 
from its ‘properties’ in the way that Fine thinks. Gonzalez argues that, for Plato, existence is 
always einai ti, being something; there is no concept no concept of existence as such, for 
subjects of an indeterminate nature. 
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 The distinction between the predicative and existential readings of the word ‘is’ 
which Fine imposes onto Plato, says Gonzalez, makes it look as though Plato is confused. 
Both the existential and predicative readings can be found in the text, but that is not because 
Plato is confused, but because, for Plato, they are simply different aspects of the same 
meaning. Gonzalez thinks he has shown that they do not violate the dialectical requirement, 
and the two kinds of knowledge they require (‘knowledge what’ and ‘acquaintance’) are 
compatible and complementary.  
 It is Fine’s reading, Gonzalez argues, that is incompatible with the text. He says that 
the combined existential-predicative reading is compatible with the objects analysis and 
incompatible with Fine’s veridical reading, which itself is compatible with the contents 
analysis. The latter is, according to Gonzalez, incompatible with the text for the following 
reasons: 
 First, it is difficult to square with the language of the argument that strongly suggests 
objects; Socrates’ claims seem to assign knowledge to what exists and ignorance to what 
does not exist. Second, it is difficult to fit Fine’s reading into the broader context of the 
argument: the dispute with the sight-lovers concerns the knowledge of and existence of 
beauty itself, not of propositions. Their dispute with the philosophers is about what objects 
can be known, in which case it is difficult to fit in Fine’s reading with the argument. 
Gonzalez concedes that these two points are not decisive, and does not elaborate. The next 
two points, though, he says are major difficulties: 
 Gonzalez’ third point is to find a problem with Fine’s idea of knowledge and belief 
being different capacities set over the same things. Gonzalez63  points out that the analogy 
with sights and sounds would break down if Fine’s reading were correct: we cannot see 
sounds, or hear sights. He thinks that Fine is wrong in saying that the word epi can be set 
                                                
63 Cf Stokes (1992) pp. 103-132, who makes a similar point. 
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over contents as well as objects, saying that there is no textual basis for such a use.64 
Moreover, even if we ignore the problems Gonzalez sees with epi, he says that there are 
claims made in the text are inconsistent with Fine’s interpretation.  
At 478b3-4, Socrates says that what is known is ‘what is’ so what is believed must be 
something ‘other than (ἂλλο ἢ) what is.’ For Fine’s reading to work, we need to interpret 
ἂλλο ἢ as ‘not only, but also,’ rather than ‘other than.’ This is because Fine wants to say that 
what is believed is what is false in addition to what is true. Gonzalez thinks that we cannot 
justify such an interpretation, when the text can be much more economically explained by 
saying that the province of belief is a third thing distinct from the provinces of knowledge 
and ignorance. He thinks that the decisive passage comes at 478e1-2, where the objects of 
belief are said to participate in both being and non-being. As a thing is not identical with that 
in which it participates (Gonzalez [1996] p 268), belief needs to be different from both being 
and non-being, and cannot be a mere combination. Gonzalez thinks that the mention of 
participation makes it ‘as clear as possible’ that belief is set over sensible objects (Gonzalez 
[1996] p 268). 
Moreover, Gonzalez continues, Socrates says that it is impossible to believe what is 
not, so if Fine reads ‘what is not’ as meaning ‘what is false’, then she is making Socrates 
claim that all beliefs are true: ‘but if all beliefs are necessarily true, then the only distinction 
Fine recognises between belief and knowledge is collapsed’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 268-9). 
Gonzalez’ fourth point is that Fine violates her own dialectical requirement. Her 
interpretation requires two assumptions. Firstly, ‘there is just one property, the F, the same in 
all cases, in virtue of which all and only F things are F.’ Secondly, ‘we cannot know anything 
about F things unless we can define what F is’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 270).65 These assumptions 
                                                
64 This claim is extended by Gonzalez, who argues that this reading also incorrectly reduces the epi to the 
difference between the fallibility and infallibility of the work that belief and knowledge do and thus eliminates it 
as a distinct criterion; see Gonzalez (1996) p 267. However, Gonzales does not elaborate on his point here. 
65 Referring to Fine (1990) pp. 85-115. 
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are necessary in order to argue that all knowledge of sensibles requires knowledge of Forms. 
However, Gonzalez says, ‘it is hard to imagine assumptions that would be more controversial 
than these to the lovers of sights and sounds’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 270). In this case, Fine 
violates her own dialectical requirement, in a way more serious than the one with which she 
charges rival interpretations and Fine’s argument is refuted on its own terms.66 
As for Gonzalez own theory, he admits that Fine has legitimate concerns about the 
Two Worlds theory in Plato. He thinks that the existential/predicative reading can provide a 
solution. He says that we can still have justified true belief about the sensibles, but that this is 
simply not what Socrates means by epistēmē: the sensibles are simply not objects relevant to 
knowledge. 
Moreover, he says, we need to recognise that the relation between Forms and 
sensibles is not one between two completely distinct worlds, because sensibles are 
instantiations of the Forms. In this case, recognising beautiful objects needs some awareness 
of the Form of Beauty, but it is a ‘dream-like’ awareness that fails to distinguish the Form 
from the sensibles. In the sense that the Form is deficiently grasped through the sensibles, 
doxa can be about the Form; but the cognition of doxa is still set over the sensibles. The 
deficiency of doxa lies in its indirectness. ‘Therefore, when Socrates claims to have only 
doxa concerning the Form of the Good, he means that he is in some sense confined to 
sensible images (such as the sun) in his understanding of the good, that the good is not a 
direct, explicit object of his cognition’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 273). 
By the same reasoning, Gonzalez thinks he can explain the philosopher’s descent into 
the cave: ‘the philosopher knows the sensibles precisely as imperfect images of forms that 
transcend them…because this knowledge is not of sensibles, but of forms…it can reveal  
                                                
66 However, I think that Gonzalez’ reading of Fine’s dialectical requirement makes her claim too strong; she 
allows Plato to build in some more controversial assumptions and concedes herself that the One over Many 
assumption and Priority of Knowledge of a Definition assumption might be controversial to the sight-lovers 
(1999 n. 13 and 15 pp 222-223). 
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sensibles for what they are’ (Gonzalez [1996] p 273). It is not the shadows on the cave wall 
that the philosopher knows, but the fact that they are imitations of sensible things. 
Gonzalez' account has the virtue that the bridge between the Two Worlds is provided 
by the objects themselves. In this case, knowledge and belief are not divorced completely, but 
related (like dreaming and waking) as their objects are related. Can this be what Socrates 
means? Gonzalez’ reading is supported by his reading of Republic 520, in which Socrates 
tries to persuade the philosophers to return to the cave: 
 
For once accustomed [to the darkness] you will see with infinitely greater clarity than those 
down there, and you will know what each of the images is, and what it is an image of, 
because you have seen the truth concerning the beautiful, the just and the good (Republic 
520c3-6).67 
 
Gonzalez takes this to mean that it is not the sensibles of which the philosopher has 
knowledge, but their relationship to Forms. It is a very elegant reading and, if he is correct, it 
could be a good starting point for an answer to the Two Worlds problem. I say ‘starting 
point’ because Gonzalez devotes very little space to the solution, whereas what he (or, at 
least, Plato) needs is a fuller metaphysical account of the relationship of Forms and sensibles, 
and how this correlates to his epistemological explanation.  
The distinction between the dream-state of belief and the wakened state of knowledge 
does seem to come down at least in part to the ability to know what each thing is a shadow of, 
as Socrates continues, ‘and so our state and yours will be really awake, and not merely 
dreaming like most societies today…’ (520c). However, this passage does not explicitly limit 
the philosopher to the sort of awareness-knowledge that Gonzalez would like. Lee’s 
translation has the philosophers able to ‘distinguish the various shadows, and know what they 
                                                
67 Cited in Gonzalez (1996) p 273. 
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are shadows of,’68 which could be taken to mean that the knowledge is of sensibles as well as 
Forms. Moreover, is only initially that the returned philosophers cannot compete with the 
prisoners 'before his eyes got used to the darkness' (Republic 517a).  
With this in mind, the above passage is not conclusive evidence for Gonzalez’ 
reading. In addition, he needs to explain how his solution answers the problem that he is 
attempting to solve. How should the knowledge of what the sensible object is an image of 
equip the philosopher to rule any better than the others? On Gonzalez’ reading, the only 
difference between the philosopher and the other citizens is that he knows that a just act is a 
reflection of the form of Justice; but how does this furnish him with the tools he needs to 
rule? 
One solution would be to argue that Plato does not mean that the philosophers are 
better rulers because they have knowledge of the sensibles, but for some other reason. 
Socrates emphasizes another reason for wanting the philosophers to return to the cave: ‘The 
truth is that if you want a well-governed state to be possible, you must find for your future 
rulers some way of life they like better than government…what we need is that the only men 
to get power should be men who do not love it, otherwise we shall have rivals’ quarrels’ 
(520e-521b).    
But does Plato really want the philosophers to undergo decades of training for the sole 
purpose of turning the future rulers into selfless politicians? Undoubtedly, Plato sees their 
unwillingness to rule as an advantage, but this is not all: the philosophers are ‘better and more 
fully educated than the rest and better qualified to combine the practice of philosophy and 
politics’ (520b). This suggests that the expertise of the philosopher bridges the gap between 
the sensible and the intelligible, which could at least in part be explained by Gonzalez’ idea 
of knowledge-awareness if he expanded his idea a little. However, Gonzalez would still need 
                                                
68 Lee’s translation of the Republic (1897) p. 263; my italics. 
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to account for the fact that Republic 520 does seem to suggest knowledge of the sensibles as 
well as their relationships to the Forms they imitate. 
To summarize, the main charges that Gonzalez levels against Fine are that Fine 
violates her own dialectical requirement69 and that her idea of knowledge and belief being 
different capacities set over the same things is inconsistent with the text. The second point 
boils down to her rejection of the Two Worlds theory and her related view of Platonic 
knowledge as propositional, which seems to be the sticking point of her theory.70 The 
problem is that Plato never explicitly says that knowledge is propositional, so even if her 
reading can be made consistent with the text, it is difficult to see why we should prefer it to 
the others.  
On the other hand, should we endorse any reading that seeks to separate out the 
various functions of einai so starkly? Is Gonzalez justified in saying that the reading should 
be only existential-predicative and not propositional? In Greek, einai can be existential (‘x 
exists’); veridical (‘x is true’); predicative or copulative (‘x is F,’ with F being some 
property) or the ‘is’ of identity. Plato was certainly aware of its different functions, and the 
potential chaos it can cause in philosophical argument.71 But can we assume that Plato 
consciously wanted to work such a distinction into his philosophy?72 Surely knowledge of a 
                                                
69 All I would say about this is that the dialectical requirement is probably more important to Fine than it is to 
Plato, so her own violation of it is serious only to the extent to which her argument relies on it; Plato never 
explicitly says that his opening premises must be intuitive to sight-lovers. I have already noted that I think 
Gonzalez’ statement of Fine’s requirement is too strong, and only applies to the arguments opening premises. 
This still leaves us with the question of whether the chosen reading of what knowledge and belief are set over is 
controversial (ie, is it knowledge by acquaintance or propositional knowledge?), but does not necessarily apply 
to the two points that Gonzalez mentions in his concluding argument. In fact, her argument does not rely on the 
dialectical requirement entirely, but also draws upon her readings of the Meno, Theaetetus, Aristotle and other 
passages of the Republic. 
70 Fine’s point is a controversial one. Here, she rejects only the epistemological division of the Two Worlds, ie, 
that we cannot have knowledge of sensibles and beliefs about Forms. She does not reject the metaphysical 
separation of Forms and sensibles here; for this, see Fine (1995) pp. 44-65. 
71 See Euthydemus 283b-d; or Parmenides 132; Cf Waterfield’s comments in his (1987) translation of 
Euthydemus 284c for his remarks on the implication in Greek that that things we think are ‘somethings,’ which 
exist and are true.  See also Kahn (1993) pp 131-142 on the same point. 
72 Gonzalez would say that we need to assume that he does make such a distinction in order to avoid 
incompatibility with the text. However, this rests on an assumption that the deeper implications of Plato’s theory 
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Form leads to true descriptions of it, and these are included in the Platonic conception of 
knowledge?73 So even if Plato does take the ‘objects’ reading, it should still be possible to 
make true propositions about the things you know. 
Much remains unresolved, and given that there are a few big fights I want to pick, I 
must leave aside those points that do not directly affect my argument. This said, there are 
several major issues raised here, which my own account will need to address, when it comes 
to placing it in the debate. Fine’s work is one of the most controversial (but well-known) 
readings of Plato’s epistemology in recent times; I do not endorse everything she says, but 
there are some points she makes that I think deserve to be taken seriously. In this section, I 
have tried to make clear what these are. Namely, I do not think that Plato makes the 
distinction between propositional knowledge and object-based knowledge that Fine (or 
indeed Gonzalez!) proposes. Moreover, although I think that her coherentist explanation is 
very elegant, I think she needs to appeal more to the history of mathematics to make her case. 
Given that I think my account will be consistent with either her coherentist reading, or a 
foundationalist account, I shall not explore this aspect further. 
However, I do think that Fine makes a valuable point in that we should not so readily 
reject the possibility that Plato allows for knowledge of the sensibles and beliefs about the 
Forms. As she says, it would be strange if the philosopher-ruler can know the Form of 
Justice, but he cannot know whether his actions are just ([1999] pp. 215-246). In this case, 
there are serious implications for Plato’s political theory if there can be only knowledge of 
Forms, and Fine thinks we might reasonably question whether we can see the Republic as an 
attempt to convince us that the philosophers should rule.  
                                                                                                                                                  
were philosophically coherent (his third point against Fine), and even if we use the principle of charity, we 
cannot be sure that Plato has this worked out and leaves it implicit. 
73 Cf White (1993) Chapter One pp. 1-33. White proposes that true propositions can be deduced from 
definitions, surely the result of knowledge of a Form, although he does go on to give an alternative reading in 
Chapter Two pp. 35-61. 
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This said, there is a problem in treating the objects of the lower part of the line as 
objects of knowledge in the strict sense, because the objects of the sensible world are 
constantly changing. One solution might be to say that the Philosopher-rulers use knowledge 
of the Forms to guide their decisions in the sensible world. If we adopt the 534a version of 
the line, dianoia could be a form of noēsis but also something less than knowledge; I have 
already stated my reasons for not doing this (Section One, Chapter One). On my reading, 
dianoia can still provide the foundations of knowledge while still falling short of the 
epistemic achievements of the top segment of the line. Whereas Fine’s account entails that 
that there must be knowledge of perceptibles, my account does not necessarily need to argue 
for this. Even if knowledge and belief are set over different objects, this does not have to 
mean that each of the four sections of the line have their own objects. In Republic 510d-511a, 
Plato distinguishes between the objects of investigation (Forms, according to the traditional 
reading) and the tools that the mind uses in this kind of inquiry: the tools of dianoia are 
images and hypotheses; those of noēsis are ti estis. I argue that what differentiates noēsis and 
dianoia are their tools, not their objects, so my reading does not imply that mathematicians 
are not talking about Forms. 
What I mean is this: the objection to Platonic knowledge about sensibles and beliefs 
about Forms is that it contradicts Plato’s remarks in Republic V, that knowledge and belief 
are ‘set over’ different things. The four mental states that are represented by each subsection 
of the line are not introduced here, so there is no reason for saying that dianoia and noēsis, 
both kinds of knowledge, cannot be set over the same thing. That is, even if we accept that 
there is a difference between the objects of knowledge and belief, we still have no reason to 
assign different objects to each of the mental states that compose them. Of particular 
importance for this project, I do think that Plato means that we can reason dianoetically about 
Forms. That is, we can use the tools of hypothesis and imagery, which characterise dianoia, 
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to make inquiries about Forms. I shall try to illustrate the fact that Plato himself does this in 
the Meno and the Phaedo in the relevant sections. First, though, I shall need to present my 
own interpretation of the divided line, which allows for this reading of Plato.  
 
Chapter Three: My Reading 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present my own reading of the epistemology of the Republic, 
focusing on the divided line, but drawing on the issues raised in books V-VII. I shall argue 
that the line does represent an epistemological scale for Plato, but even if we say that 
knowledge and belief have distinct objects, noēsis and dianoia may concern the same things. 
After discussing the extent to which the allegories may be taken literally, I shall go on to 
present my reading of each of the states of mind and the kinds of tools that each state of mind 
uses to do its work. 
 
i. How Seriously Should We Take the Allegories? 
 
Socrates himself admits that the allegories are not a satisfactory account of what he is trying 
to say, calling it a ‘poor, blind, halting display,’ (Republic 506c17-d1) and we will, in 
Chapter Three ii. b of this section, discuss Plato’s famous criticisms of the use of images. On 
the other hand, they do seem to provide the most detailed account of Plato’s epistemology in 
the middle dialogues, and the prominence Plato gives to them would suggest that he means us 
to take them seriously. However, some people have gone so far as to makes claims about 
Plato’s epistemology based on the mathematical proportions of the line rather than what Plato 
says; others have tried to map the epistemology of the line exactly onto that of the cave.  
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 We should be wary about Plato’s use of imagery to make a philosophical point, given 
his own reservations and the general difficulties with the use of analogy in philosophical 
argument. One person who has been notoriously critical of Plato’s use of analogy in this 
passage is Julia Annas. She writes,  
 
The imagery is apt to get overloaded, as happens with the Line, because Plato is trying to do 
two things at once with it. And the detail of the imagery tempts us to ask questions that 
cannot be satisfactorily answered within the terms of the imagery; if we treat it with 
philosophical seriousness, the image turns out incoherent (Annas [1981] p 252). 74  
 
 Annas means that she thinks the line is not just an extended analogy to complement 
that of the sun, but also an ambitious classification of the epistemological states of mind in its 
own right: ‘as often happens with Plato, his eagerness to use analogy and images leads him 
into intellectual unclarity’ (Annas [1981] p 249). In addition to distinguishing the visible and 
intelligible realms, says, Annas, the line also puts them on a continuous scale of 
epistemological achievement. She also thinks that eikasia seems not to correspond to 
anything significant in our lives, being only there for the sake of the analogy, complains that 
dianoia seems to be too restrictive as it is confined to mathematical thinking, and remarks 
that the Form of the Good, so important in the simile of the sun, cannot fit happily into the 
line. Finally, she complains that it is unclear whether the cognitive states of the line are 
classified by their methods or by their objects. 
 Given the debate over the ‘objects’ and ‘contents’ analysis discussed above, Annas is 
right in that it is not immediately clear whether Plato’s line is divided according to the objects 
of knowledge, but I think my interpretation can answer some of her other concerns. My 
                                                
74 Cf Iris Murdoch (1977) p 68, which Annas also cites: ‘The Theory of Forms, when read in conjunction with 
the explanatory tropes of the Line and the Cave…can certainly produce some blazingly strong imagery in the 
mind which may well in the long run obstruct understanding.’  
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reading will suggest that, if we take eikasia to include images in the widest sense, it is more 
significant in our (and Greek) life than Annas thinks; moreover, I will argue that dianoia in 
the line is not restricted to mathematics, but can also be mathematical reasoning applied to 
philosophy. Finally, I will try to show that the line really is a continuum, and the four parts of 
it are not homogeneous. The early stages of dianoia look different from the later stages, as 
mathematical reasoning gradually turns the mind towards noēsis. Moreover, it is only at the 
later stages of noēsis that the Form of the Good comes into play. In this case, Plato’s use of 
the line analogy does not cause us the problems that Annas alleges. 
 However, there is no denying that the allegories have caused a lot of confusion, 
especially with regard to how literally to take them, and how they work together. My position 
is that we cannot expect them to be accurate with respect to all aspects of Plato’s theory, 
given that they are allegories rather than exhaustive descriptions of his thought. However, 
with regard to the epistemological points that Plato was trying to make, we can take them to 
be quite precise, and although we may not be able to map each directly on to the others, Plato 
does mean for them to work together. I certainly think, for example that the cave has a lot 
more to tell us about the line than has previously been thought. 
The major problem of how the line fits in with the sun has already been mentioned: 
Plato is not specific about how the Form of the Good fits in to the line.75 I shall have some 
suggestions for how this might work when I give my own reading, but here I want to say 
more about the correspondence with the cave. Along with the ascent passage in the 
Symposium, the cave allegory is one of the most powerful depictions of an epistemological 
ascent in Plato; as I shall want to say that the line can be seen as an epistemological ascent, it 
would be useful to see what the cave might have to tell us about this. 
                                                
75 Another issue is that, in the allegory of the sun, the visible is used as an analogy for the intelligible, whereas 
in the line passage, this analogy is discarded; however, as Plato is clear about where the analogy ends, it does 
not present any major problem for the relationship between the two. See Raven ([1953] pp. 22-32). 
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 Traditionally, it is thought that Plato meant the two figures to be parallel. This 
reading76 has it that there are four cognitive levels in the cave, corresponding to the four 
sections of the line, just as there are two ‘realms’ of the cave, corresponding to the two major 
parts of the line. These are: 
 
The intelligible, corresponding to epistēmē: 
Contemplation of the objects of the world above, corresponding to noēsis; 
Viewing of the reflections of objects in the world above, corresponding to dianoia. 
The visible, corresponding to doxa: 
Seeing the objects in the cave, corresponding to pistis; 
Watching the shadows on the cave wall, corresponding to eikasia. 
 
There are unquestionably four parts of the divided line, but Plato does not explicitly 
say that there are four stages to the cave allegory, so how can we be sure that he meant to 
map it onto the four stages of the divided line? Moreover, some think that Plato actually had 
two incompatible interpretations of the cave.77 If so, it is difficult to argue for such a close 
correspondence. In fact, some think that Plato never intended such a correspondence at all.78  
We could say that the cave represents the educational progress of the soul, and the 
line represents states of mind; in this case there is no need to try to argue for such a close 
correspondence between the two allegories. On the other hand, Plato’s comments at Republic 
517b would certainly seem to suggest that he wishes us to make such a connection, as we 
                                                
76 As described by Malcolm ([1962] pp. 38-45), although I do not retain Malcolm’s substitution of epistēmē for 
noēsis, and his modification of the list given at 511d . 
77 See Ross (1951) pp. 37-82, especially pp. 72-76. 
78 In the mid-20th Century, the traditional view began to be challenged; see Robinson (1953) pp.180-196. This 
resulted in a series of responses trying to argue for the unity of the three allegories; see especially Raven (1953) 
pp. 22-32, Malcolm ([1962] pp.38-45) and Ferguson (1963) pp.188-193. The discussion does not end here: even 
later scholars who think that harmonizing the line and cave allegories is problematic think that, ‘we would 
perhaps be tempted to harmonize Line and Cave even without Plato’s encouragement, since there is an obvious 
continuity of interest in the relation of image to the original’ Annas (1981) p 254. 
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mentioned in the above paragraphs. Moreover, there is a continuous development throughout 
the entire passage which some argue is often overlooked.79 The divided line is introduced as a 
way of ‘completing the analogy of the sun’ (509c)80 and the analogy of the cave picks up 
from the second division of the divided line into states of the mind. In this case, if there are 
no serious clashes between the allegories, we should take seriously the idea that Plato wants 
us to see the correspondence. 
 One of the main problems with drawing the comparison seems to be with the lowest 
stage, at which the prisoner sees nothing but shadows. The criticism is that a strict 
correspondence with the line would require this to be eikasia, ‘…and yet surely it is not true. 
Who lives all his life at this level?’ (Ross [1951] p 34). Moreover, it is argued, this would 
mean that pistis, which should mean conviction or confidence, bears no relation to the 
prisoner’s attitude immediately after his release, which is described as bewilderment. In this 
case, even if Plato himself asserts that his cave is parallel to his line, we must assert that it is 
not.81 
 However, this argument is certainly not conclusive: as Malcolm (1962 pp. 38-45) 
points out, there is no indication that the prisoner is to stay bewildered. Moreover, mapping 
the cave allegory onto the line need not involve precision in every aspect, including the 
psychological; we can say that the correlation is an epistemological, and perhaps also a 
metaphysical one.  
                                                
79 See Raven (1953) p 32: ‘Just as…the Divided Line continues and expands the analogy of the sun, so the 
allegory of the Cave continues and expands the Divided Line.’ Raven thinks that this continuity is overlooked 
due to Plato’s momentarily using the visible world as an analogy for the intelligible: In the last section of book 5 
of the Republic, Plato draws, in considerable detail, the contrast between opinion on the one hand, which 
concerns itself only with the particulars of the sense world and refuses to recognise the single Idea underlying 
the many, and knowledge and philosophy on the other, which always concentrate on the unique underlying 
Idea…When, however, we come to the analogy of the sun itself…the contrast is momentarily relegated into the 
background…[In book VI] he is reverting to the earlier contrast.’ (1953) pp. 30-31. 
80 Especially 509c1-2; Cf Raven (1953) pp. 22-32 for his remarks on this. Raven also points out that at 509d, 
Plato’s summary of the conclusions of the sun analogy confirms this point. 
81 Robinson (1953) pp. 180-196 expresses this view. 
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 Another problem that has been identified with correlating the sections of the line with 
stages in the cave centres on the moment at which the philosopher emerges from the cave: 
 
…when he emerged into the light his eyes would be so dazzled by the glare of it that he 
wouldn’t be able to see a single one of the things he was now told were real…Because, of 
course, he would need to grow accustomed to the light before he could see things in the upper 
world outside the cave. First he would find it easier to look at shadows, next at the reflections 
of the men and other objects in water, and later on at the objects themselves (516a). 
 
 This problem that people find with this passage is that the shadows and reflection in 
the world outside the cave do not seem to correspond to anything. Some people have tried to 
get around this, by suggesting that they correspond to mathematical objects,82 but, as I shall 
argue, it is not clear that Plato means mathematical objects (such as numbers and geometric 
shapes) to have their own ontological category.  
Some people want to make the divided line correspond to the cave, but not to the sun. 
From the beginning of the divided line passage, Bedu-Addo argues, Plato does not mean to 
identify the upper section of the line with the intelligible world of the sun passage. The 
grading of the objects of the line corresponds exactly to the grading of the symbols in the 
cave, because the objects of pistis and dianoia are the same. The equality of the two middle 
subsections of the divided line is intended to represent the ontological identity of the objects 
of pistis and dianoia.83 The difference is that, in dianoia, the mind ‘dreams’ about the Forms 
‘in the sense that it is quite unable to distinguish them in its thinking from sensible particulars 
which are the images of Forms’ (Bedu-Addo [1979] p 97). 
                                                
82 For example, Miller (2007) pp.310-342. 
83 These are not ‘intermediates’ because Plato is clear that the objects of dianoia are the same as those of pistis, 
but clearer. See Chapter Four of this section. 
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On this reading, Plato does not offer four grades of reality on the cave, but three, and 
these correspond to the line: 
 
Line:      Cave: 
Forms      Physical Objects in the Outer World 
(noēsis) 
Images of Forms Shadows and Reflections in the Outer 
(pistis and dianoia) World; Puppets and Statues in the Cave 
Images of Images of Forms   Shadows of Statues and Puppets 
(eikasia) 
 
According to Bedu-Addo, it is not to the allegory of the sun that we should be looking 
for an explanation of the distinction between noēsis and dianoia. Rather, we should look to 
book V of the Republic. When he describes the mental states of the divided line, Plato is 
relating all this to the metaphor of waking and dreaming. Dianoia is dreaming because it is 
unable to distinguish the original and its image. It wakes in noēsis when it distinguishes 
between Forms and particulars. 
I see two main weaknesses of Bedu-Addo’s account. First, if the divided line could be 
fitted to the cave so closely, we might also look for parallels between the line and the sun. To 
be fair to Bedu-Addo, he is not basing his argument on the presupposition of symmetry 
between the line and the cave; but he does rely on a break in the continuation between the sun 
and the line which, as we have seen, is not entirely justified.84 Secondly, the ‘Images of 
Forms’ that Bedu-Addo says make the objects of pistis and dianoia are not ontologically the 
same, neither in the cave, nor in Plato’s epistemology. While I agree that they are both 
                                                
84 Cf Raven (1953) pp. 22-32, discussed above. 
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images of Forms, in the cave, they each belong to clearly distinct worlds, and in the line, the 
treatment of sensibles is very different in dianoia to that in pistis. 
My account of the line will suggest that the shadows and reflections outside the cave 
may be the hypotheses and images of the divided line. My claim is not so strong as to argue 
that Plato explicitly intended this correlation (although this may in fact be the case); I am 
simply saying that it fits. 
 This is as far as I am prepared to go in using the cave to support my reading of the 
line: where Plato is specific about the connection, such as at Republic 517b, we can take him 
literally. Otherwise, any apparent correlation between the allegories must be taken as 
supporting evidence only; it must not be the driving force of the interpretation of the line. 
Even those who argue that there is no happy correlation between the allegories acknowledge 
their appeal to the imagination, even if they can be philosophically frustrating.85 In this case 
the allegories should be used to inform each other, but not at the expense of disregarding 
other evidence.  
 Some people have argued for a reading of the allegories that asserts the 
correspondence purely for the sake of preserving the symmetry. I shall be avoiding this; in 
addition, I also want to avoid readings that are driven by properties of the allegories that are 
possibly accidental, or that Plato may not necessarily see as relevant to what he wants to say. 
For example, Foley (2008 pp. 1-23) tries to argue that we can read more than Plato 
says into the mathematical proportions of the line. He points out that, although Plato never 
explicitly mentions the fact, the two middle subsections of the line are mathematically equal. 
However, in what he calls the overdetermination problem, he says that, according to the best 
interpretation of the passage, they are actually unequal, because ‘they represent mental states 
of unequal clarity, and possibly also objects with unequal degrees of reality’ (Foley [2008] p 
                                                
85 See especially Annas (1981) pp. 245- 246. 
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1).86 Plato was certainly aware of this, says Foley, and intended it to be discovered: ‘in 
Plato’s day and ours, only curiosity and rudimentary skills are required to discover it’ (Foley 
[2008] p 3). Moreover, Foley thinks that this is an intentional feature of the divided line 
analogy.87 He goes on to give his own theory about why Plato chose to do this, but given that 
Plato never specifically mentions the problem, he relies on the idea that it was intended to be 
built into Plato’s theory implicitly. 
Was this an intended feature of the line at all? Perhaps this is a minor unintended 
implication of the division procedure. Foley calls this the Gaffe Interpretation, saying that it 
suffers from a disadvantage from the outset, because ‘it is preferable, wherever possible, to 
prefer a consistent, successful interpretation’ (Foley [2008] p 12). This seems unfair, as Foley 
would surely not want to say that we should prefer a reading that made Plato’s argument 
consistent with other implications of his metaphors: if the sun will die one day, what does this 
mean for the analogy with the Form of the Good, which is said to be immortal? Foley seems 
to think that we need to argue that Plato is unaware of the mathematical consequences of his 
instructions, but this need not be the case. We need not claim that Plato was ignorant of the 
mathematical properties of the line, only that he viewed certain properties of it as irrelevant 
to his point.88 
In contrast to those who take such a literal reading of the divided line, Bedu-Addo 
([1978] pp. 111-127) argues that the mind of the dianoetic mathematician cannot grasp the 
mathematical Forms or any other supra-sensible entities at this stage. Plato describes him as 
dreaming about reality, and having doxa, rather than epistēmē (Republic 533b and 534c). It is 
only for the purpose of the divided line that Plato regards the doxa of dianoia as a lower 
                                                
86 This is not the first statement of the problem. See Brumbaugh (1954) pp. 91-104. 
87 Cf Denyer (2007) pp. 284-309, who notes the same thing. 
88 Foley also rejects the view that the subsections of the divided line are merely demarcation devices, as Reeve 
(1988) suggests: ‘This equality is simply not a functioning part of the simile, as the green of a shamrock was not 
a functioning part of saint Patrick’s use of it as a simile for the trinity.’ Foley dismisses this interpretation on the 
grounds that Plato compares pistis and dianoia, and that dianoia is arguably a clearer mental state.   
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grade of knowledge. Rather, we should interpret the four states of mind in the light of the 
metaphor of being awake and dreaming in relation to images and their originals. 
In fact, my position is very close to Foley’s position, emphasising the importance of 
mathematical thought in Plato, in that Foley thinks that Plato is committing himself to the 
importance of thinking mathematically in philosophical activity. To be fair to Foley, he does 
try to support his reading by reference to the importance that Plato gives to mathematics in 
the middle books of the Republic, and thinks that the line is an ontological taxonomy rather 
than an analogy per se (Foley [2008] p 20). However, he relies too much on implicit 
properties of the line, which Plato has himself acknowledged, is not a perfect account of his 
theory.89 Foley’s own suggestion, that Plato intended the equality of these two subsections to 
prompt debate outside the dialogue on the comparable qualities of the states of mind, is as far 
as I am prepared to go in terms of drawing conclusions from the mathematical proportions of 
the line; drawing conclusions about doctrine requires much more evidence than this.  
To summarise, although we should be wary when trying to use these allegories to 
provide a literal and coherent account of Plato’s theory, they can, when used carefully, have a 
lot to tell us about Plato’s theory. The allegories should not be forced into an exact 
correspondence, but they can certainly be used to inform each other, and their implicit 





                                                
89 Other scholars go deeply into the mathematical properties of the divided line. See, for example Balashov 
(1994) pp. 283-295, who discusses the division of the line into the mean and extreme ratio. I am certainly not 
against investigation into the divided line’s mathematical properties. In fact, I wholeheartedly agree with Foley 
that it is a virtue of this passage that the reader is encouraged to ‘interact dialogically with Plato’s writings, then 
leave them behind and think for herself’ (2008) p 23. My point is simply that we cannot use these implications 
to argue for a certain reading of Plato’s theory without more textual evidence than Foley seems to think 
necessary. 
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ii. Ascending the Scale  
I said that I would try to show that the divided line really is a continuum, and the four 
parts of it are not homogenous. This point is at the heart of my reading of the divided line, 
and is important to my solution to the problem of how hypotheses and imagery relate to each 
other. I am going to suggest that the early stages of dianoia look different from the later 
stages, as mathematical reasoning gradually turns the mind towards noēsis. The hypotheses 
and images are gradually replaced by ti estis (which, I shall explain, are Platonic definitions; 
see especially section two, chapter one for this) as the mind becomes more experienced in 
dianoetic thought, until at the later stages, it uses no images and reaches for the higher 
hypotheses of noēsis. I will try to show that arguments do not generally involve only one 
concept, so we may have a mixture of ti estis, hypotheses and images in the same discussion, 
which would place it in the higher stages of dianoia, below noēsis. It is beyond the scope of 
this project to resolve the debate about the nature of the Form of the Good, but I shall suggest 
that it is only at the later stages of noēsis that this is grasped by the philosopher. 
Inevitably, I shall need to argue for rather a wide scope to the states of mind. Eikasia, 
I shall argue, is not restricted to the images of physical things (either as contents or as 
objects), but includes the images made by artists that shape Greek moral life; pistis includes 
all physical things and dianoia is mathematical reasoning in philosophical arguments, as well 
as the investigations of the mathematicians.90 For the points about eikasia and pistis, I shall 
be appealing to books II, III, VI, VII and X of the Republic. For the point about dianoia, I 
shall appeal to the Republic, but also try to support this reading with additional textual 
evidence in the Meno and Phaedo sections. 
When I introduced the allegories, I pointed out that, when he comes to dianoia, there 
is a shift in the way that Plato is describing the parts of the divided line, at least if we take the 
                                                
90 Cf Fine (1999) p 233: ‘To be sure, the Line (unlike the Cave) is not an allegory. It describes literal examples 
of cognitive conditions – but they are only illustrative, not exhaustive, examples.’ 
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traditional ‘objects’ reading. According to this reading, for Plato the objects of inquiry are the 
first two subsections of the line: images and physical things. For the next two sections, he 
seems to focus more on the process by which the mind inquires, and the objects that the mind 
uses to inquire. He says that, in dianoia, the mind uses images and hypotheses; in noēsis, it 
proceeds from assumption to a first principle…pursuing its inquiry solely by and through 
forms themselves’ (510b). 
Forms must be the object of noēsis: even Gail Fine’s ‘contents analysis’ of the line 
allows for this; she just thinks that Forms are not exclusively the subject-matter of noēsis. 
However, no-one would want to argue that hypotheses and imagery are the objects of 
dianoia; even those who support the ‘objects analysis’ of the line would want to say that the 
objects of dianoia are Forms (mathematical or otherwise) or mathematical intermediates, if 
they support that particular reading.91 
Of course, this does not mean that the divided line passage contradicts the objects 
analysis; it is perfectly compatible with what Plato says in this section. It does mean that, if 
you want to support that particular reading, you need to admit that Plato is switching focus 
here, unless you want to say that Plato is talking about the tools that the mind uses for the 
first two subsections, instead of, or in addition to, the objects of inquiry. This is what I am 
going to suggest. As far as I am aware, my reading will be compatible with both the objects 
analysis, and the contents analysis, although it does share some things in common with Fine’s 
reading. What defines the states of mind of the divided line, I propose, is not the objects of 
inquiry, but the process of inquiry. In this, I am saying something similar to Fine, but also 
something less radical: I am not committing myself to the fact that epistēmē and doxa have 
distinct objects at this point. 
                                                
91 This is supported by Republic 510-511: “it is not about the square or diagonal which they have drawn that 
they are arguing, but about the square itself or diagonal itself, or whatever the figure may be.”  
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So what defines each state of mind? It is not, I shall argue, the objects of their inquiry, 
nor is it an awareness of the nature of these objects. That is, the fact that pistis, for example, 
may draw conclusions about physical things does not make it pistis; nor does an awareness 
that these physical things are different from intelligibles or images define pistis as a state of 
mind, although both of these things may be features of it. What defines pistis is that it uses 
physical things to draw conclusions. Each of the pathēmata en tēi psuchēi is what it is not 




Pistis, like eikasia, has a specific set of objects connected to it, which in this case is 
the set of physical things. Traditionally, this has been read as Plato emphasizing that pistis is 
about physical things, rather than that it uses them in its work. Undoubtedly, Plato introduces 
the divided line as an extension of the division that he has drawn in the allegory of the sun 
between the visible and intelligible worlds (Republic 509d). In 509e-510b, he simply seems 
to be talking about what kind of objects there are in each realm, without saying whether they 
are the tools or the subject-matter of each state, but in the descriptions of dianoia and noēsis, 
he is specifically talking about their tools. What if Plato meant for his descriptions of each 
subsection to be continuous throughout the passage? This would mean that, in eikasia, the 
mind uses images of sensibles with which to reason, and in pistis, it uses physical things. 
If we think about pistis in this way, we can place the method of the natural scientists 
in this scheme.92 Although nothing that would satisfy our definition of an ‘experiment’ 
existed in Greece at the time, there have been some attempts to use and manipulate the 
                                                
92 That is, insofar as they were natural scientists at all. In Plato’s day, the natural sciences were in their infancy. 
The Presocratic philosophers did make some advances in the field, but there was no developed methodology, 
and their experiments were more like demonstrations. There was no demarcation of the natural sciences from 
the other disciplines, and the early scientists were really early philosophers as much as scientists. 
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physical world in order to discover facts about it.93 Moreover, this seems to be the kind of 
thing to which Socrates refers in his criticism of Anaxagoras in his autobiography in the 
Phaedo. I will examine this in greater detail in the Phaedo section, and justify the connection 
I make between the autobiography and the divided line but for now I just want to mention it 
as an illustration of pistis. 
In his intellectual autobiography in the Phaedo, Socrates hopes to have found an 
authority on causation in Anaxagoras. However, these hopes are quickly dashed, when he 
finds that Anaxagoras uses physical entities to explain phenomena: things like air, ether and 
water ‘and many other oddities’ (Phaedo 98bc). Anaxagoras is using the physical world as a 
tool for inquiry: he wants to know about causation, so he looks at physical things in order to 
produce an account. 
Socrates’ problem with this kind of explanation is that it is no more use than saying 
that Intelligence is the reason for everything Socrates does, but then explaining his actions in 
terms of bones, sinews and other physical properties of the body. As Socrates points out, the 
reason his sinews and bones are in a prison in Athens, and not in some other place, is that he 
felt it was better to remain and submit to the penalty that had been imposed upon him 
(Phaedo 98e-99a). His major argument against Anaxagoras is that he is unable to distinguish 
between ‘the reason for a thing and the condition without which the reason couldn’t be 
operative’ (99b). That is, Socrates’ physical characteristics are required for him to be in a cell 
in Athens, but the reason for his being there is that he has decided it is better that way. We 
shall return to this in Section Three, Chapter Two i and ii. 
                                                
93 In order to support his argument that void does not exist, Anaxagoras inflates a wineskin with air, and tortures 
it to demonstrate that the air offers resistance. He encloses air inside a water-thief to show that the air assists in 
moving the water, in the style of a pipette (Aristotle, Physics 213a22-213b). Empedocles is convinced that there 
is no such thing as void and refers to the operation of a clepsydra, which, like Anaxagoras’ water-thief, lifts 
quantities of water out of the river using trapped air (Aristotle, On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death and 
Respiration 473a15. Other observations/experiments of Empedocles include the investigation of what the 
modern scientist would call centrifugal force with water in a cup, to develop theories about the motion of the 
heavens. See Aristotle, On the Heavens 295a15-22). 
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Pistis need not be limited to investigation into the natural world. In fact, I would 
suggest that many of Socrates’ interlocutors have this state of mind when they investigate 
moral entities. Often, when Socrates first poses a question about the ti esti of a thing, his 
interlocutor replies by listing instances of it from the physical world. In Euthyphro, when 
Socrates asks Euthyphro what holiness is, Euthyphro replies by giving particular examples 
from the sensible world: 
 
Well, I say that holiness is what I am doing now, prosecuting a criminal either for murder or 
for sacrilegious theft or for some other such thing, regardless of whether that person happens 
to be one’s father or one’s mother or anyone else at all, whereas not to prosecute is unholy. 
Take a look, Socrates, and I’ll show you clear evidence of divine law… (Euthyphro 5de). 
 
Meno does the same. When Socrates initially asks him for a definition of virtue, he 
provides a list of examples, drawn from his experience of the sensible world: a man’s 
capability of managing the city’s affairs; a woman’s skill in being a good housewife, her care 
with her stores and obedience to her husband (Meno 71e, 72a). Theaetetus’ response to 
Socrates’ question about knowledge is to list the kinds of knowledge that he knows from the 
sensible world, rather than thinking about knowledge itself: geometry, cobblery ‘and so on’ 
(Theaetetus 1146cd). 
Pistis, then, is drawing conclusions from observations of the physical world, whether 
that is from natural phenomena, or observations of human actions to draw conclusions about 
morality. The tools of pistis are physical things, but this does not mean that its subject-matter 
need be limited to the physical world; at this point, we are not committed either way to the 





With respect to eikasia, we are told little of the contents (or objects, depending on 
which reading you choose it take) of this section of the line, just that it is ‘one subsection of 
images…shadows, then reflections in the water and other close-grained, polished surfaces, 
and all that sort of thing, if you understand me’ (Republic 510a). If we take this to be an 
exhaustive list of what eikasia involves, it does seem rather obscure, as Annas complains 
(Annas [1981] p 250). However, I want to suggest that Plato might have in mind something 
that played very large role in Greek life: making claims based on poetry and the arts.  
As we can see from books III and X of the Republic, art and poetry contain reflections 
that are a third remove from reality. These are images, just as the shadows and reflections in 
the water and polished surfaces are images. In this way, I want to argue, we can legitimately 
make comparisons (in terms of ‘degrees of clarity’) with ‘all that sort of thing’ that Plato 
means when he refers to the shadows and reflections at Republic 510a.  
Plato describes poetry as mimēsis in book III of the Republic. He asks, ‘is not to 
assimilate oneself to another person in speech or manner to ‘represent’ the person to whom 
one is assimilating oneself?’ (393c). This kind of representation, says Plato, has far-reaching 
implications, and he goes on to discuss the effect of it on the citizens of the ideal state. 
In book X, Socrates explains the ‘real nature’ of such representations as poetry,94 an 
explanation that also applies to art. The group’s procedure is that ‘we usually postulate a 
single form for each set of particular things, to which we apply a single name’ (596a). So 
there is one Form for a bed, and one for a table. Next, we have the physical instantiations of 
the bed and the table. A painter can create a bed in some sense, but this only a representation 
of the physical object; this is even compared to holding a mirror up to the world to ‘make’ a 
reflection (596de).  The same goes for the (tragic) poet: ‘if his art is representation, (it) is by 
                                                
94 At least, the poetry that he classes as ‘representation’ in book III. 
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nature a third remove from the throne of truth; and the same is true of all other representative 
artists’ (597e). In fact, the artist does not even represent physical things as they are, but as 
they appear, for if you look at a physical bed from a different angle, it will look different. 
Plato then goes on to examine the implications of this for poetry: 
 
We must go on to examine the claims of the tragedians and their chief, Homer. We are told 
that they are masters of all forms of skill, and know all about human excellence and defect 
and about religion; for – so the argument runs – a good poet must, if he is to write well, know 
all about his subject, otherwise he can’t write about it. We must ask ourselves whether those 
who have met the poets have, when they see or hear their works, failed to perceive that they 
are representations at the third remove from reality, and easy to produce without any 
knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances and not realities; or are they right, and 
do good poets really know about the subjects on which the public thinks they speak so well? 
(598e-599a). 
 
 The answer to the final question is negative. If a man was capable of producing an 
original, surely he would not devote himself to the manufacture of copies (Republic). The 
tragedian does not really know about the things he represents: 
 
We may assume, then, that all poets from Homer downwards have no grasp of truth but 
merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat, including human excellence 
(599a). 
 
 Plato hints at the connection of this passage to the divided line. A painter may paint a 
picture of a bridle and bit, but these are made by a harness-maker and smith. The makers do 
not know what the bridle and bit ought to be like (or how to make a set); this knowledge 
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belongs to the horseman, who knows how to use them (Republic 601c). The maker of an 
implement has πίστιν ҆ορθήν: The user has direct experience, which gives him knowledge 
(Republic 601c-602a).95 
 What Plato is doing here is evaluating the epistemic merit of reasoning through 
images of sensibles. When we read the works of a poet, we are studying something that is a 
long way from truth; we are engaging with images of sensibles, and our state of mind is 
eikasia.  
As Lee points out in his translation of the Republic, ‘the claims made for the poets by 
Greek opinion were often extravagant. They treated the works of Homer and the poets as 
their Bible, and in Plato’s Ion Homer is claimed as a teacher of everything from carpentry to 
morals and generalship’ (Lee [1987] p 359). In this case, eikasia is not as insignificant as 
Annas claims.96  
On this reading of eikasia, we see how prominent it was in Greek life, and it becomes 
clear why Plato saw fit to give it a place on the divided line, and devote so much of Republic 
X in discussion of it. I would even suggest that we see hints of eikasia in the dialogues. In 
Protagoras 339a-347, Socrates and Protagoras engage on a discussion of Simonides’ poetry. 
This is Protagoras’ suggestion: he thinks that to become an authority on poetry is the most 
important part of a young man’s education. The passage forms part of a discussion on the 
nature of virtue, and the poetry is used to try to support the positions taken by Socrates and 
Protagoras in the dialogue. Socrates indulges Protagoras, but at the end of the passage 
suggests that they leave the subject of poetry: 
                                                
95 This is a potential stumbling-block for Fine’s rejection of knowledge by acquaintance in Plato. 
96 It has been pointed out to me that the word eikasia itself does not necessarily involve mistaking an image for 
reality, and that there is no suggestion that a reflection in water is not recognised as a reflection. Here is one of 
the points at which I think the line and cave allegories diverge: the fact that the prisoners in the cave fail to 
recognise that the shadows are not the true reality does not mean that everyone exercising eikasia is in the same 
position. For example, we might want to draw conclusions about morality by reading Homer, but that does not 
mean that we do not recognise Homer as a poet. As I will argue, whether or not one is in a particular state of 
mind does not depend on this kind of awareness. 
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Conversation about poetry reminds me too much of the wine-parties of second-rate and 
commonplace people. Such men…(are) too uneducated to entertain themselves as they drink by 
using their own voices and conversational resources… (Protagoras 347cd).97 
 
Socrates stresses the indirectness of this route to truth, although it forms such a large part 
of the Greek educational system. Having said this, in books II and III of the Republic, he does 
allow for the use of poetry as an educational tool: children learn from imitation, but adults are 
not exposed to it. Initially incapable of understanding, children can develop a taste for beauty 
and goodness (Republic 402a).98 This reinforces the idea of the divided line as an 
epistemological scale: eikasia, although the least preferable state of mind, can form the initial 
stages of education. Imitation is worthless as a source of knowledge, but may constitute a 
form of ‘play.’99 Eikasia, then, is drawing conclusions based on images, whether that is 
conclusions about a physical object based upon a reflection or shadow of it, or about 




I have argued for a reading of pistis and eikasia that takes the objects associated with them, 
physical things and images of physical things, to be the tools the mind uses when it is in that 
particular state. Although Plato is not specific about the fact that these are tools in the pistis 
and eikasia passages, I have grounded my reading in the remarks Plato makes about poetry 
                                                
97 Simonides is a lyric poet, so he escapes the harshest criticisms levelled at the poets in book III of the 
Republic. In lyric poetry, the poet speaks in his own person, so he is not producing the kind of mimēsis of which 
the tragic, comic and epic poets are guilty. On the other hand, drawing conclusions from a discussion of lyric 
poetry is still an indirect route to truth (Republic 393c-394c). 
98 Cf Nehamas (1999) pp. 251-269, who discusses the relevance of poetry in the early stages of development. 
99 See Republic 424-426: paidia is only to be forbidden if it is harmful. See Nehamas (1999) pp.251-269 for a 
discussion on this. 
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and the natural sciences in the Republic, Protagoras and Phaedo, as well as the actual 
practice of some of Socrates’ interlocutors in the dialogues. This, I have argued, gives us 
good evidence for taking the ‘tools’ reading of the passages when the text is unclear. In itself, 
this reading does not mean that we have to reject the ‘objects’ reading, because we could still 
say that, in pistis, for example, the mind uses the tools of physical objects to reason about 
physical objects.  
What it does mean, though, is that Plato’s main concern in the divided line passage is 
the tools that the mind uses in each subsection of the divided line. This is explicitly clear 
when Plato turns to his description of dianoia. Here, as I stressed when I introduced the 
allegories, Plato’s remarks are about what the mind uses in inquiry. In this section, I take the 
dianoia passage to be very much about the methodology, a view which has support from 
other scholars, such as Benson. However, unlike Benson’s ‘methodological’ reading, I am 
going to argue that the method of mathematics and the dianoetic method are the same, 
although the latter has a much wider scope in terms of subject matter. That is, it can be 
applied to ethics, mathematics and any other philosophical subject.  
Benson distinguishes between the ‘mathematical’ and ‘methodological’ view of the 
line (2010 pp. 188-208; 2011 pp. 1-34). The mathematical view, endorsed most famously by 
Burnyeat ([2000] pp. 1-81), is that the mathematical method is identical to the dianoetic 
method. Benson ([2011] p.2) describes this view as follows: “Plato is not distinguishing 
between a correct and incorrect application of the same method (or even between a better and 
worse method…Rather dianoetic is the correct application of the same method applied by 
dialectic. Dialectic is simply reserved for a further inquiry - an ontological inquiry - not 
pursued by dianoetic.” My reading has many similarities with this view, although I arrive at 
my reading through rather different means. The methodological view, Benson says, is that 
Plato does not identify mathematics and dianoia. Rather, mathematics as it should be done is 
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identical to dialectic, and the dianoetic method is rather the misapplication of the 
mathematical method by some mathematicians.  
 Both arguments have strong support. I am committed to the view that, when Socrates 
says that he is going to apply the practice of the geometers in the Meno, and when we reach 
the hypothetical passage in the Phaedo, he is committed to applying the method of 
mathematics to philosophy. Moreover, this is a second-best method, identical with the 
dianoetic method of the divided line. I shall make this argument in the Meno and Phaedo 
sections of this thesis; here, I want to look at the debate in the context of the Republic.  
Myles Burnyeat, whose reading falls into what Benson would call the ‘mathematical’ 
reading, distinguishes between two possible ways in which mathematics could be good for 
the soul. Isocrates, Plato’s arch-rival, argued that the value of mathematics is not the 
knowledge you gain in doing it, but process of acquiring it. Burnyeat likens this to a ‘dry-as 
dust classicist for whom the value of learning Greek had nothing to do with the value of 
reading Plato or Homer,’100 but rather it has to do with the rigorous discipline that helps train 
the mind.  
On the other hand, Alcinous, a later Platonist, says that mathematics provides the 
precision needed to focus on real beings: ‘mathematical objects can only be grasped by 
precise definition, not otherwise, so there is good sense in the idea that precision is the 
essential epistemic route to a new realm of beings.’101 This view, Burnyeat likens to 
‘enlightened classicists (who) promote Greek and Latin as means of access to a whole new 
realm of poetry and prose which you cannot fully appreciate in translation.’102 
Burnyeat says that the latter view seems more satisfactory. However, he argues that it 
does not go far enough. The comparison for his view ‘would be with a classicist who dared 
                                                
100 Burnyeat (2000) p 3. 
101 Burnyeat (2000) p 5; Annas (1981) pp 238-9, 250-1 and 272-3 also comments on this point. 
102 Burnyeat (2000) p 5. 
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claim that embodied in the great works of antiquity is an important part of the truth about 
reality and the moral life’ (Burnyeat [2000] p 5).  
Burnyeat points out that the goal of the mathematical curriculum is knowledge of the 
Good.103 We need to remember that, for Plato, the ‘real’ objective world is the world of 
Forms. The idea that we do not see the world as it is actually is not strange to the modern 
reader of Plato; but for us, the ‘world as it actually is’ is, according to scientists and many 
philosophers, a world of forces and particles, stripped of morality and values. For Plato, 
Burnyeat reminds us, mathematics can tell us about how things are objectively speaking, 
which is ‘precisely what enables us to understand goodness.’104 
Burnyeat’s point that mathematics’ value is not purely instrumental is evident in book 
VII of the Republic. Socrates says that mathematics ‘is really necessary to us, since it so 
obviously compels the mind to use pure thought in order to get at the truth’ (Republic 
526ab).105 Burnyeat admits that Plato also likes the fact that arithmetic makes you quicker at 
other studies (‘transferable skills,’ as Burnyeat puts it [2000 p 9] 106) and the fact that its 
demanding nature makes it a good test of moral calibre.107 However, Burnyeat argues that the 
transferable skills and practical application of mathematics (eg, the practical application of 
geometry in war108) are by-products, coming second in importance to pure theoretical 
knowledge. He cites several passages to support this,109 but the decisive passage is Republic 
527de: 
 
                                                
103 Referring to Republic 526de, 530e, 531c, 532c. 
104 Burnyeat (2000) p 8. Moreover, says Burnyeat, ‘It is this concept of impersonal, objective goodness that 
links the epistemology and metaphysics of the Republic to its politics’ (2000) pp 8-9. 
105 This point is also made at Republic 524d-526b. 
106 Supported by Republic 526b, 522c. 
107 See also Republic 503ce, 535a-537d for this.  
108 Also found at Republic 526d. 
109 Republic 525bc, in which the philosopher needs mathematics for a different reason than the generals; 526de, 
in which Socrates says that we should be thinking about whether geometry will help us to know the Form of the 
Good. 
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‘You amuse me,’ I said, ‘with your obvious fear that the public will disapprove if the subjects 
you prescribe don’t seem useful. But it is in fact no easy matter, but very difficult for people 
to believe that there is a faculty in the mind of each of us which these studies purify and 
rekindle after it has been ruined and blinded by other pursuits, though it is more worth 
preserving than any eye since it is the only organ by which we perceive truth.’ 
 
Burnyeat stresses: ‘The benefit of mathematics does not reside in its rigorous 
procedures’ (Burnyeat [2000] p 13). Rather, it turns the mind away from the sensible world 
towards the intelligible (Republic 527bc). Burnyeat argues that the mathematician does not 
study Forms directly, as we saw above, but that it is an intermediate epistemic state, which 
plays a pivotal, highly positive role in education. Mathematics is ‘the lowest-level 
articulation of the world as it is objectively speaking’ (Burnyeat [2000] p 42).  
Moreover, Burnyeat argues, ‘mathematics and meta-mathematics prescribed for the 
future rulers is much more than instrumental training for the mind. They are somehow 
supposed to bring an enlargement of ethical understanding’ (Burnyeat [2000] p 46). 
Burnyeat’s solution to the problem of how mathematics may perform this role is to appeal to 
the ethical value of concord and attunement. Burnyeat says that the concord, unity and 
proportion that we learn about through mathematics are valued because they create and 
sustain unity.  
Burnyeat appeals to Plato’s work in the Timaeus to support his reading. Concordant 
intervals sound good to the ear because of their imitation of the divine attunement (Timaeus 
80ab; 67ac).110 There is ethical value in concord and attunement, not least because of the 
strong emphasis placed on it in the Republic.111 Mathematical harmonics, argues Burnyeat, 
gives the philosophers ‘an abstract, principles understanding of structures they will want to 
                                                
110 Burnyeat also makes this point in (2000) pp. 47-53 and 64-67. 
111 See also Republic 401cd; 410a-412b, 441e-442a; 430e, 431e; 432ab, 442cd; 443de; 522a; cf Burnyeat (2000) 
pp. 53-54 for further explanation. 
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create and sustain when they return to the cave…Thus, knowing what numbers are 
concordant, and why, has a very great deal to do with the tasks of government, because 
concord is an important structural value at the lower level of ethics and politics’ (Burnyeat 
[2000] p 56). 
A satisfactory account of dianoia should explain how it can lead to noēsis. One way 
of doing this, as Burnyeat does, is to show that mathematics turns the mind towards 
intelligible things. The main virtue of Burnyeat’s account is that, along with accounting for 
the high level of respect that Plato has for the mathematical disciplines, he also provides a 
mechanism for ascending the epistemological scale using mathematics, which means that 
dianoia fits coherently into the divided line.  
For Burnyeat, mathematics is crucial in turning the mind away from the sensible 
world and towards the intelligible. He thinks that Republic 524d-526b is actually the first 
example of how it might do so. Here, Plato discusses the education of the philosopher, of 
which a major part is mathematics. Initially, the philosophers are to be trained in literature 
and music, which is to be complemented by physical training, but now Socrates is looking for 
a subject that will draw the minds of the philosophers from the world of change towards 
reality. He says that the discipline that all occupations make use of, but that, unlike other 
disciplines, leads to noēsis is mathematics.  
 According to Socrates, there are some things which have the drawing-power and 
some which do not: 
 
You see, there are some perceptions which don’t call for thought (noēsis), because sensation 
can judge them adequately, but others which demand the exercise of thought, because 
sensation cannot give a trustworthy result…By perceptions that don’t call for thought I mean 
those that don’t simultaneously issue in a contrary perception; those that do call for thought 
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are those that do so issue in the sense that in them sensation is ambiguous between two 
contraries, irrespective of distance (Republic 523ab). 
 
A finger, says Socrates, is an example of a perception that does not call for thought: 
‘Each of them looks as much a finger as any other… There is nothing here to force the mind 
of the ordinary man to ask further questions or to think what a finger is; for at no stage has 
sight presented the finger to it as being also the opposite of a finger’ (523d). 
The problem for Plato is that he needs to distinguish between the various mental 
representations here: he wants to say that the unit can somehow result in a higher kind of 
thought than the finger, but how are these objects of thought different? We are only given a 
hint at the answer: Plato describes how the ‘perception’ of the unit ‘by sight or any other 
sense’ (524d) does not draw the mind towards reality any more than the perception of a 
finger. However, when seen in conjunction with a plurality, as happens in arithmetic, it 
naturally ‘calls for the exercise of judgement and forces the mind into a quandary in which it 
must stir itself to think, and ask what unity itself is; and if that is so, the study of the unit is 
among those that lead the mind on and turn it to the vision of reality’ (524d). The difference 
here is analogous to the difference between thinking 'I am hungry' and thinking about the 
nature of hunger itself. 
Philosophers are thus asked to study arithmetic until they come to understand ‘by pure 
thought,’ (525c) the nature or metaphysics of numbers. In this way, the mind is forced to 
argue about ‘numbers in themselves’ (525d). Burnyeat describes the ascent thus: 
 
It is the most elementary example of the intellect (the instrument of the soul) being forced to 
turn towards something non-sensible and abstract. The next step is to go beyond counting and 
calculating to begin a systematic study of what Socrates calls ‘the nature of the numbers’ 
(525c) or ‘the numbers themselves’ (525d). Note the plural. This is number theory as we find 
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it in Books VII-IX of Euclid’s Elements. Recall the variety of kinds of number that Euclid 
sets out for study: even-times even, even-times odd, odd-times odd, prime number, numbers 
prime to one another, composite number, numbers composite to each other, perfect number. 
As you leave behind the everyday practice of counting and calculating (whether for trade or 
military purposes), a whole new realm of abstract objects opens to the eye of the soul 
(Burnyeat [2000] pp 75-76). 
 
Miller ([2007] pp. 310-342) provides a similar, fuller account of how mathematics 
might turn the soul towards the Forms, which accords with my idea of the divided line as a 
continuum. At Republic 394d, Socrates says that there is a ‘longer and fuller way’ to get the 
‘best possible view’ of the soul and its virtues, but does not take it here. At 504c, he suggests 
that the ‘longer way’ is the educational process of the philosopher-kings. The five 
mathematical studies (arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy and 
harmonics), taken as a sequence, form a ‘purgative ascent’ (Miller [2007] p 320) to the 
threshold of the Forms. Each stage of the mathematical curriculum in book VII purges a little 
more of the visible and sensible world. In calculation and arithmetic, we use pebbles in our 
visible models and many instantiations of pure units, ‘but it is by means of their spatial 
arrangements – in expanding triangles, squares and oblongs – that their defining kinds, the 
series of integers and of odds and evens, are collected and distinguished for thought’ (Miller 
[2007] p 321). In geometry, ‘we drop the pebbles and the units they represent in order to let 
the figures that they compose emerge in their own right and come to stand as proper objects’ 
(Miller [2007] p 321). In harmonics, by way of astronomy, we make another purgation: ‘we 
drop these figures in order to let the ratios they express emerge in their own right and come to 
stand as proper objects’ (Miller [2007] p 321). These ratios are neither visible nor spatial. 
Step by step, we have purged the sensible aspect of our studies, and prepared ourselves to 
turn to dialectic.  
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The mathematical studies, says Miller, allow us to ‘understand the intelligible as the 
very structure of the sensible.' Or, in Socrates’ ontological terms, even as we come to 
understand ‘being in its irreducible difference from and priority to ‘becoming,’ we also come 
to understand it as the very being of that which becomes. Accordingly, the ‘conversion 
should be understood as a process not just of departure, but, rather, of departure that is also 
return; in bringing the soul to the pure ‘understanding of being, philosophical education will 
bring it to the ‘understanding’ of becoming as well, in its dependence on being’ (Miller 
[2007] p 322-323). This account appeals to me, because it provides the bridge between the 
intelligible and the sensible that I said Gonzalez needed, when he tries to explain the 
application of knowledge of the Forms to the sensible world. It is a very elegant account, as it 
allows Plato’s metaphysics to do some of the work of his epistemology. 
Miller’s and Burnyeat’s explanations of the return of the mind is close to my own in 
that he makes mathematics the stepping stone to the world of the Forms, after being confined 
to the physical objects of pistis. However, I do not see that such an ascent should be made 
solely through the subject matter of mathematics, when Plato makes it clear that the 
mathematical method can be applied to other areas of philosophy. We see this in the passages 
of the Meno and Phaedo that will be discussed in the following sections, as well as in the 
ascent passage of the Symposium, which we mentioned before. My own reading makes not 
mathematics, but the mathematical method, the stepping stone, something I have in common 
with the ‘methodological’ approach. 
Benson ([2011] pp. 1-34) calls Burnyeat’s reading the ‘mathematical reading,’ as 
opposed to his own ‘methodological reading’. He admits that Burnyeat has made an 
impressive defence of this method, but says that, in spite of the many things to recommend it, 
Burnyeat’s reading is incorrect. Benson thinks that the dianoetic method is not identical to the 
mathematical method, but rather the misapplication of it by a subset of practising 
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mathematicians. In this sense, says Benson, Plato is not criticising mathematics, but 
mathematicians. The mathematical method and the philosophical method are identical. It is 
their subject matter that differs.  
As Benson concedes, the mathematical method has much to recommend it. Plato 
approves of the mathematical disciplines, and recommends the study of them, as we can see 
from Republic VII. Benson acknowledges that Plato’s remarks here are hardly critical of 
mathematics, and agrees with Burnyeat that the mathematician is forced, anagkazetai, to use 
hypotheses; he is not finding fault with this, as it is a necessary part of mathematics. The 
difference between noēsis and dianoia, says Benson, is not dianoia’s use of hypothesis, 
because dialectic uses these too. Rather, it is the use of images in dianoia, and the mistaking 
of the hypothesis for first principles by the dianoetician. 
Burnyeat anticipates the claim that it could be the mathematicians, not mathematics, 
that Plato is criticising, remarking that the mathematician makes epistemological, rather than 
methodological, mistakes. The claim to ‘know’ the hypothesis, if it is ever made, is the 
problem, not the fact that the hypothesis is used. But, claims Benson, Plato is not talking 
about good mathematicians; dianoia is the practice of bad mathematicians. 
Dianoia must be the practice of a select group of mathematicians who incorrectly 
apply the mathematical method, says Benson. We know that Plato distinguishes between 
method and its practitioners from Euthydemus: 
 
Socrates: My dear Crito, don’t you realize that in every pursuit most of the practitioners are 
paltry and of no account whereas the serious men are few and beyond price? For instance, 
doesn’t gymnastics strike you as a fine thing? And money making and rhetoric and the art of 
the general? 
Crito: Yes, of course they do. 
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Socrates: Well, then: in each of these cases, don’t you notice that the majority give a 
laughable performance of their respective tasks? 
Crito: Yes indeed – you are speaking the exact truth. 
Socrates: And just because this is so, do you intend to run away from all these pursuits and 
entrust your son to none of them? 
Crito: No, this would not be reasonable, Socrates. 
Socrates: Then don’t do what you ought not to, Crito, but pay no attention to the practitioners 
of philosophy, whether good or bad. Rather give serious consideration to the thing itself: if it 
seems to you negligible, then turn everyone from it, not just your sons. But if it seems to you 
what I think it is, then take heart, pursue it, practise it, both you and yours, as the proverb says 
(Euthydemus 307ac). 
 
Here, Plato is clearly distinguishing between philosophy and its practitioners, and 
claiming that this distinction could be made in every pursuit, which presumably includes 
mathematics. This, says Benson, should make us more comfortable with the idea that Plato 
distinguishes between mathematics and the mathematicians in the Republic. In support of 
Benson’s claim, I would concede that Plato makes the same distinction between philosophy 
and its practitioners in the Republic. Plato remarks, 
 
But far the most damaging reproach to philosophy is brought on by those who pretend to 
practise it, and whom your critic has in mind when he says that most people who resort to it 
are vicious, and the best of them useless – a criticism with which I agreed, did I not?... (But) 
it’s not philosophy’s fault (489de). 
 
 However, I would stress that this in itself is no reason to suppose that Plato is making 
the same distinction in the divided line passage. My reading of the divided line is as a 
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classification of the different states of mind, when the mind pursues certain types of inquiry, 
not as comparing good and bad practice of the same method. Even if we were to allow that 
Plato does use such a distinction in this passage, why should we not say that the difference is 
between better and worse philosophers, rather than mathematicians? That is a step closer 
(although not identical) to my reading of dianoia as the second best philosophical method. 
Having made the point that Plato would distinguish between mathematics and the 
mathematicians, Benson goes on to consider the mathematicians about whom Plato might be 
speaking. Of course, Plato is familiar with talented mathematicians like Theaetetus and 
Eudoxus, but surely also with less accomplished mathematicians like Hippias, whose 
thinking seems to be characterized by the flaws of dianoia: Hippias is prone to thinking he 
knows things he does not, thus taking hypotheses to be archai. Moreover, his work in 
harmonics might suggest an inappropriate appeal to sensible objects. Benson points out that 
Plato associates Hippias with mathematical expertise in three different dialogues. Hippias 
professes to be, or is reported as professing to be, an expert in arithmetic (Hippias Minor 
366cd; Hippias Major 285bd; Protagoras 318d), astronomy (Hippias Major 285bd; 
Protagoras 318d), geometry (Hippias Major 285bd; Protagoras 318d) and music (Hippias 
Major 285bd; Protagoras 318d). Benson argues that, although we think of Hippias as a 
sophist, these passages suggest that Plato also viewed him as a mathematician, albeit a self-
professed one. Also, Theodorus, described by Socrates as and expert in geometry, astronomy 
and music (Theaetetus 147d-148b), is recognized as a less accomplished mathematical 
practitioner than Theaetetus. 
Benson’s point is that Plato may fail to criticise arithmetic and geometry in the course 
of describing his educational scheme, but this does not mean that they are being practised 
correctly. To say that they were would be ‘both prima facie implausible and in conflict with 
Plato’s claim in the Euthydemus that in every pursuit most of its practitioners practise it 
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incorrectly, as well as with Plato’s assessment of Hippias and perhaps Theodorus’ (Benson 
[forthcoming] p 23). Once again, I think it is too strong to say that such a reading conflicts 
with Plato’s distinction between mathematics and mathematicians; Plato is talking about the 
mathematicians of his day when he makes the distinction in the Euthydemus, but surely the 
mathematical education of the philosophers will not be vulnerable to such a charge. Benson 
has yet to show that Plato’s acknowledgement of bad mathematicians is evidence for the 
connection between dianoia and bad mathematical practice.  
The other failing of dianoia, notes Benson, is the use of diagrams in geometry, or 
even, he concedes, thought experiments that use imagery in moral inquiry. However, Benson 
thinks that it is unclear why this should make it inferior to dialectic. He says that, if we think 
about Plato’s comments about the difference between making logoi about sensible objects 
and making logoi for the sake of Forms, we might suggest that ‘Plato is emphasizing the 
indirect nature of dianoetic. Dianoetic seeks to know or think about the forms by in some way 
using or thinking about the things that are images of forms. Unfortunately, Plato provides 
very little guidance on the nature of this indirection’ (Benson [forthcoming] p 14).  
Given the extensive attention that Plato gives to the relationship of Forms to their 
images in book X of the Republic, it is difficult to agree that Plato does give little guidance. 
As we have seen, the (sensible) image is three times removed from reality, and does not 
contain full information about the original, so Plato has plenty of scope for being suspicious 
of it. As we shall see in the following chapter, the dianoetic image is different from the 
sensible image, but shares with it the fact that it is removed (although not as extensively 
removed) from reality. This means that even a method that uses diagrams correctly is always, 
like dianoia and the deuteros plous, a second-best method. In addition, at Republic 510de, 
Plato says that the geometers use models, but they are not thinking of these but of the square 
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or diagonal itself. In light of this, it is difficult to agree that mathematicians are thinking 
about things that are images of Forms. 
Patterson ([2007] pp.1-33) argues that Plato recognises that diagrams are useful, and 
they have many important uses in mathematical proofs. They can be examples, both 
clarifying (for example to check that the slave knows what a square is in the slave-boy 
passage of the Meno 82 b) or probative. They can also provide a notational system, encoding 
information that we do not get from the proof or anywhere else; moreover they are 
temporally enduring, extending memory over time and providing a synoptic view of how we 
get from premiss to conclusion. They can also be dynamic, by being revised or enlarged if 
necessary. Finally, they play a role in mathematical discovery and creativity, which could 
have arisen in the slave-boy experiment of the Meno (which I discuss in Section Two, 
Chapter One ii b) if we imagine him noticing on his own the potential answer, when looking 
at the line drawn from opposite corners of the square. 
Given the many uses of the diagram both in Greek and modern mathematics, and as it 
emerges from the dialogues, it would seem futile and misguided of Plato to object to the 
mathematicians’ use of diagrams in general, says Patterson. He thinks that Plato’s actual 
concern with diagrams is firstly that they can be mistaken for the true subject matter of 
geometry, and given position and shape and so on. Secondly, the habit of imagistic thinking 
can lead the mathematician into error about the nature of their own cognition. The 
mathematician is using Forms in some sense, even if she does not recognise the fact. Thus, 
dianoia is limited in that it fails to appreciate the metaphysical and epistemological 
foundations of mathematics. ‘None of this entails that the dialectician should try to prove 
geometrical theorems without using diagrams...They may even, at the end of a hard day of 
dianoetic theorem proving, safely retire to enjoyment of the divine Homer...The important 
thing is not to avoid the use of diagrams in proving theorems, but to appreciate the reality and 
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nature of separate mathematical Forms, and to understand how they are fundamental to 
mathematical truth and mathematical cognition' (Patterson [2007] p 33). 
Patterson’s reading has much in common with Benson’s, in that it allows for both the 
correct and incorrect application of the mathematical method. However, Patterson stresses the 
validity of the use of diagrams, which I think is a strong point against Benson’s reading. The 
use of diagrams is not a mark of a bad mathematician, as opposed to a good one. Rather, it 
simply means that he is reasoning dianoetically, rather than noetically. The distinction 
between the two states lies in the tools used by the practitioner. 
As Benson concedes, at Republic 527b and 533d, Plato equates mathematics with 
dianoia. Indisputably, in the divided line passage, the use of the image and hypothesis is tied 
to the mathematical method, and, as we have seen, the use of images is a part of the correct 
mathematical method. The virtue of Benson’s approach is that it allows for the use of 
hypothesis when reasoning noetically, which the divided line passage implies is the case. 
However, his account provides no mechanism for ascent to noēsis, as the ‘mathematical' 
reading does, and cannot account for the correct use of imagery in mathematics.112 
 My reading of dianoia is ‘methodological’ in the sense that I think that what defines 
dianoia is the use of particular tools. I retain the association of mathematics with dianoia, but 
argue that it is that mathematical method, whether applied to mathematics or philosophy, that 
denotes this particular state of mind. When one uses the tools of imagery and hypothesis, one 
is in dianoia. The use of hypothesis in noēsis can be explained by the fact that the divided 
                                                
112 Consider Ross' (1951) remarks: "It is his conviction that geometry consists not in deducing, by pure logic 
alone, conclusions from propositions taken as starting points, but in apprehending the implications of figures 
which we draw. The drawn 'square' is not that which the geometer is reasoning about, but a mere image or 
approximation to it; yet he would not be able to deduce the properties of the genuine square if he did not see the 
way in which the elements of a seen or imagined square fit together. He needs an intuition of spatial figures, as 
well as his axioms, definitions and postulates" (pp. 48-49). Ross cites Aristotle's observation that geometers 
make their discoveries by dividing figures (Met 1051a22), and says that this was undoubtedly the method of the 
Greek mathematicians. In this way, the ascent to knowledge begins in the sensible realm and proceeds - via 




line is actually a continuum, and it is the hypotheses themselves that lift the mind from 
dianoia to noēsis. This is because the hypothesis and the image act as proxies for the tools of 
noēsis when we do not have them: ti estis, or Platonic definitions. As the mind ascends the 
epistemological scale into noēsis, the hypotheses and images are gradually replaced by ti 
estis. This reading has the virtue of accounting for Plato’s respect for mathematics and 
allowing for the correct use of imagery, like the ‘mathematical reading,’ but also the 
generalization of dianoia to other kinds of philosophy provides a mechanism for 
epistemological ascent to knowledge of the Forms in a much wider sense. I shall expand on 
this reading in the following chapter, but first I want to justify my account of ti estis as the 




Noēsis, we are told, ‘moves from assumption to a first principle which involves no 
assumption, without the images used in the other sub-section, but pursuing its inquiry solely 
by and through forms themselves’ (Republic 510b). This would suggest that the tools of 
noēsis are Forms, and perhaps initially hypotheses as the mind moves away from dianoia. 
Plato goes on, saying that the mind  
 
…treats assumptions not as principles, but as assumptions in the true sense, that is,  starting points 
and steps in the ascent to something which involves no assumption and is the first principle of 
everything; when it has grasped that principle it can again descend, by keeping to the 
consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion. The whole procedure involves nothing in the 
sensible world, but moves solely through forms to forms, and finishes with forms (511b). 
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Again, Plato says that noēsis proceeds through Forms, suggesting that these are the tools 
of this particular mental state. But how exactly does one proceed through Forms? I suggest 
that we do so by attaining ti estis, or definitions, of the Forms. A ti esti is a Platonic 
definition, that is a definition that has the attributes that Plato thinks are needed for high-level 
philosophy. As we shall see in the Meno section, a ti esti must both identify the thing to be 
investigated, and also be a heuristic tool: we shall examine these points more closely in the 
Meno section, but for now, we shall examine the place of definitions in Plato's wider 
philosophy. 
Aristotle highlights the link between the importance placed on the search for a definition 
and the theory of Forms: 
 
For as a young man Plato was originally an associate of Cratylus and Heraclitean opinions, to 
the effect that all perceptible things were in a permanent state of flux and that there was no 
knowledge of them, and these things he also later on maintained. But when Socrates started to 
think about ethics and not at all about the whole of nature, but in ethics seeking universals and 
first seeing the importance of definitions, by accepting him as such he thought that this could 
apply also to other things and not to the objects of perception. For a general definition was 
impossible of any of the sensible things, which were constantly changing. He then called such 
entities Forms, and he said that all sensible things were spoken of in accordance with them 
(Metaphysics 987a32-b9).113 
 
 This in itself is not sufficient to convince us that the theory of Forms came about as a 
result of the Socratic/Platonic emphasis on definition.114 However, unlike in the case of 
                                                
113 See also Metaphysics 1078b17-32 and 1086b2-7 for similar statements; Cf Irwin (1977) pp. 144-148 for a 
discussion on the same point. 
114 See p. 120 n 135 of this thesis for remarks about Aristotle as a historian of philosophy. Here, he offers us a 
very scant idea of what the link might be. The only hint he gives us would involve rejecting the ‘contents’ 
 103 
mathematical intermediates, we have extensive evidence in the dialogues to support the link 
between definitions and the theory of Forms. This is something that I shall cover in more 
detail in the Meno section, so here I shall focus on how a ti esti might fit into Plato’s scheme. 
 I shall argue that my reading of noēsis helps to explain the connection between 
imagery and hypothesis in dianoia: I shall do this by focusing on the tools used by each state 
of mind, rather than their objects. Again, that is not to deny that there are distinct objects of 
knowledge and belief; I just want to say that we need to ask a different question about the 
divided line if we are to answer the question about the connection between the two marks. I 
shall argue that, for noēsis, the mind’s tools are ti estis. A ti esti, as we shall see in the 
following section, is not an exhaustive account of a Form, but it is something by means of 
which we are able to study the Form. This explains the role played by hypothesis and 
imagery in dianoia. If we do not have a ti esti, we need a proxy, which should not only 
identify the thing to be investigated, but also be a heuristic tool; something that allows us to 
make progress in the quest for knowledge. In dianoia, lacking these ti estis, the hypothesis 
and the image act as such proxies.  
 This means that we can assign a different kind of tool to each section of the divided 
line: 
Section: Subsection: Tool: 
epistēmē noēsis  ti estis115      
dianoia  hypotheses and dianoetic images 
doxa  pistis   physical objects 
  eikasia  images of physical things 
                                                                                                                                                  
analysis of the divided line, as he says that there is no knowledge of perceptibles. It does not, however, conflict 
with my reading of the divided line. Kahn (1996) pp. 329-363 provides an opposing view of this. 
115 That is, ti estis are the main tool of noēsis . In the early stages of noēsis, one may also employ hypotheses – 
provisional assumptions that await confirmation - as a way of moving the argument forward, but this is part of 
the process of moving from dianoia to noēsis. To remain in noēsis means to eventually confirm these and move 
solely through ti estis. 
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 So why am I justified in saying that the tool associated with noēsis is the ti esti, and 
what should a ti esti look like? I shall tackle the second question in the Meno section, but here 
I want to say a few things about the role of the ti esti in the dialogues, arguing that Plato’s 
Socrates’ aim is always this, as it is the closest we can get to the Forms in our lifetimes. To 
study a Form through a ti esti is the most direct way of studying the Form at all. 
The first clue to this can be found in the huge emphasis on the ti esti in the dialogues. 
As we shall see in the following section, Socrates often refuses to inquire into the properties 
of something, often to the exasperation of his interlocutors, without first saying what it is. In 
Meno, for example, he says, ‘how can I know a property of something when I don’t even 
know what it is? Do you suppose that somebody entirely ignorant who Meno is could say 
whether he is handsome and rich and well-born or the reverse? Is that possible, do you 
think?’ (Meno 71b).116 
Socrates makes the point more emphatically in the Hippias Major: 
 
…during a discussion in which I was condemning some things as contemptible but praising 
others as fine, I was rudely interrupted with a question which went somewhat as follows: 
‘Socrates,’ I was asked, ‘what makes you an expert on what sorts of things are fine and 
contemptible? I mean, could you tell me what fineness is?’ Now, I’m not up to this kind of 
thing, so I got confused and couldn’t make a proper reply. After we’d parted company, I was 
angry with myself, told myself off, and swore that as soon as I had bumped into any of you 
experts, I would return to my inquisitor to renew the battle, with instruction, teaching and 
study to back me up (Hippias Major 286cd). 
                                                
116 The early ‘Socratic’ dialogues centre on the search for definition: in the Euthyphro, we ask, ‘what is 
holiness?’; in Charmides, ‘what is sophrosune?’; in Laches, ‘what is bravery?’; in  Hippias Major, ‘what is a 
fineness?’; in Lysis, ‘what is friendship?’; Cf Benson (2012) pp. 1-37, who argues that the Socrates of the 
Socratic dialogues takes the answers to these definition-questions to have a special epistemic status. Benson 
agrees that knowledge of what F-ness is itself is essential for any other knowledge of F-ness.  
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 Socrates emphasises this point at the end of the dialogue, saying of his constant 
inquisitor:  
 
‘And yet,’ he continues, ‘how can you know whose speech or other action is finely 
formed, if you’re ignorant about fineness?’ (Hippias Major 304de).117 
 
 The early ‘Socratic’ dialogues are emphatic about the need for a definition in order to 
pursue inquiry, and the middle dialogues are clear that knowledge needs (and, according to 
the ‘objects’ interpretation, is exclusively about) Forms, as we have seen so far. In this case, 
it would be reasonable to suppose that definitions somehow allow us to study Forms. But in 
what way do they do this? 
 White ([1976] pp. 30-53) suggests two possibilities. Either definitions of Forms are 
premisses from which further statements can be deduced, or they allow us to look to and 
examine Forms, and by that examination, we can somehow observe features of the Form that 
are not inferable from the definition. White describes the difference thus: ‘Very roughly put, 
the difference is like the one between telling that Socrates is a teacher by learning that he is 
the teacher of Plato and therefrom inferring that he is a teacher, and learning that he is the 
most snub-nosed man in the market place, finding him on the basis of that description, 
observing his behaviour, and telling from that observation that he is a teacher’ (White [1976] 
p 38). 
 The second alternative would be knowledge by acquaintance, and would seem to be 
supported by Socrates’ example of knowing who Meno is in order to know what he is like, 
which I mentioned above. Some people would also want to use the example of finding the 
                                                
117 See also Charmides 176ab and Lysis 223b, in which similar remarks are made. 
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way to Larissa, which comes at the end of the Meno (98a), to support this view: knowledge of 
the way to Larissa comes from travelling it, through direct acquaintance with the way to 
Larissa. 
 Some readings of Euthyphro 11ab would support this reading. Here, Plato draws the 
distinction between the essence, ousia of holiness and the affection, pathos, of it. Here, 
Socrates says, 
 
…perhaps, Euthyphro, when asked what the holy is, you don’t want to point out the essence 
for me, but to tell me of some attribute which attaches to it, saying that holiness has the 
attribute of being approved by the gods; what it is, you’ve not yet said. So if you don’t mind, 
don’t keep me in the dark, but tell me again from the beginning what on earth the holy is, 
whether it gets approved by the gods or what happens to it (as it’s not over this that we 
disagree) (Euthyphro 11ab). 
 
 The use of this passage to support the second alternative would rely on the 
assumption that it is a forerunner to the ti esti/hopoion distinction that we find in the Meno,118 
which I have tacitly assumed here. Then one could use the idea of knowing the essence of 
holiness to argue that knowledge must be by acquaintance.  
 However, this does not settle the question, because, in the Euthyphro, Plato displays 
the same laxness of terminology that we have mentioned before. That is, he uses ‘knowing 
holiness’ and ‘knowing what holiness is’ interchangeably.119 This overlap occurs in other 
dialogues (Meno 75b5 with c5, d6; 79d7-8, c1, 4 with c8-9), so it could be argued (as Gail 
                                                
118 White thinks that Plato had not fully worked out his views on this, because Socrates does not seem to be 
saying that knowledge of ousia must precede knowledge of pathos (White, 1976 pp. 40-53). This is part of a 
tradition which tries to argue against the generality of the priority of definition, or even to disregard it 
altogether. See Benson (2012) pp. 1-37 for a discussion of this. 
119 Euthyphro 15c11-12: the necessity of discovering ‘what holiness is’ as opposed to Euthyphro 15e1 and e6-7: 
the need to ‘know holiness.’ Cf White (1976) p 45: Plato ‘tends to describe his epistemological efforts quite 
indifferently as being efforts to know X and also being efforts to know what X is.’ 
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Fine might) that to know the form of Holiness is simply to know true propositions about it 
(Cf Fine [1990] pp. 85-115). In this way, the passage could be used to support the first 
alternative, in which the definition of a Form can be used to derive true propositions about it. 
 In further support of this view, it is said that Meno 86ff suggests that the answer to 
questions such as ‘is virtue teachable?’ can be deduced from the definition (White [1976] pp. 
35-53 also has a good discussion of this). On this point, I would say that, here, we are talking 
about a hypothesis rather than a ti esti, the latter being much more extensive, as we have said. 
White thinks that, at least at this stage, Plato does not give us any clear indication of which 
alternative he has in mind, but it is clear that Plato thinks that definitions are necessary in our 
quest for knowledge of the Forms.  
 What I have to say is compatible with either alternative. I am saying that the 
hypothesis and image allow us to study the Forms indirectly in dianoia, by acting as proxies 
for the ti estis that we do not have. The ti estis will either give us knowledge of the Forms by 
allowing us to be acquainted with the Forms, or by deducing true propositions about the 
Forms from the definition. My reading does not prima facie exclude either knowledge by 
acquaintance; nor does it exclude epistemological ascent being partially by intuition, because 
a ti esti could enable us to gain intuition of the Form. In this case dianoia and noēsis are 
distinct because of the different tools they use; noēsis is ‘clearer’ than dianoia because its 
tools enable us to study the Forms in a more direct way. If we take knowledge of the Forms 
to be knowledge by acquaintance, then we have a further distinction between the two states: 
in this case, knowledge is deduced from the hypothesis or image, whereas knowledge is by 
acquaintance in noēsis. 
 Plato hints at the difference between the work of the mathematicians and the 
dialecticians in Euthydemus: 
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No art of actual hunting, he said, extends any further than pursuing and capturing: whenever 
the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and the 
fishermen hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, geometers and astronomers and 
calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they simply 
discover those which already exist), since they themselves have no idea how to use their prey 
but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians – at 
least, those of them do so who are not completely senseless (Euthydemus 289e-290c). 
 
In this case, the objects of the philosophers and the mathematicians (or at least the 
domain of their subjects) are not distinct. What is distinct is the work they do. In the Meno 
section, I argue that often one of the roles of the image is to answer the identification 
question. This part of the work of mathematical thought: to hunt down the concept in 
question. In the Phaedo section, I suggest that the criticism given by Socrates of Simmias’ 
choice of image is also part of this process: we need to check if what we have got hold of is 
in fact an instantiation of the Form we are looking for.  
 Dianoetic thought ‘hunts’ these Forms indirectly through the tools of hypothesis and 
imagery, in the same way as a hunter might have to throw a spear at his prey. Noēsis gets 
much closer to the Forms: its tools, the ti estis, allow the practitioner of noesis to study the 
Forms directly, just as a cook’s knife allows him to work much more closely with the object 
handed over by the hunter. 
 The problem remains that, according to my reading, noēsis uses ti estis to study 
Forms, but I want to say that it studies Forms directly. Surely, then, noēsis studies forms 
indirectly, through the medium of ti estis? I want to say that, in fact, the study of a Form 
through a ti esti is the most direct way of studying it that is possible in our lifetimes. We are 
told in Phaedo that in life, we are tied to the body, actually a hindrance to rational inquiry. 
This means that probably, ‘either it is totally impossible to acquire knowledge, or it is only 
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possible after death, because it is only then that the soul will be isolated and independent of 
the body’ (Phaedo 66e-67a).  I shall look at this idea quite extensively in the Phaedo section, 
so here, I just want to point out that, in life, we need something like a ti esti to reach beyond 
the sensibles and grasp the Forms. In the absence of these, dianoia gives us a proxy via the 
hypothesis or image. It is pivotal on our journey into the world of the Forms. 
 
iii. Noēsis and the Role of Definition in Plato’s Epistemology 
 
I shall argue in the Meno section (Chapters One ii and Chapter Two, especially Chapter Two 
iv) that the aporia that results from a failed search for definition is Plato’s psychological 
foundation for dianoia, and that dianoetic reasoning is introduced in the absence of a ti esti. I 
also want to point out that book one of the Republic is actually a failed search for the 
definition of justice. Various definitions of justice are proposed.120 However, the book ends 
with Socrates complaining that ‘we have left the original object of our inquiry, the definition 
of justice, before we had discovered it’ (534b).121 Socrates decides to try to ‘find justice on a 
larger scale in the larger entity’ (368e-369a) by examining justice in the state – in the absence 
of a definition of justice. As we see in the earlier dialogues, Socrates is uneasy about 
inquiring into the properties of a thing without knowing its definition.122 The use of dianoetic 
reasoning is helpful to Plato because its hypotheses and images allow the philosopher to 
make progress without a ti esti, but also without resorting to eristic (see Section Two, Chapter 
Two of this thesis). However, the ti esti remains an aim of the philosopher, and, I shall argue, 
                                                
120 For example, Simonides’ idea that justice is rendering what is owing (332a) and Thrasymachus’ idea that 
justice is ‘that which is advantageous to the stronger’ (338c). 
121 Instead, says Socrates, the group ‘went off to consider whether it is a vice and ignorance, or wisdom and 
virtue. Then another argument appeared, to the effect that injustice is more profitable than justice. And I could 
not refrain from leaving what we were at for this further point, so that now the result of our conversation is that I 
know nothing. For when I do not know what justice is I am hardly likely to know whether it is a virtue or not, or 
whether he that possesses it is unhappy or happy’ (Republic 354b). 
122 See my discussion of Gail Fine’s Priority of Knowledge What in Section Two, Chapter One ii.b 
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once she has attained a sufficient number of ti estis, the philosopher can make even more 
progress towards an understanding of the Form of the Good.  
The hypothesis or image of dianoia needs to do two things: firstly, it should identify 
the thing to be investigated (for example at Meno 82b, where Socrates uses the image of a 
square to confirm that a square is ‘a figure like this’). Secondly, it should be heuristic: the use 
of it should allow us to work out things about the Form we are studying (for example, 
Socrates’ drawing of the square and extra lines in the Meno allows the slave to work out that 
the area of the square is half of what it would be if it were drawn on the diagonal). As I shall 
argue in the Phaedo Section (Chapter Three), during the process of using dianoetic reasoning, 
the philosopher can generate a series of other statements about the Form we are studying.123 
These statements form at least one approximation (which can be improved and made fuller 
by further argument) of the ti esti we wanted. 
A ti esti, then, retains both qualities we said belong to the image and hypothesis of 
dianoia. It will be heuristic, allowing us to work out other things about the Form, and it will 
identify the Form. However, it will have an additional degree of certainty, having gone 
through the process of reduction of the initial problem to a hypothesis, and the subsequent 
(usually deductive) downward step. Each reduction provides us with additional information 
about the Form that we are studying.  
The main focus of this thesis is dianoia, and the role that images and hypotheses play 
in Plato’s epistemological scheme. However, my reading also has implications for the role of 
Platonic definitions, because I am saying that the tools of dianoia act as proxies for those of 
noēsis. I want to suggest that ti estis also have a role in Plato’s epistemological ascent. That 
                                                
123 For example, dianoetic reasoning in the Phaedo generates these statements about the Soul: Soul must be 
present in a body to make it alive (105dc); when soul takes possession of a body, it always brings living with it 
(105d); soul will never admit the opposite to that which accompanies it (105d); the soul is undying (105e); when 
death approaches, the soul retires and escapes unharmed and indestructible; our souls will really exist in the next 
world (106e-107a). 
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is, once the philosopher has her ti esti, there remains more work to be done in her 
philosophical quest to gain an understanding of the Form of the Good.  
As I will argue in Section Three, Chapter Four, the immediate value of attaining the ti 
esti is that it allows the philosopher to arrive at more true statements about the Form. For 
example, in the Phaedo, the statement that ‘our souls will really exist in the next world’ 
(106e-107a) is both a result of the hypothetical argument and part of the set of statements 
about the soul that form (at least an approximation of) a ti esti. Not only does this give the 
immediate result of answering the hopoion question of whether or not the soul survives after 
death, but it also has a wider implication: once the philosopher has generated sufficient ti 
estis, she may begin to form a teleological account of the kind that Socrates wants in the 
Phaedo, because these ti estis will allow Socrates to see connections between the properties 
of the Form, and its connection to other Forms (and ultimately to the Form of the Good).  
Imagine the philosopher applies the hypothetical method to several hopoion problems 
about the soul, the body and the afterlife, leading to several ti estis belonging to related 
Forms. The generation of true statements about the definiendum results will allow her to 
make connections between the definiendum and other Forms.  After many such 
investigations, she begins to build a teleological account that links all ti estis to the Form of 
the Good. I propose that the teleological structure of the ti estis is the end of the ‘upward 
path’ in the Republic’s method of dialectic.  
As we shall see in Chapter Four ii of this Section, Annas ([1981] pp. 291-293) 
complains of Plato’s divided line that there is nothing left for the way down after the triumph 
of the ascent through Plato’s states of mind of the divided line. Annas complains, “The Line 
clearly suggests (511bc) that there is not only a ‘way up’ to the unhypothetical first principle, 
but also a ‘way down.’ What is the difference between them?...”  On my reading, Plato can 
avoid this complaint, because the ‘way down’ is not symmetrical to the upward path. Rather 
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than using ti estis to answer hopoion problems, on the ‘way down,’ the philosopher provides 
the kind of teleological accounts that Socrates is ideally looking for in the Phaedo, giving a 
completely different kind of explanation, this time with reference to the Form of the Good.  
This thesis aims to show that the tools of dianoia allow Plato’s characters to make 
progress in philosophical discussions in a way that the elenchus of the early dialogues could 
not. They can be heuristic devices used to generate a positive statement, in contrast to the 
elenchus’ purely purgative role (see my Section Two, Chapter Two). Once this has been 
done, and we arrive at our ti esti, we may be able to answer our initial hopoion question. 
However, there remains more work to be done in the philosopher’s overall epistemic journey, 
starting with the gathering of more ti estis, if she is to attain Plato’s ultimate goal of 
knowledge of the Form of the Good. 
 
Chapter Four: A Closer Look at Dianoia 
 
Having sketched my reading of the divided line, I shall now go on to have a closer look at 
dianoia. To summarise the claims that I am making about dianoia specifically, my main aim 
is to show that the hypothesis and the image are used in dianoetic thought as proxies for ti 
esti answers that we do not have, whether that is in mathematics, or in mathematical 
reasoning applied to philosophy. The ‘hypothetical method’ is not identical to dianoia, 
although its early stages are a kind of dianoia. The hypothetical method is distinct from the 
Socratic elenchus (contra Fine). We can have dianoia without hypotheses, which usually uses 
images, for example the slave-boy passage in the Meno. Sometimes, the hypothesis is an 
image, as in the objections of Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo. We can also have 
hypotheses without images, as we see in the ‘hypothetical passage’ of the Meno.  
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When we come to the upper part of the line, Plato explicitly states that he is talking 
about the tools the mind uses to draw conclusions, and in the case of dianoia, these tools are 
hypothesis124 and imagery. In this section, I want to examine each of them, explaining how I 
think my reading provides a mechanism for ascent to noēsis, which I said was so critical in 
the previous chapter. I shall examine first the dianoetic image and then the hypothesis, before 
I go on to give an example of the method in action. 
We sometimes see the hypothesis and the image used in conjunction, which is what is 
happening in the Theaetetus. I shall be expanding on my claims concerning the Meno and 
Phaedo in the relevant sections, so in the final part of this chapter, I want to illustrate what I 
mean by saying that the Theaetetus shows dianoia using hypotheses and imagery. The main 
scope of the project concerns the Meno, Phaedo and Republic, but we should also be aware 
of other dialogues, especially those that have such a strong connection to the issues at stake.  
 
i. The Dianoetic Image 
 
In dianoia, reasoning employs hypothesis and imagery. However, the imagery of dianoia is 
not the same as the imagery of eikasia. In dianoia,  
 
…the mind uses the originals of the visible order in their turn as images… (Republic 510b). 125 
 
 The difference between the images of eikasia and dianoia is that the image of eikasia 
is an image of a sensible object, whereas the image of dianoia is a sensible object used as an 
image. This distinction is not always acknowledged. Cross and Woozley ([1964] pp. 238-
                                                
124 Cornford ([1932] pp. 39-41) points out that there are, according to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 1 10, two 
kinds of hypothesis in mathematics: those relative to the pupil (something he tries to prove) and the the 
hypotheses of the science itself (archai, basic truths). Plato means the former kind. Cornford thinks that Plato 
seems not to include definitions in hypotheses, but assumptions of existence: the odd and the even etc. 
125 My emphasis. 
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244) think that dianoia is a parallel mental state to eikasia, and often the two states are linked 
by scholars due to their apparently common use of imagery. However, we should ask whether 
Plato meant for this to be the case, or whether he had something else in mind for the images 
of dianoia. We also need to engage with the debate over the existence of mathematical 
‘intermediates’: did Plato mean that there are objects (rather than tools) of mathematics that 
correspond with the dianoia part of the line, just as the Forms correspond with noēsis? I shall 
argue that the two questions are distinct, but linked in this way: the question of what the 
dianoetic image is refers to one of the two tools of dianoia, whereas the question of the 
existence of intermediates refers to the subject-matter of dianoia (on the traditional 
reading).126 The questions are, what does the dianoetician use, and what does he study? The 
answers, I suggest, are that he uses hypotheses and dianoetic images, to study Forms. 
 So what kind of image is a tool of dianoia? Even if the dianoetic image is different 
from that of eikasia, some maintain that we should see a connection between the two states. 
Cross and Woozley’s view of eikasia is formed partly on the basis of the alleged connection 
with dianoia. They think that, if we are to maintain an exact parallelism between the cave and 
the divided line, we cannot say that eikasia is conjecturing about originals through their 
reflections. They stress that there is no linguistic objection to this. Instead, they try to argue 
for the parallel between eikasia and dianoia based on the properties of the divided line itself. 
They note that, when we look at the ratios, eikasia and dianoia are related: eikasia is to pistis 
what dianoia is to noēsis.  
They think that this leads us to another parallel in the mental states, suggesting ‘that 
as the mathematician in some sense takes the likeness for an original, not realising it is a 
likeness, so the man in the state of eikasia does the same…likeness is accepted as reality, 
without any realisation that it is a likeness…and it would then be parallel to the state of mind 
                                                
126 The dianoetician’s tool is an image of a sensible thing, whereas its subject-matter is (at least sometimes, 
according to Fine; always, according to the traditional reading) an intelligible thing. 
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of the prisoners in the cave’ (Cross and Woozley [1964] pp 219-220). Cross and Woozley 
think that eikasia in the moral spheres corresponds to accepting the imitations of justice made 
by the rhetoricians, sophists and politicians in law-courts as real.127 In this case, say Cross 
and Woozley, dianoia is parallel to eikasia in that it accepts its hypothesis without question, 
just as eikasia accepts the images without recognising that they are nothing else but images 
(Cross and Woozley [1964] pp 243-244). However, it is difficult to reconcile this with the 
claim at Republic 510de that those who reason dianoetically “make use of and argue about 
visible figures though they are not really thinking about them, but about the originals which 
they resemble; it is not about the square or diagonal which they have drawn that they are 
arguing, but about the square itself or diagonal itself, or whatever the figure may be.” 
 Klein ([1965] pp. 112-125) thinks that dianoia and eikasia are connected in a 
different way, and writes of the ‘dianoetic extension of eikasia’ (Klein [1965] p 115). Klein 
sees eikasia as the faculty to see an image as an image, and thinks that we should not 
overlook the crucial importance of it; he sees it as particular to human beings, our 
‘prerogative.’128 The dianoetic eikasia exercised by dianoia, according to Klein, ‘consists in 
understanding visible things in terms of their intelligible foundations’ (Klein [1965] p.120). 
Klein thinks that, in dianoia, we interpret the things and properties of the physical world as 
‘images of invisible νοητά’ (Klein [1965] p 119). So arithmeticians and geometricians use 
figures and pebbles for their demonstrations, but they do not have these ‘in mind.’ Klein 
rightly points out that this  
 
                                                
127 Cross and Woozley’s reading is similar to mine in that they take a wider reading of eikasia to include the 
moral sphere, but I do not think that eikasia needs to include a lack of awareness of the nature of the image: 
rather it is the use of the image to draw conclusions that defines eikasia. The term eikasia occurs in his text only 
when Plato is talking about the Line (not in connection with the prisoners in the Cave, who really do lack an 
awareness of the nature of the image).  
128 Klein (1965) p 114-115. His view is in opposition to Fine, among others, who believe that those in eikasia 
are unable to make such a distinction.  
 116 
kind of eikasia is ‘different from the one we exercise in the domain of visible things and their 
images’ (Klein [1965] p 119).129 
 I agree with Cross and Woozley that dianoia and eikasia are connected in that their 
ratios with the states of mind directly above them on the line are the same. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they use similar tools, nor that their awareness of the nature of 
these tools is what assigns them to these particular states. Plato is simply telling us that 
dianoia stands in relation to noēsis as eikasia does to pistis in terms of their respective clarity. 
If we were to extend this reasoning to the tools or objects of each state, then we would say 
that the dianoetic image is proportional to, but not identical to the image of eikasia.  
Moreover, much of Cross and Woozley’s reading stems from the implication that we 
should look to the Cave analogy to inform our translation of eikasia. The term eikasia occurs 
in the text only when Plato is talking about the Line. Until they are released, the prisoners in 
the Cave have no experience of the world except the shadows they see on the wall. They have 
no experience of their originals, so they have no reason to doubt the reality of the shadows. 
At 515c5, Plato calls their mental state ἀφροσύνη, 'mindlessness' or 'delusion' – not eikasia. 
In this case, we need not impose such a strict correlation between the line and the cave by 
suggesting that eikasia involves such a delusion. We should continue to be careful about 
translating eikasia in the same way. As I discuss in Chapter Three, segment ii b of this 
section, eikasia is not such a strange state of mind as this correlation would imply. 
Note that my reading does not differentiate between the mental states in terms of 
awareness of the nature of the tools or objects as I explained in the previous chapter. What 
makes dianoia a state of mind is the (self-aware) employment of hypothesis and imagery as 
tools of inquiry. As I shall argue Socrates and his friends do this in Meno and Phaedo; they 
are using dianoetic reasoning, but this does not mean that they are unaware of the nature of 
                                                
129 Although I would not use term ‘eikasia’ here without the specific qualification that it means looking at 
something and drawing conclusions about the thing it represents, not that it means ‘illusion.’” 
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the hypothesis and image. 130 In addition, Plato’s remarks at 510de do imply that dianoia 
involves being aware that one is not really thinking about the images, but about “the originals 
which they resemble.” 
 As for Klein’s view, that dianoia, understands visible things in terms of their 
intelligible foundations, I would suggest that dianoia does not always employ visible images, 
and that of course hypotheses, their other tools, are not visible at all. For example, in the 
Phaedo section, I shall argue that Simmias’ harmony image and Cebes’ tailor image are 
dianoetic images; but we would not call them visible images. Rather they, like the diagrams 
of the mathematicians, are physical objects used as images of Forms. In this way, the 
dianoetic image is different from that of eikasia; the tools of those two states are completely 
distinct. Plato affirms this himself: in dianoia, the mind uses ‘as illustrations the very things 
which in turn have their images and shadows on the lower level’ (Republic 511a). That is, the 
mind uses the physical objects as images, it does not use images of the physical objects in 
dianoia. 
If this is what the dianoetician uses, what does she study? I wanted to divide the 
question in this way, because I am proposing that there are a number of ontologically 
different things involved in what I want to say, and the debate about mathematical 
intermediates has so many similarities to my theory about the tools of dianoia that it would 
be easy to confuse the two things.  
The distinction is between mathematical objects (such as numbers and shapes) and the 
objects of mathematical thought, including mathematical thought applied to philosophy. It is 
                                                
130 Unlike Cross and Woozley, who stress the lack of awareness of those in eikasia that the things they study are 
only images, Klein argues that it is exactly such an awareness that is distinctive about eikasia. Many other 
scholars use this idea of awareness of the real nature of objects to define the different states of mind: Gail Fine 
says that the prisoners in the cave are in eikasia (or L1, as she calls it) ‘because they cannot systematically 
discriminate between images and the objects they are images of.’ The philosopher who returns to the cave will 
not lapse back into L1, because he knows the images there (that is, he knows that they are images; Cf Republic 
520c). My reading does not depend on awareness of the nature of the objects (either tools or subject matter) for 
the distinction between mental states. It is possible to engage in eikasia while being aware that the tools you are 
using are only images, for example. This is what Socrates does when he uses the poetry of Simonides in the 
passage of Protagoras, referred to above. 
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possible, I suggest, to reason noetically about mathematics. There is such a thing as the Form 
of the Number Two, and the Form of the Square, and this is what noēsis is about. Dianoia, 
when one is reasoning dianoetically in the sphere of mathematics, can also be about the Form 
of the Square or the Forms of the Number Two, but indirectly, through instantiations of these 
forms in theory. These instantiations are not ‘intermediates’ as they have been described by 
previous scholars. They do not exist as a category, until they have been instantiated in the 
mind of the thinker.  
In this case, some of the things I am going to suggest look very similar to the theory 
of intermediates, because I am going to say that hypotheses and images instantiate Forms. 
However, the difference is that these are not the objects of dianoia, but rather the tools used 
by the dianoeticians. The objects of dianoia could still be Forms, but in dianoia, they are 
studied indirectly; in noēsis, they are studied directly. What is ‘intermediate’ about my 
reading is the medium of theory in which the Forms are instantiated. This may be the same 
thing as calling these instantiations ‘intermediate,’ but they are certainly not intermediates in 
the same sense as it is traditionally argued. 
I am saying that the image and the hypothesis are ontologically different from the 
tools in the other mental states: ti estis, physical things and eikasiastic images. Leaving aside 
for the moment Fine’s view, that dianoia can be about Forms or sensibles, the traditional 
‘objects’ reading tells us that pistis, eikasia and noēsis have as their objects images, physical 
things and Forms respectively. The debate about the existence of mathematical 
‘intermediates’ centres on the discussion at Republic 510d-511a, in which dianoia is 
discussed. The question at the heart of the debate is whether dianoia is about Forms, like 
noēsis, or whether it is about a distinct class of objects called ‘intermediates.’  
 This could mean one of several things. It could mean that intelligible mathematical 
entities form their own class of objects, but that these are Forms in every other sense. This 
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view would say that mathematical Forms are the subject of dianoia, and it is their subject-
matter, not their ontological status that defines them. As I have rejected the ‘mathematical’ 
reading of the line, which limits the subject-matter of dianoia to mathematics, I shall say very 
little about this; I just want to mention it now in contrast to the other views. 
The second thing it could mean is that images in the sensible world are copies of 
physical objects, which are copies of mathematical intermediates, which are copies of Forms. 
These correspond exactly to the mental states of eikasia, pistis, dianoia and noēsis. If we 
reject the idea of intermediates and give Plato only a threefold ontology of images, physical 
objects and Forms, we lose the symmetry.131 As I rejected readings of the line that are driven 
by the mathematical properties of the line and the wish for symmetry, rather than by Plato’s 
more explicit philosophical concerns, I shall not focus on this here. 
 The strongest arguments for the existence of intermediates involve the idea of ‘perfect 
exemplars.’ If the proponent of intermediates agrees that numbers are Forms, we end up with 
a distinction between ‘mathematical numbers’ and ‘ideal numbers.’ Wedberg132 agrees that 
mathematical numbers are intermediates between ideal numbers and sensible things, or 
collections of sensible things. On his reading, mathematical numbers are perfect 
exemplifications of ideal numbers, and collections of sensible things are imperfect 
exemplifications of ideal numbers. Geometrical intermediates exist for Plato, consciously or 
unconsciously, in a way that is analogous to numerical intermediates.133  
                                                
131 In this case, we can have two ways of looking at the same type of object: we can have pistis about physical 
objects, or we can use them as images of Forms in dianoia. Foley (2008) pp.1-23, who thinks that this is the 
only way to deal with the rejection of intermediates, thinks that this still leaves this interpretation open to the 
overdetermination problem of the line on epistemological grounds: dianoia is still a clearer state of mind than 
pistis. 
132 (1955), especially pp. 65-67 and Appendix D; Cf Wedberg in Vlastos (1971) pp 28-52. In Appendix D (of 
1955), Wedberg presents the evidence for his reading of intermediates in Plato’s dialogue, which are reviewed 
by Annas (1975) pp. 146-166. 
133 In a similar reading, Miller (2007) pp. 310-342 says that Plato distinguishes between a Form and its perfect 
exemplar, for example, the Form of Triangularity, as opposed to the perfect Triangle. The perfectly triangular 
triangle presents itself to the mathematician in thought, but it is the Form of Triangularity that acts as a tacit 
standard of this. The role of perfection, then is to provide the context in which the perfectly intelligible figure 
can come to mind. Transcending all exemplars, perfection itself is indeterminate, so it allows us to understand 
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Plato never explicitly says that there is an ontologically separate class of 
mathematical objects; but there is a tradition that says that he endorses them implicitly. 
People who take this view draw on Aristotle’s reading of Plato. Aristotle attributes to Plato 
the view that there exist mathematical objects that are ontologically intermediate between 
sensibles and Forms: 
 
Again, in addition to sensible objects and Forms, they said that mathematical objects existed 
between them, differing from the sensibles in that they were eternal and unchanging and from 





Plato’s doctrine was that Forms and mathematicals are two substances and that the third 
substance is that of perceptible bodies… (Metaphysics 1028b18-21). 
  
 Aristotle is writing as a philosopher, not a doxographer, and he is notoriously 
problematic as a historian of philosophy.135 Of course, this in itself does not mean that he is 
wrong here, but we have other reasons for being suspicious. Firstly, Plato’s own silence on 
the subject should make us reluctant to attribute such a doctrine to him; those who wish to 
                                                                                                                                                  
the goodness of the Good as perfection. In this way, we can understand the Good as responsible for the 
existence of all Forms and mathematicals. As I noted in the previous chapter, Miller’s reading has the virtue of 
providing a way of progressing from mathematics to teleology, and therefore to moral theory. 
134 Sir David Ross's ([1924] pp. 165-168), in his note on Metaphysics 987b l4, confesses that he cannot find 
evidence for intermediates in the divided line (or elsewhere), although he does believe that ‘the logic of the 
simile requires that the objects of dianoia should be a distinct class of entities’ (pp. 167-168). Ross thinks that 
Aristotle might have heard Plato speak about them. I have already argued that we should not ascribe otherwise 
unsupported views to Plato in order to preserve or create symmetry in the divided line. See my Section One, 
Chapter Three i for my discussion of this. 
135 See Cherniss ([1964] pp. 347-404) and Guthrie ([1957] pp. 35-41), who highlight this issue. I am not saying 
that my scepticism to Aristotle's attitude is an accusation that Aristotle is wilfully misrepresenting or even 
misunderstanding Plato; rather Aristotle’s concern is to present his own ideas, rather than to preserve those of 
others. 
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argue for it need to try to find it in various passages in which Plato is concerned with other 
matters. Secondly, it is probably the case that Aristotle is attributing intermediates to Plato’s 
theory because he feels that Plato needs it to resolve a problem implicit in his theory.  
 As Aristotle is not specific about what kind of entity intermediates might be or why 
he thinks Plato might need them, we need to seek the solution in for ourselves. Annas (1975) 
thinks that the answer lies at Metaphysics 987b14-18, quoted above. For Plato, Forms are 
eternal and unchanging, and this is a property shared by intermediates. Aristotle is at least 
clear that, for Plato, numbers are forms,136 so the intermediates are something other than 
numbers:  
 
Now, if you buy the Theory of Forms, then at least numbers explain your entities (after a 
fashion). The idea is that each of the numbers is a Form and that the Form is a cause of being 
for other entities (Metaphysics 1090a46).  
 
Annas thinks that this fits in with the problem for Plato of adding two and two 
together to make four. If the Form of two is unique, we should not be able to add it to itself. 
The same applies to geometry: mathematicians can draw two circles intersecting, whereas the 
Form of the circle is unique. However, mathematical operations cannot refer to the physical 
world, so Plato needs intermediates in order to resolve this. Annas calls this the Uniqueness 
Problem ([1975] p 151) and says that it is the only line of argument suggested by Aristotle’s 
reading:137 Forms (including number-Forms) are unique, whereas intermediates are not. This 
                                                
136 Annas also cites Phaedo 101 and 103-105 as passages in which Plato treats numbers as Forms, although he is 
not explicit here. Annas (1975) makes a similar point on p 150.  
137 Annas also thinks that Aristotle’s objections to the idea of intermediates supports her view that Aristotle 
thinks that intermediates are a solution to the Uniqueness Problem. His first objection is that he disagrees with 
the theory of Forms anyway, so the theory of intermediates irritates him even more. Secondly, there is no real 
difference between Forms and intermediates, which suggests that intermediates were only introduced to solve a 
problem. Finally, Aristotle says that the situation for non-mathematical things for which there are Forms is not 
parallel to that for mathematicals because ‘they blithely posit the mathematicals between the Forms and 
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is the only hint that Aristotle gives us as to the distinction between Forms and intermediates, 
so Annas thinks that it must be Aristotle’s reason for attributing the intermediates to Plato’s 
theory.  
However, Annas says that the Uniqueness Problem is Aristotle’s reason for thinking 
that Plato needs the intermediates, not Plato’s: when Annas examines the passages in which 
she thinks Plato does hint at intermediates, she finds that they do not contain the same line of 
thought as Aristotle. Annas does not deny that Plato endorses intermediates, but she does 
think that Aristotle is making a different argument, and one that does not necessarily refer to 
what we find in the dialogues.138 
 As for the passages in which Plato supposedly hints at a theory of intermediates, they 
fall into two categories according to Annas (1975): ‘inconclusive’ and those that can be 
treated as serious attempts to establish the existence of intermediates. Annas does a good job 
of arguing that the ‘inconclusive’ passages should not be taken as evidence for the existence 
of intermediates, and we shall, in any case, be referring to them later in the dissertation, so I 
shall not attempt to give my own criticisms of this reading of these passages here.139 
 Annas does accept that Aristotle’s claim, that Plato’s mathematical reasoning does not 
concern Forms, is plausible when you think about the discipline itself: ‘mathematics talks 
about circles and lines, not about the physical diagrams that illustrate them, nor about the 
                                                                                                                                                  
perceptibles, as being Third Entities between the Forms and the things round here’ (Metaphysics 1059bff); so 
the intermediates are needed to maintain the higher status of mathematics over science. 
138 Annas rightly thinks this reflects a more general feature of Aristotle’s treatment of Plato. She says, ‘where 
what Aristotle says about a thesis of Plato’s does not square with the dialogues, we should not assume that there 
is conflict and hasten to resolve the problem on that assumption. When we examine the argument on both sides, 
we may find that they are completely different’ Annas (1975) p 166. 
139 These passages are: Euthydemus 290b, in which Plato likens the mathematicians to hunters; Theaetetus 198a, 
in which Plato distinguishes the thought that 11 things are 12 things from the thought that 11 is 12; Phaedo 
101b, in which it Plato seems to distinguish numbered groups from pure numbers; Cratylus 432ab in which 
Plato distinguishes the logic of pictures from the logic of numbers and Timaeus 50c, in which geometrical 
figures seem not to be identified with either Forms or physical objects. Annas (1975), pp. 156-160, argues that 
Plato is concerned with a number of different things here: there is no single concern with intermediates that 
unites them and any reference to intermediates is implicit at best. 
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unique Form of Circle and Form of Line’ (Annas [1981] p 251). She sees more reason to take 
seriously the idea of Platonic intermediates in passages in the Republic and Philebus.  
In Republic 525c-526b, Annas thinks that Plato seeks to replace groups of physical 
objects with more dependable objects counted by philosophers and mathematicians. These 
are indivisible units or ‘ones’: ‘satisfactory counting and calculating require a whole different 
range of objects distinct from the objects around us that we count’ (Annas [1975] p 162). 
This is not the same as the Uniqueness Problem, because, as we learn from Philebus, Plato’s 
dissatisfaction lies in the dissimilarity and divisibility of groups of physical objects, not in the 
uniqueness of Forms (Philebus 56ce).140 In the divided line passage, Annas affirms that 
people want to posit intermediates because they wish to assign intermediates as objects of 
dianoia.  
Given Annas’ successful criticism of Aristotle’s reading of Platonic intermediates, it 
seems that the doctrine only holds if we say that the logic of the divided line demands them, 
or if we take the passages from Philebus and Republic 525c-526b to suggest them. As my 
reading of the divided line does not require them to complete the symmetry,141 I shall now 
turn to the latter point. 
I examine the Republic passage in my discussion of the application of dianoia to 
spheres other than mathematics, so here I shall restrict my remarks to the points relevant to 
the discussion of intermediates.  
Wedberg thinks that, although the distinction between ideal and mathematical 
numbers is not explicitly made in the Republic, we do see the implication that the 
arithmetician needs sets of Ideal numbers (intermediates) in the following passage: 
 
                                                
140 Cf Annas (1975) p 161, who refers to this distinction. 
141 I have repeatedly said that symmetry should not be the driving force here; in addition, my ‘tools’ reading 
could provide the symmetry if it were required. 
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‘…You must know how the experts in the subject, if one tries to argue that the unit is 
itself divisible, won’t have it, but make you look absurd by multiplying it if you try to divide 
it, to make sure that their unit is never shown to contain a multiplicity of parts.’ 
‘Yes, that is quite true.’ 
‘What do you think they would say, Glaucon, if one were to say to them, “This is 
very extraordinary – what are these numbers you are arguing about, whose constituent units 
are, so you claim, all precisely equal to each other, and at the same time not divisible into 
parts?” What do you think their answer would be to that?’ 
‘I suppose they would say that the numbers they mean can be apprehended by reason, 
but that there is no other way of handling them’ 
‘You see therefore,’ I pointed out to him, ‘that this study looks as if it were really 
necessary to us, since it so obviously compels the mind to use pure thought in order to get at 
the truth.’ 
‘It certainly does have that effect,’ he agreed.  
(Republic 525d-526b). 
 
Wedberg thinks that this passage implicitly assumes the existence of intermediates as 
sets of Ideal numbers: ‘In the numbers of which he is speaking every unit is exactly equal to 
every other unit and, further, each unit is in itself absolutely without parts’ (Wedberg [1955] 
p 124). He thinks this thesis reappears in the Philebus: 
 
SOCRATES: The most precise sciences, however, are those we recently called essential. 
PROTARCHUS: I suppose you mean arithmetic and the other sciences you mentioned along 
with it. 
SOCRATES: I do. Here again, however, Protarchus, oughtn’t we to speak of two sets of 
sciences, not one? What do you think? 
PROTARCHUS: Which sets do you have in mind? 
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SOCRATES: Take arithmetic first: shouldn’t we distinguish between the common and the 
philosophical variety? 
PROTARCHUS: What’s the criterion for distinguishing these two kinds of arithmetic? 
SOCRATES: The boundary between them is clearly visible, Protarchus. Some arithmeticians 
operate with unequal units: for example, they add two armies together, or two cows, or two 
things one of which might be the smallest and the other the largest thing in the world. Others, 
however, would never follow their example unless every unit, no matter how many there are, 
is taken to be identical to every other unit. 
PHILEBUS: You put that very well: since arithmeticians clearly fall into two classes, it 
makes sense for there to be two kinds of arithmetic.  
(Philebus 56ce). 
 
 This passage is supposed by Annas and Wedberg to shed light on the previous 
passage from the Republic: philosophical units are equal, whereas the units of the 
arithmeticians are not equal in all respects: an army is itself divided into ‘units;’ cows may be 
unequal in respect of size. As we have seen, Annas differs from Wedberg in saying that this 
is not the same line of argument that Aristotle applies to Plato (ie, it does not concern the 
Uniqueness Problem), but she thinks that this passage from the Philebus elaborates on the 
argument at Republic 525c-526b. The problem with which Annas thinks that Plato is 
concerned is the dissimilarity and divisibility of groups of physical objects, not the problem 
of duplicating a Form in calculations. 
 However, if this is the case, there is no need to postulate intermediates without the 
Uniqueness Problem: collections of sensibles are dissimilar and divisible, but Forms are not. 
So the mathematician needs to calculate with homogeneous units; but there can only be one 
Form of the Unit (or Form of Unity), so they exemplify the unit perfectly multiple times as 
intermediates and so on.  
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 Can this be what Plato means in the Philebus? Socrates goes on to confirm that 
‘…there are two techniques of arithmetic, two techniques of measurement, and so on’ 
(Philebus 57d). But why can this not mean that there is one technique for collections of 
sensibles, and another for Forms? The passage from Philebus suggests a dichotomy like this; 
not the trichotomy that we would need to postulate intermediates: for this, we need to 
distinguish between counting sensibles, performing calculations on sets of ideal numbers (or 
intermediates) and contemplating Ideal numbers (or number-Forms). Moreover, Annas 
concedes that to postulate intermediates contradicts directly Republic 510d, in which 
mathematicians talk about ‘the square itself’ and ‘the diagonal itself’ (‘surely Forms,’ says 
Annas [1981] p 251), as well as the depiction of mathematics as the best introduction to the 
contemplation of Forms (although she does not retract her position). 
 The passages that have been most convincingly used to argue for the existence of 
intermediates are those from Republic in conjunction with the Philebus quoted above, yet 
these passages do not make the distinctions necessary to uphold the doctrine. We have 
already rejected the evidence from Aristotle as being inconclusive and the ‘intermediates’ 
doctrine contradicts Plato’s explicit words at Republic 510d. We still have the problem that 
the ‘ones’ or units that the mathematicians study are many, whereas there can only be one 
Form of One; likewise, they use more than one of the same geometrical figure in their 
operations, where there can only be one Form for each.142 However, at no point in the 
dialogues does Plato propose the existence of intermediates as a solution to this problem.  
 Confining ourselves to the divided line passage, the strongest evidence against the 
existence of intermediates is the divided line passage itself. Annas admits that Plato’s 
                                                
142 This is the Uniqueness Problem, which, in spite of Annas’ claims that it does not concern Plato, seems to be 
the enduring snag of his theory; See also Cross and Woozley (1964) pp 236-7 for this argument. Of course, we 
could say that there is a contradiction in Plato’s theory: he does not endorse intermediates, but without them, 
there is a problem with his theory of Forms: we cannot perform mathematical operations without contradicting 
the uniqueness of the Forms we use. However, I suggest that this is not a problem unique to mathematics, but to 
calculations in all spheres. 
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reference to ‘the square itself’ and ‘the diagonal itself’ conflict with the idea that the 
geometers are not concerned with Forms. Here, Plato says that they are arguing about ‘the 
square itself or diagonal itself, or whatever the figure may be.’ (Republic 510d). Clearly, here 
Plato is saying that the subject-matter of dianoia is Forms; its tools are images and 
hypotheses.143 As we shall see, this reading has been challenged by Burnyeat, but only to the 
extent to say that it is not decisive. 
 On first glance, the only reason, based on the divided line passage alone, that you 
would want to postulate the existence of intermediates would be for the sake of assigning a 
different object to each subsection of the line.144 However, I suggest that, if we read the 
divided line as distinguishing between the mental states on the basis of the tools they use, 
rather than their subject-matter, this problem does not exist: as images are assigned to eikasia 
and physical things to pistis, hypothesis and the dianoetic images are assigned to dianoia. 
Noēsis has its own tools, which we shall examine below. In this case, each mental state has a 
different tool or tools, meaning that there is no need to postulate the existence of 
intermediates on the grounds of the internal logic of the divided line. I have tacitly assumed 
the ‘objects’ analysis in this section, although a similar argument could apply to the 
‘contents’ analysis. 
So far, we have made little headway in resolving the debate. Aristotle’s reading of 
Platonic intermediates gives by far the best reason for wanting to assign them to Plato (the 
Uniqueness Problem), but we find little in the text to support them. In fact, as Annas argues, 
                                                
143 Looking at the debate from the angle of Plato’s scheme for higher education, Cornford ([1968] pp. 61-95, 
especially pp. 77-65) says that nothing here points to a class of mathematical numbers and figures intermediate 
between forms and sensibles. The only Forms that figure in the scheme of education are the moral (507b) and 
the mathematical (510d). Mathematical forms can be apprehended by noēsis; they do not form a lower class, 
apprehended by dianoia. According to Cornford, at Republic 511d, mathematical objects are seen in the 
connection with the first principle. 
144 Not everyone thinks that the objects of dianoia are intelligible at all. Bedu-Addo (1978) pp. 111-127, who, as 
we saw thinks that it is only for the purpose of the divided line that Plato regards the doxa of dianoia as a lower 
grade of knowledge, says that from Republic 510e and 511a that it is not only physical models and objects that 
fall into the metaphysical subsection of this part of the line. Ontologically, diagrams are the same as these. The 
objects of pistis and dianoia are the same: ‘those very objects (auta)’ of pistis are clearer in dianoia. They are 
the same objects, but, in dianoia, the mind treats them as images of the Forms, albeit unconsciously. 
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Plato seems to have something entirely different in mind. Moreover, we have the problem 
that Plato speaks of the square ‘itself’ in dianoia, and seems to be talking about Forms. This 
seems to be a problem that, in the dialogues at least, Plato leaves unresolved. 
Burnyeat’s145 contribution to the case for intermediates is the most convincing. 
According to Burnyeat, Plato does not settle the exact ontological status of mathematical 
objects in the Republic, a point with which I agree. Burnyeat thinks that this is because Plato 
was primarily interested in conveying his point about mathematics and the Good, and did not 
see the need to go into this. He thinks that Plato makes the distinction between dianoia and 
noēsis on the grounds of the further ontological investigation pursued by the latter. He points 
out that, in the Republic, Socrates is intentionally leaving aside the distinction (if any) 
between the objects of dianoia and noēsis. His translation of the relevant passage, Plato’s 
second discussion of the divided line at Republic 534a, reads, ‘Let’s leave aside the 
proportion exhibited by the objects of these states when the opinionable and the intelligible 
are each divided in two. Let us leave this aside, Glaucon, lest it fills up with many times more 
arguments/ratios than we have already.’146 
Burnyeat goes on to give his own statement of the uniqueness problem, pointing out 
that the Republic tells us that mathematicians talk about pluralised, idealised entities that are 
not Forms, and that if we take an example of a theorem from Euclid, which refers to multiple 
shapes and numbers, we can see that this is true.  Burnyeat goes on, 
 
Plato may have thought that the mathematicians’ multiple non-sensible particular numbers 
and figures…could ultimately be derived from Forms, so that in the end mathematics would 
turn out to be an indirect way of talking about Forms. Perhaps the mathematical entities are 
the ‘divine reflections’ outside the cave (532c 1) dependent on the ‘real things’ they image. 
                                                
145 Burnyeat (2000) pp 33-35, although the groundwork for this is laid in Burnyeat (2000) pp 29-33. 
146 Republic 534a, trans. Myles Burnyeat in Burnyeat (2000) p 33-34. 
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But whatever Plato thought, or hoped to show, Greek mathematics is certainly not a direct 
way of talking about forms (Burnyeat [2000] p 34). 
 
The main strength of Burnyeat’s argument lies in his refutation of the apparently 
decisive support for the argument against intermediates at Republic 510de and 525de, in 
which Plato says that the arguments of the mathematicians are pursued for the sake of ‘the 
square itself’ and ‘the diagonal itself’ and in which he says that if someone tries to divide ‘the 
one itself’, the mathematicians laugh and do not allow it. Burnyeat points out that the word 
‘itself’ should not be decisive on its own, because that would mean that we have to admit that 
the Socrates means the Form of Thirst when he speaks of ‘thirst itself’ in book IV.147  
Burnyeat is convincing in his suggestion that we should not take the word ‘itself’ to 
be decisive, but, once again, this gives us no reason to prefer the argument for intermediates 
over any other. Burnyeat’s other appeal is to the uniqueness problem, which, as we have 
seen, was not a concern of Plato’s, so the argument remains unresolved if we let it rest on this 
point.  
In fact, I am going to leave the question of mathematical intermediates unresolved. As 
Burnyeat says, it is simply not Plato’s concern in the divided line passage to resolve it, and 
the evidence in the dialogues is too patchy to be sure. The related problem that Plato does 
need to tackle - and that relates to the question of what the mind uses in each mental state - is 
that mathematical objects are already abstractions, so it is difficult to talk about the difference 
between the Form of Two and a given two. Plato does seem to want to say that the Forms are 
unique, so he needs some way of being able to perform these calculations without sacrificing 
that. On the other hand, Plato would not want to say that the Forms are confined to the mind 
of the thinker. Rather, I will suggest, the operations that take place in the mind of the thinker 
                                                
147 Burnyeat gives other examples, the most convincing of these being that of Phaedo 66a 1-3, in which we 
would have to say that one Form studies another if we took ‘itself’ to signify a Form: Plato recommends using 
‘pure thought itself by itself to try to hunt down each pure being itself by itself.’ 
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involve instantiations of the Form, but the thinker cannot actually perform operations upon 
the Form itself (Republic 526ab). 
As Patterson ([2007] pp. 1-33) points out, even if there were intermediates, they could 
not be the ultimate ground of the truth of geometry: the Forms are. Thus, the unique Forms 
are still the foundations of geometry.148 Of course, one could extend this reading to the other 
mental states: physical things are instantiations of Forms, so really, any truth about the 
physical world is underpinned by the Forms, too. If we take the ‘objects’ reading of the line, 
this means that the Forms underpin pistis; on the ‘contents’ reading, it means that the Forms 
underpin noēsis applied to the sensibles. 
I want to say that we should be focusing on a different aspect of the question. I 
introduced the distinction between what the dianoetician uses and what he studies. Usually, 
the debate about intermediates focuses on the latter: mathematicians study mathematical 
intermediates. However, I want to argue that Plato does recognise a more generalized and 
implicit version of the Uniqueness Problem, but that mathematical intermediates (whether 
they exist or not) are not his answer, although they may be implicit in the answer. I am going 
to say that the Uniqueness Problem is not resolved by mathematical intermediates as objects 
of dianoia, but by the tools of dianoia as distinct from those of noēsis. 
I have already covered the usual passages that are supposed to support mathematical 
intermediates in Plato; I shall not repeat them here. Instead, I want to examine another 
passage from the Republic. Speaking about geometry, Socrates notes that the subject is in fact 
the opposite of what is implied by the terms of its practitioners: 
 
The terms are quite absurd, but they are hard put to it to find others. They talk about 
‘squaring’ and ‘applying’ and ‘adding’ and so on, as if they were doing something 
                                                
148 Cf Phaedo 96e ff, where Socrates points to the ‘simple but safe’ explanation that the Forms are the only 
cause of things. 
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and their reasoning had a practical end, and the subject were not, in fact pursued for 
the sake of knowledge…(yet) the objects of that knowledge are eternal and not liable 
to change and decay (Republic 526c 527 a6-b1, b5-6). 
 
Aristotle says that Platonic Forms are unique and unchanging; Platonic intermediates 
are unchanging but not unique. What I am about to propose is not the same as Aristotle’s 
account of intermediates, but draws on this distinction, in conjunction with the above passage 
of the Republic. The reason geometers (and other mathematicians, and as, I shall argue, some 
other philosophers who reason dianoetically, using hypotheses and images) are ‘hard put to 
it’ to find other terms for their operations is that they do not recognise that they are speaking 
about multiple instantiations of the same changeless Form, rather than making changes to the 
Form.  
Both those who propose Plato’s endorsement of mathematical intermediates149 and 
those who do not150 note that mathematical operations involve the use of more than one 
instance of the same Form. Socrates’ slave-boy experiment in the Meno involves several 
squares; geometers talk of two circles bisecting; one is added to one to make two. This is 
what gives rise to the problem of Uniqueness. However, this is not what Plato is talking about 
in the above passage of the Republic: he is talking about the implicit claim of geometers to 
change the unchangeable.151 Plato would have the same problem with adding the area of a 
square to a rectangle. This is not the Uniqueness problem, because here, we are not talking 
about two of the same Form, rather, the problem here is that we are talking about changing 
the changeable. 
                                                
149 For example, Burnyeat (2000) pp.1-81. 
150 For example, Annas (1975) pp. 146-166. 
151 Plato is also presumably concerned by the fact that some geometers do not realise the value of geometry in 
leading us to a higher state of mind, because they see only its practical use. 
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Plato’s solution is that dianoia instantiates the Form in theory. What I mean by this is 
that dianoia provides instances of Forms, and therefore gives us access to them. It does this 
by allowing us to access Forms through images taken from the phenomenal world. As we 
shall see, in the Phaedo, Socrates speaks of the need for the deuteros plous to study reality 
through ‘some other medium’ lest it injures the eyes (99de). This method takes recourse to 
theories, so the Forms are instantiated here through hypotheses and images. In this way, the 
dianoetic slave-boy experiment instantiates several squares in the course of the argument, in 
order to ‘double’ the area. The image that Socrates draws on the ground acts as a substitute ti 
esti, firstly be helping to identify what a square is (‘a figure like this’ - Meno 82b). Secondly, 
we are able to draw conclusions about properties of the Form of Square by instantiating it 
several times throughout the course of the investigation. (for example, that the area of the 
square is half of that it would be if it were drawn on the diagonal). 
As I have been arguing, dianoetic reasoning includes the mathematical method 
applied to philosophy in other spheres, so the objects of mathematical thought, or dianoetic 
thought, would include numbers and shapes, when a mathematician studies them with 
hypotheses and images and, crucially, moral concepts like virtue and entities such as the soul, 
when that method is applied to philosophy. So in the Republic, the Form of Justice is 
instantiated in theory, through philosophical images of the soul and the state. We draw 
conclusions about the nature of the Form of Justice by comparing the relationships between 
parts of a just soul and a just state, so we use two instantiations of the Form of Justice, even 
though there can only be one Form. 
This is an intelligible instantiation, and a more direct instantiation of a Form than the 
eikasiastic image. What makes the (correctly chosen) dianoetic image veridical is its 
connection to the Form. Dianoia is, on this reading, metaphysically connected to noēsis 
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because they are respectively indirect and direct ways of studying the same thing.152 I shall 
go on to expand on the nature of the dianoetic image, and its connection to truth, in the Meno 
and Phaedo sections, and my concluding chapter. For now, I just want to summarize what I 
have said about it here. 
Firstly, it is not the same as an eikasiastic image. It is a sensible object used as an 
intelligible instantiation (an intelligible representation or a dianoetic image) of a Form. As I 
will argue in the following chapter, even a diagram has intelligible qualities, because the 
information it contains is not entirely sensible, but is partially contained in the mind of the 
dianoetician. When Socrates draws his figures on the ground in the Meno, he cannot 
represent perfect figures, and the square he draws on the diagonal will not be exactly double 
the area of the original square. The image includes the diagram plus information like this that 
the diagram does not contain. It is intelligible, in that its properties exist in their fullest sense 
in the mind of the thinker. 
The dianoetic image is more veridical than that of eikasia because it is less removed 
from the Form. Once again, it is not an image of a sensible, which would make it ‘thrice 
removed’ from reality like the eikasiastic images, but an image of a Form. We saw that the 
problem with the images of eikasia was that they do not contain all the information about the 
thing they represent: 
 
If you look at a bed, or anything else, sideways or endways, or from some other angle, does it 
make any difference to the bed? Isn’t it merely that it looks different, without being 
                                                
152 This could also be said to provide a mechanism for ascent up the epistemological scale. In the Republic, 
Socrates says that he has only doxa about the Form of the Good (Republic 506c). By using an intelligible image 
in the form of the allegory of the sun, he is able to draw conclusions about it in a way that suggests dianoia. In 
this way, the intelligible image ‘lifts’ the mind from doxa into epistēmē. 
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different?...When the painter makes his representation, does he do so by reference to the 
object as it actually is or to its superficial appearance? (Republic 598ab).153 
 
The information contained in the eikasiastic image is limited to the angle from which 
it was made. The dianoetic image, however, being intelligible, is heuristic: we can use 
information it contains to draw conclusions about the Form we study. The tools of dianoia 
are ‘intermediate’ in a sense, in that dianoia uses instantiations of Forms in theory, but not in 
the traditional sense of the word. I have left the debate about traditional intermediates 
unresolved, partially because we have insufficient evidence to resolve it, partially because, 
like Burnyeat, I think that Plato’s focus was elsewhere, and partly because, like Patterson, I 
think that Forms ultimately underpin the tools of dianoia, and it is that which makes the 
image (or hypothesis) veridical. 
 
ii. The Hypothesis 
 
I shall say a good deal more about the hypothesis in dianoia when we come to the Phaedo 
section, and a good deal of what I have already said of the dianoetic image applies to 
hypotheses. The hypothesis performs a similar role to the image in that it stands in for a ti 
esti, and this similarity will be examined more closely in the Meno section. As I have argued, 
the ti esti is the most direct way of studying the Forms during our lifetimes. Although the 
hypothesis and image perform similar roles, there are important differences between the two. 
The main difference is that the dianoetic image is only found at dianoia, whereas the 
hypothesis appears at both dianoia and noēsis. A second difference is that a hypothesis is not 
an image of a Form. Rather it is a provisional statement about a Form. Finally, I said that the 
                                                
153 Cf Cratylus 432b, in which Plato points out that no image can be perfectly like its original, inside as well as 
out, because if it were, it would not be an image but a replica or double. Robinson (1953 p 218) takes this to 
mean that, for Plato, we should learn through realities rather than images. 
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roles played by the hypothesis and image were similar, not that they were the same. As we 
shall see, the hypothesis has a greater role to play in the ascent of the epistemological 
scale.154 
This last point has to do with the involvement of the hypothesis in ‘the upward path,’ 
which, since Robinson, has tended to be ascribed to the move from a hypothesis to an 
unhypothesized beginning.155 There are two passages in the Republic that give us reason to 
ascribe an ‘upward path’ to Plato. At Republic 511b, Plato seems to imply that the hypothesis 
can be stepping stones to an unhypothesized beginning: 
 
Then when I speak of the other sub-section of the intelligible part of the line you will understand 
that I mean that which the very process of argument grasps by power of dialectic; it treats 
assumptions not as principles, but as assumptions in the true sense; that is, as starting points and 
steps in the ascent to something which involves no assumption and is the first principle of 
everything; when it has grasped that principle it can again descend, by keeping to the 
consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion (Republic 511b). 
 
This is the passage from noēsis in the divided line, which we examined before. As I have 
been arguing, the divided line represents an epistemological ascent for Plato; the mental 
states are arranged in a hierarchy, which is clear from Plato’s remarks at Republic 511e: the 
                                                
154 Although I do suggest that the dianoetic image can lift the thinker from pistis to dianoia. 
155 Robinson is not the first to use the idea of ascent and decent in Plato’s epistemology. For example, see Adam 
([1902] pp.168-179), who uses these words in his Appendix iii Book VII of the Republic in his commentary. 
Adam links the idea of ascent to examples in the early dialogues of what he thinks is progression from one 
hypothesis to another. In addition, Laws 626b5-627al0, has been suggested to me as an example of ascent and 
descent in the application of the method of analysis in a non-mathematical context. Here, ‘the same test holds 
good’ for comparing cities with cities, as comparing villages with villages. An original definition of the well-
constituted city as the city that ‘must be so equipped as to be victorious over its rivals in warfare’ is replaced by 
another in which it is described as the city in which the better rule the worse. The progression is made upwards 
(from city via village and household to individual), then downwards via the same route, with the claim by 
Clinias that the position is made all the more incontestable by reducing the method to first principles. As the 
downward step is made as a summary, and does not involve an ascent to the Form of the Good, I would not say 
that this is the method described in the divided line as a whole, although it may be said to have been inspired by 
the method of analysis and synthesis (it cannot be reduction per se as, in this process, the way up and the way 
down are not separated like this). 
 136 
states of mind are arranged ‘on a scale, (and we may) assume that they have degrees of 
clarity corresponding to the degree of truth possessed by their subject-matter.’ Not only is it 
an ascending scale of progressively improving epistemological states, I want to say, but it is 
also a continuum: there will be a point at which the mind leaves dianoia and enters noēsis; 
this passage is describing that point.  
Plato explicitly says that the mind progresses through the mental states (Republic 532a), 
and the implication is that we proceed through each of the states and build on them. On this 
reading, dianoia is an indispensable part of the epistemological ascent. This is in direct 
contradiction to Benson’s reading, which I described above, which says that dianoia is the 
misapplication of the method of noēsis and therefore not the foundation for it.  
On my reading, the so-called hypothetical method of the Republic extends from dianoia 
into noēsis, and the hypotheses we find in dianoia are the foundations for noēsis. On this 
point, I also differ from Burnyeat, because I am saying that the same hypotheses from 
dianoia can be substantiated in noēsis. Plato tells us a little about how the ‘upward path’ 
might look at Republic 533c, where he speaks of the dialectical method as destroying 
hypotheses to the very beginning, in order to receive confirmation: 
 
Dialectic, in fact, is the only procedure which proceeds by the destruction of assumptions to the 
very first principle, so as to give itself a firm base. When the eye of the mind gets really bogged 
down in a morass of ignorance, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it up, using the studies we 
have described to help it in the process of conversion (533cd). 
 
Robinson tackles the two questions of what receives confirmation, and what it means to 
destroy a hypothesis: ‘destroying’ a hypothesis cannot mean either refuting or confirming, as 
there are bound to be some true, and some false, hypotheses. Robinson thinks that it is the 
hypothetical character of the hypotheses that are being destroyed, not the proposition itself:  
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‘To destroy hypotheses is not to prove the falsity of certain propositions which we formerly 
hypothesized (nor to prove their truth), but to cease hypothesizing certain propositions which 
we formerly hypothesized, and take another attitude towards them’ (Robinson [1953] p 161). 
The problem is that this seems to be implied by the ‘downward’ path anyway: after the 
dialectician has done his work, the proposition considered will either be a certain truth or a 
certain falsehood. 
It is not the deductive process that results in certainty: at least, not the absolute certainty 
that Plato is looking for. He says: ‘for if one’s starting point is something unknown, and 
one’s conclusion and intermediate steps are made up of unknowns also, how can the resulting 
consistency ever by any manner of means become knowledge?’ (Republic 533c). In this case, 
deduction can only give certainty if the hypothesis has already been substantiated, which is 
the role of the upward path. 
But how exactly does one make this epistemological ascent? Robinson distinguishes 
between the synthesis theory of the upward path, the mathematical theory, the ‘Phaedo’ 
theory and the intuition theory. He rejects the synthesis theory and the mathematical theory, 
has sympathies with the ‘Phaedo’ theory and supports the intuition theory. I also reject the 
synthesis theory (for different reasons from Robinson), but as I am proposing what Robinson 
might class as a mathematical theory, I shall now go on to state my reasons for differing from 
Robinson. 
The synthesis theory is that there are two processes involved in dialectic: the upward path 
towards the principle and the downwards path away from the principle. The upward path is a 
process of generalization (as we might see from the ascent passage of the Symposium) and 
the downward path is a process of classification or division. This would mean that the 
upward and downward paths of the Republic are similar to the method of collection and 
division of the Phaedrus.  
 138 
Robinson rejects this reading on the grounds that the Form of the Good is not, for Plato, a 
summum genus. How, asks Robinson, can finding the genus of a group of species be 
‘destroying the hypothesis?’ Robinson thinks that for the upward path to be generalization, it 
would have to be empirical,156 whereas dialectic proceeds without the senses. Moreover, 
identifying the upward path with collection means identifying the downward path with 
division; but the downward path should more properly be thought of as proof.157 The 
activities of collection and division might aid the dialectician, but this is not what Plato 
means by the upward and downward paths of the divided line.  
As I will explain in the Phaedo section, I do not think that the epistemological ascent is 
driven by generalization in this sense; although knowledge of the genus and that of the 
species are mutually reinforcing. So, for example, knowledge of the species lion (panthera 
leo) will tell us something about the genus panthera, and vice versa. Plato is not thinking 
primarily of biological examples here, but the lion example serves to illustrate Robinson’s 
point: to find that the tiger, lion, jaguar and leopard all belong to the genus panthera cannot 
substantiate the hypothesis. Obviously, there will be some features that these animals have in 
common, but Plato thinks that a hypothesis can be made about a feature of a species that is 
not common to the genus. If we want to hypothesize, ‘lions live in prides,’ there is no way 
that this hypothesis can be substantiated by finding the genus, because living in prides is a 
property of lions, not of the other cats in the genus panthera. 
The same can be said of other disciplines. As we shall see, the hypothesis can be any kind 
of proposition about the thing we are investigating: it does not have to be a definition or 
statement of existence. So if we want to hypothesize, ‘the diagonal of a square is 
                                                
156 Robinson thinks that Phaedrus 249bc supports his point, in which ‘It is impossible for a soul that has never 
seen the truth to enter human shape; it takes a man to understand by the use of universals, and to collect out of 
the multiplicity of sense-impressions a unity arrived at be the process of reason.’ Here, sense-impressions are 
important in the process of generalisation, as the collection of the former enables the latter (although the soul 
has experienced the Forms before entering the body). 
157 In fact, Republic 534bc seems to Robinson to show division as arriving at the Form of the Good, so would 
therefore come in the first part of dialectic. 
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incommensurable with its side,’ generalization to the properties of shapes is not going to 
destroy the hypothesis. That is not to say that generalization will not come into it at some 
point; in fact, knowledge of the properties of shapes is fundamental to geometry, and it is our 
knowledge of geometric principles that allows us to prove the incommensurability of the 
diagonal with the side. What I am saying is that this generalization is not what Plato is talking 
about at this stage: rather, it comes in at a higher level of noēsis, where teleology (Plato’s 
‘best method’) comes into play. 
I have said that the divided line is a continuum: the early stages of noēsis are a 
progression on the later stages of dianoia, so they will look different to the later stages. When 
the mind ascends to noēsis from dianoia, it substantiates the hypothesis from which it has 
derived its conclusions by deriving this from a ‘higher’ hypothesis. In the later stages of 
noēsis, these hypotheses are supported by the teleological account that the mind has attained. 
On this reading, the method that appears in the Phaedo, the deuteros plous,158 is dianoia plus 
the early stages of noēsis, before the teleological account has been produced.  
Robinson has some sympathy for the ‘Phaedo’ theory of the upward path, according to 
which the upward path is the hypothetical method described in the Phaedo. According to 
Robinson, this means first using the elenchus to check the hypotheses for consistency, which 
Robinson thinks is probably what Plato did mean in the divided line passage.159 However, 
Robinson argues that, in spite of first appearance, the hypothetical method of the Phaedo 
does not exhaust the upward path of the Republic, because it cannot give the infallible 
certainty of the ‘unhypothesized beginning’ which is emphasized in the Republic. Robinson 
thinks that the method of the Phaedo is probably a part of the upward path of dialectic, 
because, as the downward path sounds like a deduction of theorems from axioms, it is likely 
                                                
158 See Section Three, Chapter Two segment ii, for a discussion of deuteros plous as ‘second best.’ 
159 In Book VII (which Robinson says is ‘universally recognized to be the expression of the same ideas) we find 
elenchus. Robinson cites Republic 534bc, in which the words ἐλέγχων (c1) έλέγχειν (c3) are found. 
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that the upward path would proceed from as yet unproved theorems to as yet uncertified 
axioms.  
However, Robinson’s conception of the ‘higher’ hypothesis in the Phaedo does not 
make it higher in the sense that it takes the argument ‘upward,’ as the divided line passage 
seems to require: ‘it is much more likely to be ‘on the same level’, since it is intended to fulfil 
the same function’ (Robinson [1953] pp 171-172). This is not my reading of the ‘higher’ 
hypothesis in the Phaedo, as I will explain in this section. However, Robinson, while 
sympathetic to the idea that the method of the Phaedo is connected to that of the Republic, 
does not think that it is enough to explain the ‘upward’ movement of dialectic. 
Robinson champions the ‘intuition-theory’ of the upward path. He agrees that the 
method of the Phaedo plays a part in the epistemological ascent, but thinks that, in order to 
achieve the certainty of the unquestionable first principle, something else is needed. This 
‘something extra’ is not an additional method: ‘he merely claims that the man who 
competently and conscientiously practises this hypothetical and elenctic procedure will, or 
may, one day find himself in the possession of an unhypothetical certainty’ (Robinson [1953] 
p 172-173). After many months of testing, it will dawn on him that one particular hypothesis 
will have endured every possible test. It is the intuition, not proof or demonstration that 
makes this hypothesis a certainty. The process strengthens the philosopher’s mental vision. 
Robinson thinks that his account is supported by the ascent to knowledge on the cave 
allegory of the Republic, the Symposium and the Seventh Letter. In this way, thinks Robinson, 
the upward path of the Republic is the method of the Phaedo with the added claim that this 
method can produce certainty. The confirmation of the proposition, on this reading, occurs 
long after its conception.  
 I agree with Robinson in that Plato seems to be talking about the same thing in both 
the ‘hypotheses’ passages of the divided line and the hypothetical passage of the Phaedo. I 
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also agree that intuition has a role to play in the epistemological ascent. However, on my 
reading, this role is limited to the ‘upward’ heuristic process of finding an appropriate 
‘higher’ hypothesis (or dianoetic image: it is not the appeal to intuition that makes the image 
convincing, as Robinson says, but rather, it is the intuition of the Form that allows the 
practitioner of dianoia to choose an appropriate image). This intuitive function is part of the 
application of the mathematical method to philosophy that I will try to demonstrate in the 
following sections. I will argue that the image and hypothesis play heuristic roles, but that 
finding the appropriate hypothesis or image is itself a heuristic process, and it is here that 
intuition comes in. The intuitive part according to Robinson is also in the heuristic reach for 
the hypothesis, but he also thinks that it is the intuitive certainty about a hypothesis that 
makes the ascent; I do not.  
 Robinson is also correct in saying that the method of the Phaedo does not exhaust the 
method of dialectic described in the Republic. As I have said, the deuteros plous of the 
Phaedo represents dianoia and the early stages of noēsis. I am using the term ‘method’ quite 
loosely here. What I mean is that the teleological account that we find in the later stages of 
noēsis is a different kind of explanation produced by the later stages of the same method. I 
shall explain this more in the Phaedo section. For now, I just want to point out that we should 
not be expecting the deuteros plous to exhaust dialectic: as I shall take great pains to point 
out in the Phaedo section, the deuteros plous is a second-best approach and, as such, it is by 
no means the end of the story. 
 So far, I’ve agreed with Robinson that the ‘upward’ path is linked to the method of 
the Phaedo and that intuition plays a role in the heuristic ascent, but I’ve disagreed with the 
main thrust of his argument, that it is intuition that gives us the true testing of an 
unhypothesized beginning. My own reading falls under what Robinson would describe as the 
‘mathematical’ theory of the upward path, which Robinson rejects. He associates this with 
 142 
the method of geometrical analysis, which I shall discuss in the Meno section. Robinson 
argues that there is little incentive to read the method into the divided line because ‘it would 
have to mean that dialectic hypothesises some proposition and goes on deducing its 
consequences until it arrives at the Idea of the Good, which it independently knows to be 
true. It then (and this synthesis would be the downward path) asserts the Idea of the Good, 
and deduces consequences therefrom in the reverse order until it arrives at the original 
hypothesis, which is thus established’ (Robinson [1953] p 166). 
The problem with this, Robinson thinks, is that the Form of the Good cannot be 
independently known to be true; it is the job of the upward path to confirm it. We could try to 
say that the upward path (analysis) involves making propositions about the Form of the Good 
and the downward path (synthesis) involves proving our definition from the known fact at the 
end of the analysis. However, this is inconsistent with the divided line passage, because the 
Good comes at the beginning, not at the end, of the downward path. 
As I shall argue, the method that Plato applies to philosophy in the Meno and Phaedo is 
not analysis and synthesis, but apagōgē (reducing the problem to another that is easier to 
solve). I follow Karasmanis (1987) in this, but in his reading of the divided line, Karasmanis 
thinks that the dialectical method of the Republic is that of analysis and synthesis (pp. 257-
307). This is where I differ from Karasmanis. The main difference between the two methods 
is that, in the latter, the ‘way up’ and the ‘way down’ are separated, whereas in the former, 
every step up is followed by a step downwards. The other difference is that, in apagōgē, the 
problem is reduced to a hypothesis, whereas in analysis, the thing sought is the hypothesis 
and starting point. Because apagōgē is a forerunner to analysis, the two methods present 
some similarities.  
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As I explain in Section Two, Chapter Three ii, Plato uses the method of reduction at 
Meno 87b-89a (and Aristotle seems to confirm this in Prior Analytics 69a).160 Reduction 
starts from the enunciation of a problem, then ‘reducing’ it to a problem that is easier to 
solve, through the use of lemmas (premisses assumed in establishing something else). 
Enunciation of the problem→lemma1→lemma2→lemma3→…Conclusion 
In the Meno, Socrates reduces the problem of whether virtue is teachable to the problem 
of whether virtue is knowledge. He enunciates the problem with the theorem ‘If virtue is 
knowledge, it can be taught’ (87c) and the diorismos is ‘this is the condition on which virtue 
is teachable’ (87c). During the passage, lemma 1, ‘virtue is knowledge’ is reduced to lemma 
2: ‘virtue is good’ (87d). 
Unlike Robinson, Karasmanis thinks that the dialectical ascent of the Republic is analysis 
and synthesis. He thinks it cannot be apagōgē, because the (a) two processes, up and down, 
are clearly separated and (b) the dialectical ascent arrives at the Form of the good, the 
unhypothetical first principle. Against Robinson’s objection that geometrical analysis is 
always deductive, whereas the dialectical ascent is not, Karasmanis argues that this is not 
necessarily true (a claim that I shall explore in the Meno section). He says that the two 
methods are not identical, and that Plato is aware of the differences between a mathematical 
proof and a philosophical argument. However, he thinks that the general form of the 
dialectical ascent in the Republic and the method of analysis and synthesis is the same. 
In the sections that follow, I shall be building on Karasmanis’ claim that apagōgē is the 
method that Plato has in mind in the Meno and Phaedo. I have already said that the deuteros 
plous of the Phaedo covers dianoia and the early stages of noēsis in the divided line. In the 
previous chapter, I described hypotheses as proxies for ti estis, saying that they are not 
themselves definitions, but propositions about Forms. In the Meno section, I argue that a ti 
                                                
160 I also argue that what follows 89a, is not part of the method of reduction, but two separate, empirical 
arguments. 
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esti is not an exhaustive account of a Form, but it is sufficiently extensive to allow us to work 
out other things about the Form we are studying.  
On my reading, the move from dianoia to noēsis is made as we use the method of 
apagōgē. We have a problem (mathematical or otherwise) and reduce it to a hypothesis-
lemma (an ‘upwards’ step). The consequences of this are checked for coherence (a 
downwards step). The hypothesis is reduced to a ‘higher’ hypothesis (which, as I shall argue, 
is identical with the method of the Phaedo), which involves an ‘upwards’ move from dianoia 
to noēsis, as this is equivalent to the state of mind that ‘treats assumptions not as principles, 
but as assumptions in the true sense’ (Republic 511b).161 The reach for this higher hypothesis 
is an upwards step, but the reduction of the previous hypothesis is a (probably deductive) 
downwards step. So far, the transition from dianoia to noēsis resembles apagōgē. 
A ti esti, I shall argue, needs more than just the proposition about a Form provided by its 
proxy, the hypothesis. But indisputably, hypotheses are ‘starting points and steps’ to the 
unhypothesized first principle, so I propose that the method of reduction provides us with the 
extra properties that a ti esti needs (Republic 511b). It needs at least some degree of certainty, 
plus enough information to enable us to work out other things about the Form: it cannot be 
limited to the existential or propositional statement that we get from a hypothesis. The ti esti 
is able to appear in noēsis because at least some degree of certainty is provided by the 
reduction of the initial problem to a hypothesis, and the subsequent (usually deductive) 
downward step. Each reduction provides us with additional information about the Form that 
we are studying. This provides an account, which, I shall argue in the Meno and Phaedo 
sections, is the second thing we need to make the claim a ti esti. So, after the initial stages of 
noēsis, ti estis appear. The nature of these, on which I shall expand in the following sections, 
allows us to build the teleological account that Socrates seeks in the Phaedo, that goes 
                                                
161 As I have stressed throughout this chapter, it is not the awareness of the hypothesis or image that determines 
the mental state of the thinker, but the treatment of them. 
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beyond the deuteros plous to the first principle of everything, which is the end of the upward 
path in the Republic’s method of dialectic.  
Once we arrive at this principle, we begin the descent. One of Robinson’s problems with 
the mathematical theory of the dialectic ascent is that it is apparently inconsistent with the 
divided line passage, because the Good comes at the beginning, not at the end, of the 
downward path. On my reading, which does not try to make analysis and synthesis the format 
of the whole process, this is not a problem. The ascent moves from hypotheses to ti estis to 
teleology and the Form of the Good. This enables us to give the kind of teleological accounts 
that Socrates wants in the Phaedo on the way down. This reading has the added bonus of 
avoiding Annas’ ([1981] pp. 291-293) problem that there is nothing left for the way down 
after the triumph of the ascent: on my reading, the way down builds on the way up to give a 
completely different kind of explanation.  
Of course, as I have taken the deuteros plous/dianoia to noēsis transition to be apagōgē, 
the initial stages of the ‘way up’ actually begin with successive steps up and down, but the 
overall movement on this view would be upwards, and my reading fits in nicely with Plato’s 
description of the dianoia to noēsis transition as ‘steps and sallies’ at Republic 511b.162 Plato 
does not mention here a transition as such from the lower to the higher division. However, 
Plato explicitly says that the mind progresses through the mental states (Republic 532ab) and 
speaks of progress to ‘the summit of the intellectual realm’ (532b). My reading suggests a 
solution to the problem of how Plato expects us to do this. It also allows for the division 
between dianoia and noēsis that Plato specifies, because although hypotheses are used at both 
levels, the dianoetic image is restricted to dianoia and the ti esti is restricted to noēsis.163 
                                                
162 It is the hypotheses in the uppermost section of the Line that are called 'steps and sallies.' However, that does 
not exclude the possibility of ‘downward’ steps at the beginning of dianoia (in fact, as I argue in Section Two, 
Chapter 3.ii, this is what happens). Moreover, it is consistent with what I have to say about the extension of the 
use of hypotheses into noēsis.  
163 Scott (1995) pp.15-23 and 38-52 has an opposing view to mine. Rather than thinking that we ascend to 






iii. Theaetetus: Hypothesis and Image in the Search for a Definition 
 
 The main focus of this project is dianoetic thought as described and practised in the 
Meno, Phaedo and Republic. There are many more passages in middle Plato (and beyond) 
that refer to mathematics, but it is beyond the scope of this project to give exhaustive 
accounts of all of them. However, it has been said that we see, in Theaetetus, the clearest 
example of the hypothetical method in action (Matthews [1972] pp. 38-39), and the 
dialogue’s affinity to the Meno as a search for definition that resorts to hypothesis164 means 
that it merits at least some attention. Although I am not attempting to give a full exposition of 
this dialogue here, I do want to suggest that this is one instance of hypotheses being used in 
conjunction with images in dianoetic reasoning in Plato. I also want to show that the image 
does not have to be a hypothesis, but because, as I argued above, most arguments require the 
use of more than one concept, we can see the image being used as proxy for a ti esti that we 
do not yet have. 
                                                                                                                                                  
According to Scott, Plato excludes ordinary learning from the scope of recollection: Scott thinks that Plato has 
an empiricist theory of this: according to him, ordinary learning is acquired by habit. On this reading, most 
people do not go beyond ordinary learning to recollect, but philosophical discoveries are startling revisions of 
ordinary ways of thinking. We forget our knowledge of the Forms at birth and regain it by the process of 
recollection. 
164 The search for a definition is a feature of many early dialogues, but Theaetetus and Meno share a particular 
feature of introducing the hypothetical method after the initial failure of the first few attempts. In both Meno and 
Theaetetus, the Socratic interlocutors offer initial definitions as answers to the question posed by Socrates. In 
both cases, these definitions are rejected on the basis of the form of these definitions. Theaetetus’ and Meno’s 
first definitions consist of lists of examples without reference to anything that unites all instances (Meno 71e, 
72ab; Theaetetus 1146cd). The other problem with Theaetetus’ definition, and with Meno’s other two 
definitions, is that they incorporate concepts that rely on the things to be defined (Meno 73d, 77b; Theaetetus 
146c). In both dialogues, the interconnectedness of definitions is remarked upon (Meno 75bc; Theaetetus 
196de). 
 147 
 Firstly, I will argue that the discussion in Theaetetus is heavily influenced by 
mathematics. This in itself should suggest that the Theaetetus contains at least some 
mathematics applied to philosophy, and my reading of the argument will show that that the 
three hypotheses are used in conjunction with images, making Theaetetus a paradigm of 
dianoetic reasoning.  
 Theaetetus is heavily influenced by mathematics; Socrates' interlocutors are 
themselves mathematicians, making them ideally placed to apply mathematical reasoning to 
philosophy, especially Theaetetus, who is young enough to pick up new ways of speaking. 
The mathematical example is introduced after the rejection of Theaetetus’ initial definition of 
knowledge. Theaetetus says that he had learned of the irrationality of √3, √5…√17 from 
Theodorus. He saw that there were evidently an infinite number of square roots, and tried 
with a friend to gather them all under a single heading. They call numbers that can be the 
product of multiplying some number by itself ‘square’ numbers, and those that cannot 
‘oblong’ numbers. The lines which form the side of a square whose area is a square number 
is a ‘rational length’, and those which form the sides of a square whose area is an oblong 
number is an ‘irrational root’ (Theaetetus 148ab). 
Theaetetus points out that a similar distinction can also be made for solid figures. 
Theaetetus sees that Socrates wants the same kind of answer to his question about 
knowledge, and thus takes mathematics as a model for philosophy. This sentiment is echoed 
by Socrates, when he says,  
 
You showed the way well, just now, so take your answer about irrational roots as a model. 
What you must try to do is give a single account of the many branches of knowledge, in the 




Mathematics is again referred to later in the dialogue to set the standards of sound 
method. The fact that geometers would be considered worthless if they relied on probability 
is cited as a reason to prefer logical proof to probability (Theaetetus 162e-163a).165 
 Another instance of mathematics being used as a model for philosophy in Theaetetus 
is in the discussion on false belief.  Socrates and Theaetetus have already included 
mathematical concepts like ‘odd’ and ‘even’ in the question about whether there is a specific 
organ with which the mind perceives features that cannot be grasped by the senses 
(Theaetetus 185cd). Then, in the analysis of the wax tablet image, a mathematical example is 
given to argue that error can occur even when we think about things that are already known. 
We can know the numbers five and seven, but erroneously conclude that they are eleven 
when added together. Theaetetus adds,  
 
…and the greater the number, the greater the chance of error. I mention larger numbers 
because I take you to be talking about any number (Theaetetus 196b). 
 
In the analysis of the aviary image, arithmetic is again used as an example, this time 
of a skill that affords control over pieces of numerical knowledge (Theaetetus 198ab). These 
examples not only highlight the virtue of mathematics as a discipline that produced universal 
rules to cover all instances, but also commend it as a model for other types of inquiry. 
Theodorus recommends that Socrates ‘treat the theory like a geometrical problem and 
look into it by ourselves’ (Theaetetus 180c) and this, I suggest, is how the group proceeds. 
The method of the mathematicians is applied to philosophy throughout the dialogue, as the 
bulk of the discussion is engaged in the hypothetical method. We are not given a theoretical 
account of the method, as we are in the Meno, but we do see the method in action. Socrates 
                                                
165 Phaedo 92d also seems to make this point. 
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and Theaetetus are searching for a ti esti for knowledge; in the absence of this, they use 
hypotheses.  
Theaetetus suggests three hypotheses which could serve as answers to the question, 
‘what is knowledge?’ and they investigate each in turn. The first hypothesis is, ‘knowledge is 
perception’ (151e). The second is, ‘knowledge is true belief’ (187b), and the third is, 
‘knowledge is true belief accompanied by a rational account’ (201c). They are treated as 
hypotheses throughout the text,166 and they are treated differently from the definitions. Rather 
than being objected to on account of their form, the hypotheses are expounded. This happens 
either by being supplemented with an additional theory (in the case of flux), or by images (in 
the case of the aviary and wax tablet images). Following this, the elaborated hypotheses are 
subject to analysis before being finally rejected. 
This, I am saying, is an example of dianoia, where hypotheses are adopted in the 
absence of a ti esti. However, as Theaetetus and Socrates investigate, they need to use other 
concepts, for which they are also missing ti estis. It is here that the image, the other tool of 
dianoia, is used. 
As Socrates and Theaetetus investigate the hypothesis ‘true belief is knowledge,’ they 
find that they need to find out how there can be false belief. Socrates says that he thinks he 
has found a way in which the inquiry can continue. It is possible that error can occur by 
something unknown being thought to be something known. They thought this to be 
impossible before, because it made the known things unknown. However: 
 
…for the sake of argument, imagine that our minds contain a wax block, which may vary in 
size, cleanliness and consistency in different individuals, but in some people is just 
right…whenever we want to remember something we’ve seen or heard or conceived on our 
own, we subject the block to the perception or the idea and stamp the impression onto it, as if 
                                                
166 For example, at 165d, Theaetetus says, Ἀλλά λογίζοµαι ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπεθέµην.  
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we were making marks with signet-rings. We remember and know anything imprinted, as 
long as the impression remains in the block; but we forget and do not know anything which is 
erased or cannot be imprinted (Theaetetus 191ce). 
 
Here, the image stands in for a ti esti that we do not have, for ‘memory.’ We said that 
an image standing in for a ti esti should be a heuristic tool; something that allows us to make 
progress in the quest for knowledge. This image is heuristic because it allows Socrates to 
move the argument on, and explain false belief as ‘cross belief’ (193d; cf 194b6). The image 
is eventually found not to apply to all cases, and the assertion of false belief as cross belief is 
dropped (196d).167 However, progress has still been made, because it has allowed Socrates to 
identify another problem: they do not have a ti esti for ‘knowing.’ Socrates is frustrated about 
the need for more terms that they have not yet defined: 
 
Then doesn’t it strike you as dishonourable for us to assert what knowing is like, when we are 
ignorant about knowledge? But in fact, Theaetetus, our conversation has been contaminated 
by impurities for a long time! Countless times we’ve said ‘We know’ or ‘We do not know’, 
‘We have knowledge’ or ‘We have no knowledge’, as if we could understand each other in 
the slightest, as long as we remain ignorant about knowledge. And never mind the past; we’re 
at it again at the moment! We’ve just used the words ‘ignorant’ and understand’, as if we had 
the right to use them while knowledge eludes us (Theaetetus 196de). 
 
Here, Socrates puts his finger on a problem that many scholars overlook when 
thinking about definition in the dialogues. If we want to prioritise definition, which Socrates 
evidently does, we cannot avoid using other, related terms in our quest for the definition we 
seek. Socrates and Theaetetus want to find the definition of knowledge; they cannot help 
                                                
167 At 194b6: εἰς πλάγια καὶ σκολιά.  
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using words like ‘knowing,’ ‘ignorant’ and ‘understand’; but they lack definitions for these 
terms, too. 
Aware that he cannot avoid using these terms, Socrates mentions what he calls a 
‘topical description of knowing’ (197a). This is, ‘the having of knowledge’ (197b).  This is 
not the only place we find this description. Dionysodorus gives us the same one in 
Euthydemus:  
 
Tell me, isn’t learning the acquisition of the knowledge of what one learns? 
Cleinias agreed. 
And what about knowing? He said. Is it anything except having knowledge already?  
He agreed. 
Then not knowing is not yet having knowledge?  
(Euthydemus 277bc). 
 
 This may well be a sophistic definition of knowledge,168 which could explain 
Socrates’ reference to it as ‘topical.’ At any rate, Socrates is not happy with the description (it 
is not a satisfactory ti esti) and wants to change it to ‘the possession of knowledge’ (197b). 
For possessing and having, says Socrates, are different. This prompts Socrates to use another 
image: 
 
Think of the analogy of someone who has tracked down some wild birds (pigeons or 
whatever) and keeps them in a pigeonry he’s constructed. Surely we would say that in a sense 
he always has them, because he possesses them, wouldn’t we? (Theaetetus 197cd). 
 
This allows him to make a step towards the ti estis he needs:  
                                                
168 See Waterfield’s note 1 in his translation of Theaetetus (1987). 
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And we call transmission ‘teaching’, reception ‘learning’, and having, through processing in 
our hypothetical aviary, we call ‘knowing’ (Theaetetus 198b). 
 
Using the aviary image, Socrates is able to explain how things that were learned some 
time ago can be re-learned, and to distinguish the possession of knowledge from having 
knowledge.  
 
Section Two: The Meno 
 
 Recent scholarship on the Meno has acknowledged the dialogue’s ambition and 
scope. Although nominally an inquiry into the nature of virtue, Meno also offers complex 
discussion on definition, inquiry and knowledge. It has been suggested that it is a mistake to 
search for a single main theme; rather, the dialogue has ‘complex unity’ and a ‘dramatised 
conflict of interests.’169 Importantly for this project, it also presents mathematics as a model 
for philosophy, and the hypothetical method is used by Socrates for the first time here.  
The Meno opens with a conversation between Meno and Socrates, in which Meno 
asks Socrates whether or not virtue can be taught.  Socrates answers that he does not even 
know what virtue is; so he cannot possibly know what its properties are; this is typical of 
Socrates’ preference for a ti esti before inquiry into a hopoion. After three failed attempts to 
define virtue, Meno confesses to aporia. Moreover, he says that he does not even know how 
to inquire into it, as it is impossible to recognise something that he does not know, even when 
he has found it.  
                                                
169 Scott (2006) pp.1-7; Cf Fine (2007) pp.331-367, who also acknowledges the complexity of the dialogue. 
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As a response to Meno’s paradox, Socrates introduces the theory of recollection. He 
conducts an experiment with Meno’s slave boy asking him how to double the area of a 
square. The boy thinks he knows, but is mistaken. After a similar experience of aporia to 
Meno’s, he discovers the answer. Socrates does not give him information; instead, he 
questions the slave until he arrives at the solution himself. Socrates thinks that this proves 
that the slave already possessed the knowledge himself. What is interesting for us is that, in 
this passage, there is no ti esti for what a square is; instead, Socrates uses a diagram. 
What follows is the hypothetical passage (Meno 86-89), which draws upon the 
method used by geometers in their inquiries. Meno still wants to inquire into the hopoion 
question of whether virtue can be taught, whereas Socrates prefers to ask the ti esti question 
of what virtue itself is. However, Socrates reluctantly agrees to investigate whether or not 
virtue can be taught, providing they adopt the hypothetical method. This is done by using the 
hypothesis, ‘virtue is knowledge.’ 
However, the dialogue still ends in aporia. After the hypothetical passage follows an 
empirical discussion which seems to show that virtue is not knowledge, and then a discussion 
of the difference between knowledge and true belief.  Socrates says that they will not get to 
the bottom of the matter until they have agreed upon what virtue is. Therefore our 
interpretation of the hypothetical passage in the Meno needs to account for the apparent lack 
of progress on the issue, if we are to say that mathematics provides a step up the 
epistemological ladder. 
 The dialogue is often seen as a ‘transitional’ work between Plato’s early ‘Socratic’ 
period and his middle works, in which he moves away from the Socratic elenchus and 
towards the more positive (rather than refutational) hypothetical method.170 It is sometimes 
said to be a dialogue of two parts. The first part attempts to find a definition of virtue, and is 
                                                
170 See Vlastos (1991) pp. 107-131 and the introduction to this dissertation. 
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usually seen to be similar to the early Socratic dialogues; the second part, 80 to the end is 
where Plato introduces his more ‘Platonic,’ ‘middle-period’ ideas.171 However, some people 
deny the existence of such a sharp break; some say that we could see the whole dialogue as 
Platonic (Karasmanis [2006] pp. 129-141). The first part of the dialogue is the failed search 
for a ti esti for virtue, and the second part employs the hypothetical method, so the 
relationship between the two is crucial for our solution to the research question. This solution 
is that hypotheses (and images) are used in the absence of ti esti answers in inquiry at a 
certain point on Plato’s epistemological scale, ie, the section of the scale which uses 
mathematical reasoning. 
The problem of the Meno for this project is this: if mathematics is not important in a 
general epistemological sense, or if is not imported into the philosophical method to a 
significant degree, and with positive results, the solution proposed by the project is 
undermined. We need to show that mathematics is an integral part of Plato’s epistemological 
scale, that he imports its methodology into his philosophy to a significant degree, and that 
hypotheses (and images, although this will be more important in the Phaedo chapter) are used 
as substitutes for ti esti answers. 
The purpose of this section will be to show importance of mathematical reasoning in 
Plato’s Meno, arguing that the hypothetical method is adopted in response to the absence of a 
ti esti for virtue. The failed search for a definition in the first part has cohesion with the 
second, in that it justifies the resort to the hypothetical method, and also gives us the 
psychological preparation we need to use it and some epistemological signposts for how to 
do so (chapters one and two). We shall see that the hypothetical method does exist as distinct 
from the elenchus, and it succeeds at least partly in importing mathematical methodology into 
philosophy (chapter three). Moreover, it produces positive results, as the aporia at the end of 
                                                
171 For example by Robinson (1953) pp.10-15, 114-122; Sharples (1985) pp.3-4. 
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the dialogue is a result of the empirical arguments that follow it, not of the hypothetical 
method itself (Chapter Four).  
 
Chapter One: Definition in the Meno  
 
Socrates insists that he cannot answer Meno’s question, ‘can virtue be taught?’ until he 
knows what virtue is, so the first part of the Meno is spent searching for a definition, a ti esti, 
of virtue. I want to explain the hypothetical method in Plato’s middle works as something the 
philosopher does when he does not have a ti esti. It is clear that Socrates thinks that a ti esti 
should be heuristic: in order to solve the problem of whether virtue is teachable, we need a ti 
esti: a definition for Plato is not just something done for its own sake, but this, or something 
like it is a necessary condition for inquiry. Therefore, the problem for this chapter will be to 
explain what, according to the Meno, a ti esti answer involves and how it might help us to 
gain knowledge.  
The first subsection will examine what Socrates appears to want from a definition, 
looking at his objections to Meno’s answers, and his own attempts at definitions. We shall 
examine Karasmanis’ view that, in the Meno, Plato presents us with an almost complete 
theory of definition, and Charles’ ([2006] pp.110-128) view that there are two questions: the 
signification question and the essence question. This should tell us what a ti esti should look 
like. Then we will look at how ti esti answers might fit into Plato’s epistemological scheme. 
We shall examine Fine’s view that inquiry in the Meno is conducted through a series of 
approximations, using this idea to place the ti esti in Plato’s scale of reasoning. 
 
i. What does Socrates want from a ti esti?  
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The Meno is usually considered to be a transitional dialogue, divided into two parts: 70-9 and 
80 to 100c. The first part attempts to find a definition of virtue, and is usually seen to be 
similar to the early Socratic dialogues. The second part is sometimes seen (for example by 
Vlastos) as Plato’s first attempt to employ his new, positive mathematical methods. However 
Karasmanis ([2006] pp.129-141) argues that the whole dialogue should be seen as Platonic, 
as the first part presents an almost complete theory of definition, not simply the refutation of 
three bad definitions of virtue. We shall examine the definitions given in the first part of the 
dialogue, and try to see what Plato tells us about what a good definition should offer. 
There are six attempts at definitions in the first part of the Meno: three from Meno 
about virtue, and three mathematical definitions from Socrates. All three of Meno’s 
definitions are judged to be inadequate, but Socrates’ objections can tell us a lot about what a 
good definition should be like: we shall examine those first (a). Socrates has more success 
with his own mathematical definitions, so we shall go on to examine these (b). Finally, I want 
to put forward my own theory about what these definitions tell us about Plato’s requirements 
for a ti esti response (c). 
 
a. Meno’s Definitions: 
 
 Meno’s initial reaction when Socrates asks for a definition of virtue is to provide a list 
of examples of virtue: 
 
First of all, if it is manly virtue you are after, it is easy to see that the virtue of a man consists 
in managing the city’s affairs capably, and so that he will help his friends and injure his foes 
while taking care to come to no harm himself. Or if you want a woman’s virtue, that is easily 
described. She must be a good housewife, careful with her stores and obedient to her husband. 
Then these is another virtue for a child, male or female, and another for an old man, free or 
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slave as you like; and a great many more kinds of virtue, so that no one need be at a loss to 
say what it is. For every act and every time of life, with reference to each separate function, 
there is one virtue for each of us, and similarly, I should say, a vice (Meno 71e-72a). 
 
Socrates is not happy with this definition. He gives Meno the example of bees: insofar 
as they are bees, they do not differ from each other at all. If they differ, it is in respect to 
some other quality like size or beauty. He puns, ‘I wanted one virtue and I find that you have 
a whole swarm of virtues to offer’ (72ab). Socrates asks Meno to think about virtue in the 
same way:  
 
Even if they are many and various, yet at least they all have some common character which 
makes them virtues. That is what ought to be kept in view by anyone who answers the 
question: ‘What is virtue?’ (Meno 72cd). 
 
Socrates goes on to explain that, just as health, size and strength are the same in a man, a 
woman ‘and the rest,’ in their ‘characters,’ so virtue ‘in its character’ must be the same in 
each one of us, and Karasmanis thinks that we now have the following requirements for a 
good definition: it should give the common characteristic of all instances,172 and this 
characteristic must be ‘because of which they are virtues.’  Karasmanis thinks that this means 
the definition should refer to the essential nature of a thing.173 I also want to note that Meno’s 
definition is composed of particular instances from the physical world, which would place 
him firmly in the pistis phase of the divided line on the Republic. 
                                                
172  Ie, ‘one over many’ or the unity assumption. 
173 Here, Karasmanis refers to Meno 72c8. 
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Meno’s second definition does have the right form: it is not hopoion (that is, the 
definition aims to say what virtue is, rather than picking out one of its properties) and not by 
enumeration. The definition is: 
 
It must be simply the capacity to govern men, if you are looking for one quality to cover all 
the instances (Meno 73d). 
 
However, this is dismissed as not applying to all instances, as it does not apply to the 
virtue of a child or a slave. Karasmanis says that this definition and its refutation by a 
counterexample tells us: 
 
a. When we have a definition in the right form, we need to check for counterexamples. 
b. If the extension of the definiens is larger than the definiedum, we can revise by 
adding a qualification (as Socrates adds that ‘justly’ to the ‘capacity to govern men’). 
c. We should not identify a part with the whole. 
d. Enumeration of species of the genus is not the correct form. 
 
Meno’s final attempt, which comes after Socrates’ mathematical definitions, is to 
quote a poet. According to this, virtue is: 
 
…‘to rejoice in fine things and have power’ and I define it as desiring fine things and being 
able to acquire them (Meno 77b). 
 
This definition is dismissed after Socrates’ introduction of what is known as the 
Socratic Paradox. Socrates argues that everyone desires good things; those who desire evil 
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things do not recognise that they are evil. We cannot discuss the Paradox here.174 Socrates 
says that, according to this definition, no one is better than his neighbour (78b). He asks if 
Meno would add that the fine things must be acquired justly and righteously, and Meno 
agrees (78d). In this case, says Socrates, Meno has ignored what Socrates asked him to do 
and broken virtue up into fragments, as justice is itself a part of virtue (Meno 78e-79b). The 
question remains unresolved and Meno confesses to aporia. 
Karasmanis says that we have now learnt that definitions:  
 
a. Should use the economy principle, as the definition is reduced to ‘the ability to get 
good things.’   
b. Can be refuted with a counterexample in problems of extension, as in this case, the 
extension of definiens is larger than the definiendum, so we restrict the extension of 
the definiens (‘… with justice or other parts of virtue’). 
 
b. Socrates’ Definitions: 
 
In order to help Meno to understand what he wants from a definition, Socrates gives three 
definitions of his own. He uses geometry as a model for the kind of thing he wants. When 
Meno says that ‘justice is virtue’ (73d), Socrates points out that it is not virtue, but a virtue, 
and uses geometry to illustrate this: 
 
Take something quite general. Take roundness, for instance. I should say that it is a shape, not 
simply that it is shape, my reason being that there are other shapes as well (Meno 73e). 
 
                                                
174 See especially Scott (2006) Ch.4 pp. 46-59. 
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Meno still does not understand what Socrates wants, so Socrates points out that he 
does not want the kind of answer that gives a plurality: 
 
Seeing that you call these many particulars by the same name, and say that every one of them 
is a shape, even though they are the contrary of each other, tell me what this is which 
embraces round as well as straight, and what you mean by shape when you say that 
straightness is a shape as much as roundness (Meno 74de). 
 
He reiterates: ‘I am looking for what is the same in all of them’ (75a). 
Meno wants Socrates to give his own definition first, so Socrates defines shape as ‘the 
only thing that always accompanies colour’ (75b). 
However, Meno objects that this definition is ‘naïve’: if we do not know what colour 
is, we are no better off with this definition (75c). After checking that Meno understands the 
terms ‘limit,’ ‘surface’ and ‘solid,’ Socrates gives his second geometrical definition: shape is 
‘the limit of a solid’ (76a). 
 Finally, Meno asks how Socrates would define colour, so, with reference to 
Empedocles’ theory of effluences, Socrates says that ‘colour is an effluence from shapes 
commensurate with sight and perceptible by it’ (76d). 
 Karasmanis says that all three of Socrates’ definitions are good according to the 
theory that Karasmanis says is implicit in his refutation of Meno’s definitions: for all of them, 
the extension of definiendum is the same as the definiens, there is one characteristic common 
to all cases, and the definitions reveal the reason for something being X. As Karasmanis says, 
the third definition is the worst (possibly because this is drawn from the natural sciences): 
Socrates says that he is convinced that the definition of shape is better, so if the theory is 
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refuted, the definition collapses.175 Karasmanis adds that it is actually an explanation of how 
we perceive colours, rather than a definition. 
 Which of the first two definitions is better? The answer to this can tell us a great deal 
about what Plato wants from a definition. Karasmanis says that most people think the second 
definition is best, and if one is better, we can suppose that one refers to the essence, the other 
to what the name signifies. However, says Karasmanis, if they are equally good, we need to 
admit that Plato permits two (best) definitions for the same thing: but that means that the 
same thing could have two essences, if the definition is supposed to reveal the essence of the 
thing defined.   
Karasmanis has identified a lot of important features that Plato used in his evaluation 
of the six definitions that he proposes. However, I would hesitate to say that he gives us a 
complete theory of definition, or even an almost complete theory. That is not to say that this 
means the first part of the Meno is Socratic, rather than Platonic, because Plato does have a 
lot to say about what he is looking for in answers to a ti esti. However, as I shall argue below, 
he never explicitly endorses one particular type of definition over another, even if we can be 
reasonably sure that he does prefer one of the definitions over the others. 
 I will also argue that Plato might have a preferred answer, but that does not mean that 
this is the answer to the essence question, while the second-best is the answer to the 
signification question. Rather, (following Fine) it is just a better approximation. Moreover, if 
the definition is supposed to reveal the essence of a thing, two good but different ‘essence’ 
definitions of a thing do not mean two different essences, but two different means of 
revealing the same thing.  
 
c. What is Plato’s preferred answer?  
                                                
175 Meno 76e. The implication is that both definitions of shape are better than the definition of colour. 
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 I want to argue that Socrates does have a ‘best definition’ but this is because it is the 
best of a set of possible answers, and its superiority does not derive from the type of 
definition it is. In short, I want to say that Plato is looking for the best definition possible at 
this stage in the inquiry. I shall go on to build on Fine’s (2005 and 2010) idea, that we can 
inquire by drawing upon our true beliefs about a thing, by putting forward my own theory 
about how it is that we do that, drawing on evidence from later passages in the Meno. To do 
this, we first need to look more closely at what Plato wants from a ti esti answer. 
We should examine whether there is a good reason to think that Plato is asking two 
different questions when he makes Socrates ask, ‘what is virtue?’ After some additional 
remarks on the Socrates’ definitions, which are, after all, his models for the answer to the 
virtue question, we shall consider David Charles’ careful argument that Plato is asking two 
questions about virtue: the signification question (ie, what does the word ‘virtue’ mean?) and 
the essence question (what is the eidos, or Form, of virtue?). Again following Fine, we shall 
argue that there is no evidence that Plato does make this distinction in the Meno. Moreover, 
we shall say, it is not clear that a ti esti for Plato needs to specify an eidos, at least not at this 
stage of the inquiry. What Plato wants from a ti esti, we shall argue, is the means by which to 
study the Form; but that need not be a full exposition of the Form itself. 
David Charles ([2006] pp.110-128) points to the three kinds of definition that critics 
have identified when talking about Socrates’ responses to Meno. He says that these critics say 
that Socrates fails to determine which of these types of definition is to be preferred. The 
critics distinguish between: 
 
(a) real definitions: propositions which give the essence of the thing to be defined (for 
example, colour is the effluence of shapes, commensurate with and perceptible to sight).  
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(b) conceptual definitions: true propositions about the thing to be defined, known a priori by 
anyone who understands the concept (for example, shape is the limit of solid). 
(c) factual claims which identify the phenomenon (for example, shape is the only thing which 
always accompanies colour) (Charles [2006] p 110).176 
 
The problem is that none of these definitions is an ideal candidate for Plato’s ideal 
definition. Type (a) seems to be a good choice at first, as Plato seems to want to get at the 
essence of a thing; sometimes his reference to the thing that makes a bee a bee at 72b is seen 
as an early reference to the Theory of Forms. It seems clear that, to be epistemologically 
useful, a ti esti must have some kind of relation to the Forms; whether this means that it must 
specify an eidos or whether it is simply a means to study the eidos will be discussed below. 
However, the particular example we are given of this kind of definition sheds doubt on 
whether Plato did prefer it to the others. 
The definition of colour as an effluence from shapes is an example from Empedocles’ 
theory of effluences, from the natural sciences.177 As we have discussed in Section One, 
Chapter Three ii, and as we shall go on to discuss in Section Three, Chapter Two i and ii, 
Plato doesn’t think that the natural sciences by themselves can furnish us with the truth: it 
would be odd if he chose to use them as a model for an ideal definition. Moreover, the textual 
evidence does not support the argument that this is Plato’s favourite definition.  
                                                
176 Cf, Robinson (1953) pp. 49-60 who also discusses Plato’s types of definition. 
177 The natural sciences in Plato’s day were not advanced. There was no reliable was of demarking the natural 
sciences from philosophy and early natural scientists had no systematic methodology or tradition of 
experiments. However, with these qualifications, we can see Empedocles as an early natural scientist. 
Empedocles believes that intelligence can overcome the limitations of sense-data (Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Logicians I.125), and appeals to demonstrations that use physical objects, although these are more like 
observations than experiments. Empedocles is convinced that there is no such thing as void and uses these 
observations of the physical world to prove it. He refers to the operation of a clepsydra, which lifts quantities of 
water out of the river using trapped air (Aristotle, On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration 473a15). 
He also investigates what the modern scientist would call centrifugal force with water in a cup, to develop 
theories about the motion of the heavens (Aristotle, On the Heavens 295a15-22). Moreover, Aristotle, in Poetics 
1447b17-20 gives an account of Empedocles as a natural scientist rather than a poet. 
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Firstly, the definition is not presented as a model definition, but an answer á la 
Gorgias (76c). Socrates asks, ‘you and he (Gorgias) believe in Empedocles’ theory of 
effluences, do you not?’ (76c). But Socrates himself never himself commits to the theory. He 
says that, in the theory, there are passages to which and from which the effluences make their 
way, into which some of the effluences fit, whereas other effluences are too coarse or too fine 
(76cd). That colour is an effluence from shape commensurate with and perceptible by sight is 
what follows ‘from these notions,’ (76d) but at no point does Socrates maintain that the 
theory itself is true. In fact, although Meno likes this definition, Socrates is ‘convinced the 
other is better’ (76e), a clear show of preference for the geometrical answer over that from 
the natural sciences. 
Type (c) definitions are often dismissed by critics as Plato’s preferred answer because 
of the forms they take. As Karasmanis (2006) points out, this seems strange to the modern 
reader: ‘we would expect a definition by a genus and differentia and we find a totally 
different pattern’ (Karasmanis [2006] p 136). This in itself need not lead us to rejecting it as a 
good definition: Meno objects to it for different reasons, these being that ‘colour’ is an as yet 
undefined term. Perhaps Meno would have been satisfied with the definition if Socrates had 
defined ‘colour’ beforehand, but it seems that the next definition, type (b), is taken both by 
Meno and Socrates to replace the first, so we should take this to mean that this is at least as 
good as the other.178  
Perhaps Plato is not intending to make a general argument about types of definitions 
at all. We can argue that the example of type (b) is Plato’s preferred definition on the grounds 
that, after Socrates and Meno use this definition to replace the type (c) definition Socrates 
                                                
178 Some people have puzzled over why Plato thought that shape was the limit of a solid and not the converse, as 
we find in Euclid. Karasmanis argues that at the time Plato wrote Meno, geometry had not been axiomatized. In 
fact, we could argue that Plato’s conversion of genus and species is evidence that this axiomatization had yet to 
be done: if the axioms we find in Euclid had been established, Plato would certainly have been aware of them 
from his studies in Sicily. The first axiomatization of geometry, Karasmanis argues, takes place within the 
Academy. See Karasmanis (2006) p 138 n 33 for this. 
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originally gave, then he goes on to say that it is to be preferred to the type (a) definition 
(Meno 76e). However, the type (a) definition is rejected on the grounds of its foundation in 
the natural sciences, and the type (b) definition is never actually rejected as being useless in 
inquiry. It’s possible that the type (a) definitions could be perfectly acceptable if the terms are 
all properly defined beforehand, or that type (b) definitions would be acceptable if they were 
grounded in something other than the natural sciences. 
We shall see below that one possible reason for preferring the particular type (b) 
definitions is that the examples we have of types (a) and (c) seem to cancel each other out, as 
they result in circularity. However, this is particular to these examples, and there is certainly 
no need to say that this criticism is applicable to all definitions in this category. It is likely 
that the critics who try to put Socrates’ examples into these categories are making a mistake, 
and that each definition is judged on its own merits, and not on the type of definition it is. 
Socrates certainly never says that each of his definitions represent a particular type.179 In this 
case, Plato’s preference for any one of these definitions should not be taken as his affirmation 
of the priority of any one type of definition. 
We should be clear that all of these definitions are attempts to answer the same 
question. For this reason, we shall examine Charles’ argument that they are answers to two 
different questions, before going on to argue that the quest for a ti esti is an epistemological 
ascent for Plato. 
Charles claims that Socrates is not asking just one question. He says that the  
answer to the (essence) question, ‘What is virtue?’ should have at least these two 
characteristics: 
i. It should specify the eidos, or form, which all virtues possess.  
ii. It should specify the eidos, by being which, all virtues are virtues. 
                                                
179 Moreover it is not clear that type (a) definitions are actually used at all: this would mean saying that the 
essence of shape is a kind of efflux, when it is not at all clear that this is how Plato conceives of essence. 
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He says that Socrates sometimes asks a different question (the signification question): 
iii. ‘What is it to which the name x applies?’  
This is less demanding, but Charles thinks that there is linguistic evidence that  
Socrates means this. 
We shall consider Charles’ claims about the answer to an essence question needing to 
specify an eidos in the following chapter, but first, let us examine his claim that Socrates 
sometimes asks two different questions.  
The number of definitions as answers to the question, ‘what is virtue?’ in the Meno has 
sometimes puzzled people: we saw Karasmanis’ attempt to construct a single theory of 
definition from them above. Charles says that, instead of there being ‘one good question, 
several distinct and conflated answers,’ there are ‘two good questions, each with an 
appropriate answer’. These are, What is virtue? (essence question) and What is ‘virtue’? 
(signification question). Charles uses three kinds of evidence to support this claim. He cites 
linguistic evidence: the fact that Socrates sometimes asks what virtue is, sometimes to what 
the name ‘virtue’ refers.  Secondly, he cites the fact that the accounts of shape and colour 
don’t specify the real essence of shape or colour, but are good answers to the signification 
question. Finally, he cites Socrates’ alleged confusion of the signification and essence 
questions in his formulation of and reply to Meno’s paradox.180 
It would be difficult to argue that Socrates is asking two distinct questions on purely 
linguistic grounds: but Charles does provide some linguistic evidence, citing various places in 
which he thinks Plato is asking two different questions: When he asks, ‘what is virtue?’ at 
77b9, Charles thinks that he is specifically interested in the eidos of virtue. However, when 
he goes on to define ‘shape,’ he asks, ‘do you call something a boundary?’ at 75e1, and ‘what 
                                                
180 The Paradox goes from [A] ‘How can you search for something (e.g. for what virtue is) if you do not know at 
all what virtue is?’ (80d5-6) to [B] ‘A person cannot search for what he knows because he already knows it nor 
can he search for what he does not know, since he does not know what he is searching for.’ Charles thinks that 
Socrates conflates the two questions: ie, Meno is asking the signification question, saying that you need it in 
order to answer the essence question. 
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is that of which there is the name ‘shape’? In this way, Charles would argue that ‘shape (is 
the name of) the limit of a solid’ (Charles [2006] p 112). 
However, without additional evidence to support this, we could just cite stylistic variation 
for these differences. For example, Gail Fine ([2010] pp. 125-152) says that all of Socrates’ 
questions are just different ways of asking the essence question. She says that there is ‘one 
good question, with one correct sort of answer, as well as others that approximate to it.’181 
We shall examine Fine’s alternative reading below. 
As for Charles’ point that the accounts of shape and colour don’t specify the real essence 
of shape or colour, but are good answers to the signification question, we should remember 
why Socrates is giving us these definitions in the first place. They are models for Meno’s 
definition of virtue, which Charles says should be an answer to the essence question. He uses 
the example of there being shapes other than roundness to point out one of Meno’s mistakes: 
‘Just as I could name other shapes if you told me to, in the same way, mention some other 
virtues’ (74a ). Subsequently, the attempt to define shape is ‘practice for the question about 
virtue’ (75b). It would be very strange if Socrates sets these definitions up as models for the 
answer to the virtue question, when in fact they are answers to a completely different kind of 
question. 
Charles points out that his reading avoids the circularity in Socrates’ definitions. As has 
sometimes been said, if we combine two of the definitions, we arrive at a circular statement. 
So: 
 
                                                
181 Fine also successfully refutes Charles’ view that Socrates confuses the signification and essence questions in 
his formulation of a reply to Meno’s paradox, She agrees with Charles that Socrates takes Meno to think there 
are just two possibilities. Meno thinks that either one knows, or else one doesn’t know: ‘But this needn’t involve 
confusion between the essence and signification questions.’ Fine suggests that Socrates thinks Meno assumes 
that, for any x, one either knows all there is to know about x or is in a complete cognitive blank with respect to 
x: ‘It’s true that someone who holds that view doesn’t believe one can know what ‘F’ signifies without knowing 
the essence of F. But it’s not that the person conflates the two issues.’ Fine’s solution is that Plato tries to show 
that lack of knowledge does not have to mean being in a complete cognitive blank. As we shall see below, this 
is all part of Plato’s epistemological scale. 
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‘Shape is that which always accompanies colour’ 
and, 
‘Colour is the effluence of shape’ 
 
Gives us the combined answer, 
 
‘Shape is that which always accompanies the effluence of shape’ 
or, 
‘Colour is the effluence of that which always accompanies colour’182 
 
 As we said above, one reason for preferring the alternative definition of shape (shape 
is the limit of a solid) is that it avoids the circularity. If we say that this is Plato’s preferred 
definition, we have no need to adopt Charles’ distinction between the signification and 
essence questions to avoid this, because this second definition of shape produces no 
circularity when combined with the definition of colour. The definition of colour is only 
introduced after Socrates has replaced the first definition of shape, so there is no question of 
Socrates wanting to combine it with the first definition. 
 In conclusion, there is no need to say that there are two separate questions when 
Socrates asks, ‘what is virtue?’ If there were, it would mean that Socrates’ definitions are not 
supposed to be models for Meno’s answer, which is inconsistent with what he actually says 
in the text. There is only one question, with several attempts to answer it. Plato thinks that 
some answers are better than others, but that does not mean that he is endorsing any 
particular ‘type’ of definition, at least not as the critics have defined them.  
                                                
182 See Charles (2006) p 115, although many others have remarked on this apparent circularity. 
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 What we are left with is a set of different answers to the question, ‘what is virtue?’ Up 
until now, I have tacitly assumed that this is what Charles would call the essence question, 
but this needs to be qualified to avoid Karasmanis’ problem of a thing having two essences if 
there are two good ‘essence-type’ definitions of something. I have said that Plato prefers the 
definition ‘shape is the limit of a solid,’ so he does have a preferred definition; but this does 
not exclude the possibility of there being a case in which there are two equally good 
definitions, since I have also argued that Plato does not endorse any particular type of 
definition. I shall now go on to tackle these problems.  
 
ii. What role do definitions play in Plato’s epistemological scale? 
 
I want to explain ti esti answers as having a role in the ascent up Plato’s 
epistemological scale. Any attempt at a ti esti is a good start, and can be improved upon by a 
series of better approximations. As I shall argue in the rest of the Meno chapter, failure to 
produce a satisfactory ti esti is often followed by aporia and the hypothetical method, but 
what we eventually want from a ti esti is for it to reveal the Form. After saying a few words 
about ti estis and essences, we shall consider Gail Fine’s concept of inquiry in the Meno, 
endorsing her idea that we can proceed through a series of good approximations. I want to 
build on that by putting forward my own theory about how it is that the approximations help 
us in the epistemological ascent. Finally, we shall see what this means for our concept of a ti 
esti, and their wider role in Plato’s epistemology.  
 
 a. Definition and Essence 
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 We said that there is only one question about virtue in the first part of the Meno, and 
so far I have tacitly assumed that this is at least some kind of essence question. We also said 
that we wanted a ti esti to help to reveal a Form. A ti esti cannot actually be a Form; at the 
very most it could be a literally true and exhaustive description of a Form. However, it is not 
clear that Plato is asking for even this much. The geometrical definitions certainly do not 
provide this, and we said that these definitions were model answers. It could be that a ti esti 
allows us to examine a form and then make inferences about it.183  
However, this does not necessarily mean that a ti esti is an exhaustive account of a 
Form, merely that it is something by means of which we are able to study the Form. It should 
at least identify the Form; that is, it should answer the signification question, and also allow 
us to say other things about it. It is possible that what have been called conceptual definitions 
could enable us to do this. By giving true propositions about the thing to be defined (known a 
priori by anyone who understands the concept) we could arrive at other true propositions 
about it. As Socrates says, ‘when a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge,…there is 
no reason why he should not find out all the rest’ (Meno 81d). Through this process, we 
would eventually arrive at an account, which is the kind of thing Socrates wants when he asks 
‘what is x’ type questions. 
We traditionally expect Socrates to be looking for a short, perhaps sentence-long 
answer for a ti esti, but this may not be the case. The longest description of a single Form we 
have occurs in the Symposium; it is not limited to a single proposition or statement. This 
longer account enables us to see connections between the properties of the Form, and its 
connection to other Forms, which is what Plato is ultimately looking for, and the best shot we 
have of providing a teleolological account.184 
                                                
183 Cf White (1976) pp. 35-38, in which he discusses the role of definitions in enabling us to examine Forms. 
184 For example, in the Symposium (210e-211b; cf. 211c-212a) we are given the most extensive description of a 
Form than we find anywhere else in Plato. Is any one of these statements a clear candidate for the only ti esti of 
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At the very least, we need our ti esti to enable us to arrive at other true propositions 
about the thing defined. If we are going to allow a concise answer, the preferred definition of 
shape is a good candidate for this, as it specifies the relation of shape to solid, so we can go in 
to ask more questions about the nature of a limit, what shape must be like to perform this 
relation, etc, whereas the definition, ‘shape is the only thing which always accompanies 
colour’ tells us nothing about the relation of shape to colour and gives us less scope for 
further questions. 
This would explain why Plato prefers the definition, ‘shape is the limit of a solid,’ 
because we might arrive at other true statements about shape by building on this definition. 
At the same time, there could be another, equally good definition that allows us to do the 
same thing. In this way, we can have more than one good ti esti about the same thing without 
having to admit to there being two essences of that thing.  
 
b. Gail Fine and the Meno 
 
In her response to David Charles, Fine elaborates on her previous work on epistemology 
in the Meno. She thinks that, in the Meno, there is ‘one good question (about virtue), with one 
correct sort of answer, as well as others that approximate to it’ (2010 pp. 125-152).  We have 
already said that there is only one question about virtue (at least in the first part of the Meno). 
We also said that there was a preferred answer, although this is not necessarily something 
that can be reached by knowing a particular format to look for in advance (ie, Plato does not 
give us an ideal type of definition). 
Fine draws attention to the importance of ‘helpful steps’ in the quest for knowledge. In 
her evaluation of Charles’ work, she points to the first definition of shape. We said that this 
                                                                                                                                                  
Beauty? Could we derive several good but different ti estis from the passage? On my reading, a ti esti is not the 
concise statement we traditionally expect, but rather, a longer account like this. 
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seemed like an odd definition, because it simply gave a feature true of all and only shapes, 
without attempting to answer the essence question or being in the form we are used to 
(definition by a genus and differentia). Fine thinks that Socrates views this as helpful step in 
the effort to find the essence of shape. She refers us to 75b11-c1, where Socrates says he 
would be pleased if Meno could say what virtue is in a way analogous to saying that shape is 
the only thing that always follows colour.  
Fine takes him to mean that he would be pleased if Meno could give an analogous 
answer to the essence question ‘What is virtue?, ‘not because it would be ultimately 
satisfactory, but because it would be better than anything Meno has come up with so far - a 
helpful step in the effort to answer the essence question.’  
 This idea of ‘helpful steps’ is an extension of Fine’s earlier work on inquiry in the 
Meno (2005) which is in turn an extension of her wider project to refute the ‘two worlds’ 
reading of Plato’s middle dialogues (1990 and 1995). I do not intend to endorse Fine’s wider 
project of refuting the ‘two worlds’ reading, and I made it clear exactly how my reading 
differs from Fine’s in the Republic chapter. However, I do share Fine’s reading of the Meno 
in the sense that inquiry is a kind of ascent to knowledge, made through a series of 
approximations.  
 We shall examine Fine’s reading more closely, before identifying exactly what it is I 
want to endorse. I shall then go on to put forward my own explanation about how each step in 
the scale is helpful. 
Fine acknowledges the importance of ti esti answers in Platonic inquiry. Like me, she 
does not think that this prevents the inquiry from making progress. She argues that Socrates’ 
insistence on having a ti esti answer for inquiry, which she calls the Priority of Knowledge 
What (PKW), does not mean that we need knowledge before we even begin to inquire (not 
even recollection). She says that it is not clear that PKW says that one needs to know the 
 173 
essence of something to know anything else about it. It simply says that one needs to know 
what (ti) something is, to know what it is like (poion). According to Fine ([2005] pp.200-
226), PKW means that if one does not know the definition of something, one cannot know 
anything at all about it; but one can have true beliefs and these can guide inquiry. 
 In addition to her comments on the ‘helpful steps’ in the first part of the dialogue, 
Fine thinks that the second part displays this kind of inquiry. This, she says, is the elenctic 
reply to Meno’s paradox. I’m going to propose a slightly different reading of the second part 
of the Meno below: I want to say that what follows from the paradox is actually a departure 
from the elenchus. However, I do agree with Fine’s point that Plato’s solution to the paradox 
does not end with the theory of recollection. Moreover, I think that the parts of Fine’s reading 
I want to endorse can support my conception of an epistemological ascent in Plato, so now is 
a good point to explain which parts these are. 
 Let us first examine the paradox. After Meno admits to aporia, Socrates urges him to 
carry on the inquiry into what virtue is. However, Meno thinks he can convince Socrates that 
his inquiry is impossible, producing the following paradox: 
 
But how will you look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is? How on 
earth are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object of your search? To put 
it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have 
found is the thing you didn’t know? (Meno 80d). 
 
 The implications of the paradox are that gaining new knowledge is impossible: in 
fact, it is impossible to begin inquiry at all. As part of his response to Meno, Socrates then 




Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has been born many times, and has seen all things both 
here and in the other world, has learned everything that is…for seeking and learning are in 
fact nothing but recollection (Meno 81cd). 
  
 In order to illustrate this, Socrates carries out the slave-boy experiment. He draws a 
square in the sand and asks one of Meno’s slaves if he is familiar with the figure. He then 
asks the slave-boy about the properties of the square: the boy has never studied mathematics 
before, but Socrates wants to know if the boy knows how to double the area of the square. 
The boy initially gets the answer wrong, but after Socrates questions him more closely, the 
boy arrives at the correct answer. Socrates claims that he has answered only with his own 
opinions, and he has gone from not knowing to knowing. He says that his ‘opinions were 
somewhere in him’ (Meno 85c). In this way, all learning is actually recollection. 
 The theory of recollection is sometimes seen as Plato’s response to Meno’s Paradox: 
if we admit that acquiring new knowledge is impossible, claiming that learning is actually 
remembering existing knowledge avoids the problem. However, it does not tell us how this 
existing knowledge is accessed. Fine thinks that, for this reason, the theory of recollection 
cannot be the whole reply to the paradox. 
According to Fine, the slave-boy experiment illustrates that the slave lacks knowledge, 
but has true beliefs, so that enables him to inquire.185 She says that recollection is important, 
but it is not the answer to the paradox on its own: the method of elenchus is the key. 
According to Fine, the difference between knowledge and true belief is crucial to the elenctic 
reply: the slave-boy can inquire into geometry in the absence of knowledge, because he has 
true beliefs about the subject. Although she acknowledges that recollection is important, she 
disagrees with Nehamas’ ([1985] pp.5-6) objection that Meno 85c7, in which Socrates’ points 
                                                
185 In fact, Socrates does say that the slave will have to repeat the exercise several times before he can be said to 
have knowledge. 
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to the slave’s true opinions, is just an intermediate step. Fine points out that Plato returns to 
true belief later in the dialogue, saying that it is a good guide for action: thus, it is not just an 
intermediate step, but the reason that inquiry is possible.186 
 In this way, lacking knowledge of something does not mean having a complete 
cognitive blank, because we still have true beliefs, and it is this that provides the ‘helpful 
steps’ in inquiry. Fine draws heavily on the distinction between knowledge and true belief 
that we find in the final stages of the Meno, taking seriously the metaphor in which true belief 
about the way to Larissa is as good a guide as knowledge. We shall examine this more 
closely below.  
But do we need to rely so heavily on true belief to argue that inquiry is made through 
a series of approximations? Unarguably, true belief is important. The Socratic elenchus 
requires the interlocutor to ‘say only what he believes,’ which implicitly assumes that the 
truth is in him already.187 True belief is important in the generation of propositions to be 
investigated (that is, it is important in the context of discovery as well as the context of 
justification).188 Then, the theory of recollection that we find in the Meno and other middle-
period works makes this assumption explicit: ‘So a man who does not know has in himself 
true opinions without having knowledge.’ (Meno 85c). 
 However, in the following chapter, I will argue that this ‘say only what you believe’ 
rule takes a back seat in the second part of the dialogue, when the hypothetical method is 
introduced. In addition, Socrates seems to be relaxing this rule in the first part of the 
dialogue. He begins by insisting on the rule: when Meno says that Gorgias knows what virtue 
is, he says, ‘Then let’s leave him out of it, since after all he isn’t here. What do you yourself 
                                                
186 See the section on knowledge and true belief in the Meno, below. 
187 Cf Vlastos ([1988] pp. 362-396), who also discusses this. 
188 See Reichenbach’s ([1938] pp. 6-7 and 381-382) famous distinction between the contexts of discovery and 
justification. Burnyeat [(2000) pp.6-8] discusses Reichenbach’s distinction in relation to Plato. 
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say virtue is?’ (Meno 71d). However, Socrates himself does not believe at least one of his 
own definitions: as we pointed out, he never commits to believing his definition of colour.  
 True belief is definitely important in the slave-boy experiment, although it is not clear 
whether it is equally important in the rest of the dialogue. It could be that inquiry in the Meno 
works just as well if the interlocutor proposes a series of approximations that have no 
connection to what he believes, but that are necessary to propose in order to solve the 
problem: that’s something we shall examine in the third chapter of this section. For now, let 
us examine Fine’s broader idea of ‘helpful steps’ as a route to knowledge.  
 The slave-boy experiment is a demonstration of the doctrine of recollection, which 
most people agree is at least Plato’s initial response to the paradox. Fine thinks that the 
experiment is also the ‘elenctic response’ in that it shows how we may recollect: through the 
use of the elenchus. I think that the hypothetical method that follows the passage is Plato’s 
abandonment of the elenchus, so I think it would be wrong to say that Plato is proposing the 
elenchus as the only way to recollect, but, with this in mind, I want to otherwise endorse 
Fine’s reading, and explain how the slave-boy experiment fits in with Plato’s epistemological 
ascent. 
 At first, the only concern is that the boy speaks Greek (82b): he has never studied 
mathematics before, although he is able to recognise the image of a square when Socrates 
draws one (82b). Socrates does not ask him what a square is. This is the first point I want to 
make about what happens when Socrates allows inquiry without an accepted definition. In 
this case, Socrates does not ask for the ti esti of a square, but draws an image of a square on 
the sand. This project argues that, at least in middle-Plato, if we are to inquire about 
something without a ti esti and arrive at knowledge, we need to use something to stand in for 
that ti esti, and, in pure dianoetic thought, that is going to be either an image or a hypothesis. 
The slave-boy experiment is evidence for this, and gives us an additional suggestion: if the 
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investigation is about a mathematical object, the likelihood is that the ‘stand-in’ is going to be 
a mathematical diagram, as it is in this case.189   
 Socrates asks the slave: Are the four sides equal? Are the two lines which intersect in 
the middle of the square equal? Could the square be either larger or smaller? If the area were 
two feet in one direction and only one in the other, would it not be two feet taken once? Is the 
area actually twice two feet? (82cd) The boy answers truly in the affirmative, then works out 
that the area is four feet. Socrates is asking carefully chosen questions, but the boy is 
answering with his own opinions: so far, Fine’s point that it is the slave’s true beliefs that 
enable him to inquire is not contradicted. 
 Socrates then poses the following problem for the boy: how can we draw a square 
with double the area? The slave correctly believes that the area will be eight feet, but 
incorrectly thinks that the sides will be four feet long (82de). Socrates introduces what 
follows as ‘the proper way to recollect’ (82e), which supports Fine’s argument that the 
experiment is an elaboration of the ‘recollection’ response to the paradox.  
 What Socrates does next is elenctic:190 he proceeds to question the boy on his beliefs, 
demonstrating that they lead to a falsehood: ‘doubling the side has not given us a double but a 
fourfold figure’ (83b). They decide that ‘the side of the eight-feet figure must be longer than 
two feet but shorter than four’ (83d). 
Next, the slave says that the side will be three feet long. Again, Socrates repeats the 
elenctic process of showing the boy that his beliefs are incorrect through a method of 
question and answer and the boy admits to aporia. In the passage that follows, Socrates 
continues to only ask questions until they arrive at the answer. 
                                                
189 Cf Patterson (2007) pp. 1-33, who also sees the diagram as part of an abbreviated definition of a square. 
190 The slave-boy passage is often seen as a paradigm of the Socratic elenchus; for example by Robinson (1953) 
pp. 10-12 and Sharples (1985) pp.8-9. 
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The ‘notorious objection’ is that ‘the vast majority of his questions contain the correct 
answer. They take the form, such and such is true, is it not?’191 The problem is that Socrates 
already knows the answer, so we are inclined to accuse him of feeding the boy information 
surreptitiously. In support of Fine’s view, we do have a series of approximations leading to 
the correct answer: first the slave gives two completely wrong answers (82e and 83e); then he 
assents to a good approximation192 before finally arriving at the correct answer (85b). 
However, the Socratic question-and answer method is not sufficient on its own to 
arrive at the answer. In the introduction, we noted that the elenchus is a method for 
eliminating falsehood, but in this case, we want to solve a particular problem: how to double 
the area of a square. We might get away with saying that Socrates’ x- is-true- is-it-not 
questions are a valid part of the elenchus, but we should remember that the puzzle is solved 
by Socrates drawing in extra lines in the diagram. That is, the heuristic success of the 
experiment relies on the mathematical image. Let us examine the role played by the diagram 
in finding a solution: 
 
1. After the aporia, Socrates points to the original square of four feet (84d). 
2. He then draws in three identical squares, to make a single large square of sixteen 
feet. The boy agrees it is four times the original (84de). 
3. He draws in the diagonal of each small square, and the boy agrees that they cut 
each of the squares in half (85a). 
4. He asks the boy how many halves there are in the large figure, and the boy 
answers, ‘four.’ (85a). 
                                                
191 Scott (2006) p 101. Scott’s reading of this is that Socrates is not teaching the boy, but allowing him to 
crystallise views that he already holds. There is also the possibility that Socrates is using the word teach in a 
narrower sense than we might: maybe teaching for Socrates implies a certain level of passiveness on the part of 
the learner. 
192 ‘…the side of the eight-feet figure must be longer than two feet but shorter than four.’ Meno 83d. 
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5. He asks how many halves are in the original figure, and the boy answers, ‘two’ 
(85b). 
6. Socrates says, ‘What is the relation of four to two?’ and the boy answers, 
‘Double’ (85b). 
7. Socrates says, ‘How big is the figure then?’ and the boy answers, ‘Eight feet’ 
(85c). 
8. Socrates asks, ‘On what base?’ and the slave answers, ‘this one,’ meaning the 
diagonal of the original square (85b). 
 
Steps one to three are taken up with Socrates adding in lines on the diagram and 
checking that the slave understands their relationship to the original square. Steps four to 
eight are only possible because of these additions. The additional lines are heuristic, and 
enable the problem to be solved. This is a different function from that of the original diagram, 
which was initially used to check that the boy knew ‘that a square is a figure like this’ (82b). 
To use Charles’ terminology, it is initially used as an answer to the signification question, 
what is it to which the term ‘square’ applies? 
 Extra lines on the diagram are used by Socrates to purge the boy of his false beliefs: 
Socrates actually draws the squares of three-foot and eight-foot sides, when the boy suggests 
them as solutions, to illustrate that they are the wrong sizes. However, the diagrams play a 
vital heuristic role in the final part of the experiment, when the boy comes up with a 
solution.193 We said that a ti esti response should at least answer the signification question, 
and also allow us to say other things about it; derive true propositions and say what its 
                                                
193 I have left room in my interpretation for the view that Socrates is ‘cheating’ by feeding the boy information, 
but the view I have taken is also compatible with a more charitable reading. It is still possible to argue, as Scott 
([2006] pp.98-120) does, that the additional lines in the diagram are vital but allow the boy to understand for 
himself. What’s important about my interpretation is that, without a ti esti for a square, the diagram is essential 
in solving the problem. 
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properties are. We do not have a ti esti for the square in this particular experiment, so the 
diagram performs that role.  
 It should be noted that, in this case, the problem requires a diagram for the solution. 
The question is, ‘what will be the side of a double-sized (square)?’ (82d) The answer is that it 
will be the length of the diagonal of the original two-feet sided square. However, these do not 
share a common measure, so the only way for the boy to answer the question is to point to the 
line on a diagram.  
As we saw in the introduction, the discovery of the incommensurability of the side of 
a square and its diagonal had already played a part in Greek intellectual history, and Plato 
was well aware of its implications for philosophical discourse. He is also interested in the 
mathematician’s reliance on the diagram in his inquiries, as we discussed in the Republic 
section. Plato’s use of this particular problem in the slave-boy experiment allows him to 
highlight the role played by diagrams in mathematical investigation, but it also allows us to 
see Plato’s conception of dianoetic inquiry. We saw from the first part of the dialogue that a 
ti esti needs to answer the signification question, and also allow us to further investigate the 
properties of the thing defined: that is, it has a heuristic role to play. In the slave-boy passage, 
we do not have a ti esti, so the diagram performs that role. 
In this way, Fine’s argument about true beliefs enabling inquiry in the absence of 
knowledge, through a series of ‘helpful steps’ is not a complete explanation: we also need a 
heuristic mechanism, in the form of a ti esti, if one is available, or a diagram in the case of the 
slave-boy passage. As we will see below, even the true beliefs can even be dispensed with 
when we employ the hypothetical method: in this case, we can replace beliefs with the ability 
to posit lemmas. I would qualify Fine’s explanation in this way, while retaining her 
conception of inquiry in the Meno as a series of helpful steps and approximations towards 
knowledge.  
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In conclusion, we have seen that a ti esti is necessary to inquire about something. If 
we do not have one, we need something to stand in for it, like the diagram in the slave-boy 
experiment. A ti esti or its proxy should not only identify the thing to be investigated, but also 
be a heuristic tool; something that allows us to make progress in the quest for knowledge. 
The heuristic value of the diagram in the slave-boy passage allowed an epistemological 
ascent for the boy: he now has dianoia kind of knowledge, whereas before he only had pistis. 
Meno begins the inquiry in a state of pistis; he looks to instances in the physical world for an 
answer to Socrates’ questions; however Socrates thinks that a ti esti for virtue can allow us to 
make headway in our investigations into what it is like. In this way, a ti esti or its proxy is a 
vital step in Plato’s epistemological scale. 
 
Chapter Two: Aporia and the Psychology of Mathematics 
 
We saw that Fine’s account of true belief as a guide to inquiry in the absence of 
knowledge was incomplete in that we need a heuristic mechanism to help us to inquire. 
Preferably, this is a ti esti, which is why the first part of the dialogue is spent searching for 
one. In the slave-boy experiment, a diagram was used as a substitute, but Meno still insists on 
wanting to inquire into the properties of virtue, when he is still in a state of aporia about its ti 
esti. Socrates agrees to do this only if they use the hypothetical method, a clear indication that 
this is something we do in the absence of a ti esti. In this chapter, I want to present the 
hypothetical passage as a progression of the epistemological journey started at the beginning 
of the dialogue: it builds upon the aporia established by three failed definitions of virtue. 
The hypothetical method is often seen as a way out of aporia, a state of perplexity 
often induced by Socrates which characterises many of the early dialogues. In Meno, there 
are instances of aporia experienced by Meno (79e-80b) and the slave (84a) respectively, but 
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we shall see that the Meno gives us a different presentation of aporia than we find in the 
earlier dialogues. This chapter will present aporia in the Meno as a necessary state of mind 
for research: it is psychological preparation for the hypothetical method and a bridge between 
pistis and dianoia. In doing so, we shall see that the hypothetical method is something very 
much distinct from the elenchus, more evidence for the place of mathematical reasoning as an 
integral part of the epistemological scale.  
 
v. What is aporia? 
 
Socratic aporia is the state of puzzlement that results from the interrogation of one’s 
beliefs by Socrates. The Socratic interlocutor gives his opinion on a subject, only to find that 
his opinion leads to contradictory beliefs. He then finds himself in a state of aporia, 
perplexity, about the truth of the matter in question.194 
Meno experiences aporia after the failure of his attempts to define virtue. He admits 
to having previously thought that he knew what it was, often speaking about it in front of 
large audiences (80b), before being perplexed by Socrates (80ab) and now having nothing to 
reply (80b).  The slave boy undergoes the same sequence of emotions when Socrates 
questions him. The boy thought he knew the answer and Socrates playfully remarks (84b) 
that he thought he could, like Meno, speak well and fluently on the problem on many 
occasions before large audiences, before being perplexed by Socrates and having nothing to 
reply (82d). 
 
vi. What good is aporia? 
 
                                                
194 See Vlastos ([1988] pp. 362-396) and Scott ([2006] pp. 69-74) for a further discussion of this. 
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On the traditional reading, the aporia we see in the early (Socratic) dialogues plays 
the role of purging the interlocutor of his false beliefs, making him more likely to pursue 
knowledge as a result. There is a purgative effect; Meno no longer has the same conviction 
about his initial definitions of virtue (71e-79e); the slave boy no longer believes that doubling 
the length of the side will double the area of a square (82e-84a). In other dialogues, 
Charmides is disencumbered of his false definitions of self-control (Charmides 160bd 
161ab;162ab); Laches is disencumbered of his false definitions of bravery (Laches 190e-
193e). 
We also have a motivational effect. The horse (a metaphor for the Athenian) of the 
Apology is stimulated into action (Apology 30e); Laches closes with everybody keen to 
recommence the discussion in the morning (Laches 201bc); Charmides resolves to turn 
himself over to Socrates for more training (Charmides 176bd). The presentation of aporia in 
Meno is the same in this respect. Socrates points out that the slave boy is now aware of his 
own ignorance (84a); he is in a better position than he was before, and no harm has been done 
to him by the experience (84b). In fact, now he is more likely to search for what he does not 
know and the process was good for him (84c). 
This might be what Socrates would have us believe, but it is not always clear from the 
dialogues that the result is so positive. Consider Beversluis’ comments on Laches: 
 
In the end, everyone remains exactly as they were. All they can do is marvel at the time they have wasted, 
and, with their appetites inexplicably whetted for more of the same, resolve to reconvene the next 
day…Why bother?195 
 
Myles Burnyeat argues that it is not until Theaetetus that aporia is treated as a productive 
state (Burnyeat [1977]). He thinks that it is the first stirring of creative thought, whereas in 
                                                
195 Beversluis (2000) p 134. Not everyone has such a negative view of aporia: see Scott (2006) pp.69-74. 
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the early dialogues it is valued only for its purgative functions.196 In Theaetetus, we are given 
the metaphor of Socrates as midwife, and aporia represents the labour pains of an idea 
struggling to be born (Theaetetus 148e; 151ab). Burnyeat thinks that we should take the 
metaphor seriously, and wishes to draw a line between the aporia of Theaetetus and that of 
the early dialogues – including Meno. We shall see how the presentation of aporia in Meno is 
also a departure from that of the earlier dialogues; here we are given another metaphor, which 
should also be taken seriously.  
 
vii. What is distinct about aporia in Meno? 
   
 Meno likens the experience of aporia to being stung by a stingray: not only does 
Socrates resemble the stingray in outward appearance, but he also has the same effect on 
those he meets; he renders them numb, into a state of torpor (νάρκη; Meno 80ab). Socrates 
protests that the metaphor succeeds only if the stingray renders himself numb at the same 
time; in the discussion about virtue (although not in the slave boy passage), Socrates admits 
to being just as perplexed as his interlocutor (80cd). 
 This aspect of aporia is quite different from the one we see in Apology. Here, 
Socrates claims to be like a gadfly, stinging a large thoroughbread horse. The horse (which in 
this case represents the city) is lazy and in need of stimulation. Socrates does not cease to 
settle on the horse, ‘rousing, persuading, reproving’ so that before long the city may awake 
from its drowsing (Apology 30e-31a). This is a very different image from the one we are 
                                                
196 We should not limit our conception of aporia only to these two functions in the early dialogues. See, for 
example, MacKenzie ([1998] pp. 351-38) on aporia as self-consciousness in Charmides and Politis ([2006] pp. 
88-109) on the different kinds of aporia in early Plato. 
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given in Meno; in Apology, Socrates tries to shake people out of their state of torpor; in 
Meno, he seems to induce it.197 
 Of course this is not the only point of divergence in Meno from the earlier dialogues. 
As we noted in the introduction, Meno is often seen as a ‘transitional’ dialogue, where the 
Socratic elenchus is abandoned, and Plato experiments with a philosophical method that 
produces positive results.198  The early ‘Aporetic’ dialogues are products of the elenchus, 
which serves to eliminate falsehood, but has no means of generating truths. As Ryle puts it,  
 
…Socrates has, like a gadfly, to sting Athens into wakefulness, with almost nothing to show 
what she is to be wakened to, save to the existence of the gadfly (Ryle [1966] p 177). 
 
 Meno, in the hypothetical passage, tentatively attempts to say something positive 
about virtue.199 To do this, we need a quite different approach, and this is where the 
hypothetical method comes in. 
The introduction of this method in the Meno is significant to the different presentation 
of aporia we find there. There is nothing incompatible about the aporia purging one’s false 
beliefs, motivating one to learn, and yet leaving one in a state of torpor – in fact, we find all 
three present in Meno. But certainly here the emphasis is different; the νάρκη induced by ἡ 
πλατεία νάρκη ἡ θαλαττία is central to the presentation. For the rest of this chapter, we shall 
see that this state of mind is important psychological preparation for those wishing to 
undertake hypothetical investigation. 
 
viii. Aporia and hypothesis  
                                                
197 Other scholars have noticed this difference before; see Scott (2006), Ch. 6 pp. 69-74 and Cavini (2009) pp. 
159-187. 
198 Cf. Vlastos (1988) pp. 362-396; Karasmanis (2006) pp 129-141 and Scott (2006) pp. 129-133, who support 
this view. 
199 Cf. Robinson (1953) pp.114-122, who supports this view. 
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The hypothetical passage in Meno is an inquiry without a definite starting-point. We are 
given hints throughout the dialogue that an inquiry with a definite starting point would look 
very different. We are told that once a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge, there is 
nothing to stop him from finding out all the others (81d); and in presenting the essential 
nature of virtue as the main question (86d), Plato implies that knowing the nature of virtue 
itself would allow us to deduce other things about it.200 
Meno himself notices the interconnectedness of definitions in geometry and, by 
extension in philosophy. When Socrates defines shape as the only thing which always 
accompanies colour, Meno points out that we need to know what colour is in order for the 
definition to be acceptable (75bc). Without a solid definition of virtue, in which all terms are 
agreed upon, the hypothetical method is adopted as a second best approach to inquiry.201 
The hypothetical approach is often seen as a way out of the aporia of not knowing 
what virtue itself is, but aporia in Meno is actually important preparation for using the 
method. In particular it is this conception of being in a ‘frozen’ state of mind that is important 
when we undertake mathematical investigation, or, as in the Meno, philosophical 
investigation modelled on a mathematical approach. 
The stingray is a literary metaphor; it is not picked apart explicitly in the dialogue for 
philosophical merit. Why, then, should we take it seriously as having important philosophical 
meaning? There are two justifications for doing so. Firstly, as we have previously noted, 
Socrates returns to Meno’s comments in the slave boy passage, pointing out that the numbing 
process has been good for him (84ab). This tells us that Plato wishes to emphasise the 
                                                
200 Cf. Bluck (1964) pp. 320-321, who supports this point, and thinks that Plato intended his readers to see all of 
this. 
201 That is not to say that an inquiry with a definite starting point would exclude deductive influence, but it 
would proceed from principles that are not hypothetical, and have already been agreed upon. In short, there is no 
need to use the hypothetical method in such an inquiry. I would say that the difference between the two kinds of 
inquiry is akin to the difference between dianoia and the later stages of noēsis in the Divided Line passage of 
the Republic, but that is another conversation. 
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importance of aporia, in the sense described by Meno. Secondly, the conception of aporia in 
Meno is significant in the shift in the psychology of learning that we see there and that in turn 
informs the psychology of mathematics for which we argue here. 
Let’s note a difference between the hypothetical method and the elenchus. One of the 
requirements of the elenchus is that the interlocutor says only what he believes (Charmides 
161c; Phaedrus 275b; Meno 71d; Theaetetus 171d). Consider (the early) Socrates’ frustration 
with Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name. The latter says that he is willing to assume 
for the sake of argument that justice is holy and holiness just, even though he does not really 
believe it: 
 
“Excuse me,” I said. “It isn’t this ‘if you like’ and ‘if that’s what you think’ that I want to 
examine, but you and me ourselves. What I mean is, I think the argument will be most fairly 
tested, if we take the ‘if’ out of it” (Protagoras 331c). 202 
 
This is quite unlike the hypothetical method, where making an assumption is 
central.203 The ‘say only what you believe requirement’ of the elenchus, does at least 
implicitly carry the idea of innatism, as it presupposes that one has the beliefs in him already. 
Recollection, as conceived in Meno, is a species of innatism, but seems to require something 
more than the elenchus to bring it about. We need some way of generating positive 
statements that the elenchus cannot provide. Socrates uses more than the elenchus to help the 
slave boy; although he does not tell the boy the answer, he does draw in the additional lines 
                                                
202 See also, for example, Charmides 161c.  
203 We do not have to assume the developmentalist position to take the point about this difference in approach. 
We see Socrates’ concern for the real beliefs of his interlocutors in the Meno itself (Meno 71d) and in later 
dialogues (for example, Theaetetus 171d). What is important is that the hypothetical method, used for the first 
time in Meno, actually requires the philosopher to do what is prohibited by the elenchus that is so prominent in 
the early dialogues. 
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on the diagram, that enable the boy to find it.204 In the subsequent inquiry into virtue, in 
which Socrates does not already know the answer, the hypothetical method is adopted. 
Fine ([2007] pp. 331-367) argues that the hypothetical method does not violate any 
Socratic practices or assumptions. She points out that, in the early dialogues, we do not 
always have to know what something is in order to inquire into what it is like, and cites Crito, 
in which the question of whether it is just for Socrates to flee is discussed, without a 
definition of justice being offered. Fine acknowledges that the method may be new, but she 
still thinks that the dialectical requirement is formulated at 75c8-d7 and 79d.  
However, we should remember that the dialectical requirement as Fine understands it 
is an assurance that the interlocutor understands the terms, rather than the ‘say only what you 
believe’ rule. The formulation at 75cd, Socrates says that, in a more confrontational dispute, 
he would say, ‘You have heard my answer.  If it is wrong, it is for you to take up the 
argument and refute it’ (75c). However, in a friendly conversation, such as the one with 
Meno, ‘one’s reply must be milder and more conducive to discussion. By that I mean that it 
must not only be true, but must employ terms with which the questioner admits he is familiar’ 
(75d). The formulation at 79d emphasises the need to avoid terms which are still in question.  
The first formulation does specify truth, but it does not specify that one must be 
committed to the truth of each statement one makes. This is implied at 71d, when Socrates 
asks Meno to give his own opinion and leave Gorgias out of it, and also at 85bc, in which 
Socrates says that the slave-boy’s opinions were all his own. However, all of these instances 
are firmly distinct from the hypothetical passage, which breaks the rule, so the method does 
represent a break from the elenchus. 
                                                
204 This is not to argue that the elenchus is not used in the slave boy passage, only that it is not sufficient by 
itself. Many scholars see the slave boy passage as a paradigm of the elenctic method; see Irwin ([1977] pp.133-
147) and Nehamas ([1985] pp. 1-30), for example. I am grateful to Vlastos ([1988] pp.362-396) for his 
discussion of this point. For an opposing view, see Fine ([2005] pp.200-226). 
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Kahn notices a further difference in Meno. He calls the hypothetical method that 
follows the aporia in Meno, ‘the earliest known theoretical account of deductive inference’ 
(Kahn [1998] p. 309). He thinks it is the first text to distinguish sharply between the truth of 
the premiss and the validity of the inference. This is quite a difference from the elenctic 
method of only beginning from premisss we believe to be true. 
This is one of the main differences between the elenchus and the hypothetical method. 
The term hupothesis is used in the early dialogues,205 to describe a position expressed by the 
interlocutor, but it is not until Meno that the hypothesis is severed so explicitly from actually 
held beliefs.206  
However, there is a danger to abandoning the ‘say only what you believe’ rule, and 
arguing for both sides. Think about Euthydemus, which aims to show Socratic argument as 
distinct from eristic. Dionysodoros tells Socrates that ‘whichever answer the lad gives, he 
will be proved wrong’ (Euthydemus 275e). When Socrates later asks Dionysodorus if he is 
merely arguing for arguments sake, or if he really believes what he says, Dionysodorus says, 
‘Just try to refute me’ (286de ). The goal for the Sophist is not truth, but to beat his opponent 
– in this case by proving the truth of the opposing argument.207  
The last thing that Plato wants is to associate Socrates with the Sophists. They are 
mentioned later on in the dialogue, where Plato takes thinly-disguised shots at their behaviour 
and standing in the community. Anytus’ reaction when Socrates mentions them as teachers of 
virtue emphasises this attitude: 
 
                                                
205 Euthyphro 11c; Gorgias 454c and Kahn (1998) p 310. 
206 Opposing sides of an argument are also investigated earlier than Meno, for example in Charmides 167b-
175a; see Politis ([2008] pp. 1-34). However, again, we do not see the separation between the proposition and 
the interlocutor, which we see in Meno. 
207 Socrates later describes this as ‘light-hearted dancing…initiation’ into the sophistic mysteries (277de). 
Contrast this with the Plato’s use of the idea of initiation in the description of aporia in Meno. See Lloyd 
([1992] pp. 166-183) on the idea of initiation in the latter dialogue. 
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Good heavens, what a thing to say! I hope no relative of mine or any of my friends, Athenian 
or foreign, would be so mad as to go and let himself be ruined by those people. That’s what 
they are, the manifest ruin and corruption of anyone who comes into contact with them (Meno 
91c). 
 
Socrates says that he finds it unbelievable that men like Protagoras ‘took in the whole of 
Greece, corrupting his pupils and sending them away worse than when they came to him, for 
more than forty years’ (91e). However, Anytus insists that the Sophists are so corrupt, 
blaming the young men who pay them and the cities that allow them in (92ab). He has no 
experience of them himself, but he knows their ‘kind’ (92c). This is the kind of attack from 
which Plato wants to insulate Socrates. 
Plato needs to legitimise the Meno’s departure from Socrates’ ‘say only what you believe’ 
rule; he does not want to reduce the hypothetical method to a kind of eristic. The ‘frozen’ 
kind of aporia allows for the use of hypotheses on a psychological level. We are disabused of 
our false beliefs: rather than the stumbling bewilderment of the earlier presentations, this 
aporia emphasises the suspension of our beliefs and judgement. In earlier dialogues, Socrates 
and his interlocutors are ‘woozy with the argument’ (Lysis 222c); made fools of (Lysis 223b, 
Charmides 176a). But the aporia of Meno prevents the interlocutor from being made a fool 
of, as would happen in an eristic display and even in the earlier dialogues. It provides for a 
way forward without commitment to untested propositions, introducing the argument as a 
thought experiment rather than just an argumentative display. If the hypothesis follows any 
other state of mind than this ‘frozen’ aporia, it jeopardizes the integrity of the argument. 
 The aporia on this reading also has the virtue of making the hypothesis hypothetical. 
As we shall see, Plato says of the mathematicians in Republic VI that they proceed from 
assumptions that they regard as known, without feeling the need to explain them (510cd). 
The philosopher must go beyond the mathematician. One of the first steps, we are told, is to 
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treat ‘assumptions not as principles, but as assumptions in the true sense, that is, as starting 
points and steps’ (511b). 
The hypothetical method in Meno, we shall see, is an exercise in the application of 
mathematical method to philosophy. If the Meno tries to show that discovery is recollection, 
then aporia plays an important role in the process. The presentation of it we are given is not 
incompatible with previous conceptions, but gives us a new perspective, along with the 
hypothetical method introduced in the dialogue. The aporia of Meno gives us the 
psychological preparation we need: disencumberment of our false beliefs and the suspension 
of attachment to new ones. It is Plato’s first step towards a psychology of mathematics. 
It is also a clear sign that Plato is about to do something different. Socrates is about to 
abandon the ‘say only what you believe’ rule of the elenchus but wants to avoid the mean 
tricks of eristic. This is why, aporia, although a negative state of mind for Meno is a positive 
one for Socrates: it is a necessary condition for research.208 We need to ensure that the 
inquiry maintains its integrity, even when it resorts to the provisional tool of hypothesis. In 
this way, aporia in Meno is a way of marking the difference between pistis and dianoia, and 
the foundation for the hypothetical method that Socrates goes on to use. 
 
Chapter Three: The Hypothetical Passage and Mathematical Method in the Meno 
 
Rowe ([2007] pp.131-134) downplays the importance of mathematics in Plato’s 
epistemology. Some people think that we cannot be made to ‘see’ truths about virtue in the 
same way that we can be made to ‘see’ mathematical truths, so mathematical demonstrations 
like the slave-boy experiment have limited implications for Plato’s epistemology as a whole. 
Also, there is a perceived looseness of fit between Plato’s hypothetical passages and 
                                                
208 For this comment, I am grateful to Walter Cavini, in the unpublished paper he gave in Bologna, Aporie, 
Paradossi e Misteri (Platone, Menone 79e5-81e2) 21.9.09. See also Frede (1998) pp. 253-269, who covers 
similar ground. 
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mathematical method, which Plato does not seem to acknowledge; Plato has also been 
accused of imprecise use of mathematical terminology by Mueller (2005). Taken on its own, 
this could shed doubt on the extent to which mathematical reasoning is an important part of 
Plato’s epistemological scale, a vital element of the solution proposed by this project: I am 
going to argue that, on the contrary, mathematics is pivotal. 
Plato’s application of the mathematical method in the dialogues should be taken piece 
by piece, so this chapter will focus on the passages we find in the Meno. In this chapter, we 
shall briefly summarise the Meno’s presentation of mathematics as a model for philosophy. 
This account should at least make us think seriously before devaluing the role that 
mathematics plays in Plato’s epistemology, and suggests that Plato gives mathematical 
reasoning a role in ethical inquiry. Next, we shall examine the hypothetical passage in Meno. 
We shall make particular reference to the claim that Plato does not fully import the 
mathematical method, arguing that there is a closer fit between mathematics and the passage 
than previous scholars have allowed. Finally, we shall examine the passage in the context of 
the dialogue as a whole. 
 
i. Mathematics as a model for philosophical investigation 
 
In the earlier attempts to define virtue, a geometrical example is used as a model 
(Meno 73e), and later (75b-76a). Socrates gives Meno two definitions of ‘shape’ and asks 
him to model his definition of virtue on these geometrical examples (77ab). The qualities that 
Socrates looks for in a philosophical definition are the same as those required in geometry.209 
Note also that when Socrates appeases Meno by using a definition from the natural sciences, 
                                                
209 The definition should not employ terms that are still in question (Meno 75c; 79d) and should look for a single 
quality to cover all instances (Meno 73e; 74a). 
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drawing upon Empedocles’ theory of effluence (76cd), he qualifies it with the comment that 
the geometrical answer is better (76e). 
 We also saw that the slave-boy experiment uses a geometrical example to illustrate 
Socrates’ point. This is not an accidental choice; Socrates takes care to point out that the 
same principles which apply to the mathematical example apply to all other kinds of 
knowledge. The experiment is intended to show that all learning is recollection, not just 
mathematical learning (81d). When the experiment is concluded, Socrates explains that the 
boy will come to know things by recovering them for himself. This is not limited to the 
sphere of mathematics. Socrates emphasises, ‘he will behave in the same way with all 
geometrical knowledge, and all other kinds of knowledge’ (85e). 
 Moreover, the method that Socrates uses in the slave-boy experiment is faithful to the 
mathematical method. Patterson ([2007] pp. 1-33) notes that Socrates’ proof for doubling the 
square in Meno is idiosyncratic, but it does bear significant resemblance to the Euclidian 
version in that it starts with just the given square then (ignoring the two false starts and the 
aporia) supplies the diagonal and the square on the diagonal, and concludes by showing that 
the constructed square does have the double area required.210   
 Finally, we are given a mathematical example as a model for the hypothetical method 
(87a). The example is obscure,211 but involves whether it is possible to inscribe a given area 
into a circle. We are told that the geometer makes a hypothesis that if a particular condition is 
fulfilled, one result follows; if not, the result is different. Then the two proceed to investigate 
                                                
210 On the other hand, it differs from the second type of Euclidian proof in that the latter ‘gives away’ in its 
Proposition the solution that the slave recollects for himself. 
211 It is beyond the scope of this section to resolve this, but the exact nature of the problem to which Plato refers 
is unclear. Heath ([1960] pp. 297-303) gives an overview and comments on the number of different 
interpretations, while other discussions have been provided by Sternfeld and Zyskind ([1977] pp. 206-211), 
Lloyd ([1992] pp.166-183). Guthrie ([1956] pp.103-114) comments in his translation of Meno that it is not 
necessary to understand the example in order to grasp the hypothetical method, but given the lack of consensus 
on the details of the hypothetical method in Meno, any clues we could glean from knowing the exact geometric 
example would be useful. See Karasmanis’s (1987) thesis for an example of how an understanding of Greek 
geometry can inform our conception of Plato’s use of hypotheses. See also Mueller ([2005] pp.170-199) and 
Knorr ([1986] pp. 86-88). 
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the question of whether virtue can be taught using this method, beginning from the 
hypothesis that ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable, if it is not knowledge, it is not 
teachable’212 from which the investigation proceeds.213 
 Clearly then, Plato wishes to model at least part of his philosophical investigation on 
mathematics. In addition to the numerous references to mathematics in the dialogue, the 
slave-boy experiment and the geometrical example are intended to be exemplars for inquiry. 
Therefore we should take seriously Socrates’ claim that he is using the method of the 
mathematicians in the hypothetical passage. 
 
iii. The Hypothetical Method in the Meno 
 
The problem for this chapter is to gain a better understanding of how the method works, and 
to explain mathematical reasoning as productive at this stage in the dialogue. The challenge is 
to show that, although the fit between mathematics and philosophy is not exact, it is close 
enough to argue for the constructive role of mathematical thought in the dialogue. We will 
examine Mueller’s discussion of the alleged ‘looseness of fit’ between the hypothetical 
method and the method of the geometers, then go on to question whether Plato is using the 
method of geometrical analysis, as Mueller assumes, or whether Plato is using a different 
mathematical method (the method of reduction is a much closer fit than that of analysis).214  
                                                
212 Or, on an alternative reading, ‘virtue is knowledge.’ For discussions on whether or not the hypothesis is bi-
conditional, see Scott (2006) pp221-224; Zyskind and Sternfeld ([1976] pp. 206-211); Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 
77-93) and Rose ([1970] pp.1-8) and section three, below. 
213 We should note that this is a kind of second best in the absence of τί ἐστι knowledge. Socrates says that he 
would prefer to find out what virtue itself is, but since Meno is succeeding in governing his actions (Meno 86d), 
he agrees to answer the question that Meno would like. This is consistent with Plato’s portrayal of the 
hypothetical method as the second best method in Phaedo; Cf Shipton ([1979] pp. 33-53) and the Phaedo 
chapter of this dissertation). 
214 I am grateful to Karasmanis’ ([1987] pp. 19-60 and 211-315 especially) unpublished DPhil thesis for his 
excellent discussion of these methods. Although other scholars have contributed much to the debate, 
Karasmanis discussion has had a huge impact, in spite of being unpublished. See Vlastos ([1991] pp. 123-124 n. 
67 and 72) for his acknowledgement of the influence of Karasmanis’ thesis on his own discussion of 
mathematical influences on Plato. 
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Ian Mueller ([2005] pp.170-199) argues that Plato does try to unite smooth-working 
mathematics with the ‘rough and tumble’ of Socratic examination, but there are clear 
discrepancies between his method, and that of the mathematicians. Moreover, he says that 
Plato ignores the differences between mathematical method and his own adaptation of it. 
Mueller does not want to disparage Plato’s accomplishments, but he says that we should not 
lose sight of the imperfect fit. We shall now examine this claim, arguing that there is a much 
closer fit than Mueller supposes between mathematical method and the hypothetical passage. 
The hypothetical method in Meno is widely supposed to be based on the geometrical 
method of analysis and synthesis (Mueller [2005] pp.170-199; Beaney [2009] SEP). 
According to Michael Beaney, the influence of the method of analysis, in particular, is 
evident in Meno. Socrates ‘hypothesizes’ the supposedly prior proposition, that virtue is 
knowledge. By means of this, the proposition under consideration, that virtue is teachable, 
can be demonstrated. However, Beaney acknowledges that, like geometrical analysis, it is not 
clear what the relationships are supposed to be between the various elements involved, and 
that there are important differences between geometrical analysis and the method of 
hypothesis (Beaney [2009]). 
It is argued that Plato tries to apply this method to philosophy, even if he is not 
absolutely precise in its application. Mueller argues that, in Meno, the method of analysis is 
imperfectly applied. Firstly, says Mueller, Socrates does not use mathematical terminology 
precisely in the geometrical example, nor does he employ the terms in the hypothetical 
passage. Moreover, says Mueller, ‘the dialogue ends with Socrates arguing against both the 
hypothesis…and the teachability of virtue’ (Mueller [2005] p 179). He thinks this is a 
reflection of the practical difference between mathematics and philosophy. Greek geometrical 
analysis is a method of successful analysis rather than a method of searching and, according 
to Mueller, this may also explain ‘why, in the Meno, no attempt is made to relate the 
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subsequent refutation of the claim that virtue is knowledge to the mathematician’s 
investigation from hypothesis’ (Mueller [2005] p 179-80). Mueller says that this is because 
the hypothesis will more frequently be found questionable in philosophy than in mathematics. 
We shall examine Mueller’s two points: that Plato does not apply mathematical 
concepts in the passage in a precise way and that he argues against the hypothesis in the end. 
We shall argue that Muller assumes that Plato tries to apply the method of geometrical 
analysis, and that he does not take into account the fact that there is another possible method 
that Plato is trying to apply - ἀπαγωγή, or reduction. This is a precursor to analysis and a 
likely candidate for the method Plato was trying to use as a model for the hypothetical 
method in the Meno. If we take Plato to be trying to use this method, and take 89a or even 
89c as the end of the hypothetical passage, there is actually a much closer fit between the 
Meno passage and the method than Mueller supposes. Moreover, if we think about the 
mathematical terminology Mueller mentions in terms of Plato’s enunciation of the problem to 
be solved, it is not clear that Plato is being so imprecise. 
Mueller refers to Philodemus’s history of the Platonic school, which lists analysis and 
the lemma concerning diorismoi as being created under Plato’s general directorship of the 
Academy.215 Analysis is commonly called the ‘analysis and synthesis,’ to reflect the reverse 
process in the second part of the method. Mueller then goes on to explain these terms: 
 
Analysis can be thought of as the process of looking for the proof of an assertion P by 
searching for propositions that imply P, propositions that imply those, and so on until one 
reaches propositions already established; in synthesis, one simply writes down the proof 
                                                
215 In fact, the method is said by Proclus to have been invented by Plato and handed over to Leodamus. 
However, it is likely that Plato did not actually invent the method, and that it was actually in use before him. 
Probably Proclus confused Plato’s invention of the method of collection and division with that of analysis. His 
contribution in terms of geometrical analysis was to observe the importance from the point of view of logical 
rigour. Cf Heath (1949) p 272 and (1960) p 290-292. 
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discovered by analysis, that is, one goes through the steps of analysis in reverse order 
(Mueller [2005] p 175). 
 
A diorismos is usually explained as the determination of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the solution of a problem or the truth of a proposition (Mueller [2005] p 
175). 
 
 The term ‘lemma is frequently predicated of any premisss assumed in establishing something 
 else…But in geometry a lemma is specifically a premiss which needs verification (Proclus, 
 Commentary on the First book of Euclid’s Elements, cited in Mueller [2005] p 176). 
 
 Mueller says that Plato does not use these words in their technical sense, but in the 
Meno, invokes mathematical precedent. He cites the geometrical example that precedes the 
hypothetical passage in the dialogue: 
 
What I mean by ‘from a hypothesis’ is like the way in which the geometers often consider 
some question someone asks them, for example, whether it is possible for this area to be 
inscribed in this circle as a triangle. Someone might say, ‘I don’t yet know whether this is 
such that it can be inscribed, but I think I have a certain hypothesis, as it were, which is useful 
for the question, as follows: if this area is such that, when one places it alongside its given 
line, it falls short by a figure similar to the one that was placed alongside, I think one result 
will follow, and another, on the other hand, if this cannot happen to it. Making a hypothesis, 
then, I am willing to tell you the result concerning the inscribing of it in a circle, whether it is 
possible or not (Meno 86e-87b, cited in Mueller [2005] p 177-178). 
 
 Mueller then goes on to say that a geometer like Euclid would reformulate the 




Problem: To inscribe a triangle of a given area in a given circle. 
Diorismos: Thus it is necessary that, ‘if one places the area alongside its given line, it falls 
short by a figure similar to the one that was placed alongside. 
Theorem: If the area of a triangle inscribed in a circle is ‘placed alongside its given line, it 
falls short by a figure similar to the one that was placed alongside’ (Mueller [2005] p 178). 
  
 Mueller says that Socrates’ presentation does not make clear whether he thinks that 
the diorismos or the theorem is the hypothesis, although it depends on both. When Socrates 
returns to the topic of virtue, the method becomes less clear still. Mueller cites Socrates’ 
presentation of that problem: 
 
Similarly then concerning virtue, since we don’t know either what it is or what sort of thing it 
is, let’s make a hypothesis and consider whether it is teachable or not, as follows: what sort of 
thing among those connected with the soul would virtue be to make it teachable or not 
teachable? First, if it is different from or like knowledge, is it teachable or not?...Or is this at 
least clear to everyone, that a person isn’t taught anything other than knowledge? 
But if virtue is some sort of knowledge, it’s clear that it will be  
teachable. 
 Then we’ve quickly finished with this point: if virtue is of one sort it’s teachable, and, 
if of another, not (Mueller [2005] p 178). 
 
 Mueller says that Socrates does not make a diorismos, but performs an analysis: he 
reduces the question of whether virtue is teachable to the claim that virtue is knowledge. So 
we now have: 
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Hypothesis-theorem: If virtue is knowledge, then it is teachable (Mueller [2005] p 179). 
 
This is of use only if one can establish: 
 
Hypothesis-lemma: Virtue is knowledge (Mueller [2005] p 179). 
 
 Mueller points to the scholarly disagreement about which of these hypotheses 
Socrates uses. He thinks that the most explicit text implies the hypothesis-theorem, although 
the hypothesis-lemma still needs to be shown. He goes on to question whether the further 
hypothesis, ‘virtue is good’ is conceived as a theorem or a lemma. He says that the method of 
geometrical analysis would use the hypothesis theorem, and concludes that Plato’s imprecise 
use of vocabulary is part of the reason we cannot expect a ‘perfect fit’ between mathematics 
and philosophy. 
 Let’s examine this claim, before we go on to examine Mueller’s other assertion, that 
the end of the argument precludes the possibility of a perfect fit.  
 The method of analysis, which Mueller and other scholars claim to be the method that 
Plato tries to use in Meno, takes its name from ἀνάλυσις or ἀναλύειν. So the word takes its 
meaning from λύειν, to loosen, untie or set free, which when combined with the preposition 
ἀνά, gains meaning of ‘upwards’, ‘backwards’ and sometimes ‘strengthening’ or ‘repetition.’ 
We also find a sense of ‘taking apart,’ closer to our modern use of the word, ‘analyse.’216 
 The method is described by Pappus of Alexandria (c.290-c.350 CE) as follows: 
 
                                                
216 Cf Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 49a, 51a, 47a, 50ab, 51a; Nichomachean Ethics 1112b. I am grateful to 
Karasmanis for his (1987) discussion of this. Szabo ([1974] pp. 118-130) argues that ἀνάλυσις does not have 
this meaning in ancient times, but Karasmanis points to these parts of Aristotle, which do seem to use the word 
in the sense of ‘taking apart.’  
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(A) Analysis is the way from what is sought – as if it were admitted – through its 
concomitants in order to reach something admitted in synthesis. (B) For in analysis we 
suppose what is sought to be already done and we inquire from what it results, and again what 
is the antecedent of the latter, until we on our backward way light upon something already 
known or having the position of a beginning. And we call such a method analysis, as being a 
solution backwards.217 
  
 Pappus then goes on to define synthesis: 
 
In synthesis, on the other hand, we suppose what was reached last in analysis to be already 
done, and arranging in their natural order as consequents the former antecedents and linking 
them one with another, we in the end arrive at the construction of the thing sought. And this 
we call synthesis. 218 
 
He distinguishes between two types of analysis: theoretical and problematical. 
Theoretical analysis ‘seeks the truth’: 
 
…we suppose the thing sought as being and as being true, and then we pass through its 
consequences in order, as though they were true and existent by hypothesis, to something 
admitted; then, if that which is admitted is true, the thing sought is true, too, and the proof 
will be the reverse if the analysis. But if we come upon something admittedly false, the thing 
sought will be false, too.219 
 
Problematical analysis, Pappus says, ‘serves to carry out what was desired to do’: 
                                                
217 Pappus Reference Collectio VII Praef. 1-3 in Karasmanis (1987) pp.23-24; Cf Mansfield (1998) pp 9-14, 
who makes a similar point. 
218 Pappus Reference Collectio VII Praef. 1-3 in Karasmanis (1987); Cf Mansfield (1998) pp 9-14.  
219 Pappus Reference Collectio VII Praef. 1-3 in Karasmanis (1987); Cf Mansfield (1998) pp 9-14. 
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…we suppose the desired thing to be known, and then we pass through its consequences in 
order, as though they were true, up to something admitted. If the thing admitted is possible or 
can be done, that is, if it is what the mathematicians call given, the desired thing will also be 
possible. The proof will again be the reverse of the analysis. But if we come upon something 
admittedly impossible, the problem will also be impossible.220 
 
The other definition of analysis we have preserved from antiquity is from 
Euclid: 
 
Analysis is an assumption of that which is sought as if it were admitted (and the arrival) by 
means of its consequences at something admitted to be true (Euclid, Elements XIII in  
Heath [1908] p 442). 
 
Synthesis is an assumption of that which is admitted (and the arrival) by means of its 
consequences at something admitted to be true  (Euclid, Elements XIII in  Heath [1908] p 
442). 
 
Aristotle also describes the method of analysis. He likens it to a the method of a 
doctor, who does not deliberate about the end (whether or not he shall cure a man) but about 
by what means he can reach it: 
 
Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems 
to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, 
while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what 
                                                
220 Pappus Reference Collectio VII Praef. 1-3 in Karasmanis (1987); Mansfield (1998) pp. 9-14 also refers to 
this. 
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means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery 
is last. For the person who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse in the way described as 
though he were analysing a geometrical construction.221 
 
As in Pappus’s description, Euclid and Aristotle have a hypothetical starting point, 
and the last step in analysis is the first step in synthesis.  Here also, analysis is an upward 
movement and the process is heuristic.222 
Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 19-59) distinguishes between what he calls the classical view 
of Greek geometrical analysis and a second view. According to the classical view, analysis is 
deductive, a method of discovering either proofs or propositions, or the solution to 
geometrical problems. It was followed by synthesis, the confirmation of the analysis, which 
is also deductive and the actual proof or solution for the sake of which analysis was 
undertaken. According to the second (Cornford’s) view, analysis is an upward movement to 
prior assumptions, from which the original assumption follows.  
Robinson ([1969] pp. 1-15) defends the classical view. On his reading, analysis 
proceeds as follows: I want to prove a proposition (1). I assume (1) is true. (1) implies (2). (2) 
implies (3). (3) implies (4). I continue on in this way until I reach a proposition, say (5) that I 
know to be true independently of (1). 
 For the method to work, says Robinson, the implications must be reciprocal. This 
means that the chain 1-2-3-4-5 must be convertible, with symmetrical relations between the 
propositions: (2) must imply (1), just as (1) implies (2). The synthesis tests the analysis by 
confirming that the chain 5-4-3-2-1 makes a necessary inference when taken in order. 
Robinson also thinks that we can widen the account of analysis to say that if (5) is proved 
                                                
221 Nichomachean Ethics 1112b15ff. Cf Karasmanis (1987) p 27, who cites Hintikka and Remes as pointing out 
the similarities with Pappus’ both in vocabulary and structure.  
222 There is not necessarily reversible movement between premise and conclusion, although this is debated in 
the literature. 
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false, we can show (1) to be false without the aid of any synthesis; so analysis is also a way 
of showing the impossibility of proving a given proposition.223 
According to the second interpretation, analysis is not deductive, ie, we do not try to 
see what follows from the original assumption, but from what the original assumption 
follows; then we proceed backwards until we reach a proposition independently known to be 
true. Synthesis deduces the original assumption through this proposition and thus proves it. 
On this interpretation, only synthesis is deductive, not analysis.  
Cornford224 defends this view. He says that analysis proceeds as follows: I want to 
prove a proposition (1). (2) implies (1). Do I know that (2) is true? If so, the analysis is over. 
If not, search for a proposition (3) that implies (2). (4) implies (3). Something I do know, say 
(5), implies (4). 
 According to Cornford, the synthesis is deductive: (5) is true, and (5) implies (4) 
implies (3) implies (2) implies (1). Cornford thinks that his reading is supported by the 
difference between Pappus (A) (from what is sought through its concomitants) and (B) (suppose 
what is sought to be already done and inquire from what it results) in the first citation above.225 
However, as Robinson rightly points out, Pappus is looking at analysis as existing for the 
sake of synthesis, so the second of his expressions (B) is that of synthesis (1969). 
Karasmanis is sympathetic to this objection, but he thinks that the classical view, that 
we draw conclusions from the theorem to be proved until we arrive at the thing known, is 
misleading. He says we should pay attention to the role that intuition, experience and mental 
                                                
223 This means that reductio ad absurdum is a special case of analysis. Karasmanis (pp 42-43) rejects this, 
because analysis is always followed by synthesis, reductio ad absurdum never; analysis leads to affirmation, 
reductio to negative proof. 
224 (1967) pp. 61-95; Cf Robinson ([1969] pp.1-15) for his representation of Cornford’s views. According to 
Robinson, Cornford’s analysis is a series of upwards intuitions. 
225 As additional support for his interpretation, Cornford thinks that ‘you cannot follow the same series of steps 
first one way, then the opposite way, and arrive at logical consequences in both directions’ (1967).  According 
to Robinson ([1969] pp.1-15), we should marvel at this. He says that it is, at least in ordinary language, false. He 
cites a counterexample: (1) 3x=4y (2) 3x+y=5y (3) 3x+2y=6y. He also cites an example from Euclid XIII which 
he takes to conform to his conception of the method, and goes on to note that false premises can give rise to true 
conclusions, so on Cornford’s account, it is possible for (5) to be false and (1) to be true. 
 204 
ability of the geometer play in the process. According to Karasmanis, ‘the main problem of 
the method of analysis and synthesis is not so much whether the process is deductive or not, 
but the process of thought of the geometer when he practises analysis.’226  
 I shall follow the classical view, with an acknowledgement to Karasmanis’ point that 
there is a psychological side to the process that also must be taken into account. In this case, 
the method of analysis is as follows: In the enunciation of the problem, we have a thing given 
(δεδοµένον) and a thing sought (ζητούµενον). From this, we move (usually deductively) from 
a hypothesis, using other known propositions, to a conclusion that is independently true of 
the thing sought.227 Synthesis starts from this conclusion and moves backwards to the thing 
sought.228 
 In this case, the method of geometrical analysis follows the following process: 
 
Enunciation of the problem→Analysis: (1, the thing sought) implies (2) → (2) implies (3) 
→(3) implies (4)…M implies N (independently known)→Synthesis: N implies M…(4) 
implies (3) →(3) implies (2) →(2) implies (1). 
 
Mueller has assumed that Plato has modelled the hypothetical passage in the Meno on 
the method of analysis, but there was a forerunner to this method. This is apagōgē, or 
reduction. This was practised by Hippocrates of Chios (c.470-c.410 BCE), as described by 
Proclus (c.412-c.485 CE): 
 
                                                
226 (1987) p 39. He says that the ‘heuristic secret’ of the method is to use B itself to find a proof for it, so there is 
also a creative/choice element to the method. At every step, we have a lot of choices both in auxiliary 
constructions and consequences. He notes that, in analysis, ‘we have two procedures bound together: a) drawing 
conclusions and b) looking for premises’ (1987) p 38. 
227 The end point may be something impossible, something constructible, or failed analysis (ie, it does not help 
us to resolve/reject the problem), but it is always the starting point for synthesis. 
228 So, says Karasmanis, there is a clear differentiation between analysis and synthesis: analysis goes upwards or 
backwards and is heuristic. Synthesis goes downwards and is demonstrative. Cf Lakatos (1976) p 9 n1 and 106 
n3 for a discussion of the method of analysis as heuristic and the importance of ‘guessing’ theorems before 
arriving at them deductively. See especially chapter one for Lakatos’ theory of proofs. 
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Reduction is a transition from a problem or theorem to another, which, if known or 
constructed, will make the original problem or theorem evident. For example, to solve the 
problem of doubling the cube geometers shifted their inquiry to another on which this 
depends, namely, the finding of two mean proportionals; and henceforth they devoted their 
efforts to discovering how to find two means in continuous proportion between two given 
straight lines. It is reported that the first to effect reduction of difficult constructions was 
Hippocrates of Chios who also squared the lunes (Proclus, In Euc, 213, cited in Mueller 
[2005]). 
 
According to this, reduction is a method that starts from an enunciation of the 
problem (eg, that of doubling the cube), then ‘reducing’ it to another that is easier to solve 
(eg, that of finding of two mean proportionals). This constitutes the principle for the solution 
of the original problem. This process can be repeated until we arrive at a conclusion that can 
be proved. These ‘principles’ are the same as Proclus’ lemmas. We said that a lemma is a 
premiss that needs verification, but Proclus also tells us that 
 
The term ‘lemma’ is frequently predicated of any premiss assumed in establishing something 
else, as when people say they have made a proof from so and so many lemmas…we assume 
them directly without proof to verify other things.229 
 
In this case, apagōgē is a method that reduces the problem to a series of lemmas, until 
we arrive at a conclusion that is independently known of the thing sought: 
 
Enunciation of the problem→lemma1→lemma2→lemma3→…Conclusion 
 
                                                
229 Proclus, In Euc, 211, cited in Mueller (2005 pp. 170-199). 
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Some people think that this method is the same as the first stage of the method of analysis 
(the ‘analysis’ part of analysis and synthesis),230 but we can see it to be an early forerunner of 
the method. One of the main differences between the two methods is that the method of 
analysis and synthesis is a series of steps ‘up’ followed by a corresponding series of steps 
‘down,’ whereas in apagōgē, each step ‘up’ is immediately followed by a step ‘down’ in the 
form of a check for coherence.  
In addition, apagōgē is not simply the first stage of analysis: it is not just breaking an 
argument into smaller steps. Pappus does not seem to relate the two terms 
methodologically.231 In fact, rather than simply breaking up the argument into smaller steps, 
apagōgē has an extra heuristic dimension: the original problem is reduced to a different one 
that is easier to solve. 
When people talk about the fit of the mathematical method to Plato’s philosophy, they 
usually assume that it is analysis and synthesis, rather than apagōgē that he is using as a 
model.232 Apagōgē, I am going to argue, is a much better fit, but this idea is often overlooked 
in Ancient Philosophy. Karasmanis’ DPhil thesis champions the idea of apagōgē in the Meno 
and Phaedo, but because this is unpublished, the idea has not been widely circulated. The 
method is certainly much discussed in the history of mathematics, but so far, this discussion 
has not been widely extended to Plato scholarship.233 
This gives us a choice between the two possible methods as models for the 
hypothetical passage in Plato. I want to argue firstly that apagōgē is a better fit for the 
passage, and secondly that chronologically, it makes more sense for Plato to be using that 
                                                
230 Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 19-59) thinks that the fundamental difference in their structure is that in apagōgē, 
each reduction simultaneously involves an analytic ‘step up’ and a synthetic ‘step down.’ 
231 Nor, according to Otte and Panza ([1997]  p. 201) do any of the other ancients. 
232 For example, Benson ([2010] pp.188-208); Mueller ([2005] pp.170-199); Robinson ([1953] pp.120-122). 
Menn ([2002] pp. 193-223) conflates the two, ascribing the invention of analysis to the originator of apagōgē, 
Hippocrates. He thinks that it is the method of analysis to which the geometrical example refers in the Meno; but 
his account of analysis is closer to reduction that those of other scholars. Interestingly, Menn identifies the 
reduction to an archē with direct perception. 
233 See, for example, Knorr (1986) Chapter Three pp. 49-88; Szabó (1978) Part One, especially pp 48 ff. 
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method at the time of writing the Meno. We shall consider whether Plato uses analysis in 
other dialogues in the chapter on the Phaedo, but here, we shall argue that apagōgē makes 
much more sense. Following this, I shall argue that we save Plato from some of the charges 
of conceptual imprecision by looking at his enunciation of the problem.  
As I shall argue below, we can take the hypothetical passage as finishing at 89a 
(passage B of the part ii). First, I want to present the passage as the method of reduction 
applied to philosophy. 
When Socrates has described the geometrical example, he says, ‘Let’s do the same 
about virtue’ (Meno 87b). He then gives an enunciation of the problem: 
 
Socrates: We shall say: ‘What attribute of the soul must virtue be, if it is to be 
teachable or otherwise?’ Well, in the first place, if it is anything else but knowledge, 
is there a possibility of anyone teaching it – or, in the language we used just now, 
reminding someone of it? We needn’t worry about which name we give to the 
process, but simply ask: will it be teachable? Isn’t it plain to everyone that a man is 
not taught anything except knowledge? 
Meno: That would be my view. 
Socrates: If on the other hand virtue is some sort of knowledge, clearly it could be 
taught. 
Meno: Certainly. 
Socrates: So that question is easily settled; I mean, on what condition virtue would be 
teachable. 
Meno: Yes. 
Socrates: The next point, then, I suppose, is to find out whether virtue is knowledge or 
something different (Meno 87bd). 
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If we take this whole passage to be the enunciation of the problem, we have all the 
elements we would expect from a mathematical method. We have the thing given, δεδοµένον 
(nothing is teachable except knowledge) and the thing sought ζητούµενον (is virtue 
teachable?). We also have the theorem (if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught) and the 
diorismos (‘if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught’) is the condition on which virtue is 
teachable).234 
This in itself does not mean that the method is either analysis or ἀπαγωγή, but it does 
clear Plato from some of the charges of confusing mathematical concepts. Socrates is not 
confusing the theorem and diorismos, nor, as Mueller thinks, is he imposing the condition 
given by the diorismos and relying on the theorem (Mueller [2005] p 178). He is simply 
stating the two as part of the enunciation.  
Mueller thinks that the ‘hypothesis-theorem (If virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.)’ 
is only of use if one can establish the ‘hypothesis-lemma(Virtue is knowledge.).  The lack of 
clarity about which of the two is supposed to be the actual hypothesis (which I discuss later in 
Section Two, Chapter Three. ii) leads Mueller to suppose that Plato has conflated the terms. 
However, if we think of the method of apagōgē, the lemma, ‘virtue is knowledge’ is 
not brought in because the hypothesis-theorem is too similar to the diorismos, but because it 
is the next step in the process. The problem, to prove that ‘virtue is teachable’ is reduced to, 
‘is virtue knowledge?’ (Lemma 1: ‘virtue is knowledge). So Lemma 1 entails the thing 
sought (as stated in the diorismos). The next step, as Socrates says, is to find out if virtue is 
knowledge, so this problem is reduced to the second lemma, ‘virtue is good.’ Lemma 2 
entails Lemma 1: 
 
                                                
234 See Euclid VI 28 on the incorporation of diorismoi into enunciation. 
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1. Virtue is good (87d). 
2. If there is something good that is different from/not associated with knowledge, virtue 
is not necessarily a form of knowledge (87d). 
3. If knowledge embraces everything that is good, virtue is knowledge (87d). 
4. All good things are advantageous (87e). 
5. So virtue must also be advantageous (87e). 
6. Health, strength, good looks and wealth are all advantageous (87e). 
7. But these things sometimes do harm (88a). 
8. The thing that determines whether these things are advantageous or harmful is right 
use (88a). 
9. Also consider spiritual qualities like temperance, justice, courage, quickness of mind 
memory, nobility of character (88a). 
10. Also learning and discipline is profitable in conjunction with right use, but without it, 
harmful (88b). 
11. Everything that the human spirit undertakes is useful when guided by wisdom, 
harmful when not (88c). 
12. So if virtue is an infallibly beneficial attribute of the spirit, it must be wisdom (88cd). 
13. The same applies to the first class of things: right use makes them advantageous 
(88d). 
14. The right user is the wise man (88d). 
15. Goodness of non-spiritual assets depends on our spiritual character – and the 
goodness of that depends on wisdom (88d). 
16. The advantageous element must be wisdom (89a). 
17. Virtue is advantageous (89a). 
18. So virtue is wisdom, either the whole or the part of it (89a). 
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If we take the argument to end there, we have the structure of apagōgē, consisting  
of two reductions: 
Enunciation: 
Is virtue teachable (87b)? [THING SOUGHT]. 
Nothing is teachable except knowledge (87c) [THING GIVEN]. 
If virtue is knowledge, it can be taught (87c) [THEOREM]. 
This (‘if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught’) is the condition on which virtue is teachable 
(87c) [DIORISMOS]. 
 
 Lemma 1: Virtue is knowledge (87c) Reduced to:  
 Lemma 2: Virtue is good (87d). 
 
 Mueller says: ‘there can be no question of a perfect fit with the method of 
mathematical analysis since the dialogue ends with Socrates arguing against both the 
hypothesis-lemma and the teachability of virtue’ (Mueller [2005] p 179). However, if we take 
the following passages to be separate arguments, there is no reason to suppose that Socrates’ 
arguments against the hypothesis-lemma and the teachability of virtue undermine a fit with 
mathematical method, merely that Socrates has used different arguments to get different 
results. We will argue for taking the argument to end here in the next part, but now we should 
note that Mueller’s point partly depends on taking the hypothetical passage to extend into the 
rest of the dialogue. 
 Historical sources also point to the acceptance in antiquity of the fact that Plato was 
using ἀπαγωγή. Here is Aristotle’s description of the method: 
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By reduction, we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle, but 
the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than 
the conclusion; or again, in an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last 
term and the middle are few. For in any case, it turns out that we approach more nearly to 
knowledge. 
(Prior Analytics 69a). 
 
Aristotle then goes on to cite an example remarkably close to that which we 
find in Meno: 
 
For example, let A stand for what can be taught, B for knowledge, C for justice. Now it is 
clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. If now the 
statement BC is equally or more probable than AC, we have a reduction: for we are nearer to 
knowledge, since we have taken a new term, being so far without knowledge that A belongs 
to C. Or again suppose that the terms intermediate between B and C are few: for thus, too we 
are nearer knowledge. For example let D stand for squaring E, for rectilinear figure, F for 
circle. If there were only one term intermediate between E and F (viz. that the circle is made 
equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules), we should be near to knowledge. But 
when BC is not more probable than AC, and the intermediate terms are not few, I do not call 
this reduction: nor again when the statement BC is immediate: for such a statement is 
knowledge. 
(Prior Analytics 69a). 
 
It is likely that Aristotle does have the hypothetical passage from the Meno in mind 
when he writes this.235 
                                                
235 Cf Bluck (1964) pp. 76-79, who also links the two passages. 
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 So far, we have argued that the thing sought, the thing given, theorem and diorismos 
can all be found in Plato’s enunciation of the problem, and that his method more closely 
resembles ἀπαγωγή than geometrical analysis; evidence from Aristotle bears this out.236 We 
have also seen that, if we take the argument to end at 89a, Mueller’s point about Socrates 
arguing against the hypothesis does not affect the fidelity of the passage to the method, when 
the passage is taken on its own.  
This reading also avoids the problem that Plato is not clear about what the hypothesis 
actually is. It could be either, ‘virtue is knowledge’ or the bi-conditional ‘if virtue is 
knowledge it is teachable, if it is not knowledge it is not teachable.’237 I endorse Scott’s 
argument for the hypothesis being, ‘virtue is knowledge,’238 but the bi-conditional reading is 
not incompatible with the argument that Plato is closely following the method of reduction, 
rather than loosely following the method of geometrical analysis. What is important is Plato’s 
use of (what Mueller concedes is) a lemma, ‘virtue is knowledge’ as a heuristic device. This 
(Mueller again concedes) is directly taken from mathematics, and, if we think about the 
history of geometry and reduction as a forerunner to the method of analysis, we can see that 
the hypothetical passage is far closer to the mathematics of Plato’s day than Mueller allows. 
Historical evidence linking the Meno passage to reduction bears this out. 
                                                
236 Once again, I am grateful to Karasmanis’ wonderful thesis for this. 
237 We cannot give full attention to the argument here, but the question has been much discussed. See Scott 
([2006] pp. 221-224); Zyskind and Sternfeld ([1976] pp. 130-134); Karasmanis ([1987] pp.103-118) and Rose 
([1970] pp. 1-8) for discussions. Briefly, the debate can be summarized: the geometrical example would indicate 
that the hypothesis is the bi-conditional, if we assume that everything that follows the words ‘the following 
hypothesis’ at 87a3 is the hypothesis, which would mean that 87c8-9 would be a full statement of the bi-
conditional hypothesis about virtue. However, as Scott (2006) points out, we could take ‘virtue is knowledge’ in 
apposition to ‘the hypothesis’ at 89c2-4. Moreover, Scott continues, the bi-conditional interpretation cannot do 
justice to the methodological remarks Socrates makes at 86de: Socrates is trying to broker a deal with Meno, so 
the hypothesis must be provisional, or the method is a concession, not a compromise. The bi-conditional cannot 
do justice to these remarks, so Scott thinks that ‘rules it out of court’ (2006) p 224.   
238 Summarized in the preceding note. As I have taken the passage to end at 89a, the main textual evidence for 
the bi-conditional actually falls outside the hypothetical passage, which would support this reading. As I shall 
argue below, 89a-89c actually forms a separate empirical argument, so when Meno speaks of an inescapable 
conclusion from the assumption ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable,’ at 89c, he is actually referring to the 
assumption of 89a, not whatever assumption was made when the method was introduced.  
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 The most controversial thing I have done so far is to say that the passage ends at 89a. 
Some people think that the hypothetical passage takes up most of the second part of the 
dialogue,239 whereas others think it ends at 89c. In the following chapter, I shall argue for my 
interpretation, but for now, we should note that we have everything we need for the method 
of reduction up to 89a, and that even if we take the passage to end at 89c, Mueller’s point 
about Socrates going on to argue against the hypothesis does not effect the passage’s fidelity 
to the method when taken in itself.  
 Given this interpretation, we can see the role of the hypothetical method in the 
absence of a ti esti for virtue. Taking the lemma, ‘virtue is knowledge’ as a hypothesis, we 
can see that the lemma plays a similar role to the diagram in the slave-boy experiment: it acts 
as proxy for the ti esti. We said that a ti esti needs to answer the signification question, and 
also allow us to further investigate the properties of the thing defined as its wider heuristic 
role.  
 It is clear that the lemma(s) in both the hypothetical passage and the method of 
reduction are heuristic mechanisms. It is also clear that, in the hypothetical passage, the 
lemma is adopted as a result of the absence of a ti esti, as we have argued in chapters one and 
two of this section. It is less clear that the lemma answers the signification question in the 
same way that the diagram does in the slave-boy experiment. However, it is used as a proxy 
until such an answer has been attained.240 
 If we take the hypothesis to be the lemma ‘virtue is knowledge’ (which we shall do 
from now on), we can say that the role of the hypothesis in this passage is to act as proxy for 
                                                
239 For example, Vlastos ([1991] pp. 123-125) puts forward this view. 
240 We gain a glimpse of what that answer might be within the passage itself. Socrates says that spiritual 
qualities such as temperance, justice, courage, quickness of mind, memory, nobility of character and others may 
be harmful as well as advantageous (88ab). These qualities are profitable in conjunction with wisdom, but 
without it harmful (88b). Socrates goes on to provisionally identify wisdom with virtue. If we rephrase that, we 
have: ‘wisdom (of which virtue is some sort) is the only thing that always accompanies the advantageous results 
of spiritual qualities’ which is the same form as Charles’ paradigm signification answer, ‘shape is the only thing 
that always accompanies colour.’ The problem with this is that, at 97a, Socrates says that it was a mistake to 
suppose that knowledge was a sine qua non for right leadership. In any case, the lemma, ‘virtue is knowledge’ is 
used as a substitute until we arrive at a satisfactory signification answer. 
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the missing ti esti, and work as a heuristic device in the progression towards knowledge. If 
we take it to be the bi-conditional, we can say that the role of the hypothesis is to generate 
lemmas that do this, although, as we shall see in the Phaedo chapter, it makes much more 
sense to say that the hypothesis is the lemma.  
 In conclusion, we can see that the slave-boy passage and the hypothetical passage in 
Meno are both good examples of each of the characteristics of dianoetic reasoning described 
in the divided line passage of the Republic. The diagram of the slave-boy passage and the 
hypothesis-lemma of the hypothetical passage both act as proxies to the absent ti esti, and are 
both heuristic devices used to generate a positive statement, in contrast to the elenchus’ 
purely purgative role. So far, this supports our solution to the problem of the relationship 
between the two characteristics. However, we still need to explain how dianoia can be part of 
an epistemological ascent in the Meno when the dialogue nevertheless seems to end in 
aporia. Moreover, we need to further justify the fact that we took the hypothetical passage to 
end at 89a. This will be the purpose of the following chapter. 
 
Chapter Four: The Hypothetical Passage in the Context of the Inquiry 
 
The problem of the Meno for us is that the dialogue still ends in aporia: Socrates still 
does not know what virtue is, or whether or not it can be taught. After the demonstration that 
virtue is knowledge, we seem to have another passage showing that virtue is not knowledge. 
As we want to say that mathematics provides a step up the epistemological ladder, we need to 
account for the apparent lack of progress on the issue. Socrates says that they will not get to 
the bottom of the matter until they have agreed upon what virtue is, but we should at least 
have arrived at some kind of provisional truth if the hypothetical method is to be of any use 
of all. This chapter aims to show that the aporia (if it is aporia) is actually a result of two 
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empirical arguments that follow the hypothetical passage, not of the hypothetical method 
itself. 
We said that the dialogue ends in aporia, but I’d like to qualify this by pointing out 
that Socrates’ final ‘aporia’ is nothing like the aporias of Meno and the slave-boy in the 
middle of the dialogue. We said that aporia in these passages is like being stung by a 
stingray: he renders them numb, into a state of torpor: Meno and the slave-boy previously 
thought they had knowledge, Meno often speaking about it in front of large audiences (80b), 
before being perplexed by Socrates (80ab; 84b) and now having nothing to reply (80b; 82d; 
84b). The numbness also implied a sense of helplessness in not knowing which way to turn. 
None of these traits are present in the final passage. Socrates never claimed to know whether 
virtue could be taught; he claimed that it was impossible to answer that question without a ti 
esti, a Platonic definition, for virtue and this itself gives him the next step if he wants to carry 
on the inquiry. The similarity between Socrates’ aporia and Meno’s can be found in 
Socrates’ suspension of judgement until we have a ti esti: 
 
If all we have said in this discussion, and the questions we have asked, have been right, virtue 
will be acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine 
dispensation without taking thought…But we shall not get to the truth of the matter until, 
before asking how men get virtue, we try to discover what virtue is, in and by itself’ (Meno 
100b). 
 
However, this is quite different from the suspension of judgement that Meno is forced 
into by his aporia. In Meno’s case, he is unwilling to commit to any proposition, because he 
is perplexed by Socrates. In Socrates’ case, there is simply more work to do to complete the 
inquiry. The argument is inconclusive, rather than aporetic in the strict sense. How much of 
this inconclusiveness or aporia is due to the hypothetical method? We shall examine the 
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structure of the second part of Meno, arguing that this aporia is due to the empirical 
arguments that follow the hypothetical passage; the hypothetical passage itself merely renders 
the argument inconclusive rather than perplexing in the aporetic sense. 
In the discussion from 98d to the end, Socrates summarises the argument of more or 
less the whole second part of the dialogue (87b-98c). It is useful to note the main points in his 
summary, as we can see how the conclusions have been reached. Here are the steps in the 
argument, as summarised by Socrates (call this passage A): 
 
1. 98d. Socrates says: assuming that there are men good and useful to the community, it 
is not only knowledge that makes them so, but also right opinion, and neither of these 
comes by nature but both are acquired (referring to 96e-98d). That being so, goodness 
is a matter of teaching, if virtue is knowledge and conversely, if it can be taught, it is 
knowledge (he is referring to 87bd). 
2. 98de. Socrates says: Next, we decided that if there were teachers of it, it could be 
taught, but not if there were none (he is referring to 89d). 
3. 98e. Socrates says: But we have agreed that there are no teachers of it, and so that it 
cannot be taught and is not knowledge (he is referring to 89e-96d). 
4. 98e. Socrates says: At the same time, we agreed that it is something good, and that to 
be useful and good consists in giving right guidance (he is referring to 87d-89a).  
5. 99a. Socrates says: And that these two, true opinion and knowledge, are the only 
things which direct us aright (he is referring to 96d-98c). 
6. 99ab. Socrates says: Since virtue cannot be taught, we can no longer believe it to be 
knowledge, (he is referring to 89e-96d again) so that is not the guide in public life 
(95b). 
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7. 99c. Socrates says: The alternative is that it is well-aimed conjecture,241 which is no 
different from divine revelation.  
8. 99e. He concludes: On our present reasoning, whoever has virtue gets it by divine 
dispensation. 
 
How much of this argument is taken up with dianoetic reasoning and specifically the 
hypothetical passage? Meno formulates the problem that the argument is trying to solve at 
86cd: ‘are we to pursue virtue as something that can be taught, or do men have it as a gift of 
nature or how?’ That is, Meno wants to know if virtue is (a) teachable, (b) a gift of nature or 
(c) got by some other means. In the hypothetical passage, Socrates says that he is responding 
specifically to point (a): ‘let us use a hypothesis in investigating whether it is teachable or 
not’ (87b). 
I want to argue that the argument ends at 89a. This would make the structure of the 
hypothetical argument (including the enunciation at 87bc, but excluding the geometrical 
model at 86e-87b) as follows (call this passage B): 
 
1. 87b. Virtue is knowledge. 
2. 87c. Nothing is teachable except knowledge. 
3. 87c. If virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.  
4. 87c. This is the condition on which virtue is teachable.  
5. 87c. Is virtue knowledge? 
6. 87d. Virtue is good. 
7. 87d. If there is something good that is different from/not associated with knowledge, 
virtue is not necessarily a form of knowledge. 
                                                
241 Guthrie (1956) chooses the translation ‘conjecture.’ See the Republic section for a discussion of this. 
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8. 87d. If knowledge embraces everything that is good, virtue is knowledge. 
9. 87e. All good things are advantageous. 
10. 87e. So virtue must also be advantageous. 
11. 87e. Health, strength, good looks and wealth are all advantageous. 
12. 88a. But these things sometimes do harm. 
13. 88a. The thing that determines whether these things are advantageous or harmful is 
right use. 
14. 88a. Also consider spiritual qualities like temperance, justice, courage, quickness of 
mind memory, nobility of character. 
15. 88b. Also learning and discipline are profitable in conjunction with the right use, but 
without it, harmful. 
16. 88c. Everything that the human spirit undertakes is useful when guided by wisdom, 
harmful when not. 
17. 88cd. So if virtue is an infallibly beneficial attribute of the spirit, it must be wisdom. 
18. 88d. The same applies to the first class of things: right use makes them advantageous. 
19. 88d. The right user is the wise man. 
20. 88d. Goodness of non-spiritual assets depends on our spiritual character – and the 
goodness of that depends on wisdom. 
21. 89a. The advantageous element must be wisdom. 
22. 89a. Virtue is advantageous. 
23. 89a. So virtue is wisdom, either the whole or the part of it.  
 
This would mean that the hypothetical passage only covers steps one and four of 
Socrates’ summary. That is, goodness would be a matter of teaching, if virtue were 
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knowledge and if it could be taught, it would be knowledge; also virtue is something good, 
and that to be useful and good consists in giving right guidance.   
Following the hypothetical passage as I want to define it, there is a short passage that 
supports the argument (call this passage C). This correlates to the second part (b) of Meno’s 
formulation: whether virtue is a gift of nature:  
 
1. 89a. Socrates points out that, if his conclusion that virtue is wisdom is true, good men 
cannot be good by nature. 
2. 89b. There is another point: If good men were good by nature, there would be experts 
among us who recognised them from an early age, and removed them from bad 
influence. 
3. 89bc. If goodness does not come by nature (as in 89a), it is got by learning. 
4. 89c. Meno: this is an inescapable conclusion from the assumption: if virtue is 
knowledge, it is teachable. 
 
Most people think that this passage is part of the hypothetical passage: step four is 
usually tied to the original hypothesis. However, I want to argue that it is actually a short, but 
separate, empirical point that is meant support the hypothetical argument. In any case, it is 
strange that the argument should take such an empirical turn here and we should definitely 
not see this as superseding the previous passage. Rather, it is a separate response to a 
different part of Meno’s formulation of the problem at 86cd. 
To show that it really is a separate point, as Socrates claims, and not a continuation of 
the hypothetical argument, we should think about the method of reduction. In this case, we 
can see that passage C is superfluous to the hypothetical passage (passage B). Steps one to 
four of passage B set out the problem, and the conditions for which it is solvable 
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(enunciation); steps five-twenty three demonstrate the two lemmas, ‘virtue is knowledge’ and 
‘virtue is good.’ When he speaks at 89c (step three of passage C), Meno means that the 
conclusion of 89bc, that ‘if goodness does not come by nature, it is got by learning’ is an 
inescapable conclusion from the assumption ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable.’ That is, 
step one of passage C is not another lemma that requires demonstration in a series of 
reductions, but a separate observation inferred from the enunciation of the problem. 
We said that the form of apagōgē was as follows: 
 
Enunciation of the problem→lemma1→lemma2→lemma3→…Conclusion 
 
 Each lemma must be a reduction of the preceding problem to one that’s easier to 
solve, so in the case of the hypothetical passage in Meno, the problem, is virtue teachable? is 
reduced from ‘virtue is teachable’ to Lemma 1, ‘virtue is knowledge,’ which is in turn 
reduced to Lemma 2, ‘virtue is good.’ The conclusion, ‘virtue is advantageous (and thus 
good) supports Lemma 2, which in turn supports Lemma 1, and thus the statement that virtue 
is teachable. There is no need for a subsequent lemma, because the Lemma 2 is demonstrated 
by the conclusion. Therefore, step twenty-three of passage B is the end of the argument and 
step one of passage C is the beginning of a new argument.  
This means that we can safely say that the argument is passage B and ends at 89a for 
two reasons: first, passage C focuses on a different part of the problem, and second, it is 
superfluous to the argument of passage B. 
 The other distinctive feature of passage C is that, although it is inferred from the 
assumption ‘if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable,’ Socrates supports it with an empirical 
observation (step 2 in passage C). This should strike us as odd, partly because it is such a bad 
argument: it is not at all clear that if good men were good by nature, ‘there would probably be 
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experts among us who could recognise the naturally good at an early stage,’ and remove them 
from bad influence (89b and step 2 of passage C). Secondly, it is not clear why Socrates 
should resort to an empirical argument at all.  
The argument takes a stranger turn in the subsequent passage. Socrates does not 
withdraw the claim that, if virtue is knowledge, it must be teachable, returns to the problem 
formulated before the hypothetical passage at 86cd: is virtue teachable? This is done in 
another empirical argument. Let’s call the following passage D:   
 
1. 89de. If virtue (or anything) is teachable, there must be teachers and students of it 
(and conversely, if there are no teachers or students of it, it cannot be taught). 
2. 89e-96c. There are no teachers of virtue. 
3. 96c. Virtue is not teachable (and therefore not knowledge). 
 
Again, this seems strange, partly because of the poor quality of the argument.  
Firstly, it is not at all clear that if something is teachable, there must exist teachers of it (89de 
and step one of passage D). Secondly, the establishment of step two is sloppy and based on 
ad hominem attacks on the Sophists, which we will briefly summarize: 
Socrates begins cautiously, saying, 
 
All I can say is that I have often looked to see if there are any (teachers of virtue), and in spite 
of all my efforts I cannot find them, though I have had plenty of fellow-searchers, the kind of 
men especially whom I believe to have most experience in such matters (Meno 89d). 
 
Following this, Anytus joins the group. Socrates thinks him qualified to answer the 
question, as he is ‘a man of property and good sense, who…earned (his fortune) by his own 
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brains and hard work.’ He also shows himself to be ‘a decent and modest citizen, with no 
arrogance or bombast or offensiveness about him.’ He also brought up his own son well, and 
the Athenian people appreciate that. Socrates says, ‘this is the right sort of man with whom to 
inquire whether there are any teachers of virtue, and if so, who they are’ (90ab). 
Socrates and Anytus agree that, if you wish to learn an art, it would be foolish not to go to 
those who undertake to teach the art and are paid for it (90ce). Those who profess to teach 
virtue and are paid for it in Athens are the Sophists. We have already mentioned Plato’s 
attitude to the Sophists and his wish to disassociate Socrates from them, and Anytus’ reaction 
when Socrates refers to them as teachers of virtue. Anytus decided that any Athenian 
individual would be a better teacher of virtue than any Sophist, and they in turn learned it 
from other individuals (92e-93a). 
Then Socrates does a curious thing. In response to Anytus’ question, whether he would 
deny that there have been many good men in Athens, he says, yes, there have been many; but 
that is not the question. The question is,  
 
…have they (the good statesmen of Athens) also been good teachers of their own virtue? That 
is the point we are discussing now…whether virtue can be taught. It amounts to the question 
of whether the good men of this and former times have known how to hand on to someone 
else the goodness that was in themselves, or whether on the contrary it is not something that 
can be handed over, or that one man can receive from another.  
(Meno 93ab). 
 
According to this, the question of whether virtue can be taught amounts to the question of 
whether good men have been able to teach it or whether it is teachable; again it is not clear 
that these are the only two options. Worse, Socrates goes on to give particular examples of 
Themistocles and Lysimachus, Pericles and Thucydides, all of whom would have taught their 
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sons to be good men if it were possible, and goes on to conclude from this that virtue cannot 
be taught (93c-94e). 
He also speaks of a contradiction in the poetry of Theognis, which apparently shows that 
the poet contradicts himself as to whether virtue is teachable or not (‘for fine men’s teaching  
to fine ways will win thee’ as opposed to ‘no teachers’ skill can turn to good what was 
created ill’ 95d-96a). When people are so confused about a subject, says Socrates, they 
cannot be teachers in a true sense. In that case: 
 
…if neither the Sophists nor those who display fine qualities themselves are teachers of virtue, I 
am sure no one else can be, and if there are no teachers, there can be no students either…and we 
have agreed that a subject of which there were neither teachers nor students was not one which 
could be taught…so it would appear that virtue cannot be taught. 
(Meno 96bc). 
 
Let us enumerate the strange things about this passage. First, Socrates seems to endorse 
the claim that the question of whether virtue can be taught amounts to the question of 
whether it has been taught or whether it is teachable, when obviously there is the alternative 
that virtue could be teachable, but untaught.242 Second, Plato seems to want to influence the 
reader against the Sophists as teachers of virtue, in an ad hominem attack from Anytus.243 
Thirdly, he picks out examples of apparently good men, who apparently would have their 
sons tutored in virtue if it were possible – but the reader has no chance of evaluating this 
claim. Finally, he makes Socrates appeal to a contradiction in poetry, as though it were 
evidence one way or another about the teachability of virtue.244 
                                                
242 The fallacy of false alternatives, if we are to be uncharitable. 
243 Meno 91c-92c, quoted above. 
244 Cf Protagoras 338e-347a, in which Socrates and Protagoras spar over poetry.  
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 It is not controversial to say that passage D is not part of the hypothetical passage245: 
it is almost universally agreed to be an empirical argument that contradicts the claim that 
virtue is teachable. We have already argued that the passage ends at 89a, so on our reading, it 
is very much separate from the passage.  
On this reading, the second part of the Meno (87b-96c) runs as follows: 
 
1. The problem is formulated by Meno at 86cd: ‘are we to pursue virtue as something 
that can be taught (a), or do men have it as a gift of nature (b) or how (c)?’  
2. (Dianoetic) reply to the problem (passage B 87b-89a, including a model for the 
answer at 86e-87b and an enunciation in the style of the geometers at 87bc): virtue is 
knowledge, and therefore teachable. 
3. First empirical reply to the problem of 86cd (passage C, 89ac): virtue is not got by 
nature. 
4. Second empirical reply to the problem of 86cd (passage D, 89d-96c): virtue is not 
teachable. 
 
The first and second empirical arguments focus on two different parts of the question. 
The first seeks to demonstrate that virtue cannot be a gift of nature; the second seeks to 
demonstrate that it cannot be taught. Note that, although Socrates wonders if the lemma 
‘virtue is knowledge’ is correct at the beginning of the second empirical reply, that is not 
actually what is investigated. That is, is virtue teachable?246 I do not deny that Socrates thinks 
this amounts to the same thing: he says that nothing can be taught except knowledge (87b) 
                                                
245 Cf Robinson ([1953] pp.114-122), who points out that, after 89c, neither the word ‘hypothesis’ nor any other 
methodological remark occurs in the rest of the dialogue.  
246 To formulate the question, Socrates says, ‘if anything – not virtue only – is a possible subject of instruction, 
must there not be teachers and students of it?’ (89d); the question of whether virtue can be taught amounts to 
whether it has been taught (93b); there are neither teachers nor students of virtue, so it cannot be taught (96c). It 
is the teachability of virtue that is being investigated here, not its being knowledge. 
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and retains his commitment to, ‘if virtue is knowledge, it must be teachable’ (89d ). However, 
what we can say is that the second empirical reply is not a direct response to the hypothetical 
passage, but a completely fresh response to the original problem at 86bc. 
In the following passage (96d-98d, passage E, discussed below), we are told that the only 
alternative to acquiring virtue through nature or teaching is divine dispensation (99be) so ‘on 
our present reasoning, then, whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation’ (100b). 
However, this is not the final word, on the matter, as we still need a ti esti in order to inquire 
about virtue.  
I want to say that the aporia in this case is not the result of the hypothetical method, but 
of the juxtaposition of the two empirical arguments. On the reading I have presented, we have 
a single problem presented at 86bc and three completely separate responses to it. The 
hypothetical passage is an attempt to say something positive, and gives us the provisional 
truth that virtue is knowledge, and therefore teachable. The two empirical arguments that 
follow it seek to expose falsehood. It is their refutation of virtue as teachable and virtue as 
given by nature that leaves us with the inconclusive result.247 
Here, Plato shows us that it is empirical reasoning - not hypothetical reasoning - that 
results in aporia or inconclusiveness. It could be that Plato is trying to subtly show us the 
dangers of empirical arguments, and this certainly fits with the reading of the divided line 
passage that is presented in this project. What I do want to stress is that the apparent 
inconclusiveness of the Meno does not undermine the value of the hypothetical method; we 
have said something positive, if provisional, even though we need a ti esti to ‘get to the truth 
of the matter’ (100b). In this way, we do immediately see the virtue of Plato’s new method, 
and its potential to make progress in inquiry. 
                                                
247 If we do not see these arguments as separate, we run the risk of exposing Plato to the charge of denying the 
antecedent (that is, saying, if P, then Q. Not P. Therefore not Q.) Plato is NOT saying, ‘if virtue is knowledge it 
is teachable. It is not knowledge. Therefore it is not teachable.’ The principle of charity supports reading the 
arguments as separate, in addition to the textual reasons given above. 
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Chapter Five: Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno 
 
There is another relevant section of the Meno that we have yet to examine. This comes after 
the second empirical passage. It exploits the difference between knowledge and true belief, 
something that we will examine to a greater extent elsewhere, and relates to comments made 
in the hypothetical passage. Here, I just want to make two brief points: that the passage 
supports the reading that the Meno employs reduction, and that certainty is needed for a ti 
esti, and therefore for knowledge. 
After the second empirical response, the dialogue takes another turn. Socrates thinks that 
there is something that they have failed to perceive. Call this passage E: 
 
1. 96e. It is not only under the guidance of knowledge that human action is well and 
rightly conducted (as we said it was at 88a and 89bc in the hypothetical passage). 
2. 96e. Good men must be profitable and useful.  
3. 97a. They will be profitable and useful if they conduct our affairs aright. 
4. 97a. We were mistaken in insisting that knowledge was a sine qua non for right 
leadership (again, as opposed to 88a and 89bc). 
5. 97b. True belief is as good a guide for the purpose of right activity. 
6. 97bc. That is what was left out of the discussion on virtue (which took place at 88a-
89a). 
7. 98b. Therefore, knowledge and true belief are different. 
8. 98b. When true belief governs any course of action, it produces as good a result as 
knowledge. 
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9. 98bc. So for practical purposes, right opinion is no less useful than knowledge, and 
the man who has it is no less useful than one who knows. 
 
This passage seems to be a footnote to the hypothetical passage. That is, we said that 
knowledge was a sine qua non for right leadership, but in fact, it looks like true belief is also 
a good guide. In this case, some of the reasoning that follows the second lemma in the 
hypothetical passage is incomplete. In this case, the second lemma, ‘virtue is good’ is not an 
exact reduction of the first ‘virtue is knowledge,’ because virtue could still be good if it were 
true belief. This supports the fact that the method of the hypothetical passage is supposed to 
be reduction, because it shows that, at the time, Socrates meant the second lemma to be a 
reduction of the first.  
This does not refute the hypothetical argument tout court, but we still need something to 
show that ‘virtue is knowledge’ after all, which I suggest would be the ti esti that Socrates 
refers to at 100b. This supports my reading of the text, that the original lemma used in the 
hypothetical passage is a proxy for a ti esti, and can make some progress, but it is only a 
provisional step in the ascent to the highest form of knowledge. 
 The second thing that emerges from this passage is the distinction between knowledge 
and true belief. The distinction is made at 97ab, in which Socrates says that true opinion can 
be as good a guide as knowledge: 
 
If someone who knows the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, then when he goes there and 
takes others with him he will be a good and capable guide…but if a man judges correctly which is 
the road, though he has never been there and doesn’t know it, will he not also guide others 
aright?...And as long as he has correct opinion about which the other has knowledge, he will be 
just as good a guide, believing the truth but not knowing it. (Meno 97ab) 
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 Then we have a discussion about why knowledge is valued more highly than true 
belief, and what the difference might be (97c-98a). At first, Meno thinks that ‘the man with 
knowledge will always be successful, and the right opinion only sometimes’ 97c). However, 
Socrates points out that he will always be successful as long as he has the right opinion, and 
proposes his own solution, using the statues of Daedalus as an example: 
 
Perhaps you have not observed them in your country…if no one ties them down, (they) run 
away and escape. If tied, they stay where they are put (Meno 97d). 
 
This, explains Socrates, is how we account for the value of knowledge, as opposed to 
true belief: 
 
If you have one of his works untethered, it is not worth much: it gives you the slip like a 
runaway slave. But a tethered specimen is very valuable, for they are magnificent creations 
(Meno 97e). 
 
True opinions, says Socrates 
 
will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind, so they are not worth much until you 
tether them by working out the reason. Once they are tied down, they become knowledge, and 
are stable…What distinguishes one from the other is the tether’ (Meno 98a). 
  
What I do want to say is that, apart from being a footnote to the hypothetical passage 
as we argued above, this passage touches upon another relevant aspect of our inquiry. We see 
a kind of epistemological ascent from belief to knowledge, which will be helpful in placing 
mathematics on Plato’s epistemological scale. I said that a ti esti required certainty and an 
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account. On my reading of this passage, the ‘tethering’ is an important part of attaining this 
certainty, achieved by the mathematical method of reduction applied to philosophy. If we 
combine this reading of the Meno with my readings of the Republic and Phaedo, we see that 
mathematical reasoning is a way of progressing from opinion to knowledge. 
 
Section Three: The Phaedo 
 
Phaedo recounts a conversation between Echecrates and Phaedo in a remote Peloponnesian 
township, in which Phaedo describes Socrates’ last day in prison and death. Socrates chooses 
to spend his final hours in philosophical reflection, in particular ‘inquiring into our views 
about the future life, and trying to imagine what it is like’ (Phaedo 61e). His companions are 
a group of friends, including Phaedo, Simmias and Cebes. Plato is notable by his absence. 
Ostensibly, Phaedo can be read as a discourse on the immortality of the soul, in which 
Socrates attempts to persuade his friends of the fact of this immortality. In this dialogue, his 
interlocutors are largely sympathetic, wishing Socrates to be right, but critical, putting 
forward their own objections to safeguard the integrity of the argument. The internal dialogue 
begins with Socrates claims that the philosopher welcomes death (60a-69e). Suicide is to be 
avoided, because ‘we men are in the care of the gods’ (62b), but the philosopher does want to 
isolate himself from the body, as it is a source of hindrance to the philosopher (65b ff). 
Beauty itself and Goodness itself are apprehended by the soul, and in this, the body only acts 
as a restraint (67c). Therefore, death, as the release of the soul from the body, is to be 
welcomed. 
Cebes challenges Socrates to inquire into the verity of his claim that the soul 
continues to exist after death and retains its force of intelligence (70b). In response, Socrates 
offers the Argument from Opposites (70c-72e), in which he argues that everything comes to 
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be from its opposite. For something to become bigger, it must first have been smaller; being 
dead is the opposite of living, so they must come from one another. As dying is certain, not to 
admit that life follows from it is to contradict a law of nature. Therefore the souls of the dead 
exist. This argument is supplemented by the Theory of Recollection (72e-77a), in which it is 
argued that the soul exists prior to this life, on the grounds that we can recognise the standard 
of equality (or ‘all such things’ - 75c) even though all sensible objects fall short of it. 
Socrates says that if we combine the Argument from Opposites with the Theory of 
Recollection, we have proof that the soul will exist after death no less than before birth 
(77cd). 
Cebes is not satisfied with this as a proof, so there follows the Argument from 
Affinity (78b-79e). Socrates says that we need to consider what sort of thing it is that would 
naturally suffer the fate of being dispersed (78b). That is, naturally compound objects would 
suffer this fate, but the soul is more akin to uniform, inconstant and invisible entities. 
However, this argument still does not satisfy Simmias and Cebes, who each have an 
objection to Socrates’ theory (86ad; 87a-88b): Simmias proposes that the soul could be like 
an attunement of a musical instrument, which is also invisible, but which ceases to exist once 
the instrument is broken; Cebes proposes that maybe the soul is like a tailor, who outlasts the 
cloaks he makes for himself (with the exception of the last cloak), but who does die sooner or 
later. 
Socrates replies to Simmias that he would have to reject the theory of recollection in 
order for his account to be ‘harmonious,’ and that he has not picked a good analogy for the 
soul (92ac; 93ae);248 his response to Cebes is more complex. He gives an account of his 
intellectual development as a young man (96a-100a),  and his disappointment in the failure of 
the natural sciences to produce a teleological account of causation. Lacking a perfect solution 
                                                
248 Cf Scaltsas ([1990] pp. 110-119), for a discussion of this. 
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himself, he devised his own secondary approach to the problem, the hypothetical method, 
which he describes, and then applies to the question of the immortality of the soul (100a-
107a). Finally, Socrates gives a myth-like account of the nature of the universe and the soul’s 
prospects after death, before his final moments and death (107a-114d; 115b ff). 
 This is a summary of the apparent form and purpose of the Phaedo, but the dialogue 
has a lot more to tell us about method; in particular, the hypothetical method and the use of 
imagery in connection with it. Imaginative thought is not only appealed to,249 but also 
encouraged and praised.250 Moreover, not only do we have an extensive description of the 
method, but also examples of its application. We are told of the psychological elements of the 
method and given a description of the method by Socrates. Equally valuably, we see its 
application in Phaedo, and the interaction between imagery and hypotheses in the dialogue.  
 We should note that the hypothetical passage in the Phaedo is generally recognised to 
run from 100a-102e. However, some of its most important features are discussed and 
elaborated upon in other parts of the dialogue. Notably, the need for hypotheses to accord or 
harmonise with each other is discussed in 92b-c and the hypothetical method as a second best 
method is discussed at 85cd, using the same imagery.251 Moreover, the method can be seen to 
be applied throughout the dialogue as a whole.252 In particular, I want to argue that dianoetic 
reasoning takes place in the discussion before the ‘hypothetical passage,’ and the clearest 
example of the interaction between hypothesis and imagery occurs with the objections of 
Simmias and Cebes (Phaedo 84c-88a; 91c-d).  
                                                
249 I refer to the famous eschatological myth and the two images that are presented at objections by Simmias and 
Cebes; Cf Cebes’ comments at 87b: ‘…like Simmias I must have recourse to an image.’ 
250 I acknowledge the controversial nature of this comment. I refer to Socrates’ comments at 60e-61c, in which 
he describes how he has been practising arts other than philosophy in prison. More importantly, see again 
Socrates’ comments at 61e, where he recommends that someone in his position ‘inquires into the future, and 
tries to imagine what it is like.’ Finally, see the role of imagery in recollection, below. 
251 See Gallop’s (1980) translation of the Phaedo pp. 176-177. He notes of 99b6-d3 that here, Socrates is not 
expecting the kind of teleological explanation he once expected of Anaxagoras; rather this is an inferior kind of 
explanation; inferior, that is, to the teleological kind he expected from Anaxagoras, but superior to the kind that 
Anaxagoras actually provides, Gallop notes (and I wholeheartedly agree) that this passage should be taken in the 
spirit of Simmias’ remarks at 85cd.  
252 Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 119-183) has a good discussion of this. 
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These objections employ both hypotheses and images, fitting the criteria of dianoia, 
as described in the Republic, and also the initial stages of the hypothetical method as 
described in the ‘hypothetical passage’ of the Phaedo. This section will be split into three 
chapters: the first part will argue that it is dianoia that is employed in the objections of 
Simmias and Cebes; the second chapter will examine Socrates’ autobiography, arguing that 
Socrates’ rejection of the natural sciences also correlates with the divided line. The final 
chapter will examine the ‘hypothetical passage’ in more detail, and the implications for the 
connection between hypothesis and imagery in dianoetic reasoning. 
 
Chapter One: Dianoia and the Objections of Simmias and Cebes 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue two points: firstly that Plato intends parts of the 
Phaedo to be applications of the hypothetical method; secondly, that the objections of 
Simmias and Cebes fit Plato’s description of dianoetic reasoning in the divided line passage 
of the Republic and the early stages of the hypothetical method in the Phaedo. We shall 
consider the textual evidence that Plato wishes to present parts of the Phaedo as dianoetic 
reasoning. We shall point out that mathematics is presented in the dialogue as a model for 
philosophy, which is evidence for this because dianoetic reasoning in Plato’s epistemology is 
the method of the mathematicians applied to philosophy. However, it is also a second best to 
noēsis, and we shall also see that the dialogue is full of references to the method of the 
Phaedo as second best. There are also explicit comments made by Simmias that show that 
Plato sees at least Simmias and Cebes’ objections as the initial stages of the hypothetical 
method. 
 
i. Plato Wishes to Illustrate Mathematical Reasoning in the Phaedo 
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Like the Meno, the Phaedo is full of references to mathematics as a model for 
philosophy. The hypothetical passage is the most extensive of these, and will be discussed 
below, but we should first mention the others, as they give us a good idea of Plato’s 
confidence in the value of mathematics as an archetype in the dialogue as a whole.  
When the Theory of Recollection is introduced by Cebes, Simmias asks him to 
‘remind’ the group of the proof of the theory (72e-73a). Cebes makes two quick points before 
Socrates takes over the discussion: that someone could come to a correct conclusion (which 
requires perfect knowledge) if he was questioned in the right way, and that the way someone 
reacts when they are confronted with a diagram also proves this theory (73ab). Although 
mathematics is not directly mentioned, the use of τὰ διαγράµµατα immediately calls the 
discipline to mind. The combination of this with the reference to the method of questioning to 
draw out a correct conclusion strongly recalls the slave-boy passage of the Meno, in which 
Socrates uses a combination of the diagram and interrogation to draw out correct answers 
from the slave-boy (Meno 82b-85b). As we have seen, this passage in the Meno is part of the 
dialogues' wider endeavour to promote mathematics as a model for philosophical inquiry.  
Recollection is to be achieved (as least initially, given the absence of a more perfect 
method) through mathematical reasoning, as the hypothetical passage will explain later in the 
dialogue. This is consistent with the presentation in Meno, and anticipates mathematical 
thought as the beginnings of knowledge, as opposed to belief, in the Divided Line allegory in 
the Republic (509d-511e). Note in this passage that when Socrates takes up Cebes’ argument 
for Recollection in Phaedo, he expands upon the idea of visual prompts for recollection. His 
point starts with an appeal to the fact that when someone sees, hears or otherwise notices 
something, and becomes conscious of something else, he can be said to be reminded of that 
thing (73cd). When Socrates expands this point, he takes up the example of seeing, and says 
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that one could be reminded of a person by seeing an object that they own, or even a picture, 
ἰδóντα, of someone (or even to be reminded of something dissimilar - 73cd). Further, it is 
from seeing equal objects like stones and sticks that the notion of equality comes to mind 
(74b). Once again, recollection and mathematical reasoning begin with a sensible object and 
are realised through images. 
The other reference to mathematics as a model for philosophy in Phaedo comes in the 
discussion of Simmias’ image of the soul as an attunement. Once again, the reference is 
linked to the Theory of Recollection. Socrates points out that Simmias would not wish to say 
that the attunement existed before the musical instrument, so this means that the Attunement 
hypothesis does not ‘harmonise’ with the Theory of Recollection, because this theory states 
that the soul existed before the body Phaedo (92ac). Simmias agrees that he needs to reject 
one of the two claims, and rejects the attunement hypothesis, accepting the Theory of 
Recollection and giving the following reason: 
 
The other appealed to me, without any proof to support it, because it came with a certain 
likelihood and attractiveness; which is why it appeals to most people. But I realise that 
theories which rest their proof on likelihood are imposters, and unless you are on your guard, 
they deceive you properly, both in geometry and everywhere else. (Phaedo 92d). 
 
This has clear parallels with the Meno, in which Socrates illustrates the recollection of 
knowledge, which applies to ‘geometrical knowledge, and every other subject’ (Meno 
85e).253  Once again, the principles that apply to mathematical knowledge are used as a model 
for other kinds of knowledge. There are also parallels with the Theaetetus, when it is 
acknowledged that geometers would be considered worthless if they relied on likelihood is 
cited as a reason to prefer logic to probability (Theaetetus 162e-163a). In this passage also, 
                                                
253 Plato also does this at Meno 81d. 
 235 
the standards of mathematics are applied to philosophy, to determine what is acceptable as an 
argument. 
 
ii. The Hypothetical Method as a Second Best Method 
 
a. The Phaedo and Epistemological Pessimism 
 
Unlike the Meno and Theaetetus, which unambiguously stress the importance of the aporetic 
state for inquiry, Phaedo acknowledges the dangers of perplexity, while retaining some of the 
most important aspects of the psychological value of aporia. Plato acknowledges the 
vulnerability of the human psyche: it is as though within us there is a fearful child who needs 
reassurance. He makes this point when Socrates teases Simmias and Cebes for being afraid, 
‘as children are,’ (Phaedo 77d) that the soul will be scattered after death. Cebes replies, 
‘…not so much that it’s our true selves who are afraid – perhaps there’s a kind of child with 
this kind of fear hidden in us too. Try to convince him not to be afraid of death as though it 
were a bogey’ (77e). 
 The Phaedo also introduces the concept of becoming ‘misologic’ (89b-91c). This is 
introduced after the objections of Simmias and Cebes. Socrates is quick to recognise how this 
turn of discussion has affected the group (89a), which feels that its convictions have been 
upset and its confidence ‘not only in what had been said already, but also in anything that 
was to follow later’ (88c), and fears ‘that either we are incompetent judges, or these matters 
themselves are inherently obscure’ (88c). Even Echecrates, listening to Phaedo’s account of 
the conversation, shares their misgivings. He says, ‘How can we believe in anything after 
that?’ (88d). 
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 Recognising the psychological impact of these objections on the group, Socrates 
warns them against the danger of becoming ‘misologic’ in the same way that some people 
become misanthropic. After repeated disappointments in arguments, at the hands of his 
friends, a man might become irritated and begin to dislike everybody, and to loose faith in the 
existence of sincerity anywhere. The same thing can happen with a man’s faith in argument. 
If he believes that an argument is true without possessing any skill in logic, then later decides 
that it is false, then he repeats this pattern over and over, he might come to believe that there 
is nothing stable or dependable in arguments, and that everything fluctuates. Those who 
spend their careers arguing both sides of an argument, like the Sophists, are especially 
vulnerable to this charge,254 and may begin to believe that they are wiser than everyone else. 
Socrates urges the group not to ‘let it enter our minds that there may be no health in 
argument. On the contrary we should recognise that we ourselves are still intellectual 
invalids…’ (90de; compare this with 68a).  
 These passages are extremely telling in a number of ways when we think about the 
hypothetical method. The idea of a blank slate of aporia is still recognised as having 
cognitive value in the Phaedo, but Plato is acknowledging here that extreme doubt can also 
have negative effects. Given the fearful, childlike instincts we have when approaching 
arguments of vital importance, and given the human tendency to become mistrustful of 
argument, we should proceed with great self-awareness and an awareness of epistemological 
limitations. Bound as we are to the sensible world, we may never have the ability to produce 
infallible results, if we do not live as philosophers, as described in the opening section of the 
dialogue (63b-69e). An absolute truth about the matter may exist, but we ourselves may lack 
the capacity to reach it. Therefore, we should look towards improving ourselves, rather than 
giving up on the capacity of reason to find it. As in the Meno, Plato takes care here to 
                                                
254 Plato exposes this in Euthydemus. 
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distinguish between Socrates’ activity, and the Sophists, portraying the former as genuinely 
in search of the truth. 
Again and again, the impossibility of certainty in earthly inquiry is alluded to. Near 
the beginning of the dialogue, when the group discusses the philosopher as avoiding suicide 
but welcoming death, Socrates admits that ‘even my information is based on hearsay’ (61d). 
However, he goes on to develop the case that, in life, we are tied to the body, and with it, the 
experiences of the senses, which are actually a hindrance to rational inquiry. This is why the 
philosopher seeks to isolate himself from bodily concerns (65cd).  In fact,  
 
It’s likely…that the wisdom which we desire and upon which we profess to have set our 
hearts will be attainable only when we are dead, and not in our lifetime…either it is totally 
impossible to acquire knowledge, or it is only possible after death, because it is only then that 
the soul will be isolated and independent of the body. 
(Phaedo 66e-67a). 
 
This theme is continued throughout the dialogue, and is picked up by other speakers. 
When Simmias introduces his objection, he begins by saying,  
 
I think, just as you do, Socrates, that although it is very difficult if not impossible in this life 
to achieve certainty about these questions, at the same time it is utterly feeble not to use every 
effort in testing the available theories, or to leave off before we have considered them in 
every way, and come to the end of our resources.  
(Phaedo 85e). 
 
After the argument for the immortality of the soul is concluded, Simmias retains his 
doubts about the possibility of certainty, even in the face of a convincing argument. He says,  
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I have no doubts myself now, in view of what you have just been saying. All the 
same, the subject is so vast, and I have such a poor opinion of our weak human 
nature, that I can’t help still feeling some misgivings.  
(Phaedo 107ab). 
 
Socrates praises Simmias for this remark, saying that he is right to still have some 
misgivings, and that he and his friends must continue to search for the truth, ‘in so far as it is 
possible for the human mind to attain it’ (107b). He later reaffirms his own inability to speak 
with certainty on his theories about the earth (108de). 
Although extolling the virtue of reason, the Phaedo is nevertheless pessimistic about 
the possibility of pure rational inquiry in a man’s life, as least insofar as it yields certain 
results. It is often forgotten that the dialogue frequently appeals to divine revelation as 
superior to rational thought. This should seem strange to us, given that rational inquiry is 
Socrates’ preferred occupation during his last day on earth, and he holds it in such high 
esteem.  
Yet divine revelation is constantly cited as a greater source of certainty than rational 
thought. Socrates admits to writing poetry in obedience to a dream (60e-61b); Simmias refers 
to divine revelation as a surer means of ascertaining the facts than human intelligence (85c). 
Perhaps most strikingly, Socrates cites divine revelation as the basis for his belief in the 
immortality of the soul, in spite of the fact that he spends the day in rational discussion of the 
matter. In fact, divine revelation makes him invulnerable to the doubt that the rational 
objections that Simmias and Cebes might arouse. He says, 
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Evidently you think that I have less insight into the future than a swan… [They] know the 
good things that await them in the unseen world…I consider that I am no worse endowed 
with prophetic powers by my master255 than they are, and no more disconsolate at leaving this 
life (Phaedo 84e-85b). 
 
Although Socrates goes on to provide a response to his friends’ objections, his 
message is clear: their argument relies on uncertain means, and the divine revelation that he 
has received from Apollo supersedes the conclusions of rational thought, at least in the 
context of the present discussion. Reassured that what they have to say will not upset 
Socrates, ‘in his present misfortune,’ Simmias and Cebes are happy to make their objections 
(84d; 85b). 
We should be aware of the controversial nature of this claim: the Phaedo is often seen 
as a dialogue in which the virtues of rationality are valued above everything; after all the 
rational, philosophical life is upheld as the best preparation for death, and in fact the best way 
to live in the opening scenes of the internal dialogue. However, again and again we are 
cautioned against placing too much faith in the conclusions of such inquiry: until we either 
find an infallible method, or are blessed with divine revelation, all our conclusions are 
provisional. 
The Phaedo does not even seem to share the Meno’s optimism about the capacity for 
reason belonging to all people. While the slave-boy experiment of the Meno demonstrates 
Socrates’ conviction that we are all able to ‘recollect’ knowledge, the Phaedo seems to be 
more hesitant about attributing the capacity for rational inquiry to all people. Socrates says 
that ‘ordinary people’ do not seem to understand the philosopher’s endeavour (64a) and urges 
the group to ‘dismiss them and talk among ourselves’ (64c). 
                                                
255 Apollo. 
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This is a step towards the claim that Plato’s Socrates makes in the Republic, that not 
all of us have the right character to lead the philosophical life. Here, if we take Socrates 
seriously, we are not all cut out for the kind of reasoning that the philosopher needs to do. On 
the other hand, the Republic does seem to abandon the epistemological pessimism of the 
Phaedo: if the Philosopher Kings are to use their knowledge to rule wisely, we have to 
suppose that such knowledge is attainable during their lifetimes. Perhaps it is attainable to 
them because of the training they receive,256 which would not contradict the claim in the 
Phaedo that certain knowledge is unattainable to Socrates and his interlocutors, because they 
have not received such training.  
In the Republic section, I stressed that my reading of Plato’s epistemology gives us 
the most direct way of studying Forms that we can have in our lifetimes, and I promised that, 
in this section, I would expand on my point about Plato’s pessimism about the possibility of 
direct contact with the Forms before death. Here, I have tried to show that the presentation 
we are given in the Phaedo is that the group is unable to attain certain knowledge, and must 
resort to a more provisional, ‘second-best’ method, which is what I shall focus on next. On 
my reading of the Republic, this method provides the foundation for the best possible method 
that we are able to achieve in our lifetimes. A ti esti is the most direct way of studying a Form 
that we can achieve in our lifetimes, and a part of the teleological account that the Phaedo 
seems to require. Because our souls are bound by the senses in life, we need to proceed 
through a second-best way before we can achieve even this. 
 
 
b. The Second Sailing  
 
                                                
256 Or perhaps they have access to the method that Socrates was hoping to find in the works of Anaxagoras; see 
Phaedo 96a-99d for Plato’s hints about this. 
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This, then, is the psychological setting for the hypothetical method in Phaedo. The possibility 
of achieving certain knowledge is exceedingly slim, yet it would be ‘utterly feeble not to use 
every effort in testing the available theories (85c). The group must resort to a secondary 
approach, referred to explicitly and with strikingly similar imagery in two places in the 
dialogue.  
Simmias describes this first. He says that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible to 
achieve certainty about what happens to the soul after death, so we must do one of two 
things: ‘either ascertain the facts…or, if that is impossible, to select the best and most 
dependable theory that human intelligence can supply, and use it as a raft to ride the seas of 
life – that is, assuming that we cannot make our journey with greater confidence and security 
by the surer means of a divine revelation’ (85cd). 
Socrates’ use of the idea comes after his explanation of his disappointment with 
Anaxagoras’ idea of intelligence. As a young man, Socrates was keen to study causation, and 
had hoped to find some answers from a book of Anaxagoras’, which argued that Intelligence 
was the reason for everything. However, on procuring the book, Socrates was disappointed to 
find that Anaxagoras adduced reasons other than Intelligence for things, and that his 
explanation was quite insufficient. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, Socrates has 
worked out his own ‘secondary approach (99cd)’ deuteros plous, a secondary approach, or 
literally a ‘second sailing’ when there is no firm starting point to attain knowledge. This 
approach is the hypothetical method.  
The striking similarity of Socrates and Simmias’ remarks cannot be overlooked: both 
refer explicitly to a second best method and both use the same metaphor of sailing. Simmias 
makes his comments by way of introduction to his and Cebes’ objections, showing that these 
objections employ the same methodology that Socrates describes. 
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Second Sailing as Second Best? 
 
In noting Plato’s apparent epistemological pessimism in the Phaedo, we should be careful not 
to overlook Plato’s steps towards epistemological progress: after all, the Phaedo does portray 
Socrates as eager to make as much progress towards knowledge as possible. In this segment, 
I shall expand upon what I mean by saying that the second sailing is a ‘second best’ method – 
as I go on to explain in Section Three, Chapter Two ii, some people (for example Byrd [2007 
pp.141-158]) reject this translation, so here, I shall explain what I mean.  
The first thing to say is that Socrates’ secondary approach is secondary not to 
Anaxagoras’ disappointing theory, but to the approach that Socrates had initially hoped to 
find. That is, Socrates feels that his method is an improvement on that of Anaxagoras.257  His 
metaphor of deuteros plous or ‘second sailing’ implies a more laborious means of getting to 
one’s destination (although it does not necessarily imply that there is less likelihood of 
getting to one’s destination).258  We also have contextual evidence to show that Socrates feels 
his method is ‘second best’: he tells Cebes that “what you require is no light undertaking, 
Cebes. It involves a full treatment of the reasons for generation and destruction (95e-96a).” 
He had hoped for this from Anaxagoras, but was disappointed (96a-99d). Having been unable 
to discover the best approach, Socrates adds, “I’ve worked out my own secondary approach 
to the problem” (99cd). I argue in Section Three, Chapter Two i that Socrates is looking for a 
teleological explanation as the best account. I also propose that teleological explanations can 
                                                
257 I have already (in the introduction to Section Three) referred to and agreed with Gallop’s (1980) translation 
of the Phaedo (pp. 176-177) in which Gallop remarks that Socrates’ secondary approach is not the kind of 
explanation he once expected of Anaxagoras. Rather, it is an inferior kind of explanation to the teleological kind 
he expected from Anaxagoras, but superior to the kind that Anaxagoras actually provides. See also Burger 
([1984] pp. 144-147) for another view that supports the reading of Socrates’ deuteros plous as the ‘second-best 
alternative’ (p. 144): Burger argues that it is a complementary, not compromising alternative. 
258 According to Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon, deuteros plous is ‘the next best way.’ This does not 
necessarily imply failure to reach the destination, rather a more laborious means of arriving. Dorter (1982) also 
agrees that deuteros plous “suggests that Socrates’ ultimate destination remains the same, the discernment of the 
teleological cause, and only the means of approaching it has changed…the alternative approach turns out to be 
the metaphor of hypothesis…” (p. 120). 
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be built with the ti estis that result from the hypothetical method, so Socrates’ secondary 
approach, although more laborious, and secondary in the sense that the explanations it 
initially produces are not teleological, does not prohibit the philosopher from reaching the 
desired destination in the end. 
I argue that Socrates’ method is the initial stages of dialectic, and covers the dianoia-
noēsis transition. This is not Socrates’ ‘best method,’ but it allows the philosopher to get to 
the destination in a way in which it can be done in the absence of the best method. As a result 
of this method, the philosopher will have the tools she needs to arrive at the destination for 
which Socrates initially set out. That is, she will have attained an understanding of teleology. 
Having done so, she may then use the ‘best’ method, to approach questions like the one 
Cebes asks Socrates about the immortality of the soul, and which Socrates restates at Phaedo 
95bd. The deuteros plous, I argue, allows Socrates to generate ti estis about the thing to be 
investigated. Sufficient ti estis will enable the philosopher to gain an understanding of 
teleology. Therefore, although the deuteros plous is not the direct approach that Socrates had 
hoped for, it by no means prohibits the philosopher from getting to the desired destination.  
This process has two phases: firstly, the use of the deuteros plous, or the hypothetical 
method, generates true statements about the Form we are investigating, the kind of definition 
upon which the Socrates of the early dialogues famously insists. We actually see this 
happening in the Phaedo. As I shall discuss in the following segment, from Phaedo 102a – 
107a, during the process of reducing the problem of whether the soul is immortal to the 
hypothesis that Forms exist, and in the subsequent steps, Socrates generates a series of other 
statements about the soul: Soul must be present in a body to make it alive (105dc); when soul 
takes possession of a body, it always brings living with it (105d); soul will never admit the 
opposite to that which accompanies it (105d); the soul is undying (105e); when death 
approaches, the soul retires and escapes unharmed and indestructible; our souls will really 
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exist in the next world (106e-107a). Socrates’ ‘second best’ method has thus generated at 
least one approximation (which can be improved and made fuller by further argument) of a ti 
esti for the soul. 
The second phase (which goes beyond the hypothetical method but which has been made 
possible because of it) is the generation of the teleological account. As I argued in Section 
One, Chapter 4. ii, the nature of the ti estis collected in the initial stages of dialectic allows us 
to build the teleological account that Socrates seeks in the Phaedo. This is because a good ti 
esti will allow Socrates to see connections between the properties of the Form, and its 
connection to other Forms (and ultimately to the Form of the Good), especially once this 
method has been applied to several problems, leading to several, interconnected ti estis. The 
generation of true statements about the definiendum results in understanding, and will allow 
us to make connections between the definiendum and other Forms.259  This is comparable to 
Fine’s account of teleology: she describes the Form of the Good as ‘the teleological structure 
of things; individual Forms are its parts, and particular sensible objects instantiate it' (Fine 
[1999] p 228).   
This process of collecting ti estis will lead to the teleological account that Socrates is 
looking for. That is, the end of the ‘upward path’ in the Republic’s method of dialectic. The 
ascent moves from hypotheses to ti estis to teleology and the Form of the Good. The ‘way 
down,’ I argued (and will continue to argue in Chapter Three of this section) is not 
symmetrical to the upward path, but comes after reaching Socrates’ unhypothetical beginning 
(the Form of the Good): the philosopher provides the kind of teleological accounts that 
Socrates is ideally looking for in the Phaedo. This reading also avoids the problem that there 
is nothing left for the way down after the triumph of the ascent: on my reading, the way down 
builds on the way up to give a completely different kind of explanation (the ‘best’ method), 
                                                
259 For example, the longest description of a Form we have is that of the Form of Beauty in the Symposium 
(210e- 211e). I already mentioned in the Republic section that this account enables us to see connections 
between the properties of the Form, and its connection to other Forms, for example the Form of Love. 
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this time with reference to the Form of the Good. In this way, although I am limiting my 
reading of the deuteros plous to the initial stages of dialectic, the method does not fall short 
of reaching the desired destination, because it eventually results in a collection of ti estis, 
which will allow us to build the teleological account that Socrates initially wanted. It is 
‘second best’ because it is more laborious, and because the initial explanations it produces are 
not teleological, but Plato’s epistemological scheme allows the philosopher to progress to this 
kind of explanation as she surpasses the initial stages of dialectic. 
 
iii. More Textual Evidence for Dianoia in Phaedo 
 
As we have seen, Simmias’ comments when he introduces the Attunement Hypothesis 
anticipate Socrates’ remarks at 99cd. Socrates’ response to Simmias involves a discussion of 
what is required for the harmonious coexistence of separate hypotheses. The metaphor of the 
Attunement hypothesis ‘harmonising’ with the Theory of Recollection is key here, because it 
anticipates the metaphor of accord in the discussion of the hypothetical method in the 
following passages (100a; 101d ). In the latter, Socrates says, 
 
…I first lay down the theory which I judge to be the least vulnerable; and then whatever 




If anyone should question the hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and refuse to answer 
until you could consider whether its consequences were mutually consistent (συµφωνεῖν) or 
not (Phaedo 101d). 
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 Both Socrates’ response to Simmias’ Attunement hypothesis and his remarks on 
συµφωνεῖν, or accord, in the hypothetical passage, relate to the question of how two claims 
can coexist with each other. The latter, as a response to Cebes’ Tailor Theory, is an expansion 
on the former. Therefore, it is more evidence that Plato intends for these objections to be the 
early stages of the hypothetical method, and therefore, dianoia. 
We should also not forget that Simmias and Cebes are Pythagoreans. As such, they 
are dedicated to the pursuit of mathematics, and, according to Plato’s epistemology, must 
base their reasoning on the use of hypothesis and imagery. Most tellingly, 87b allows the 
inference that both the Attunement and Tailor as images; Attunement is explicitly called a 
hypothesis (94b) and the Tailor also involves a hypothesis. 
This tells us that what Simmias and Cebes are about to embark upon are the initial 
stages of the hypothetical method: dianoia. This is a secondary, imperfect method that we 
should use in the absence of certain knowledge, until we have ‘come to the end of our 
resources’ (85c). In the initial stages, we shall argue, in which there are no ti esti answers to 
help us in our inquiries, these resources might include such imperfect tools as imagery. 
 
 
iv. The Objections of Simmias and Cebes and the Divided Line 
 
I suggested that Plato intends some of the arguments from the Phaedo to be examples of 
dianoia. That is, strong references to mathematics as a model for inquiry, the epistemological 
pessimism about attaining absolute knowledge and explicit textual references that link the 
Attunement and Tailor Hypotheses to the initial stages of dianoia. The purpose of this section 
will be to examine these passages in detail, showing how the arguments follow the criteria set 
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out for dianoia in the divided line passage. Following this, we shall examine the implications 
of this for the role played by the image in hypothetical reasoning. Firstly, we need an account 
of the passages in question. 
Simmias’ objection is that the things that have been agreed upon about the soul could 
also be said of the attunement of a musical instrument. It is something invisible, incorporeal, 
splendid and divine, and located in the instrument, as the soul is located in the body. The 
body, on the other hand, is like the instrument: corporeal, composite, earthly and closely 
related to what is mortal. However, if the instrument is broken, or if the strings are cut, or 
snapped, the attunement is destroyed. Simmias says that if the soul really is such an 
attunement (as contemporary theories said it was, and as is consistent with Socrates’ 
reasoning from the Argument from Affinity), it must be a blending of those things that keep 
the body in tension (‘hot and cold, dry and wet, and the like’ [86a]). It then follows that the 
soul will be destroyed when the body dies (85e-86d). The question of whether there are 
varying degrees of attunement is unresolved. 
Cebes’ objection is a little different. He is satisfied with the proof that the soul existed 
before birth, and willing to concede that it is stronger and more durable than the body. 
However, this does not mean that the soul is immortal: 
 
Suppose an elderly tailor has just died. Your theory would be just like saying that the man is 
not dead, but still exists somewhere safe and sound; and offering as proof the fact that the 
cloak which he had made for himself and was wearing was still intact. 
 
Cebes says that the same analogy could apply to the relation of the soul to the body: 
the soul could be superior to the body, and longer-lived, even ‘wearing out’ a number of 
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bodies, but at some point, one of these bodies will be its last.260 In this case, no-one has a 
right to face death ‘with any but a fool’s confidence, unless he can prove that the soul is 
absolutely immortal and indestructible’ (88b).  
These objections make a big impression on the group. The interlocutors are quite 
depressed after hearing them, and Echecrates, hearing Phaedo’s account, interjects to say that 
he sympathises with their misgivings. He asks for another proof, ‘right from the beginning,’ 
once again emphasising the ‘blank slate’ element involved in using hypotheses, which we 
noted in the Chapter on the Meno. Socrates’ first response is to say that Simmias’ objection 
does not ‘harmonise’ with what has previously been agreed upon, but then he goes on to 
respond in a way that tells us a great deal about Plato’s use of imagery in this kind of 
argument. 
 Socrates evaluates the fit of the attunement hypothesis as a model for the soul.261 He 
identifies the following properties of an attunement: it should not be in a condition different 
from its composite elements; it should not control its elements, but should follow their lead; it 
should not conflict with its elements in any way; there are varying degrees of attunement and 
there is no such thing as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ attunement in the moral sense. Socrates and 
Simmias agree that the varying degrees of attunement cannot correlate to the quantity of 
goodness or badness in the soul. Moreover, the soul does not possess the other properties 
associated with attunement – it does not follow the lead of its elements, for example, so 
‘there is no justification for our saying that the soul is a kind of attunement’ (94e-95a). 
 Socrates’ response to Cebes’ objection is that a full treatment of the reasons for 
generation and destruction is required. He goes on to give an intellectual autobiography and 
an account of the hypothetical method, but he does not criticise Cebes’ choice of image as a 
bad model for the soul as it has been conceived at this point. Also, he does not say that it 
                                                
260 In the examination of this argument, the definition of death changes from ‘the separation of the soul from the 
body’ to ‘the extinction of the soul’ (see Phaedo 87e and 95d). 
261 Scaltsas ([1990] pp.110-119) discusses this point. 
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contradicts any other hypothesis that has already been accepted in the way that the 
Attunement hypothesis contradicts the Theory of Recollection (we shall discuss the fact that 
the latter is also a hypothesis in the following section).  
Ιn the rest of this section, we shall examine the Attunement and Tailor hypotheses 
more closely, looking at the role the images play in the argument. We shall identify these 
passages as part of the beginnings of dianoetic thought, as described in Plato’s divided line of 
the Republic, and as such, we shall begin to understand why sometimes the philosopher must 
resort to images at this stage, as he does not have access to the ti esti definitions that are 
available to him as he ascends the epistemological hierarchy. 
When we summarised the divided line passage, we saw that dianoia is intelligible, but 
has the following features: the mind is forced to use the objects of pistis as illustrations, it 
uses assumptions, it does not proceed to a first principle, and it is coherent. We shall see that 
the objections of Simmias and Cebes share all of these properties. 
 
a. Originals Used as Images 
 
As we saw, the one of the first things that Socrates tells us about dianoia in the Republic is 
that ‘the originals of the visible order’ are used as images, and that its inquiries are based on 
assumptions262 proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion (Republic 510b). 
 If we look at the metaphysics of the Phaedo, we see that Simmias and Cebes are 
doing exactly this: using the originals of the visible order as images. Forms have already been 
introduced in the Phaedo in Socrates’ defence of his readiness to die. There is such a thing as 
justice itself, beauty itself and goodness itself – but these things are not apprehensible to the 
senses, which is why the philosopher attempts to proceed through the intellect (65d-66a). 
                                                
262 ὑπóθεσις. 
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This is developed in the Argument from Affinity, in which ‘the actual nature of things’ is 
described as inapprehensible ‘except by the workings of the mind’ (79a3).  
 However, it is not Forms that are used in the objections of Simmias and Cebes, but 
images of the sensibles. The musical instrument, tailor and coat are all things belonging to the 
sensible world.263 The group is not actually investigating these images, rather, the images are 
used in the discussion to investigate what is “invisible except to the eye of reason” (Republic 
511a).264 
 
b. Hypotheses as Starting Points 
 
The next feature of dianoia mentioned by the divided line is that the mathematician starts 
from the hypothesis that the mathematical objects exist, without feeling the necessity to 
explain them. In the Republic section, we argued that ‘explaining them’ would begin with 
giving ti esti answers to the question of what they are; something that is absent from dianoia. 
Again, note the similarity with the methodology in the Phaedo: we do not have a ti esti 
answer to the question, ‘what is the soul?’ Thus, we are forced to begin from hypotheses: that 
the soul is like an attunement, or like a tailor. 
Recalling conversations in previous dialogues, in which Socrates is reluctant to 
investigate the properties of an object without such an answer, it seems strange that Socrates 
is happy to spend his last day on earth investigating this question at all.265 From a dramatic 
point of view, we could note that, with just one day remaining in his life, Socrates does not 
have time to investigate both the ti esti and hopoion properties of the soul.  
                                                
263 Attunement is a little different, given that it is ‘invisible and incorporeal’ (85e) (the reason, in fact, that it was 
picked for the example in the first place). However it nonetheless falls short of ‘attunement itself’ because we 
are arguing about a particular example of an attuned instrument, not ‘the actual nature of things. 
264 As we noted in Section one, this is Lee’s translation of τῆι διανοίαι. 
265 For Socrates’ wish for a ti esti, see Meno 70b-71d, 80cd, 86ce. 
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Some have suggested that Plato nevertheless implicitly makes the point that arguing 
from property to property without a ti esti results in a total lack of conviction, and that this is 
the function of the Argument from Affinity (Tarrant [1993] p 136). Whatever the reason, by 
the time Simmias and Cebes come to make their objections, there is still no agreement upon 
what the soul actually is. As Cebes says, ‘It seems to me that the argument is just where it 
was’ (86e). Simmias has already acknowledged the need to employ the second best method 
(later to be called the hypothetical method), and his ‘harmony’ image is twice called a 
hypothesis (93c and 94b). In the absence of a ti esti for the soul, Simmias and Cebes must 
begin from assumption and, like the dianoeticians of the Republic, they ‘must have recourse 
to an image’ (87b) 266  
 
c. Proceeds to a Conclusion 
 
Next, says the divided line passage, the mathematician proceeds ‘through a series of 
consistent steps to the conclusion which they set out to find’ (Republic 510d). If we look at 
the structure of the arguments, we shall see that these objections do proceed downwards to a 
conclusion, but not ‘from assumption to a first principle which involves no assumption’ 
(510b), as would happen in noesis. 
First of all, Simmias’ objection: 
 
1. The attunement and the soul share the properties of invisibility, being incorporeal, 
splendid and divine, and being located in the tuned instrument (Phaedo 85e-86a). 
2. The musical instrument and the body share the properties of being material, 
corporeal, composite, earthly and closely related to what is mortal (Phaedo 86a). 
                                                
266 Compare this with Republic 510d. 
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3. Suppose that the instrument is broken, or its strings cut or snapped (Phaedo 86a). 
4. According to the Argument from Affinity (78b-79e), the attunement must still 
exist (Phaedo 86a). 
5. The body is taken to be a balance of the extremes of the body combined in the 
right proportion (in the Greek world) (Phaedo 86bc). 
6. But an attunement, like all things that are a balance of physical constituents, is the 
first thing to be destroyed in such a case (Phaedo 86cd). 
7. Therefore the soul is the first thing to be destroyed when the body dies (Phaedo 
86d). 
 
From the hypothesis that the soul is a kind of attunement, we proceed to the 
conclusion that it is the first thing to be destroyed when the body dies; but the argument does 
not (at this point) go past the hypothesis to a first principle which involves no hypothesis. 
Next, Cebes problem: 
 
1. Suppose that an elderly tailor has just died (Phaedo 87b). 
2. According to the Argument from Affinity, we would have to say that the tailor exists 
somewhere safe and sound, offering as proof the fact that his coat is still intact 
(Phaedo 87b). 
3. The proof would rest on the fact that tailors are generally more enduring than coats 
(Phaedo 87bc). 
4. But the tailor may outlast any number of coats; nevertheless he perishes before the 
last one; this does not mean that he is lowlier or frailer than a coat Phaedo (87cd). 
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5. If we apply this analogy to the relation of the soul to the body, even if we admit that 
the soul may ‘wear out’ a number of bodies, there is no justification for any 
confidence in the view that the soul continues to exist after death (Phaedo 87de). 
 
Again, Cebes’ argument begins from the hypothesis that the soul shares the same 
properties as the tailor, and proceeds to the conclusion that that, at some point, the soul will 
perish. However, the argument does not go beyond this hypothesis to a higher principle.  
We should note that these hypotheses are true hypotheses in the sense that the 
interlocutors are allowed to break the (early/historical) Socrates’ ‘say only what you believe’ 
rule. We noted that, in the Meno, Socrates and Meno proceed by assuming hypotheses to 
which they do not necessarily subscribe. In the Phaedo, also, the ‘say only what you believe’ 
rule is abandoned. Simmias and Cebes do not actually subscribe to the Attunement and Tailor 
hypotheses; they offer them as problems that need to be solved in order to make Socrates’ 
argument sound. Simmias even admits that the Attunement hypothesis appealed to him 
without any proof to support it (92cd); Cebes puts forward the Tailor hypothesis to illustrate a 
weakness in Socrates argument without having to admit to it as an accurate description of the 
soul (86e-87a). 
In fact, Cebes’ objection makes it clear that the image is a valuable thought 
experiment regardless of how much of the theory one subscribes to: he says, ‘suppose that 
one conceded even more to the exponent of your case, granting not only that our souls existed 
before our birth, but also that some of them may still exist when we die…’ (88a). This shows 
that the method does not depend upon starting from secure knowledge; we may proceed from 
an hypothesis to the conclusions, without actually believing in that hypothesis in the first 
place. 
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Alex Long believes that the breaking of this rule plays an important role in the nature 
of the Phaedo. He says that here, Socrates’ interlocutors take it upon themselves to speak for 
positions that they themselves do not endorse (or, in Simmias’ case, do not wholeheartedly 
endorse). The difference here, Long believes, is that, as collaborative critics, they are entitled 
to do this, and break the ‘say only what you believe’ rule of the early dialogues.267 As we 
noted in the Meno section, the breaking of this rule is a central part of the hypothetical 





The passage in the Republic says that the mathematician proceeds ‘through a series of 
consistent (my emphasis) steps to the conclusion which they set out to find.’ (510d.). The 
idea of consistency is fundamental to the hypothetical method, and an important feature in 
how the objections of Simmias and Cebes fit in with what Plato is trying to do. We have 
already noted, above, that the metaphor of συµφωνεῖν, accord, occurs twice in the 
hypothetical passage of the Phaedo, and is strongly connected to Socrates’ refutation of 
Simmias’ ‘harmony’ objection in the preceding arguments. This is one of the features that 
illustrate Plato’s intention to show dianoetic reasoning in the objections of Simmias and 
Cebes. We shall see that the image actually plays a role in evaluating the consistency of 
propositions in the method.  
 Firstly, let us consider what Plato means for the steps to accord or harmonise, looking 
at both passages. Richard Robinson argues that there are only two conceivably interpretations 
for the metaphor: either ‘to accord with’ means ‘to be consistent with’ or ‘is deducible 
                                                
267 Long ([2008] pp. 45-59). 
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from/entailed by.’268 He thinks that, even though we are not justified in accepting every 
proposition that is consistent with our hypothesis, this is better than setting down as false 
every proposition that is not deducible from it. Therefore, he treats the metaphor as meaning, 
‘to be consistent with’ in the literal sense. 
 However, Bailey has another interpretation.269 He thinks that consistency is a 
necessary condition for a proposition to justify the use of συµφωνεῖ, but this is not sufficient. 
If a proposition is entailed by a hypothesis, this is sufficient, but not necessary. He says that 
συµφωνεῖν lies between consistency and entailment. 
 In proposing a solution, Bailey takes the musical metaphor seriously, underlining that, 
in Greek musical theory, musical systems are structured significantly. The pitches in a 
harmony come together to form a unity. When the notes are in the ratio 
(logos) 2:1, 3:2 or 4:3, they come together to make accord. The notes in a harmony that do 
not have this ratio do not form a unity. Bailey thinks that we can make an analogy between 
this relationship in music and that which is implicated in the metaphor of accord. Rather then 
a musical unity, the hypothetical method requires a theoretical unity. Bailey supports his case 
with literary and historical evidence,270 as well as a careful philosophical examination of the 
text and themes. He thinks that this explanation means that the method is genuinely heuristic, 
as it means that you can proceed without having the right answers.  
 Elsewhere, Plato links the idea of accord with mathematics. In the Republic section, I 
quoted this passage from the Cratylus when I was discussing foundationalism in Greek 
mathematics: 
  
The name-giver might have made a mistake at the beginning and then forced the other names 
to be consistent (symphōnein) with it. There would be nothing strange in that. It is just that 
                                                
268 Robinson ([1953] Ch. 9 pp. 123-145); See also Kahn ([1996] pp. 313-320) for a similar argument. 
269 Bailey ([2005] pp.95-115); Cf Gentzler ([1991] pp. 265-276) for a similar point. 
270 He mentions the many references to Apollo, for example. See Phaedo 58c, 60d, 85b.  
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way sometimes in geometrical constructions: given the initial error, small and unnoticed, all 
the rest that then follow are perfectly consistent (homologein) with one another. That’s why 
every man must think a lot about the first principles of anything and investigate them 
thoroughly to see whether or not it’s correct to assume them. For if they have been adequately 
examined, the subsequent steps will plainly follow from them.  
(Cratylus 436cd). 
 
 In this case, Plato is associating the mathematical process of drawing conclusions 
with the metaphor of accord. In this case, he needs a process that can apply to names and the 
connection between them (which would imply consistency) and geometry (which would 
apply deduction), as well as to other subjects.271 In which case, I would argue, Plato does not 
require a fixed intermediate between consistency and entailment, but a flexible one, to allow 
for the difference in subject-matter. As we have seen, Plato’s terminology is notoriously 
vague.272 What is clear is that, although symphōnein is important, it is only part of the process, and 
its value is dependent on the archai that produce it.  
 At this point in the dialogue, we do not have a Theory of the Soul, at least in the sense 
that Plato would wish, because for Plato, a theory requires a ti esti definition.273  The images 
of Cebes and Simmias provide a substitute for this. By using images, they are able to 
postulate that the soul behaves in a particular way, because the properties of the image 
provide the next steps in the argument in a way that ‘harmonises’ with the hypothesis. So 
Simmias uses the properties of an attunement to show that, on this model, the soul would be 
destroyed along with the body.  
In addition, the images provide us with the means to criticise them as suitable 
theories: we can see what does not accord with them. Socrates is able to show that the Theory 
                                                
271 See White ([1976] pp. 74-75) for the connection between Forms and names in the Phaedo and the Cratylus, 
and the argument for a ‘semantic consideration’ in Phaedo. 
272 See Sayre ([1969] pp.15-40, especially pp.39-40) for the view that Plato is deliberately vague here. 
273 See the Republic section. 
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of Recollection does not accord with the hypothesis that the soul is a kind of attunement, 
because an attunement does not have the property of existing before the instrument.274 Cebes’ 
image allows him to show that Socrates’ remarks on the longevity of corpses in Egypt (80c) 
do not add anything to his proof of the immortality of the soul. He uses the tailor’s property 
of being more enduring than his coats to show that being more enduring does not mean being 
immortal. 
When we look at the ‘hypothetical passage’ of the Phaedo, we shall come across the 
idea of postulating a higher hypothesis, which moves the argument on and, as we argued in 
the Republic section, is a way of moving from dianoia to noesis. Images do not perform this 
role, but they do stand in as substitutes for ti esti answers and theories. They are, like 
hypotheses, means of ‘testing the available theories,’ (85c) as well as provisional means of 
exploring a topic for which a theory, or a ti esti, is not yet available. 
 
Chapter Two: Socrates’ ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ 
 
Socrates’ answer to Cebes’ objection, and his description of the hypothetical method, 
is introduced by the story of Socrates’ own philosophical journey. In one of Plato’s most 
touching passages, we are taken from Socrates youthful passion for (and subsequent 
disappointment in) the natural sciences to his own formulation of a ‘second best’ method.  
As a response to Cebes’ objection, Socrates says that what is required of a response to 
Cebes is no light undertaking: 
 
                                                
274 See Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 119-139) and Gallop ([1965] pp.113-131) for support for the argument that this 
feature makes the passage part of the hypothetical method. 
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It involves a full treatment of the reasons for generation and destruction. If you like, I will 
describe my own experiences in this connection; and then, if you find anything helpful in my 
account, you can use it to reassure yourself about your own objections. 
(Phaedo 96a). 
 
Socrates is not presenting his response as a universal answer to Cebes’ concerns; 
rather his reply is a form of intellectual autobiography, which Cebes may use to rebut his own 
objections. Plato’s character Socrates places himself in intellectual history before going on to 
tell us about his new method. Socrates’ intellectual autobiography draws heavily on 
mathematical thought, and has been compared to Descartes’ Discourse on the Method as an 
attempt to pioneer a new philosophical approach.  
The problem for this chapter will be to explain how this approach fits into Plato’s 
epistemological scheme as we have described it. After rejecting the natural sciences as 
inadequate to attain knowledge, Socrates advocates an approach inspired by mathematics as a 
stepping-stone to the perfect method. I shall argue that this represents a move from pistis to 
dianoia on the divided line. As I argued in the Republic section, pistis is drawing conclusions 
from observations of the physical world, whether that is from natural phenomena, or 
observations of human actions to draw conclusions about morality. The tools of pistis are 
physical objects, and it is this reliance on the physical world to produce explanations that 
Socrates is criticising here. Socrates’ intellectual autobiography is also the story of his 
mathematical journey away from pistis, into the world of the Forms. 
 
i Early Enthusiasm and Disappointment 
 
Socrates begins by giving an account of his own youthful enthusiasm for the natural 
sciences, describing his ‘extraordinary passion’ for them, and his hopes that they would 
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explain to him the reasons for which each thing comes and ceases and continues to be. Menn 
([2010] pp. 37-68) points out that this introduces the first of two groups of objections to the 
natural sciences: Socrates’ initial investigations into the natural sciences, and his objections 
to Anaxagoras. The initial investigations begin from Socrates curiosity about the physical 
world: 
 
I was constantly veering to and fro, puzzling primarily over this sort of question: ‘Is it when 
heat and cold produce fermentation, as some have said, that living creatures are bred? Is it 
with the blood that we become aware, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of 
these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell; and from these 
that memory and opinion arise, and from memory and opinion, when established, that 
knowledge comes?’ Then again, I would consider how these things are destroyed, and study 
celestial and terrestrial phenomena, until at last I came to the conclusion that I was uniquely 
unfitted for this form of inquiry (Phaedo 96ac). 
 
 Some people think that these kinds of questions already show a particular focus on the 
human psyche, the overarching concern of the Phaedo.275 However, it occurs to me that that 
the kind of questions Socrates is asking span epistemology as well as the natural sciences: he 
is asking if knowledge comes from memory and opinion. Note that, after initially inquiring 
about physical phenomena, he’s asking if memory and opinion themselves arise from the 
senses, and if these arise from the brain. That is, how does the physical world explain 
knowledge? In this way, Socrates’ questions are framed in a way that makes them accessible 
to the methods of the natural sciences. This supports our reading of the Republic section, in 
which we said that pistis is not limited to investigation into the natural world. Rather, 
                                                
275 Burger (1984) pp. 135-137; Cf Menn ([2010] pp. 37-68) who implies the same. 
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Socrates’ description of the natural sciences, as with his description of pistis in the divided 
line passage, allows for their ambition to reach beyond explanations of physical things. 
 The young Socrates, then, seeks to understand the world using physical things as 
explanations. However, he soon becomes frustrated with his lack of progress in this line of 
inquiry. He had previously ‘understood some things plainly before in my own and other 
people’s estimation; but now I was so befogged by these speculations that I unlearned even 
what I had thought I knew, especially about the reason for growth in human beings’ (96c). 
Previously, Socrates had thought it obvious to anybody that growth in humans was due to 
eating and drinking; so that ‘when, from the food which we consume, flesh is added to flesh 
and bone to bone, and when in the same way the other parts of the body are augmented by 
their appropriate particles, the bulk which was small is now large; and in this way the small 
man becomes a big one’ (96d).276 
This seemed reasonable to the young Socrates, and also to Cebes, at whose objections 
the autobiography is directed (96d). The young Socrates complacently extends this kind of 
reasoning to other areas: 
 
I had been content to think, when I saw a tall man standing beside a short one, that he was 
taller by a head; and similarly in the case of horses. And it seemed to me even more obvious 
that ten is more than eight because it contains two more; and that two feet is bigger than one 
because it exceeds it by half its own length (Phaedo 96de). 
 
However, now Socrates is not so sure: 
 
                                                
276 This explanation is ‘specifically Anaxagoras’ explanation of growth, that each of the homoeomerous 
substances is imperceptibly present in the nutriment, from which they are separated out and added to 
homereromerous substances in us’ according to Menn ([2010] pp.37-68). Bostock (1986) argues that the theory 
contains hints of Anaxagoras but this is ‘really muddling’ (p 136); Plato just means the common sense view. 
 261 
Why, upon my word, I am very far from supposing that I know the explanation of any of 
these things. I cannot even convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or 
the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of one to the 
other….Nor can I now persuade myself that I understand how it is that things become one; 
nor, in short, why anything else comes or ceases or continues to be, according to this method 
of inquiry. So I reject it altogether, and muddle out a haphazard method of my own (Phaedo 
96e-97b). 
 
Is Socrates describing his own experience of aporia? Usually the term is associated 
with being perplexed by Socratic examination, so it could well apply to Socrates being 
perplexed by himself. Certainly, Socrates’ experience does resemble that of Meno and the 
slave-boy, who had also previously thought they had knowledge (Meno 80b; 82d), before 
being perplexed by Socrates himself (Meno 80ab; 84b), although instead of Meno’s ‘frozen 
kind of aporia, Socrates tries to find his own method.  
The puzzles presented here are what Menn would call the first set of objections, in the 
autobiography. These have been seen as ‘meta-puzzles’ rather than puzzles: the problem for 
the modern reader is to figure out how anyone could have been puzzled by them in the first 
place. Vlastos277 argues that Socrates’ mistake is to confuse the mathematical operation of 
addition with the physical process of joining one thing to another, and to try to give physical 
causes for what can only be given conceptual or logical reasons.  
However, Menn thinks that this is untenable, because Socrates is trying to explain a 
physical truth, not a mathematical fact. In this case, ‘it would be strange for Plato to represent 
                                                
277 ([1969] pp. 291-325). Vlastos points out that aitia has a much more general meaning than the word ‘cause’ in 
English speech. Socrates’ disappointment in the physical philosophers stems from the fact that all they can offer 
is material aitiai, whereas he is convinced that only teleology provides true or real aitiai of natural phenomena. 
Unable to discover it for himself, he falls back on the deuteros plous. Bostock ([1986] pp. 135-153) provides a 
discussion of this and Sedley ([1991] pp. 359-83) proposes that Socrates’ ‘safe explanation’ provides the key to 
the first objections. It is safer to cite only the Form itself, and not other proposed causes, because otherwise, 
there is fear of contradiction.  
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this assumption as an elementary ‘howler’ that Socrates would now be blaming on his early 
material enthusiasm’ (Menn [2010] p 41). 
Menn thinks that the purpose of the first objections is to show that ‘when we see how 
the soul functions in explanations…we can eliminate the Presocratic ways of conceiving of 
soul that makes it seem possible that a soul could perish’ (Menn [2010] p 62). He thinks that 
it is clear that Socrates is referring to problems about growth in a wider sense. At least one 
problem Plato is raising, according to Aristotle, is that of identity through-time,278 and Menn 
thinks that Aristotle is reading the Phaedo correctly: ‘Plato is not denying that human beings 
persist through time when they grow…but he denies that an explanation of growth through 
addition can explain this’ (Menn [2010] p 45). While it is unproblematic that a human body 
can persist through growth, no number can persist through the addition of a unit to make a 
larger number.  
Following Furley ([1976] pp. 61-86), who argues that Anaxagoras thinks that 
something is F by participating in the F in the sense of containing within itself some portion 
of F, Menn proposes that Plato is taking over the language of predication from Anaxagoras. 
According to Menn, Plato thinks that Anaxagoras’ account breaks down where F is ‘odd’ or 
‘even’ or ‘beautiful.’279 He thinks that, in order to fix this, participation must occur in some 
non-spatial way. Menn adds that the same difficulty arises for qualitative as well as 
quantitative change. 
Menn’s solution is thoroughly worked out, with a careful consideration of the place of 
the autobiography in the history of science. However, I do not think that there is any need to 
posit such a complicated reading. Menn is correct that the Phaedo is concerned with 
persistence through time; he is also right that the autobiography is a criticism of Presocratic 
science. However, as I pointed out when I introduced the passage, the criticism focuses on 
                                                
278 Menn (2010) p 43; Cf Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 321a34-35. Menn cites Epicharmus fr 276 as 
evidence that Plato is developing existing concerns about this. 
279 Menn (2010) p 49; Cf Hippias Major 300b-302b.  
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the reliance of sensible things for an explanation, when we should be looking to the 
intelligible, which is also a major concern of the Phaedo. Socrates is looking for a unified 
theory of growth. In introducing us to the inadequacy of physical explanations, the first 
objections prepare us for the deuteros plous as a stepping stone to the intelligible. 
 Socrates goes on to explain that he heard about a book that Anaxagoras has written, 
which says that Intelligence is the reason for everything, an explanation which pleased him. 
He says: 
 
Somehow it seemed right that Intelligence organizes things and is the reason for everything; 
and I reflected that if this is so, in the course of its arrangement Intelligence sets everything in 
order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it (Phaedo 97c). 
 
 Anticipating a teleological explanation for the way things are, Socrates speaks of his 
delight in having ‘found an authority on causation who was after my own heart – 
Anaxagoras’ (97d). He is prepared to learn about a great number of things and ‘give up 
hankering after any other kind of reason’ (97d). He emphasizes his hopefulness, saying, that 
he ‘would not have parted with my hopes for a great sum of money. I lost no time in 
procuring the books, and began to read them as quickly as I possibly could’ (98b). 
However, Socrates is soon disappointed: ‘It was a wonderful hope…but quickly 
dashed’ (98b). The problem is that Anaxagoras’ explanation is again that he uses physical 
entities to explain phenomena – things like air, ether and water ‘and many other oddities’ 
(98bc). Socrates’ problem with this kind of explanation is that it is no more use than saying 
that Intelligence is the reason for everything Socrates does, but then explaining his actions in 
terms of bones, sinews and other physical properties of the body. As Socrates points out, the 
reason his sinews and bones are in a prison in Athens, and not in some other place, is that he 
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felt it was better to remain and submit to the penalty that had been imposed upon him (98e-
99a). 
His major argument against Anaxagoras is that he is unable to distinguish between 
‘the reason for a thing and the condition without which the reason couldn’t be operative’ 
(99b). He is criticising Anaxagoras’ reversion to mechanism.280 That is, Socrates’ physical 
characteristics are necessary for him to be in a cell in Athens (‘the condition without which a 
thing couldn’t be operative’), but the reason for his being there is that he has decided it is 
better that way (‘the reason for a thing’). This mistake, Socrates says, applies to all theories 
of natural science: 
 
That is why one person surrounds the earth with a vortex, and so keeps it in place by means of 
the heavens; and another props it up with a pedestal of air, as though it were a wide platter. 
As for a power which keeps things ever in the best position, they neither search for it nor 
believe that it has any remarkable force; they imagine that they will someday find a more 
mighty and immortal and all-sustaining Atlas; and they do not think that anything is really 
bound and held together because goodness requires it (Phaedo 99bc).281  
 
These remarks should tell us two important things about how we can fit the 
epistemological system of the intellectual autobiography into the divided line. Firstly, that 
Socrates is looking for a teleological explanation in an ideal account: goodness is the 
underlying reason for all things. Secondly, the natural sciences explain things by means of 
physical objects. These physical objects might provide condition without which a thing could 
not be operative, but that is not the same as the reason for it.  
                                                
280 Cf Burger (1984) pp. 139-144, who argues that Socrates thinks Anaxagoras ‘could present only the means, 
without revealing their status as mere means’ (p. 142). 
281 Surely Socrates refers to Anaximenes’ theory when he speaks of a ‘pedestal of air.’ For suggestions about the 
other theories, see Tarrant’s (1993) note 158 on the Phaedo pp. 226-227. 
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When we discussed the divided line, we said that pistis involves the use of physical 
things to build its explanations. To this extent then, Socrates’ description of the natural 
sciences in his intellectual autobiography can be correlated to pistis. I have not argued for an 
exact fit here, just a meaningful correlation. In fact, although Socrates seems to present two 
kinds of objections to the natural sciences, they are both different aspects of the same one: 
explanation by means of physical things confines us to pistis. As in the Republic, we need to 
turn our minds to the intelligible for a satisfactory method. 
 
 ii. Socrates’ ‘Secondary Approach’ 
 
 As we noted, the best approach would be teleological, and Socrates would like to 
learn about the workings of such an explanation. However, he admits that he has been 
‘unable either to discover it for myself or learn it from another’ (99c). In this case, he has 
worked out his own secondary approach: 
 
…when I was worn out with my investigations into reality, it occurred to me that I must guard 
against the same sort of risk which people run when they watch and study an eclipse of the 
sun; some of them, you see, injure their eyes, unless they study its reflection in water or some 
other medium. I conceived something like this happening to myself, and I was afraid that by 
observing objects with my eyes and trying to comprehend them with each of my other senses 
I might blind my soul all together. So I decided that I must have recourse to theories, and use 
them in trying to discover the truth about things. Perhaps my illustration is not quite apt; 
because I do not entirely agree that an inquiry by means of theory employs ‘images’ any more 
than one which confines itself to facts (Phaedo 99d-100a). 
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Socrates goes on to explain this approach in more detail, as we shall see in the 
following chapter. His explanation is highly focused on the use of hypotheses, and has little 
to say about imagery. However, in this passage Socrates denies that the deuteros plous has no 
more recourse to images than what we have described as pistis. Note that he does not deny 
that this approach uses images at all; moreover, he does not even say that the deuteros plous 
uses images any less than pistis either. In the Republic section, we noted that the tools of both 
dianoia and pistis are images of Forms: if, as I am arguing, the deuteros plous includes 
dianoia, then this fits in with what Socrates has to say about it in the divided line.  
What is described in the autobiography is the early part of dianoia, which, as in 
Simmias’ and Cebes’ objections and the slave-boy passage of the Meno, includes images. 
The hypothetical passage that follows the autobiography covers the later stage of dianoia and 
the beginning of noēsis. I shall cover the hypothetical passage in the following chapter, but 
for now, I want to extend the claim I made previously about the autobiography of the Phaedo 
corresponding to the divided line of the Republic.  
I am not the first to propose a correlation between the two passages, and here I want 
to consider (and amend) one very good argument for the correlation, to defend the main 
thrust of the argument.282 Byrd ([2007] pp.141-158) argues that Socrates’ intellectual 
development in the Phaedo is parallel to the description of ascent in the divided line in the 
Republic (I shall endorse this). She says that Socrates’ autobiography at Phaedo 96a-100e 
illustrates his application of the method (I shall not endorse this). Thus, says Byrd, while the 
hypothetical method and dialectic are not identical, one can apply information about the 
hypothetical method to the remarks about the upward use of hypothesis in the Republic (I 
                                                
282 Some commentators point to the similarity between the method of hypothesis in the Phaedo and dialectic in 
the Republic, but most scholars reject the possibility that they are the same method for two reasons. Firstly, the 
‘stopping point’ in the two dialogues is different, and secondly, the hypothetical method is a deuteros plous. 
Those who stress the similarity of the hypothetical method to dialectic include: Bedu-Addo ([1979] pp. 89-109); 
Bluck in his (1955) translation of the Phaedo pp. 21-31. Those who stress the difference of the two methods: 
Robinson ([1953] pp.61-113); Rose ([1966] pp.464-473); Sayre ([1969] pp. 3-56). See also Byrd ([2007] pp. 
141-158) for a discussion of this. 
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shall amend this view, saying that the hypothetical method does not correspond to dialectic, 
but to some or all of dianoia plus early noēsis). 
 Byrd says that, according to Phaedo 100a and 101de, there are three injunctions: 
 
1. Put forth the hypothesis that seems strongest to you and accept as true what agrees 
with it. 
2. Deduce conclusions from the hypothesis and check them for consistency. 
3. Provide an account of the hypothesis by deducing it from higher hypotheses until you 
reach something adequate.283 
 
She thinks that step three begs comparison with the upward path described at Republic 
510c-511b, which I have already noted in the Republic section of this project. In contrast with 
students of geometry, who do not go beyond their hypotheses, those who engage in dialectic 
use hypotheses as stepping stones to the unhypothetical first principle. She writes, ‘Thus 
dialectic and the method of hypothesis seem to have two characteristics in common: both 
involve the pursuit of higher hypotheses until one reaches an adequate stopping point, and, in 
both, higher hypotheses entail lower ones’ (Byrd [2007] p 144). Byrd suggests that the 
hypothesis ‘above’ might be higher in the sense that they are more general and self-evident, 
or in the sense that they entail the lower hypotheses.284 I have already argued, through my 
correlation of the method with apagōgē in the Republic and Meno sections, that a hypothesis 
is ‘higher’ in the sense that the other one is derived from it. It is possible to have more than 
one hypothesis in the same argument, but this need not mean that one entails or is entailed by 
                                                
283 Byrd appeals to Robinson (1953) p 134, Ross (1951) p 28, Shorey (1933) p 179, Sayre (1969) p 30, Rose 
(1966) p 466 and Bostock (1986) p 170 for support of her reading. 
284 Against the view that the stopping point in the Phaedo is provisional, and not a true first principle (as 
Robinson [1953] pp.123-145; Burger [1984] pp. 147-150 argue) Byrd points out that the necessity of accounting 
for the hypothesis does not depend on there being an objector, and that the account needs to be 
epistemologically, rather than persuasively adequate. Cf Phaedo 107b. 
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the others: for example, the Recollection hypothesis and the Harmony hypothesis in 
Simmias’ objection are not derived from each other. ‘Higher’ in this sense means a further 
reduction in the argument. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have taken care to stress that the method described in the 
Phaedo is a deuteros plous, a second best method, a fact that has been used by others to try to 
dissociate the method from dialectic. Byrd, on the other hand, objects to the traditional 
translation of deuteros plous as ‘second best,’285 suggesting alternatives: ‘taking to the oars 
when the wind has failed’ and ‘making a second safer journey. Moreover, she says, the 
referent of deuteros plous might not, in fact, be the hypothetical method. Rather, says Byrd, it 
may simply apply to the particular hypothesis under consideration in the dialogue. So the 
hypothetical method is not inferior to dialectic, but the description of causes based on Forms 
given in the Phaedo is inferior to a teleological account based on the Form of the Good. 
In this case, says Byrd, we have no reason to prefer the reading that makes the 
hypothetical method completely distinct from dialectic. Moreover, she thinks that Socrates’ 
autobiography, which precedes the hypothetical method, gives us positive evidence for the 
method of hypothesis as dialectic. This argument rests on two points. Firstly, says Byrd, the 
autobiography is proleptic in the sense that Plato illustrates the method of hypothesis 
described, and secondly, that the description of Socrates’ intellectual development parallels 
the ascent of the divided line. I am going to argue that Byrd is right that the autobiography 
parallels the ascent of the divided line, but that the illustration of the deuteros plous actually 
comes later in the autobiography than Byrd thinks. I have already argued that ‘second best’ in 
this context should be taken to mean the initial stages of dialectic, rather than fully realized 
dialectic: the deuteros plous covers the dianoia-noēsis transition, which is by no means 
                                                
285 As Grube (1977) and Hackforth ([1955] pp. 27-29) translate it. 
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dialectic in its completion. As I have tried to show, we do not have direct access to the 
Forms: to study them in the most direct way possible, we must build on our previous work.   
Byrd would have it that Socrates’ initial hypothesis is that causal explanations are given 
in terms of sense perception. So, for example, at Phaedo 96d, Socrates assumes that the cause 
of a tall man being taller than another is ‘by a head.’ However, this leads to contradictory 
results, because a bigger thing could be bigger, and a smaller thing smaller, by the same 
thing. As a result of Socrates’ discovery of these contradictions, he rejects his original 
hypothesis and, after his failure to produce a teleological account, posits a second hypothesis 
of Forms as causes.  
This, says Byrd, means that the autobiography itself has illustrated her stages one and two 
of the hypothetical method. Stage three, she says, is not at first glance illustrated in the 
Phaedo. However, if we allow for a higher hypothesis to be posited in order to resolve 
contradictions to which the original hypothesis led, we can say that it has been illustrated in 
the Phaedo. That is, Socrates revised hypothesis of Forms as causes is higher in the sense that 
it revises the original hypothesis of causal explanations as sense-perceptible.286  
To connect her reading to the divided line, Byrd connects Plato’s description of 
‘summoners’ at Republic 522e-525a to his remarks at Phaedo 102be: ‘Just as the index finger 
appears to be both tall and short when viewed along with the thumb and middle finger, 
Simmias appears to be tall and short when viewed alongside Phaedo...The summoner 
provokes one to ascend from the sensible to the intelligible portion of the divided line’ (Byrd 
[2007] p 154). 
This is an instance of the summoner elevating the mind from pistis to dianoia. At a higher 
level, Byrd thinks that summoners also elevate the mind from dianoia to nous.287 In trying to 
                                                
286 Byrd appeals to Dorter’s ([1982] pp. 115-140, especially pp. 133-138) suggestion that the purpose of higher 
hypotheses can be revision as well as demonstration. 
287 Or noēsis, to be consistent with my use of Plato’s rather confused terminology. See Section One, Chapter 
One for a discussion of this. 
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resolve the contradiction of a failed hypothesis, the mind needs to identify the plurality 
involved, separate out these elements, and relate them, using the new hypothesis, in such a 
way that no contradiction is involved. In doing this, an account of these elements is provided, 
and the higher hypothesis will be higher in that it explains more. This process will eventually 
lead to the first principle.  
As I have argued, Byrd’s reading contradicts the reading of ‘higher hypothesis’ that I 
have been presenting. In addition to this, I think that Byrd is wrong for three reasons. Firstly, 
Socrates initial investigations are not hypotheses. They are things he believes, pre-aporetic, 
which are no different from the statements examined in ordinary elenchus, which, as I 
argued, is not the same as examining hypotheses. This uncovers contradictions and identifies 
falsehood, which is the same as what is happening in the initial objections. Of course, the 
hypothetical method has in common with elenchus the discovery of contradiction; in this 
way, the elenchus can even be said to be part of the hypothetical method. That said, this does 
not make Socrates’ pre-aporetic investigations hypothetical. 
The second reason I disagree with Byrd is that, in the autobiography, Socrates is clear that 
he devised the deuteros plous after his aporia, which supports my reading rather than Byrd’s. 
In this case, the first part of the biography is pistis plus elenchus ending in aporia; the 
deuteros plous is dianoia plus the initial stages of noēsis. Finally, as I have said, a higher 
hypothesis substantiates a correct hypothesis. In order to ascend, the initial hypothesis must 
be verified, and the higher one provides evidence for it.  
I have disagreed with Byrd’s claim that the deuteros plous is illustrated in the first part of 
the autobiography. In what follows, I will try to show that it is actually illustrated just after 
Byrd thinks, in the use of hypotheses in the argument about the soul. However, I think that 
Byrd is correct in drawing a parallel between the autobiography and the divided line. As I 
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have indicated, I do think that the autobiography parallels the divided line in taking us from 
pistis to dianoia and beyond. 
 
Chapter Three: The Hypothetical Passage 
 
Socrates has told us that his ‘second best’ approach starts off by appealing to theories, which, 
although it uses images, does not do so in a way more serious than the natural sciences. This 
method proceeds by laying down hypotheses, and the things which follow from them: 
 
In every case, I first lay down the theory which I judge to be the least vulnerable; and then 
whatever seems to agree with it – with regard to reasons or anything else – I assume to be 
true, and whatever does not, I assume to be untrue (Phaedo 100a). 
 
By way of illustration, Socrates applies this method to the theory of causation, in 
order to help Simmias understand how it might answer his objection. Call this Passage A:  
 
[Stage One] 
1. Grant the existence of the Forms: Beauty in Itself, Goodness, Largeness ‘and all the 
rest of them’ (Phaedo 100bc). 
2. Whatever else is beautiful apart from Beauty itself is beautiful because it partakes 
of that Beauty, and for no other reason. Call this the ‘safe answer.’ (Phaedo 100 c).288 
3. All other kinds of reason are to be disregarded, except those which appeal to the 
forms (Phaedo 100ce). 
                                                
288 Vlastos ([1969] p.306) argues that ‘it is the logical function of the metaphysical entity that does the 
explanatory work of the ‘safe’ aitia.’ For Vlastos, Plato’s logical aitia is the same as a metaphysical one.  
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4. So if one man is taller than another, it is by virtue of tallness; and if one man is 
shorter than another, it is by virtue of shortness (Phaedo 101ab). 
5. By the same reasoning, ten is not more than eight because of two; one added to one 
is not two in virtue of the addition (Phaedo 101bc). 
6. There is no other way in which a given attribute can come to be except by sharing 
the essential nature of the thing it has a share of (Phaedo 101c). 
7. So there is no other reason, for example, for something coming to be two than 
sharing in duality (Phaedo 101c). 
8. If anyone should question the hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and refuse to 
answer until you have considered whether the consequences of the hypothesis are 
consistent or not (Phaedo 101d). 
[Stage Two] 
9. To substantiate the hypothesis itself, you would proceed in the same way, assuming 
whatever more basic hypothesis commended itself to you, until you reached one that 
is satisfactory (Phaedo 101de). 
10. You would not mix the two things together by discussing both the starting points 
and its consequences (Phaedo 101e). 
 
Stage one of this method is applied to the argument about the soul. Call this passage  
B: 
 
1. Begin by accepting that various Forms exist, and the reason that other things are 
called after the Forms is that they share in them (Phaedo 102ab). 
2. In us, there is both tallness and shortness, but the tallness in us never admits 
shortness, just as the shortness in us declines to be tall (Phaedo 102a-103a). 
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3. The general principle is that an opposite can never be opposite to itself (Phaedo 
103c). 
4. Heat and cold are different from snow and fire, but snow can never admit heat and 
still remain snow, just as fire can never admit cold and remain fire (Phaedo 
103cd). 
5. So in cases like these, the name of the Form is not only applicable to the Form 
itself, but also to something else, which is not the Form but invariably possesses 
its distinguishing characteristic (Phaedo 103e). 
6. So three must always be odd, even though three and odd are not the same thing, 
just as two and four are not identical with even, but are always even (Phaedo 
103e-104a). 
7. Just as opposites themselves do not admit one another, those things which always 
possess an opposite quality do not take on the opposite Form to that which is in 
them, but on its approach either cease to exist or retire before it (Phaedo 104bc). 
8. Yet two and three are not opposites, so it is not only the opposite Forms that 
cannot face one another’s approach, but also things which compel whatever they 
get a hold of to assume not only their own Form, but invariably also some other 
Form which is an opposite (Phaedo 104cd). 
9. So when the Form of Three gets hold of a group of objects, it compels them to be 
odd as well as three (Phaedo 104d). 
10. Into such a group the opposite Form to the character which has this idea can never 
enter (Phaedo 104d). 
11. We can build sophisticated answers by going beyond the ‘safe answer’ of step 2, 
passage A, above: for instance by saying that fire must be present in a body to 
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make it hot, rather than giving the simplistic answer of heat; unity, rather than 
oddness, must be present in a number to make it odd (Phaedo 105bc). 
12. Soul must be present in a body to make it alive (Phaedo 105cd). 
13. When soul takes possession of a body, it always brings living with it (Phaedo 
105d). 
14. Dying is opposite to living (Phaedo 105d). 
15. Soul will never admit the opposite to that which accompanies it (Phaedo 105d). 
16. We call that which does not admit dying ‘undying’ (Phaedo 105de). 
17. So the soul is undying (Phaedo 105e). 
18. What is undying is imperishable, so it is impossible that it should cease to be at 
the approach of death (Phaedo 106ae.) 
19. So when death approaches, the soul retires and escapes unharmed and 
indestructible; our souls will really exist in the next world (Phaedo 106e-107a). 
 
The group agrees that they have no criticisms, and no doubt about the truth of 
Socrates’ argument. However, Simmias, although he agrees with Socrates’ argument, admits: 
‘All the same, the subject is so vast, and I have such a poor opinion of our weak human 
nature, that I can’t help feeling some misgivings’ (107ab). The argument is coherent in itself 
and follows from the hypothesis, but in this passage, the application of the argument has not 
gone beyond Stage one of passage A: the original hypothesis has not been substantiated.  
Stage two has possibly already occurred earlier in the dialogue, at Phaedo 74-76, in 
which Socrates argues for the existence of Forms. Call this passage C: 
 
1. Admit that there is such a thing as absolute equality beyond that of stick to stick 
and stone to stone (Phaedo 74a).  
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2. We do not get knowledge of this by looking at sensible things (Phaedo 74b). 
3. So equal things are not the same as equality (Phaedo 74c). 
4. But equal things bring to your mind the thought of absolute equality (Phaedo 
74c). 
5. Then this must be a case of recollection (Phaedo 74cd). 
6. Sensible things fall short of actual equality (Phaedo 74d). 
7. So we must have some previous knowledge of equality (Phaedo 74e-75b). 
8. We must have attained this knowledge before birth (Phaedo 75c). 
9. So things-in-themselves exist in such a way that we can attain knowledge of them 
before birth (Phaedo 75c-76e). 
 
Immediately after passage C, Simmias says that he is happy that the argument proves 
the existence of Forms. However, after the argument for the immortality of the soul (passage 
B) Socrates himself admits to the need to substantiate it. He says, 
 
…even if you find our original assumptions convincing, they still need more accurate 
consideration. If you and your friends examine them closely enough, I believe that you will 
arrive at the truth of the matter, in so far as it is possible for the human mind to attain it; and if 
you are sure that you have done this, you will not need to inquire further (Phaedo 107b). 
 
Socrates means that, even if the original hypothesis of the argument (the existence of 
Forms) is convincing, it still needs further work. In the context of the dialogue, Phaedo 74-76 
could play that role. In this case, stage one of the deuteros plous of the Phaedo is illustrated 
at 100b-101e (passage B) and stage two is illustrated at 74-76 (passage C).  
This is a plausible reading of the illustration of the deuteros plous in the dialogue. 
More importantly, I now want to look a little more closely at the exact procedure described in 
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passage A. Here, we have seen that Socrates’ description gives us two stages, and some 
scholars give each of the stages two procedures, based on what emerges from this in 
conjunction with the divided line passage from the Republic and the hypothetical passage 
from the Meno (Benson [2010]). In the first stage, the philosopher identifies a hypothesis, 
from which an answer one seeks to know can be derived (1a), then shows how this can be 
taken to answer the question (1b). In the second stage, the philosopher seeks to confirm the 
truth of the hypothesis by identifying a further hypothesis from which the original hypothesis 
can be derived (2a), and testing the consequences of this hypothesis (2b). In this way, the 
method that Socrates is describing has a proof stage and a confirmation stage, in the same 
way that the method of analysis has as we described it in the previous section. Robinson 
describes these stages as the ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ paths respectively.289 
Benson argues that the tradition that has emerged since Robinson, of describing the 
hypothetical method as consisting of both an upward path and a downward path is potentially 
equivocal (Benson [2010] pp.108-208). He says that both stages of the method could be 
described as consisting of an upward and a downward path. According to him, the upward 
paths of both stages consist in identifying relevant hypotheses (1a and 2a) from which either 
the original question is to be derived (1a) or the original hypothesis is to be derived (2a). The 
downward path, says Benson, consists of the proof from the original hypothesis or 
hypotheses (1b) or testing the consequences of the further hypothesis or hypotheses to see if 
they agree with each other.  
Benson argues that the procedures of the proof and confirmation stages are not 
symmetrical: he says that, while the ‘upward’ paths of the two stages are merely different 
tokens of the same type, both consisting of identifying higher hypotheses, the ‘downwards’ 
paths are quite different: ‘The downward path of the first stage amounts to providing or 
                                                
289 See the Republic section. 
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displaying a proof of the answer to the original question (the conclusion or teleutê), while the 
downward path of the second stage amounts to a second confirmation of the procedure of the 
hypothesis’ (Benson [2010] p 6). 
Benson thinks that this failure to distinguish between these different downward paths 
undermines the comparison of the method of hypothesis with the method of analysis and 
synthesis. He says that the method of analysis and synthesis is primarily restricted to the first 
(proof) stage of the method of hypothesis, whereas there is nothing in the former to 
correspond to the second (confirmation) stage. In this case, thinks Benson, if we want to 
identify the method of analysis with the method of hypothesis, we need to either omit the 
second confirmation procedure or conflate it with synthesis. However, we cannot do this, 
Benson thinks, because it is explicit at Phaedo 101d, and exemplified at Meno 89c-96d and 
Republic 487a-502c.290 
 I have argued in the Meno section that the comparison with analysis and synthesis is 
unnecessary, since, as Karasmanis ([1987] pp. 73-93) points out, Plato’s method is actually 
drawn from its forerunner, apagōgē. Analysis and synthesis, we said, moves from a 
hypothesis, which is the thing sought, using other known propositions, to a conclusion that is 
independently true of the thing sought. Synthesis starts from this conclusion and moves 
backwards to the thing sought: 
 
Enunciation of the problem→Analysis: (1, the thing sought) implies (2) → (2) implies (3) 
→(3) implies (4)…M implies N (independently known)→Synthesis: N implies M…(4) 
implies (3) →(3) implies (2) →(2) implies (1). 
 
                                                
290 Cf Mueller ([2005] pp.170-199), who argues along the same lines as Benson. 
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However, apagōgē reduces the problem to a series of lemmas, which, if known or 
constructed, will make the original problem or theorem evident, until we arrive at a 
conclusion that is independently known of the thing sought: 
 
Enunciation of the problem→lemma1→lemma2→lemma3→…Conclusion 
 
 Following Karasmanis, I maintain that, as in the Meno, the hypothetical method of the 
Phaedo resembles apagōgē. We start from the problem, reduce it to another problem (the 
hypothesis) on which it depends. We deduce the original problem from this, so it is solved 
hypothetically (stage one of passage A). For a real solution, we need to solve the second 
problem by reducing it to a higher hypothesis (stage two of passage A). Continue this process 
until we arrive at an independently known conclusion. In this process, the ways up (heuristic) 
and down (deductive) are done at each step; separate them out, and we have the method of 
analysis and synthesis. In this case, the asymmetry that Benson worries about is not a 
problem for us: the apagōgē of the deuteros plous is not intended to cover the whole of 
dialectic; dialectic’s ‘way down’ is a different process entirely. 
I have already argued that we should take this reading into account: the method of 
analysis and synthesis may have been known to Plato, but it is apagōgē that he has in mind 
when he applies the mathematical method to philosophy. I go a step further than Karasmanis 
in saying that apagōgē, not analysis, is a part of the dialectic of the Republic. Karasmanis 
([1987] pp. 251-268) thinks that dialectic taken as a whole is closer to analysis and synthesis, 
whereas I think that dialectic is apagōgē initially plus something else. The upward path, in 
the sense of a heuristic process, can still be seen as a part of this process, which is where the 
intuitive leap that I promised comes in. I am not the only one to see the search for a new 
 279 
hypothesis as an intuitive leap.291 My reading allows for the role of intuition that Robinson 
says is implied by the Phaedrus and Seventh Letter, but within the mechanism I am 
proposing for ascending the epistemological scale. I shall now expand on how that 
mechanism works, in the light of the hypothetical passage in the Phaedo. 
I argue that the ‘higher hypothesis’ is the way to ascend the epistemological scale. In 
the Republic section, I described the ‘upward path,’ as it has become known, as a way out of 
dianoia and into noēsis. I argued that the deuteros plous of the Phaedo represents dianoia 
and the early stages of noēsis, with each ‘reduction’ taking us further up the scale. I agreed 
with Robinson’s linking of the upward path with the Phaedo in the Republic section, but here 
I want to highlight an important difference between my reading and Robinson’s. 
Stage two of the deuteros plous requires us to posit a higher hypothesis ‘until you 
come to something adequate.’ Robinson (1953) thinks that this means ‘adequate to satisfy 
your objector.’ He thinks that we only need posit a higher hypothesis if someone questions 
the original. Stage one of the method is the internal, negative and elenctic process of 
checking for contradiction. Stage two, the positing of a higher hypothesis in the Phaedo is, 
according to Robinson, only done when someone objects to the original, and the metaphor of 
‘above’ does not mean something more universal.  
Robinson admits that his view sounds strange, but says that the only real test of the 
hypothesis is deducing the consequences, which is the same as the procedure in stage one: ‘If 
the hypothesis fails to imply the conclusion, or if it develops an internal contradiction, it will 
                                                
291 See also Karasmanis (1987 pp. 139-145). To clarify, Robinson does not think that the deductive part of the 
hypothetical method is intuitive (although he thinks that entailment method is fundamentally intuitive), but, like 
me, sees intuition as having a role to play in the choosing of hypotheses (1953 p 109). The difference between 
my view and Robinson’s is the extent to which we think intuition plays a part. I allow the image to have far less 
intuitive sway in dianoia than Robinson, and do not cite intuition as the reason for Plato’s extensive use of 
imagery in the dialogues. My position on the role of intuition in hypothesis is almost identical to that of 
Robinson: ‘What the method does is rather to economize intuition, by restricting it almost entirely to the 
intuition of a logical implication performed again and again, and to criticize and dispose of other intuitions by 
examining their mutual consistency. The unique beauty of Euclidean geometry down to the nineteenth century 
was that it seemed to combine in perfect harmony complete logical rigour and the complete satisfaction of all 
our intuitions about the subject-matter’ Robinson (1953) p 109. 
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have to be abandoned anyhow; and there would be no point in trying to defend it against 
outside objections by deducing it from a higher hypothesis. If it could be so deduced, the 
higher hypothesis would itself involve the contradiction involved by the lower’ (Robinson 
[1953] p 141). My reading avoids the strangeness of Robinson’s. By seeing the higher 
hypothesis as a reductive step in apagōgē, the higher hypothesis is given a positive role: it 
makes progress in the epistemological ascent.  
Traditionally, epistemological ascent in Plato is seen as a feature of the ‘upward’ path. 
Annas distinguishes between the ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’ paths by placing much greater 
importance on the ‘upwards’ path. She says that every step ‘upwards’ is the way to 
progressively greater understanding, treating the hypothesis of each science (especially 
mathematics) as literally hypothetical. It examines first the problem, then the concept, its 
status and position in the science, the science itself, and finally the whole of human 
knowledge and the nature of goodness. However, says Annas, this leaves little for the way 
down: there is nothing that a further downward path can add to our understanding.292 
Benson thinks that the solution is to say that dianoetic confines itself to the proof 
stage, whereas dialectic embraces both the proof and the confirmation stages. He cites Plato’s 
remarks that ‘if one’s starting point is something unknown, and one’s conclusion and 
                                                
292 One solution to this problem would be to cast the role of the downward path as presenting and expounding 
what has become intelligible. Annas draws on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics for this explanation. However, 
Annas thinks that this solution would have to go with an Aristotelian conception of the relationship of 
philosophy with the special sciences. Annas says: ‘For Aristotle, philosophy is continuous with science and like 
it in being a growing and continuous body of knowledge to which individuals make their contribution, relying 
on what has gone before…but Plato does not believe in such a fixity of philosophical achievement. It runs up 
against his repeated insistence that philosophical truth is something that each individual has to discover for 
himself or herself, and not something that can be handed on without difficulty’ (Annas [1981] p 292). In this 
case, a true Platonist could not hold the ‘downward’ path to be a way of presenting and expounding the 
intelligible. If Plato is serious about the way down, Annas thinks, he has not thought his way clearly through the 
role of the downward path, nor how dialectic can be both eternal and personal. The practitioner of dialectic must 
actively seek the truth instead of relying on the opinions of even the wisest.  
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intermediate steps are made up of unknowns also, how can the resulting consistency ever by 
any manner of means become knowledge?’293  
We should not lumber Plato with problems that arise from priorities that he does not 
have. As I pointed out in the Republic section, by far the most important distinguishing 
features of dianoia are the use of hypothesis and imagery, and that of noēsis is its procedure 
through Forms (by way of ti estis, according to my interpretation). The upwards and 
downwards paths are not what distinguishes noēsis from dianoia, although it may be a feature 
of the hypothetical method. The emphasis on the symmetry between the upwards and 
downwards paths belongs not to Plato, but to scholars writing after Robinson.  
That said, it would be problematic to make the downward path redundant in Plato’s 
epistemology. The philosophical work we do after reaching the unhypothetical beginning 
should be richer, not poorer, and it is here that the downward path begins. Even if the two 
paths are not symmetrical, they should both be important. In my reading, the value of the way 
down lies in providing the kind of teleological accounts that Socrates is ideally looking for in 
the Phaedo. On my reading, the way down is able to provide this because of what happens on 
the way up. 
I have said a lot about how we move from dianoia to noēsis. I have already said that 
this ascent should provide us with what we need for the ti estis we lacked in the first stages of 
dianoia. In the Republic section, I said that the ti esti is able to appear in noēsis because at 
least some degree of certainty is provided by the reduction of the initial problem to a 
hypothesis, and the subsequent downward step. Each reduction provides us with additional 
information about the Form that we are studying, which gives us the account we need for a ti 
esti. 
                                                
293 Republic 533c. Cf Benson (2010) p 9 and Burnyeat (2000) p 23 n 3. As we observed in the Republic section, 
Benson proposes this solution as part of his wider theory about the distinction between dianoia and dialectic. He 
thinks that dianoia is the incomplete or erroneous application of the method of hypothesis, whereas dialectic is 
its correct application. The goal of dialectic is to provide hypotheses from which the answer to the original 
question can be derived, and which themselves are derivable from the unhypothetical first principle.  
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In order to show this, I need to qualify the connection I am making between 
hypothesis and definition. I mentioned in the Republic section, and argued in the Meno 
section, that, in a ti esti, Socrates is looking for something more than a concise statement 
about a thing. He is looking for more information; something like an account.294 I am saying 
that a hypothesis is a stand-in for a ti esti, but it is not simply a definition awaiting 
confirmation; it does not have to even be in the form of a definition. Rather, it is a 
proposition about the Form to be defined, and the use of it will give us the degree of certainty 
and account we need to generate the ti esti. 
Robinson ([1953] pp. 100-105) against whose reading I have been arguing, also 
argues against the view that the hypothesis was always a definition, and the popular view 
that, according to Plato, the hypothesis is always a statement of existence. He provides some 
examples of statements that are not definitions: 
 
There is a beautiful itself by itself and a good and great and all the others (Phaedo 100b). 
Likeness exists (Parmenides 136b). 
Likeness does not exist (Parmenides 136b). 
 
Robinson goes on to give examples of those that are not existential: 
 
Piety is what all the gods love (Euthyphro 9d). 
Knowledge is perception (Theaetetus 165d). 
 
Finally, Robinson gives examples of hypotheses that are neither definitions nor 
existential: 
                                                
294 Cf Gallop ([1975] pp. 113-131) for the view that giving a definition requires giving an account. 
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The geometers hypothesis (Meno 87a). 
Temperance is noble (Charmides 160d). 
Virtue is good (Meno 87d). 
Not-being must not partake either of one or of the many (Sophist 238e). 
 
 According to Robinson, a hypothesis is the sort of thesis which does not define a term 
but makes an assertion, but there is no special restriction on the kind of proposition that may 
be hypothesized. I agree with this point. As I have argued, what we are looking to do is to 
generate other true statements about the Form, which will eventually lead to a ti esti.  
 In passage B, the problem of whether the soul is immortal was reduced to the 
hypothesis that Forms exist, and in the subsequent steps, we generated a series of other 
statement about the soul: Soul must be present in a body to make it alive; when soul takes 
possession of a body, it always brings living with it; soul will never admit the opposite to that 
which accompanies it; the soul is undying; when death approaches, the soul retires and 
escapes unharmed and indestructible; our souls will really exist in the next world. The 
certainty we need in a ti esti is given to us by the process of apagōgē; the ‘account’ is 
provided by the statements it generates. What is the soul, on this account? The presence in a 
body that brings life, that retires when death approaches it - and so on. As I argued in the 
Meno section (Chapter One ii.a), there is not one ‘correct’ statement of a full ti esti of any 
given Form. The hypothetical argument has allowed us to generate at least one 
approximation, which, as we saw in the Meno section, can be improved and made fuller by 
further argument. 
Because of the philosophical work that Plato is expecting a ti esti to do, we should 
expect the answer to the ‘what is x?’ question to have a number of different answers, with the 
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best approximation being the most complete. As the most direct way of studying the Form, 
the ti esti allows us to study its eidos, which will in turn allow us to build our teleological 
account, at which point we should have reached the unhypothetical first principle. The way 
down involves giving teleological accounts of what has previously been explained by the 
‘safe’ answer, so Socrates would be able to explain that it was best for him to be in the prison 




Throughout this thesis, I have suggested that Plato’s divided line should be read primarily as 
an epistemological scale, organised in an ascending order of progressively more 
epistemologically sound mental states. Not only is it a scale but it is also a continuum: so 
each subsection of the line representing a mental state is not homogeneous. The early stages 
of dianoia, for example, are not the same as the later stages and so on. The epistemological 
transition from one stage to the other is also continuous.  I have shown that, when discussing 
dianoia, Plato distinguishes between the objects of investigation and the tools that the mind 
uses in this kind of inquiry (images and hypotheses). In fact, I have demonstrated that it is the 
tools of inquiry that define the mental states: pistis, for example, is drawing conclusions from 
observations of the physical world, but, crucially, this does not mean that its subject-matter 
need be limited to the physical world. It may draw on natural phenomena, or on observations 
of human actions to make claims about morality.  
A particular problem that relates to dianoia is, what does Plato see as the connection 
between the tools of dianoia, hypothesis and imagery? The solution, I have proposed, is that 
both are proxies for ti estis, or Platonic definitions. My explanation is stronger than 
Robinson’s and Cross and Woozley’s view that the connection is that both hypotheses and 
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images appeal to intuition, because it takes into account the way in which Plato employs 
hypotheses and images in the dialogues. In this way, my account does not need to explain 
away (as Robinson does) the use of analogy and imagery by speculating that they are 
teaching devices.  
I have shown that the dianoetic image is not the same as the imagery of eikasia, arguing 
against scholars like Klein, who I suggest rely too much on the idea of awareness to 
distinguish between mental states. The difference is that the image of eikasia is an image of a 
sensible object, whereas the image of dianoia is a sensible object used as an image.  
Moreover, in a similar way to the argument I made for the other mental states, dianoetic 
reasoning includes the mathematical method applied to philosophy in other spheres, so the 
objects of dianoetic thought would include numbers and shapes and, crucially, moral 
concepts like virtue and entities such as the soul, when that method is applied to philosophy. 
So in the Republic, we draw conclusions about the nature of the Form of Justice by 
comparing the relationships between parts of a just soul and a just state, so we use two 
instances of the Form of Justice, even though there can only be one Form. I have agreed with 
scholars like Fine here, who also thinks that different mental states can share objects, 
although, like many other scholars, I do not support Fine’s ‘contents’ reading of the line. 
I also demonstrated that, although the dianoetic image can sometimes have a sensible 
element, its qualities are primarily intelligible. Even a diagram has intelligible qualities, 
because the information it contains is not entirely sensible, but is partially contained in the 
mind of the dianoetician. When Socrates draws his figures on the ground in the Meno, he 
cannot represent perfect figures, and the square he draws on the diagonal will not be exactly 
double the area of the original square. The image includes the diagram plus information like 
this that the diagram does not contain. It is intelligible, in that its properties exist in their 
fullest sense in the mind of the thinker. The dianoetic image is more veridical than that of 
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eikasia because it is less removed from the Form. The information contained in the 
eikasiastic image is limited to the angle from which it was made. The dianoetic image, 
however, being intelligible, is heuristic: we can use information it contains to draw 
conclusions about the Form we study.  
The hypothesis performs a similar role to the image in that Plato uses it in the absence 
of a ti esti. For example, in the Meno, Plato is explicit about the fact that he is adopting the 
hypothetical method because Socrates and Meno have failed to agree on a definition of virtue 
(Meno 86de). Although the hypothesis and image perform similar roles, there are important 
differences between the two. The main difference is that the dianoetic image is only used 
when engaging in dianoia, whereas the hypothesis appears when engaging in both dianoia 
and noēsis. A second difference is that a hypothesis is not an image of a Form. Rather, it is a 
provisional statement about a Form.  
I also wanted in this thesis to suggest a solution to the problem of how Plato expects 
us to ascend the epistemological scale. I have shown that the hypothesis of dianoia has an 
important role to play here. Like Burnyeat, I think that mathematics has a vital role to play in 
the philosopher’s approach to knowledge. However, I have shown that Burnyeat does not go 
far enough in the role that he ascribes to mathematics: it is not just the subject matter of 
mathematics, but the mathematical method itself that is so important in Plato’s thought. I 
have also demonstrated that Benson’s view, that the dianoetic method is the misapplication of 
the mathematical method, is wrong. This is because, at Republic 527b and 533d, Plato 
equates mathematics with dianoia, and dianoia is an indispensable part of the 
epistemological ascent. 
Plato explicitly says that the mind progresses through the mental states (Republic 
532a), and the implication is that we proceed through each of the states and build on them. 
On my reading, dianoia is an indispensable part of the epistemological ascent.  The so-called 
 287 
hypothetical method of the Republic extends from dianoia into noēsis, and the hypotheses we 
find in dianoia are the foundations for noēsis.  When the mind ascends to noēsis from 
dianoia, it substantiates the hypothesis from which it has derived its conclusions by deriving 
this from a ‘higher’ hypothesis. I have also demonstrated that the method that appears in the 
Phaedo, the deuteros plous, is dianoia plus the early stages of noēsis. 
I consider that one important contribution this thesis makes to our understanding of 
Plato is my work on the influence of the mathematical method on Plato’s epistemological 
ascent. Scholars like Mueller and Robinson have tended to downplay the extent to which 
Plato imported the mathematical method into his philosophy. These scholars tend to assume 
that the mathematical method Plato had in mind was analysis and synthesis. Building on the 
work of Karasmanis, I have shown that it was not; rather Plato modelled his ideas on the 
method of apagōgē, or reduction.  The main difference between the two methods, we said, is 
that, in the latter, the ‘way up’ and the ‘way down’ are separated, whereas in the former, 
every step up is followed by a step downwards. The other difference is that, in apagōgē, the 
problem is reduced to a hypothesis, whereas in analysis, the thing sought is the hypothesis 
and starting point. Because apagōgē is a forerunner to analysis, the two methods do present 
some similarities. Apagōgē is a method that starts from an enunciation of the problem (eg, 
that of doubling the cube), then ‘reducing’ it to another that is easier to solve (eg, that of 
finding of two mean proportionals). This constitutes the principle for the solution of the 
original problem. This process can be repeated until we arrive at a conclusion that can be 
proved.  My work builds upon that of Karasmanis, because I have been able to show that 
Plato wants us to use this method in the dianoia/noēsis segments of the divided line (not just 
in the hypothetical passages of the Meno and Phaedo).  
I have shown that the tools of noēsis are ti estis, or Platonic definitions, of Forms, 
noting the early ‘Socratic’ dialogues’ emphasis on the need for a definition in order to pursue 
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inquiry, and the middle dialogues’ claim that knowledge needs Forms. I said that the 
hypothesis and image allow us to study the Forms indirectly in dianoia, by acting as proxies 
for the ti estis that we do not have. The ti estis will either give us knowledge of the Forms by 
allowing us to be acquainted with the Forms, or by deducing true propositions about the 
Forms from the definition.  In this case, dianoia and noēsis are distinct because of the 
different tools they use; noēsis is ‘clearer’ than dianoia because its tools enable us to study 
the Forms in a more direct way. 
The most important contribution I consider this thesis to make is that my reading also 
gives us a way of ascending the scale of mental states. The tools of dianoia and noēsis, 
hypotheses, images and ti estis, are an important part of this ascent. A ti esti needs more than 
just the proposition about a Form provided by its proxy, the hypothesis. But indisputably, 
hypotheses are ‘starting points and steps’ to the unhypothesized first principle, so I proposed 
that the method of reduction provides us with the extra properties that a ti esti needs.  It needs 
at least some degree of certainty, plus enough information to enable us to work out other 
things about the Form: it cannot be limited to the existential or propositional statement that 
we get from a hypothesis. The ti esti is able to appear in noēsis because at least some degree 
of certainty is provided by the reduction of the initial problem to a hypothesis, and the 
subsequent (usually deductive) downward step. Each reduction provides us with additional 
information about the Form that we are studying, guided by the ti estis themselves. 
It is only after we arrive at the form of the Good that we begin the descent. One 
potential problem with the ‘mathematical theory’ of the dialectic ascent (that is, the theory 
that Plato modelled his method on a mathematical method) is that it is apparently inconsistent 
with the divided line passage, because the Good comes at the beginning, not at the end, of the 
downward path.  On my reading, which does not try to make analysis and synthesis the 
format of the whole process, this is not a problem. The ascent moves from hypotheses to ti 
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estis to teleology and the Form of the Good. This enables us to give the kind of teleological 
accounts that Socrates wants in the Phaedo on the way down. This explains how Socrates’ 
deuteros plous can be ‘second best’ without decreasing the likelihood of arriving at one’s 
desired destination. It has the added bonus of avoiding Annas’ problem that there is nothing 
left for the way down after the triumph of the ascent: on my reading, the way down builds on 
the way up to give a completely different kind of explanation, this time with reference to the 
Form of the Good. 
Of course, as I have taken the deuteros plous/dianoia to noēsis transition to be 
apagōgē, the initial stages of the ‘way up’ actually begin with successive steps up and down, 
but the overall movement on this view would be upwards, and my reading fits in nicely with 
Plato’s description of the dianoia to noēsis transition as ‘steps and sallies’ at Republic 511b. 
In the absence of the ti estis of noēsis, dianoia gives us a proxy via the hypothesis or image. 
It is in virtue of this that we make our ascent. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have tried to provide an account of the contribution of 
mathematics to Plato’s epistemology, based especially on the Meno, Phaedo and Republic. In 
the course of this I have explained my wider conception of Plato’s epistemology, although 
due to the limitations of the scope of the project, there remains a great deal more to say. For 
example, I have indicated that I think the ti esti can lead us to the teleological account we 
need for the ‘way down,’ and I have indicated how and expansion of this topic might be 
approached. For example, Miller’s ([2007] pp. 310-342) work on the idea of perfection in 
mathematics is a rich field, and is compatible with the reading I presented here. I think that 
my reading is compatible with a number of different readings, and there is much more I 
would have to say elsewhere on the topic.  
The mathematical approach is indispensable for Plato on the ascent to teleology, and 
essential to his epistemology as a whole. I have supported Vlastos’ work on the importance 
 290 
of mathematics in Plato’s philosophy, but I wanted to go beyond that by proposing a solution 
for exactly how Plato means us to use the mathematical method in epistemology. I have 
shown that the application of mathematical methods to philosophy is a part of Plato’s 
epistemological ascent, and that we can see this approach in the dialogues. This, I have said, 
can explain the connection that Plato makes between hypothesis and imagery in the Republic. 
At certain points in inquiry, we lack the tools necessary for the highest form of reasoning. At 
this point, we use the hypothesis and image proxies. It is in this way that, for Plato, 
mathematics provides the stepping stone to the highest form of philosophical reasoning. 
 
Appendix: Possible Future Research 
I have focused heavily on the text of the dialogues in this dissertation, but a future avenue of 
research could develop Plato's theory of diagrams in the context of the history of 
mathematics. 
i. Plato's theory of diagrams 
As I have argued, dianoetic images do not exist in nature: they are made by the thinker. Plato 
says in the Republic that, in dianoia, the mind takes the sensibles as images of the Forms: 
without the mind doing this, they are not dianoetic images. The musical instrument and the 
cloak of the Phaedo are not dianoetic images until Simmias and Cebes use them as such. The 
diagram of the mathematician is a dianoetic image because it is taken to be so. We know that 
Plato thinks that the eikasiastic image is deceptive because it does not contain all the 
information of the original295; the dianoetic image is different, we said, because it is more 
closely underpinned by the thinker’s relationship with the Forms. In the case of the dianoetic 
image, the properties of the image in are most fully instantiated in the mind of the thinker.  
Think about Cebes’s remark in the Phaedo, that a diagram can aid recollection: 
                                                
295 See my comments on Republic 598ab and Cratylus 432b, in the Republic section. 
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One very good argument, said Cebes, is that when people are asked questions, if the question 
is put in the right way they can answer everything correctly, which they could not possible do 
unless they were in possession of knowledge and a correct explanation. Then again, if you 
confront people with a diagram, or anything like that, the way in which they react provides 
the clearest proof that the theory is correct (Phaedo 73ab). 
 
 Plato is not specific about what he means by ‘the way in which they react,’ but it is 
clear that the diagram should in some way jog our memories of the Forms, because Cebes’ 
comments are made in support of the Recollection argument. Gallop296 notes that the word 
translated as ‘diagrams’ could mean ‘proofs,’ citing Cratylus 436d2, the passage that we have 
already discussed, as evidence. Gallop thinks that ‘diagrams’ is a good fit, and that, in this 
case, ‘anything else of that sort’ would refer to solid models. However, he thinks that either 
word is consistent with the text. 
This passage has been taken to mean that the diagram appeals to our intuition, which 
at first seems logical given that we are remembering something we once knew, so seeing 
something that resembles it should appeal to our intuition of it. This idea is supported by the 
way we think about diagrams in modern mathematics: because we are used to thinking about 
diagrams as helping us in certain ways, it seems natural to assume that Plato meant the same 
thing. Sometimes diagrams can help us to ‘see’ truths that we have difficulty in grasping. For 
example, we want to show that the sum of two squares cannot be factored using real 
numbers: (a+b)(a+b) = a² +2ab + b². We can show this with a diagram: 
            b         
a 
 
                                                
296 ([1965] pp. 113-131). 
a²         ab 
 
 









To someone who knows little about mathematics, the diagram can show why it must 
be the case that (a+b)(a+b) = a² +2ab + b²; without it, it is a common mistake among those 
who are not used to thinking mathematically to wrongly assume that (a+b)(a+b) = a² + b². 
This is an example of a diagram usefully illustrating a mathematical truth. I am not denying 
that this is the case, and I do not think that Plato would either; I just mean that this is not what 
Plato has in mind when he talks about the mathematician’s reliance on images in the divided 
line passage. 
Taking this a step further, some philosophers of mathematics even think that a 
diagram can prove a theorem. Brown297 argues that, although it is generally thought that 
pictures prove nothing, in fact, they have a role in proofs that go beyond the heuristic. 
Pictures, according to Brown, are crucial: they provide the independently known 
consequences for testing the hypotheses of arithmetization.298 This is further than Plato would 
wish to go, but he would agree that we should take seriously their role in the mathematical 
method. Again, Brown’s example is not what Plato has in mind in the Republic. 
As we have seen, a common approach to images in mathematics is part of the view 
that diagrams allow us to ‘see’ truths by visualizing something that we have trouble grasping 
or proving using only words. However, I want to propose another solution, which I think is 
more in keeping with Plato’s conception of recollection, intuition, and the history of Greek 
mathematics. I am going to argue that the image provides an intelligible instantiation of a 
Form, and the reason it helps us in recollection is not its appeal to the visual, but the fact that 
it is a particular instance of a Form. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the role of intuition in the upward 
path is found in the heuristic grasp for a ‘higher’ hypothesis in apagōgē. I said that it is not 
                                                
297 (2008) pp. 26-50. 
298 For an example of how a picture can do this, see Brown’s ([2008] Chapter Three, especially pp. 26-31) 
discussion of Bolzano’s intermediate value theorem. 
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the visual appeal to intuition that makes the image convincing, as Robinson says, but rather, 
it is the intuition of the Form that allows the practitioner of dianoia to choose an appropriate 
image or hypothesis. Does this intuition of a Form allows the practitioner of dianoia to 
choose one instantiation of the Form for an image to be investigated? If we do not have a ti 
esti, a direct grasp on the Form itself, then the study of an intelligible instantiation provides 
the stepping stone; for the mathematician’s diagram it at least partly instantiated intelligibly, 
and Simmias’ and Cebes’ images wholly so. 
The use of the diagram in the slave-boy experiment is essential for a geometrical 
solution. Some have argued that Plato indicates that this solution is inferior, but that is not the 
only possible explanation. I have already argued in the Meno section for the heuristic role of 
the diagram, and in the Republic section, I said that the diagram is not just a sensible object, 
but reaches into the intelligible. One possible avenue of future research could explore 
whether the diagram’s intuitive worth lies not in its visual appeal, but in the fact that it 
provides a particular for study, when the Form itself is unattainable.  
 
ii. Plato and the history of mathematics 
The problem of the slave-boy experiment is connected to the problem of 
incommensurables: the reason that the slave needs to point to the diagram to give the correct 
answer is that there is no common measure between the diagonal and its side. Usually, that is 
seen as a failing of geometry, and is sometimes cited as a reason why Plato might have held 
the discipline in lower esteem. In fact, it could be argued that Plato does not see geometry as 
having less value, and its use of diagrams are appropriate for the place that geometry, and 
dianoia in general, hold on the epistemological scale. 
Rather than taking this as an isolated problem, we can regard the discovery of 
irrationals (arithmetic) and incommensurables (geometry) as a part of this ‘fear of infinity.’  
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Aristotle hints at the proof when he speaks of the proof for the irrationality of √2 and the 
incommensurability299 of the side of a square with its diagonal: 
 
…the diagonal is incommensurable because if it is put as commensurable, then 
odd numbers become equal to even ones. It deduces that odd numbers become 
equal to even ones, then, but it proves the diagonal to be incommensurable from 
an assumption since a falsehood results by means of its contradiction (Prior 
Analytics 41a26-32). 
 
 The discovery of irrationals and incommensurability go hand in hand, if we know 
Pythagoras’ theorem:300 
 
 We may prove the incommensurability of √2 with unity by the method that Aristotle 
speaks of in the above passage of Prior Analytics: proving the original when something 
impossible results from its contradiction. This is supported by the first Scholium on Book X 
of the Elements, which credits the Pythagoreans with the discovery of the irrational.301 The 
Appendix to Book X sets a method for proving incommensurability of √2 with unity, but 
does not link this method with the Pythagoreans. It seeks to prove that AB, the diagonal of a 
                                                
299 ‘Those magnitudes are said to be commensurable which are measured by the same measure, and those 
incommensurable which cannot have any common measure.’ Euclid, Elements Book X Definition 1. 
300 We cannot explore the discovery of the Pythagoras’ theorem here. It is likely that it was Euclid who refined 
the theorem, building upon earlier Pythagorean work. See Euclid, Elements I.47; Cf Proclus’ Summary in 
Thomas (1939) p 185. See also Heath’s translation of the Elements pp 352-356 for discussion. To make our 
point, we need not argue that the Pythagoreans give the proof as it appears in Euclid, only that they know of the 
rule. 
301 Euclid, Elements X, Scholium I in Thomas (1939) p 215. 
Use Pythagoras’ theorem (on any right angled 
triangle, the square of the hypotenuse is equal to 
the sum of the squares of the other two sides) to 
find α²+β²=γ². If α and β each measure one unit, 
γ²=2. So γ=√2. If √2 is irrational, the diagonal is 




square, is incommensurable with its side, AC. Therefore, we should investigate the result of 
the opposing hypothesis, that AB is commensurable with AC. In this case, we should be able 
to express their ratio in its lowest terms γ:α. So γ>α and therefore >1. AB²:AC²=γ²:α². 
According to Euclid I.47, AB²=2AC², so γ²=2α². Therefore, γ² is even, so γ is even. Since γ:α 
is in its lowest terms, α must be odd. For some number, β, γ=2β. Therefore, 4β²=2α² or 
α²=2β². So α² and therefore α is even. But α was also odd, which is impossible.302 We may 
identify this as the probable method of the Pythagoreans given the evidence of the Prior 
Analytics.303 
The irony is that it is the Pythagorean interest in ‘principles from the beginning’ leads 
to the discovery of incommensurables. This crisis undermines the basic Pythagorean 
doctrine, ‘all is number’ because they wish to say that all things in the world can be 
expressed as integers, or as a ratio of integers, which is impossible with incommensurables. 
The one who made this known is said to have drowned at sea in a shipwreck, surrounding 
which there is great controversy.304  
The problem of incommensurables can be linked to the idea if infinite divisibility. 
This causes serious asymmetry in the Quadrivium, because what can be said of multitudes 
cannot be said of magnitudes: 
 
…for though the unit is a common measure of all numbers they [the Pythagoreans] could not 
find a common measure of all magnitudes. The reason is that all numbers, of whatsoever kind 
leave some least part which will not suffer further division; but all magnitudes are divisible 
                                                
302 Heath’s translation of Euclid’s Elements Vol. 3 p 2. 
303 von Fritz ([1945] pp. 242-264) thinks that the discovery of incommensurables was probably made by 
Hippasus in the last quarter of the fifth century. Wasserstein ([1958] pp.165-179) thinks that Fritz has confused 
the story of Hippasus’ drowning at sea as a punishment for divulging the Pythagorean secret of how to inscribe 
a dodecahedron in a sphere (Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras XVIII) with the legend we mentioned about the 
divulger of incommensurables suffering the same fate. Fritz is not confused; he uses Hippasus’ interest in the 
sphere of twelve pentagons to devise an alternative way of discovering incommensurables. However, there is no 
textual evidence to support this, so our account of the discovery being made by the use of opposing claims, 
being based upon textual evidence, is the most likely. 
304 Euclid, Elements X, Scholium I in Thomas (1939) p 217. 
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ad infinitum and do not leave some part which will not admit of further division, but that the 
remainder can be divided ad infinitum; and in sum, magnitude partakes in division of the 
principle of the infinite, but in its entirety of the principle of the finite, while number in 
division partakes finite, but in its entirety of the infinite…305 
 
The severity of the discovery of incommensurables has been argued to have affected 
the prestige of geometry in the long term. Heath ([1960] Chapter 3 pp. 65-117) says that the 
Pythagoreans allocate the discovery to the realm of geometry, citing the fact that Euclid X 
speaks in terms of straight lines and areas, and that Proclus speaks of irrational straight lines. 
Certainly the discovery of incommensurables took some time to overcome, and were a 
difficulty even by Euclid’s time: the Elements postpones the theory of proportion, which 
avoids the problem of incommensurables, until Book V, and uses the gnomon to solve 
problems for which a modern geometer would use similitude.306 
However, Stillwell ([1989] pp. 37-47) has shown that this reaction was part of a 
general rejection of infinite processes, and has nothing to do with the perceived inferiority of 
geometry to arithmetic. Stillwell points to the paradoxes of Zeno as the beginning of this 
trend, which led to the avoidance of completed infinities and limits in Greek mathematical 
proofs. Eudoxus’ theory of proportions was designed to enable lengths and other geometric 
quantities to be treated precisely as numbers, while admitting only the use of rational 
numbers. So λ = λₐ if any rational length < λ is also < λₐ and vice versa. Likewise, λ <  λₐ if 
there is a rational length > λ but < λₐ. According to this theory, the infinite set of rational 
                                                
305 Euclid, Elements X, Scholium I in Thomas (1939) p 215-217. 
306 Elements V; Cf Coolidge (1963) Chapter II §3 pp. 34-38, who has a good discussion of the application of 
areas, which handled theorems proved by proportion in the meantime. See Elements II.5 for the first application 
of the gnomon; Pythagorean use of the gnomon, which we cannot discuss here, is testimony to the wish to 
express the world in terms of integers, which explains their delight that a monad added to a gnomon produces a 
square number. 
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lengths < λ is present in spirit, but Eudoxus avoids using it explicitly by speaking of an 
arbitrary rational length < λ.307 
This theory was successful in avoiding an arithmetic approach to irrational numbers, 
and Stillwell has a theory about why the geometrical approach was more intuitive. He writes: 
 
The theory of proportions was so successful that it delayed the development of a theory of 
real numbers for 2000 years. This was ironic, because the theory of proportions can be used to 
define irrational numbers just as well as lengths. It was understandable, though, because 
common irrational lengths, such as the diagonal of the unit square, arise from constructions 
that are intuitively clear and finite from a geometric point of view. Any arithmetic approach 
to √2, whether by sequences, decimals or continued fractions, is infinite and therefore less 
intuitive (Stillwell [1989] p 39). 
 
Stillwell goes on to say that this intuitive superiority of geometry seemed a good 
reason for considering geometry a better foundation for mathematics than arithmetic. 
Eudoxus’ method of exhaustion is a generalization of the theory of proportions: known 
figures are used to determine unknown quantities by approximation. For example, an 
approximation of the circle is determined by inner and outer polygons. Stillwell argues that 
this is another way of avoiding completed infinities: ‘Notice that ‘exhaustion’ does not mean 
using an infinite sequence of steps…rather, one shows that any disproportionality can be 
refuted in a finite number of steps (by going to a suitable Pͅ). This is typical of the way in 
which exhaustion arguments avoid mention of limits and infinity’ (Stillwell [1989] p 42). 
On Stillwell’s reading, geometry’s ability to avoid the infinite and provide particular, 
finite instances of a problem gives the subject its intuitive worth. By extension, we can say 
                                                
307 There is a consensus among historians of mathematics that Eudoxus’ theory was a reaction to the discovery 
of incommensurables. See van der Waerden (1983) pp. 88-91 and Heath (1960) pp. 325-329.  See Szabó (1978) 
for the view that it was not Eudoxus’ definition that made the construction of a mean proportional possible; in 
fact this must have been known at least as early as Hippocrates. 
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that the diagram in geometry, or image in general dianoetic thought, is a part of the same 
process. In the absence of a ti esti grasp on the Form, the image provides us with a particular. 
 Plato was certainly aware of the discovery of incommensurables and its implications. 
In the slave-boy experiment, the problem relies on drawing the diagonal of a square that has 
sides of two feet long. Socrates is asking for the length of a square that is double the area of 
the initial one. He says, ‘If you don’t want to count it up, just show us on the diagram’ (Meno 
83e-84a). As the side and the diagonal are incommensurable, the boy would have been 
unable to give the length of the diagonal in integers, so pointing it out would have been the 
only sensible option. The image, in this case, enables the boy to give a finite answer, 
something that would have been impossible without it.  
Some have argued that Plato’s language itself suggests a criticism of geometry for 
being subject to this problem.308 Another avenue of possible future research would be to the 
passage in the context of the history of mathematics and Plato’s scheme in the divided line 

















                                                
308 See, for example, Malcolm Brown (1971) pp. 198-242. Brown relies on the fact that when ἀλλά is used in a 
conditional sentence to introduce the apodosis, where a command is expressed and the protasis is negative, the 
substitute is inferior: ‘if you don’t want to count it up (arithmetic), just show us on the diagram (geometry)’ 
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